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Institutionalisation of Social Movements:

A Comparative Perspective on Organic Agriculture Organisations in Denmark and Japan

PhD Dissertation

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this PhD thesis is my own research work and has not been submitted to or assessed by any university or institution.

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Abstract (English)

The theme of this study is competing strategic orientations of the organic agriculture movement toward institutionalisation: a division in whether organic agriculture should develop within the prevailing system or preserve its alternativeness compared to conventional agriculture. With primary focus on the level of organisations, it investigates the following questions:

1) How have the concepts and actions of the organic agriculture organisations evolved?

2) Why have the organic agriculture organisations chosen the strategy that promotes or resists institutionalisation?

3) What are the possible implications of such choices of the organisations for the organic movement?

Basically, the study identifies two distinctive directions of organisational strategy, i.e. pro-institutional and anti-institutional. A pro-institutional strategy tends towards professionalization, centralisation and conventional tactics. Anti-institutional strategy instead prefers grassroots form and direct actions.

The research questions are pursued in a comparative case study of organic agriculture organisations in Denmark and Japan. They are selected for their clear difference in terms of institutionalisation of organic agriculture, developments in the agricultural sector and the leading organic agriculture organisations. The Danish state has been at the forefront in organic support, while official support was delayed and half-hearted in Japan. Denmark has been and still is a net food exporter, while Japan has suffered from serious aging of the farming community and extremely low food self-sufficiency. Under these circumstances the leading Danish organisation Landsforening Økologisk Jordbrug (hereafter LØJ) has taken a clear pro-institutionalisation strategy, whereas its counterpart, Japan's Association for Organic Agriculture (hereafter JOAA) has leaned towards an anti-institutionalisation strategy of opposing state intervention in organic issues. The cases of Denmark and Japan are selected also because they show evidence of movements which were different at the start but ultimately went in the same direction. Official support to organic agriculture started in Japan in the mid-2000s. Following this development, some part of the organic movement has shifted to a more pro-institutional strategy.

Two points constitute the research agenda. The first is injection of social movement perspective. This point emphasises the field of organic agriculture as a contested area, a space for not only collaboration, but also struggles among diverse actors. The second point is establishment of an integrative framework that envisages reconciliation of the long-lasting controversies in social research: 1) the conception of reality, 2) material vs. ideational, 3) nature vs. society/culture and 4) agency, structure, nature and culture.

This integrative framework applies a critical realist theory, Strategic-relational Approach (SRA) (see Chapter 2) that enables reconciliation of the above controversies through a view of interplay among the leading organisations and their external contexts. The core of this framework is that although the external material and discursive contexts in which the organisations are situated systematically favour or disfavour their actions, they have the ability to reflect upon and change them by their strategic actions and reflexive learning.

The operationalization of this framework uses the insights from the popular social movement theories. Concepts such as political opportunity structures (POS) and discursive opportunity structures (DOS) are pursued as the external contexts of the organisation, while resources and frames are integrated as components of the internal orientation of the organisation. The theoretical insight of the New Social Movements (NSM) is used to discuss the movement's orientation towards alternativeness rather than effects on policy. The study further utilises two newer theories in this theoretical family: one that links social movements with deliberative/discursive democracy (John S. Dryzek), and another that provides an analytical perspective of social

movements and other types of collective actions (Alberto Melucci). These two theories constitute the foundation for analysing the implications of the developments in question. (See Chapters 3 and 5).

This study overall finds that *the choice of pro- or anti-institutionalisation trajectory depends on POS and DOS, but the effects of these external contexts vary between the organisations*. More open government and fragmentation in the agricultural policy community have given LØJ a favourable POS and DOS. Responding to this environment the organisation has taken a pro-institutional strategy. In contrast, POS in Japan has been generally unfavourable to JOAA. This has driven the organisation to adopt an anti-institutional strategy. However, the JOAA did not shift its strategy when POS and DOS became more favourable to organic agriculture. Hence the study argues that the more influential factor for this organisation is the *internal orientation*. It has preferred an orientation that was fundamentalist and ideologically driven and has targeted the non-political arena. Organic agriculture was formulated as fundamentally different from conventional industrial agriculture, and thus it required a radical change in the prevailing food system. JOAA has framed organic agriculture predominantly by arousing moral obligation and aesthetic values. Despite the change in political and discursive climates, this orientation has remained unchanged, since on the one hand its common ideological foundation was difficult to align with the state and market interests. In comparison, alignment with those interests was not internally controversial for LØJ, which has from the start targeted nation-wide diffusion of organic agriculture.

On the other hand, JOAA's persistent anti-institutional strategy also owes to the strong leader and his followers who have been able to determine the organisational orientation. The study points out that the organisation lacks internal democracy, as the informal and tacit power of the leaders tends to be strong. The development of LØJ as the representative of the organic agriculture movement is also put into question, since it has only managed to organise one-third of organic farmers in the country and, more problematically, the majority of the consumer members were only subscribers of the organisation's magazine and barely organised for collective actions. The development towards a professional, centralised and lobbying organisation makes this organisation akin to the conventional organisation working within the game of formal politics. This was strongly influenced by the internal power shift from pioneer organic farmers/activists to converted organic farmers, which followed the general development in the organic agricultural sector.

This study argues that LØJ's strategic choice has led the organic agriculture movement to follow the general trajectory of the environmental movement in Denmark, as represented by professionalization, centralisation and technical/scientific argumentations. This trajectory has been effective for gaining support from the state and collaborating with conventional actors in civil society. As the Danish movement has invested in its political capability, it survived the political climate change under the Liberal-Conservative government in the 2000s. All those contributed to a remarkable quantitative growth and relative stability in the organic sector in this country. However through this development, the organic movement has circumvented discussions on difficult and conflictual issues, such as continuing pressure for effectivisation, structural problems in agriculture, capitalist market economy and common consumer politics. As a result, it becomes uncritical, non-participatory and homogeneous.

Japan's organic movement led by JOAA has apparently not contributed to quantitative growth, but it has had an impact on the discursive construction of policy. The movement's concepts such as "produce locally, eat locally (*chisanchisyou*)," "indivisibility of soil and health (*shindofuji*)," "face-to-face relationship" and "food education (*syokuiku*)" have been increasingly integrated in policy documents. Furthermore, all these concepts claiming the significance of physical proximity have been more frequently connected by different actors with the critical discourse of anti-economic globalisation. This indicates a critical potential of the movement in the discursive field. However, as the movement relied on informal leadership by JOAA and nationwide networks of grassroots groups and organisations until recently, its ability for collective action and interaction with formal actors is still immature. This means great uncertainty about whether or not the emerg-

ing collaboration between traditional organic actors and newer organic actors can develop the movement's political efficacy without losing its criticality.

Dansk resumé

Denne afhandlings fokus er på forskellige økologiske landbrugsbevægelsers udvikling imod institutionalisering, hvilket vil sige om økologisk landbrug bør udvikles i det eksisterende system eller om det skal bevares som et alternativ til konventionelt landbrug. Primært med fokus på organisation, undersøges følgende spørgsmål:

1. Hvorledes har koncepter og handlinger hos de økologiske landbrugsorganisationer udviklet sig?
2. Hvorfor har økologiske landbrugsorganisationer valgt en strategi, der fremmer eller går imod institutionalisering?
3. Hvad er de mulige konsekvenser af disse strategiske valg for organisationerne i den økologiske bevægelse?

I essens identificerer undersøgelsen to markante retninger indenfor organisatorisk strategi:Den pro-institutionelle og anti-institutionelle. En pro-institutionel strategi sigter mod professionalisering, centralisering og konventionel værdikædeoptimering. Den Anti-institutionelle strategi sigter derimod græsrøddernes form og disses direkte aktioner.

Ovenstående spørgsmål forfølges i et komparativt casestudie af økologiske landbrugsorganisationer i Danmark og Japan. Disse er valgt pga deres klare forskelle i grad af institutionalisering af økologisk landbrug og generel udvikling i landbrugssektoren samt de førende økologiske landbrugsorganisationer. Den danske stat har været på forkant med hensyn til økologisk støtte, mens den officielle støtte har været forsinket og halvhjertet i Japan. Danmark har været og stadig er en netto fødevareeksportør, mens Japan har lidt af en væsentlig forældelse af landbruget samt en ekstrem ringe grad af selvforsyning af fødevarer. Under disse omstændigheder har den førende danske organisation Landsforeningen Økologisk Jordbrug (herefter LØJ) indtaget en klar pro-institutionalisering strategi, mens dens japanske modstykke, Japan Organic Agriculture Assosiation (herefter JOAA) i højere grad har lænet sig op ad en anti-institutionaliseringsstrategi og modsat sig statsintervention i økologiske spørgsmål. Et komparativt casestudie af Danmark og Japan er ligeledes valgt dersom bevægelserne i de respektive lande var anderledes i starten, men siden hen har bevæget sig i samme retning. Offentlig støtte til økologisk landbrug startede i Japan i midten af 2000'erne. Efter denne udvikling er en del af den økologiske bevægelse flyttet til en mere pro-institutionel strategi.

To centrale punkter udgør forskningens dagsorden. Den første er injektionen af et socialt bevægelsesperspektiv. Dette punkt understreger økologisk landbrug som et anfægtet område, hvor der ikke kun samarbejdes, men også et område hvor diverse aktører kæmper mod hinandens interesser. Det andet punkt er oprettelsen af en integrativ ramme, der forudser forsoning af de langvarige kontroverser i social forskning: 1) opfattelse af virkeligheden, 2) materiale vs den idemæssige, 3) natur vs samfund / kultur og 4) agentur, struktur , natur og kultur.

Denne integregrative ramme, anvender en kritisk realist teori og strategisk-relationel tilgang (SRA) (se kapitel 2), der muliggør afstemning af de ovenstående kontroverser gennem en påvisning af et samspil blandt de førende organisationer og deres eksterne sammenhænge. Kernen i denne ramme er, at selvom de ydre materielle og diskursive sammenhænge, hvor organisationerne er beliggende i, systematisk favoriserer eller defavoriserer deres handlinger, har de evnen til at reflektere over og ændre sig ved hjælp af strategiske handlinger og reflektiv læring.

Operationaliseringen af denne ramme tager udgangspunkt i populære teorier vedrørende sociale bevægelser. Koncepter som politiske mulighedsstrukturer (POS) og diskursive mulighedsstrukturer (DOS) forfølges som som organisationens eksterne kontekst, mens ressourcer og ”frames” integreres som dele af den interne orientering af organisationen. Den teoretiske indsigt i de nye sociale

bevægelser (NSM) anvendes til at diskutere bevægelsens fokus mod, det at være alternativ, fremfor at have invirkning på politik. Undersøgelsen bruger yderligere to nyere teorier i dette teoretiske spekter: én, der forbinder sociale bevægelser med det deliberative / diskursive demokrati (John S. Dryzek), og en anden, der giver et analytisk perspektiv af sociale bevægelser og andre former for kollektive aktioner (Alberto Melucci). Disse to teorier udgør grundlaget for en analyse af konsekvenserne af udviklingen i spørgsmål 3. (Se kapitel 3 og 5).

Generelt fastslår denne undersøgelse, at *valget af pro-eller anti-institutionalisering retning afhænger af POS og DOS, men effekten af disse eksterne sammenhænge varierer mellem organisationerne.* En mere åben styring og fragmentering i landbrugspolitikkens samfund har givet LØJ en gunstig POS og DOS. Som en reaktion på dette miljø har organisationen taget en pro-institutionel strategi. I modsætning hertil, har POS i Japan generelt været ugunstig for JOAA. Dette har drevet organisation til at bruge en mere en anti-institutionel strategi. Imidlertid har JOAA ikke ændret sin strategi, selv når POS og DOS blev mere gunstige for økologisk landbrug. Derfor hævder undersøgelsen, at en mere indflydelsesrig faktor for denne organisation er den *interne orientering.* Man har foretrukket en orientering, der har været fundamentalistisk og ideologisk drevent og har målrettet sig mod den ikke-politiske arena. Økologisk landbrug blev formuleret som fundamentalt anderledes end det konventionelle industrielle landbrug, og dermed krævede det en radikal ændring i den eksisterende fødevaresystem. JOAA har overvejende indrammet økologisk landbrug ved at vække moralske forpligtelser og æstetiske værdier. Trods ændringen i politiske og diskursive klimaer, er denne orientering forblevet uændret, da det fælles ideologiske grundlag på har været vanskeligt at tilpasse til de statslige og markedsmæssige interesser. Til sammenligning har denne tilpasning til interesser ikke været internt kontroversiel for LØJ, der fra starten har målrettet landsdækkende udbredelse af økologisk landbrug.

På den anden side, skyldes JOAA's vedholdende anti-institutionelle strategi den stærke leder og hans tilhængere, som har været i stand til at bestemme den organisatoriske orientering. Undersøgelsen påpeger, at organisationen mangler internt demokrati, dersom den uformelle og stiltiende magt som ledernerne besider har været dominerende. Udviklingen af LØJ som repræsentant for den økologiske landbrugsbevægelse sættes der også spørgsmålstegn ved da det kun er kun lykkedes at angagere en tredjedel af de økologiske landmænd i landet og mere problematisk er det, at størstedelen af forbrugermedlemmerne kun har været abonnenter på organisationens publikationer og i mindre grad organiseret i forhold til kollektive handlinger. Udviklingen imod en professionel, centraliseret og lobbyvirksomhed kategoriserer denne organisation som værende beslægtet med en konventionel organisation, der arbejder i området af formel politik. Dette blev stærkt påvirket af det interne magtskifte - fra pioneerende økologiske landmænd / aktivister til konverterede økologiske landmænd, der fulgte den generelle udvikling i den økologiske landbrugssektor.

Denne undersøgelse hævder, at LØJ's strategiske valg har bevirket at den økologiske landbrugsbevægelse følger den almindelige eller traditionelle vej for miljøbevægelser i Danmark, som er repræsenteret ved professionalisering, centralisering og teknisk / videnskabelige argumentationer. Denne vej har været effektiv til at opnå støtte fra staten og til at skabe samarbejde med traditionelle aktører i civilsamfundet. Da den danske bevægelse har investeret i sin politiske kapacitet, overlevede den de politiske klimaforandrings tiltag under VK-regeringen i 2000'erne. Alt Alt dette har bidraget til en bemærkelsesværdig kvantitativ vækst og en relativ stabilitet i den økologiske sektor. Gennem denne udvikling, har den økologiske bevægelse gennemgået drøftelser af vanskelige og konfliktfyldte emner, såsom et vedvarende pres for en effektivisering, strukturelle problemer i landbruget, kapitalistisk markedsøkonomi og fælles forbruger-politik. Som et resultat heraf bliver det ukritiske, ikke-deltagende og homogent.

Japans økologiske bevægelse med JOAA i spidsen, har tilsyneladende ikke bidraget til kvantitativ vækst, men har haft en indvirkning på den diskursive konstruktion af politik. Bevægelsens koncep-

ter såsom at "producere lokalt, spise lokalt *(chisanchisyou)"*, "udelelighed jord og sundhed *(shindofuji)"*, "face-to-face forhold" og "fødevarer uddannelse *(syokuiku)"* er blevet mere og mere integreret i politiske dokumenter . Desuden er alle disse begreber med til at understrege betydningen af fysisk nærhed som samtidigt er blevet hyppigere forbundet med forskellige aktører i den kritiske diskurs af anti-økonomisk globalisering. Dette indikerer et signifikant potentiale i bevægelsen i det diskursive felt. Men dersom bevægelsen har vilet på et uformelt lederskab i JOAA og et landsdækende netværk af græsrodsbevægelser indtil for nyligt, er dennes evne til at udøve kollektive aktioner med formelle aktører underudviklet. Dette betyder en stor usikkerhed om hvorvidt et samarbejde imellem traditionelle økologiske aktører og nyere økologiske aktører kan skabe en udvikling i bevægelsens politiske indflydelse uden at miste sit omdømme.

Abbreviations

BKU	Branch Koordinationsudvalget (Trade Coordination Committee)
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy (of EU)
CR	Critical realism
DARCOF	Danish Research Centre for Organic Farming
DDR	Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)
DF	Danish People's Party (Dansk folkeparti)
DKP	Communist Party of Denmark (Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti)
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party of Japan
DoC	Dynamic of Contention programme
DOS	Discursive opportunity structures
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan (*minshutou*)
EL	Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten)
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FBJ	Association for Bio-dynamic Agriculture (Foreningen for Biodynamisk Jordbrug)
FU	Common Board (Fælles udvalget) for organic agriculture
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IFOAM	International Federation for Organic Agriculture Movements
JAOAS	Japan's Association for Organic Agriculture Studies (*Nihonyuukinougyougakkai*)
JAS	Japanese Agricultural Standard
JOAA	Japan's Organic Agriculture Association (*Nihonyuukinougyoukenkyuukai*)
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (*jimintou*)
LØJ	National Association for Organic Agriculture (Landsforeningen Økologisk Jordbrug)
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan
MC	Member of Congress
NPO	Non Profit Organisation
NSM	New Social Movements
ØBM	Association for Organic and Bio-dynamic Milk Producers (Økologiske og Bio-dynamiske Mælkeproducenter i Danmark)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ØL	Organic Denmark (Økologisk Landsforening)
ØLC	Organic Land Centre (Økologisk landscenter)
POS	Political opportunity structures
PP	Political process (theory)
RM	Resource mobilisation (theory)
RV	Social Liberal Party of Denmark (Radikale Venstre)
SDP	Social Democratic Party of Japan (*shakaitou/shakaiminsyutou*)
SF	Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk folkeparti)
VS	Left Socialist Party of Denmark (Venstresocialisterne)
WHO	World Health Organisation of the United Nations

WTO	World Trade Organisation

Contents

1. Introduction

Background

Institutionalisation of organic agriculture

Along with the rise of the environmental movement around the 1970s the organic agriculture movement took shape as an oppositional force to the conventional agricultural system. Due to their critical stance, organic activists were typically driven toward the rejection of what was identified as "conventional", as represented by industrial agriculture, capitalist economy, technocratic development, principle of modernisation and so forth. This rejection went hand in hand with the formulation of what they recognised as "alternative". The common spirit was reflected in slogans such as "small is beautiful," "think globally act locally" and "democracy, equity, and respect for nature" (Campbell, 2001). Consequently organic agriculture has come to be widely known as "the most radical form of sustainable agriculture" (Pugliese, 2001, p.115) envisioning more than a mere farming method without chemicals and non-natural inputs. On that foundation activists gathered at the first conference of the International Federation for Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM)[1] in 1977 declared that their movement anticipated to "provide an articulate, informed and coherent alternative to contemporary agricultural dogma" (Woodward, 1998, p.32).

The environment around organic agriculture has changed considerably during the past couple of decades, along with its *institutionalisation*. Organic agriculture has become a routine subject for national and supra-national policy institutions. Many countries and supra-national institutions such as the EU and the UN[2] have established internationally compatible organic food standards and supported organic agriculture and food production officially. Some countries such as Germany and Denmark started subsidisation already in the late 1980s, and EU and many others followed in the early 1990s.[3] Following this trend global acreage under organic agriculture has increased rapidly in the recent years: During 2000 to 2004 it grew 60% with average annual growth rate of about 20%, while Turkey experienced 50% growth (Adl et al., 2011). At the same time, the trade of "organics", including non-food products such as organic cosmetics, is one of the fastest growing businesses, whose sales world-wide were estimated up to 38.6 billion US$ in 2006 and growing five billion US$ each year (Willer and Kilcher, 2009). According to the latest survey, organic market has grown over three-fold between 2000 and 2010 (Willer and Kilcher, 2013). Public policies in general are favourable about this growth, which was boosted by the entry of conventional agri-businesses into organic production and trade. In consequence, organic agriculture is currently located comfortably in the agenda of "multi-functional agriculture" encompassing various policy targets, such as environmental protection, food safety, rural development, development of new (value-added) production and animal welfare.

[1] IFOAM is an international umbrella organisation for the organic movement, which was established in 1972. At present, it has over 750 organisational members from 115 countries. Information from the IFOAM Home page: http://www.ifoam.org/ [Checked on 14 October, 2009].

[2] A new international organic standard was created in 1999 (2001 for animal production) by the Codex Alimentarius, which operates under the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) in the United Nation.

[3] Institutionalisation of organic agriculture has not been limited to the capitalist world. The Chinese government has been eager to promote organic production (or in their term "green food production") for both domestic and international markets, and for these aims established quasi-governmental organisations in some provinces. According to statistics from 2008, China has the second largest organically grown area after Australia (FiBL and IFOAM, 2009). Furthermore, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba has transformed a substantial extent of agriculture to organic to reduce its export dependency and increase self-reliance. In 2013, Bhutan declared that it would convert all agriculture to organic (the Guardian, 2013).

However, this institutionalisation has been the main source for the growing tension *within* the organic movement, and such tension can be identified between the two mutually conflicting strategic directions; that is to say, one pursuing the trajectory of institutionalisation and the other resisting such trajectory. Strategy of the former, then, appears to depart from the former grassroots and alternative orientation, and begins to pursue the growth of the organic sector in the conventional policy and market frameworks. As a result, many organisations for organic agriculture have, particularly since the late 1980s, transformed or "professionalised" themselves regarding their organisational structure, membership, action form and articulation of the movement to deal with formal institutions. This development often makes them more akin to professional interest organisations functioning as political lobbyists as well as to expert organisations specialised in advisory, inspection and certification service and research projects. Simultaneously, they are likely to have grown in size and economy typically through increase in external inputs such as state funding and expansion of their membership to wider population including commercial actors.[4]

However, a series of co-existing activities still clearly confront this institutionalising tendency of the movement. Those who are pushing this confrontation are explicitly critical of the globalising trend of food production and trade, and tend to be more loyal to the "original" spirit of the organic movement, and put their "alternative" identity up front. They typically prioritise the agenda for alternative food system, which emphasises (re-)establishment of face-to-face relationship between producers and consumers over quantitative growth. A prominent example is the action "Beyond organic standards", which evolved in the new millennium. Organic activists are claiming a "pro-human scale for a site-specific agriculture" which is "biologically and socially diverse with local market" and based on "*appropriate* long distance trade" (Internal material delivered at the General Assembly, 26 August 2002, Italic added). Along this line, various attempts, as represented by community supported agriculture (CSA), farm gate sales, farmers' market, box and delivery schemes, food miles, small-farmers' collective organic certification programme, farmer-consumer direct contract, consumer-owned farms, and so forth, are evolving.

Double strategy: A solution or co-optation?

Obviously such tension is not a specific problem of the organic agriculture movement. Rather, it represents the common dilemma of any social movement. Leaders of activists must constantly make strategic decisions between "ethics based on conviction" and a "logic of efficacy" (Touraine cited in Campbell, 2001, p.353), and such decisions are hardly made without conflict within their own circles. Both strategies have apparent pros and cons. Being purist to the core movement ideologies and alternative values by rejecting the conventional norms and practices might give better chances for retaining own oppositional identity and confrontational actions. However it risks political credibility and wider social cohesion, especially as such activist groups quite often result in retreat or isolation. This orientation is more likely to be insufficient for providing "realistic" solutions to the problem of society at large. On the other hand, involvement in institutional politics may enhance its efficacy in political influence while risking co-optation, assimilation, and thus, may eventually water down the movement's goals and weaken its energy for collective actions.

Under this dilemma, a popular trend among movement leaders and organisations is the formation of double or middle-range strategies that envisage both sustaining institutionalisation and resistant proponents of the movement (Dryzek, Downes et al., 2003). The following speech by former president of IFOAM, Gunner Rundgren, depicts such a double strategy.

[4] Since the late 1980s, IFOAM has gradually opened its membership to business actors, mainly due to its initial economic difficulties (Geier, 1998). At present it allows membership to individuals, organisations, and companies as long as they "follow with mission, goals and activities of the Principles of Organic Agriculture and actively pursue the mission & goals of IFOAM" (IFOAM homepage: http://www.ifoam.org/about_ifoam/membership/index.html. Checked on 8 October, 2009). This in practice means anyone can join as long as they pay the fee.

> "The redesigning of our food system is not something that primarily can take place by making special organic standards. A radical redesign of the food system across the border requires major political and economic changes and the responsibility for that can't be put on the shoulders of the organic farmers alone. I don't think we are helping anybody by telling the organic coffee farmer in Mexico that: Sorry your products can't be called organic because they have been transported too far and this is not sustainable. In the same way I don't think the farmer that sells to the big companies should be pictured as a traitor, or that an organic Mac Burger shall be prohibited because it is a symbol for junk food and a global food system. I do believe that individuals can make a choice not to buy such products and that they should have the information to be able to make such choices" (Gunnar Rundgren, Opening Speech at Organic World Congress, August 2002).

This line of argumentation can be much more easily associated with the current environmental policies and emerging initiative for the "greening" of industry and consumption than the purist claim for a more radical change in the overall food system. And it is most likely that the significant part of the organic movement community will continue to support such association by claiming that it is far from harming the movement's main objective of a sustainable development but widens its opportunities for realising that. In this argumentation, ethics and efficacy are understood as mutually compatible or even interdependent.

Yet a series of questions remain: How can "a radical redesign of the food system across the border" as asserted in the above citation be achieved when the dominant policy institutions and market continue with "business as usual"? Is the tendency of the movement toward institutional politics and market-driven development paving a way to the envisaged radical redesign, or, on the contrary, suppressing it by imposing an emerging version of capitalism – "eco-capitalism"? Is the double strategy effective for the movement or does it result in mere co-optation and watering down of the movement's goals?

Recent discussions in organic research community: Conventionalisation of organic agriculture?

The organic research community[5] is apparently divided on the direction of the organic movement. Some researchers call the current development "conventionalisation" of organic agriculture, as evidence appears to show the characteristics of a productivist pathway that conventional agriculture has experienced; i.e., increase in specialisation, mechanisation, standardisation, large scale farming and domination of agribusiness (Buck, Getz et al., 1997:Tovey, 1997:Coombes and Campbell, 1998:DeLind, 2000:Guthman, 2004). Organic agriculture is, as a consequence of penetration of capitalist wages and commodity relations into the organic community, transformed into "a slightly modified version of modern conventional agriculture" (Hall and Mogyorody, 2001, p.399). Thus it has ironically turned into what it initially opposed.

This conventionalisation process is understood to go hand in hand with de-radicalisation and co-optation of the organic movement, since the growing integration of organic agriculture into the political and administrative institutional framework means more intervention by bureaucratic-administrative agencies. This generally reduces the autonomy and leadership of the movement to develop its envisaged sustainable food system. Furthermore, some analysts (cf. Allen and Kovach, 2000:Allen and Guthman, 2006:Roff, 2007) explicitly state that the current change in organic activism toward professionalization and mainstreaming shows a worrying tendency of "neo-liberalisation", which may not only lead to the co-optation of the movement but also reinforce the *status quo* of the dominant political economy. The movement agents are currently geared towards a consumerist logic and discourses that typically emphasise "freedom of choice" and better information for consumers. People are expected to act individually as conscious consumers, rather than as politi-

[5] What I call the "organic research community" in this report refers to a forum constituted of a wide range of researchers across different disciplines (though most directly with some sort of social scientific perspective), who study organic agriculture/food, or more broadly, agri-food system and trends.

cally aware citizens uniting in group solidarity. Organic activism is losing its foundation for stimulating political participation and social interaction among people. At the same time, this view stresses that there is a growing tendency in the movement to adopt the dominant political economic principles of commoditisation, competitive advantage, and market-driven development: The movement actors' intentions to motivate giant food manufacturers to produce organically and supermarkets and retailers to sell organic food, as well as their campaigns for diffusing food labelling show this tendency.

For the advocates of this line of assertion, the "neo-liberalising" tendency of the organic movement towards individualism-consumerism is more likely to have negative effects in a long run, though it might be effective in short-term. This is particularly true in terms of the radical social and ecological change, which the movement continues to advocate. The main problem pointed out by those analysts is that the growth in the organic sector is actually not caused by the emergence of substantial change in the dominant agri-food system, but from the conventional interest in niche commodity. Although the industry may adjust some of their practice to the standardised organic line, this will only be a small part and it will continue with environmentally unsustainable and unethical practices in the rest of its enormous business activity. The strategic shift of the organic movement toward employing the dominant system's logic is found more problematic than fruitful, as its collective energy is drained to rationalise its role in a system, which, at best, establishes organic organisations' identity as "watch dog" for the procedure of standardisation and legislation of this specific production category. In the course of this shift, the movement stops challenging the system: The movement increasingly circumvents contentious issues, such as the North-South divide and economic globalisation (removal of domestic protection), where the problematique of, for instance, wasteful energy consumption for long distance trade and the industrial mode of production as well as serious erosion of local food systems can be linked. Considering these aspects, analysts who claim "conventionalisation" stress that the prevailing tendency is more likely to contribute to sustaining the unsustainable system rather than transform that system radically as originally envisioned.

On the other hand, the advocacy of conventionalisation, which has emerged and developed since the late 1990s, has been questioned by those who claim that reality is multi-dimensional and context-dependent (Campbell and Liepins, 2001:Hall and Mogyorody, 2001:Kjeldsen, 2004:Morris and Reed, 2007:Guptill, 2009). These sceptics typically assert that conventionalisation is only a limited aspect of the development, as they find what has actually been happening in the organic community is an increase in diversity and/or fragmentation, rather than homogenisation and a linear development as presented by the above-mentioned pessimistic view. These sceptics acknowledge the growing influence of capitalist forces and the political and administrative institutions on the national and worldwide organic community, but they disagree that conventionalisation is inevitable or a linear trajectory of the ongoing organic development. The penetration of conventionalisation forces depends largely upon the specific location, such as biophysical demands of organic production, structural advantages for operating small-scale artisan organic farming, the culture of the local farming community and the values attached to production and consumption of food. Understanding this multi-facet aspect of the conventionalising trend requires a deeper analysis of such site-specific contexts. The process of institutionalisation or conventionalisation, which appears overwhelming at first glance, does not necessarily undermine the organic movement. Rather, it asserts, the movement co-evolves with the process. Emerging or resurging phenomena of anti-standardisation, (re-)establishment of farmer-consumer relationship, non-/de-commoditisation of organics are recognised as a crucial part of the dynamics that keeps this movement alive. Consequently, this position overall tends to land on relatively safe ground; that is to say, the assertion of how the organic movement turns out to be, for instance whether it is absorbed by the conventional food system or successfully pushes an alternative social development, is an open empirical question.

Research questions

Considering this background, the organic movement has apparently encountered new phases of struggle along with the growing opportunity for organic diffusion in policy, market, production and consumption. The

question of whether the tendency of institutionalisation of the organic movement is a good deal for the movement or merely generates its "conventionalisation" and de-radicalisation catches major attention in the organic activist and research community. In order to discuss this question constructively and fruitfully, it is crucial to understand the core elements that *initially* constituted the organic movement and how they have evolved later. Also the question of why the split between the pro- and the anti-institutionalisation trajectories has emerged and developed should be further pursued.

Based on this objective, this study uses the competing directions of the organic movement as its research field, and the leading organic organisations are the major research unit. The main research questions are formulated as follows:

1) How have the concepts and actions of the organic agriculture organisations evolved?
2) Why have the organic agriculture organisations chosen the strategy that promotes or resists institutionalisation?
3) What are the possible implications of such choices of the organisations for the organic movement?

Research agenda

Currently the conventionalisation debate has activated discussion for a new research agenda, which this study aims to take part in. The agenda takes a critical stance on the *a priori* assumption of conventionalisation/institutionalisation as an inevitable and linear trajectory. It is also critical of the all too easy denial of this tendency often based on overestimation of the effects of "alternative" practices or, conversely, underestimation of the co-optive and assimilative force of the prevailing system. If "co-evolution" of conventionalisation and re-enforcement of alternativeness are truly happening in mutually fruitful way as the conventionalisation sceptics observe, then the strategy of the leading organisations is of great importance for the development of such a direction. The following two major points constitute the research agenda.

Injection of social movement perspective: This study holds the focus of organic agriculture as a social movement. Surprisingly, the social movement perspective is often taken for granted or, at worse, neglected in existing studies. Consequently the role of the organic movement tends to be perceived as no longer significant after the influence of authority and businesses grows. However this study argues that the inquiry of the status of organic activism as a social movement is crucial for understanding the direction and transformatory potential of organic agriculture in the past as well as in the future. By injecting the concept of social movement as an *analytical* category of collective action (see the next section and Chapter 3, 4), oppositional aspects of the organic activism to the prevailing system are brought into focus. This re-introduces the issue of power and domination infiltrated deeply into society and individual life. Hence the normative dimension of organic agriculture comes to constitute the crucial part of research, and the activism's critical potential is pursued, since that is the factor for transforming the predominant ideational, normative and physical practices (Dryzek, 2000:Dryzek, Downes et al., 2003).

Towards an integrative framework: This study envisages a conceptual and analytical framework that can reconcile the long-lasting controversies in the conception of reality, material vs. ideational, nature vs. society/culture and agency, structure, nature and culture. The integrative framework is chosen because the individual organic organisations' strategy is understood as a product of both internal decisions derived through negotiation of shared ideas, preferences, power, resources and so forth, *and* its external surrounding environment. Furthermore, it is required on the basis of understanding strategies, actions and outcomes of the organisations to emerge in the seam of discursive and non-discursive (material) interactions between them. This gears towards a more holistic orientation of research than the classic one which searches for matching evidence with theoretical models and variables. This naturally makes the inquiry more complex, and an integrative framework that can use diverse competing theoretical insights is thus needed.

Defining key concepts

Social movement

As discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, there are different approaches to social movement, and they are quite often based on the different definition of this social phenomenon. This study sees social movement as fundamentally conflictual collective actions (McAdam, Tarrow et al., 2001:Tilly, 2004:della Porta, 2006). Social movement is distinguished from collective practices of political parties, interest groups, voluntary associations, etc., but defined as a type of collective action that implicates itself in contention with "clearly defined opponents" (della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.20). That is to say, components of collective actions such as common problems, moral values, principles, norms and strategies are necessary but not sufficient to form a movement by themselves. In order to do that, social movement actors must identify the opponent that damages the interest of movement constituencies, and that opponent must be articulated as the target for their confrontation.

This study's analysis applies Alberto Melucci's (Melucci, 1996) methodological proposal to treat social movement as an analytical rather than an empirical category of collective action. This proposal helps define this concept outside how social movement is generally understood and self-claimed by activists. Based on a slight re-formulation of his definition, social movement in this study consists of three key dimensions: 1) *conflict with the targeted prevailing system*; 2) *breaching of the system's limits*; and 3) *participation* (see Chapter 3 and 5).

Institutionalisation

This study basically deals with three levels of institutionalisation: 1) institutionalisation on the macro-level signified by the integration of organic agriculture in the policy and administrative systems; 2) institutionalisation on the meso-level, that is, the targeted organisations; and 3) institutionalisation on the overarching level, which is the cognitive and normative integration of (some part of) ideas of the organic movement into the general public, collective actors outside the organic agriculture community and formal institutions. While the empirical development of the first level is pursued, the main focus is on the second and the third levels of institutionalisation.

Institutionalisation of organisation focuses on Hein Anton Van der Heijden's (1997) three typical steps of institutionalisation of social movement organisations: 1) organisational growth according to the membership increase and expansion in economic resource; 2) internal institutionalisation represented by professionalization and centralisation of the organisation; and 3) external institutionalisation indicating the selection of the organisational orientation towards either conventional action or unconventional action, though often of the former. This study's categorisation of pro-institutional and anti-institutional is based on this characterisation. That is to say, pro-institutional is the orientation of the organisation to proceed with these steps and favour state intervention in organic issues, while anti-institutional is the orientation to confront these steps and state intervention.

This relatively traditional view of institutionalisation is complemented by the focus on the third level of institutionalisation. Employing the theory of Claus Eder (1996), this tendency is captured with the cognitive and normative dimensions. This social constructivist approach enables an alternative perspective of institutionalisation of social movement as transformation of the movement discourse to a public discourse.

These aspects of institutionalisation are taken up in Chapter 4.

Research design

Framework

The integrative framework is constructed on the basis of critical realist conceptualisation, which allows reconciliation of the materialist and the idealist orientations. Based on this conceptual foundation this study employs a proposal of Bob Jessop and Colin Hay's strategic-relational approach (SRA) (Jessop, 2001:Hay, 2002:Jessop, 2008). SRA constitutes the conceptual framework which more comprehensively reconciles the above-mentioned controversies through the view of interplay among the external contexts and this study's central focus, the organic agriculture organisations. The crucial point of this interplay is that although the external material and discursive contexts in which the organisations are situated systematically favour or disfavour their actions, they have ability to reflect upon and change them by their strategic actions and reflexive learning (see Chapter 2).

The operationalization of this framework is further done through the adjustment of some popular insights of the leading social movement theories. The theories belonging to the so-called American paradigm are chosen for their specialization in the specific disciplinary focuses; i.e. the rationalists' resource mobilisation theory's specialisation in social movement organisations' reason, the structuralists' political process theory in political opportunity structures (POS), and the framing theory of the culturalist in activists' strategic adjustment of the movements' ideas. The leading European theory of the new social movement is used as it provides useful hypotheses that the contemporary movements are driven by non-(or post-) materialistic values and the symbolic-cultural struggle rather than the traditional material struggle. Furthermore, the study applies new social movement thinking for its insights on the normative role of the social movement today in turning prevailing ideas, norms and practices. This normative focus has recently co-evolved with the theory of deliberative/discursive democracy. The analysis of the consequence of the organisational strategies highlights this normative role of social movement for democracy, in particular for the strengthening of the critical civil society. This aspect will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Choice of cases

The research questions of this study are pursued through a historical study of two cases, namely Denmark and Japan. The research is interpretative rather than positivist, and the two countries are analysed first individually and later comparatively.

The two cases are chosen, firstly, due to their sheer difference in terms of institutionalisation of organic agriculture and the leading organic agriculture organisations. Denmark is often told as a success story for organic development (Daugbjerg, 2011). With clear state support already from the late 1980s, organic agriculture has grown rapidly up to the level where organic milk production reached overproduction in the late 1990s. Following this trend, the leading organic agriculture organisation Landsforening Økologisk Jordbrug (hereafter LØJ) has taken a clear pro-institutionalisation strategy that adjusts itself to the widening political opportunity. This is reflected in its professionalization with paid staff, focus on political lobbying, sale of various services and gradual centralisation. According to Moschitz and Stolze, the Danish organic agriculture organisations are among of those with the highest political potentials in Europe, due to its central position in the relatively monopolistic (less loosely-connected) organic agriculture policy network (Moschitz and Stolze, 2011).[6] In contrast, institutionalisation of organic agriculture in Japan has been slow and shallow. The result is unsuccessful development of organic agriculture, which reached only 9,495 ha, i.e. 0.21% of the all cultivated area according to the statistics of 2012 (Izumi, 2013). Around the same time, Denmark had 182,930 ha of organically grown area, i.e. nearly 7% of all agricultural land (NaturErhvervstyrelsen, 2012). Under this narrow

[6] Their study focuses on ten old and new EU countries, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Austria, England, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Poland, and Switzerland.

opportunity, the leading organic organisation, Japan's Association for Organic Agriculture (hereafter JOAA), has leaned towards a strategy of confronting state intervention in organic issues.

Furthermore, the development trajectories of the agricultural sector in the two countries have historically been quite different. Agriculture had been developed as the primary national industry in Denmark since the late 18th century, and the country's flat landscape was maximally exploited for cultivation. Although its significance for the national economy has declined, agricultural exports continue to be important (Danmarks Statistik, 2013). 62.8% of the territory is currently used for agriculture.[7] In comparison, under the Liberal Democratic Party's single party dominance since 1955, agriculture in Japan has rapidly been reduced to the secondary industry. The policy has clearly traded off this sector to secure industrial exports, and motivated migration of farming population to urban areas as labour for the growing industry. Although the decline in the farming/rural population is also evident in Denmark, the agricultural situation in Japan is much more acutely suffering from the serious aging problem and low self-sufficiency. Only 12.5% of the land area is for agriculture in 2011,[8] though it must be noted that the mountainous landscape which covers 73% of the country naturally limits the potential of agriculture.[9] The cases of Denmark and Japan enable an analysis of how different external environments can affect the organisational strategy. And more narrowly, one can establish a working hypothesis of correlation between the open opportunity and the pro-institutionalisation organisational strategy (i.e. the Danish case) and the narrow opportunity and the anti-institutionalisation strategy (i.e. the Japanese case).

Secondly, these cases present the tendency of when opportunity widens, the organisations shift their strategies from grassroots orientation to professionalization, which is often detected as a course of institutionalisation of social movement organisations (see Chapter 5), and the pro-institutionalisation strategy gains strength in the movement. LØJ is a good example of this tendency, as it has clearly transformed itself to a professional interest organisation for organic growers, businesses and consumers. In the case of the Japanese organic movement the development toward pro-institutionalisation took place through the fragmentation of JOAA. This case is interesting since JOAA did not change its anti-institutionalisation strategy, but nonetheless proceeded to professionalization. Furthermore, while this leading organisation did not change the critical stance to the integration of organic agriculture in policy and the conventional market, other collective agents with pro-institutionalisation orientation have consolidated in the rise of opportunity in the mid-2000s. The two cases represent movements which were different at the start but ultimately went in the same direction.

Lastly, the cases are selected since both have caught attention in the community of the organic agriculture movement and academia for different reasons. As much as Denmark has been highlighted as a success story of policy and civil society collaboration (Lynggaard, 2001:Michelsen, 2001b:Daugbjerg and Halpin, 2010:Moschitz and Stolze, 2011), it is currently known for its stagnancy in organic conversion (Kaltoft and Risgaard, 2006:Noe, 2008:Ørum, Jensen et al., 2011). The Japanese movement is often presented as a role model for the "unconventional" direction of the organic movement for its effects on direct farmer-consumer cooperation, rural-urban linkage, new cultural values, gender and so forth (Moen, 1997:Honjoh, 2004:Parker, 2005:Masugata, 2011). The farmer-consumer co-partnership called *teikei* has been referred to as the origin of the currently rising community-supported agriculture (CSA) and the AMAP (Association pour le Maintien

[7] Homepage of Trading Economics. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/denmark/arable-land-hectares-wb-data.html [Last checked 23 March 2014].

[8] Homepage of Trading Economics. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/agricultural-land-percent-of-land-area-wb-data.html [Last checked 23 March 2014].

[9] Homepage of MAFF Kanto. http://www.maff.go.jp/kanto/nouson/sekkei/kagaku/kokudo/01.html [Last checked 23 March 2014].

d'une Agriculture Paysanne) movement in France. Hence the investigation of these two success cases can give new insights on the competing developmental paths of reformist/pragmatist and fundamentalist/purist.

This study puts primary focus on the period which has direct connection with LØJ and JOAA and the organic agriculture movement in these countries up till 2007. The case of Denmark begins with an overview of the bio-dynamic agriculture movement which previously led the initiatives of alternative agriculture and the discussions in the 1970s. The relevant events in the pre-organic movement phase in Japan include the movement for food and health in the 17th century and the attempt to form a religious sect in the pre- and post-war period.

The table 1 below is an overview of Denmark and Japan as a comparative case.

Table 1: Overview of this study's comparative case

	Denmark	**Japan**
Political institutions	Coalition government routinized Supportive of OA but decline in support by Liberal-Conservative government from 2001	LDP's one-party domination, weakened since the 1990s. Unsupportive of OA though official support start from mid-2000's.
Agricultural community	Fragmented	Centralised
Environmental features	Homogeneous 66% is agricultural land[10]	Regional geo-climatic diversity Limited arable land
Agricultural policy	Export-driven, subsidisation (shift from price support to direct support)	Import-dependency, protection of rice farmers
Tendency of social movement	Institutionalisation	Grassroots-conservatism
Organic agriculture organisations	LØJ/ØL (founded 1981) Pragmatic/Realist From grassroots to professional Pro-institutional	JOAA (founded 1971) Purist/Fundamentalist From elite-grassroots to professional Anti-institutional Emergence of competitor in the mid-2000s with pro-institutional orientation
Status of organic agriculture	Rapid growth up till 6.7% of all cultivated area, but halted from 2003	Only 0.21% of all cultivated area in 2012

Data collection

This comparative case study is primarily based on mixed sources of qualitative data. The following are the major ones (see the Appendix for more detailed information about the data);

- Written documentation of the organisations, such as members' newspapers/magazines, newsletters, internal hand outs, annual reports, minutes of meetings and reports.
- Direct observation of meetings and practices of the organisations, including general assembly, consumer-farmer events, seminars, etc.
- Formal semi-structured and informal open-ended interviews[11] with the persons who fit in one or several of the following categories: 1) had/has a leading position of the organisation; 2) known as a pio-

[10] https://www.landbrugsinfo.dk/oekologi/sider/engoeko.aspx [Last checked 30 March 2014]

[11] I refer to "formal semi-structured interview" as a type of interview which is conducted under the consent of interviewee and primarily within the prepared questions. On the one hand, it follows the principle of structured interview which expects "the interviewer to play a neutral role, never interjecting his or her opinion of a respondent's answer." Fontana, A. and J. Frey, H (2003). The Interview: From Structured Questions to Negotiated Text. Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials- Second Edition. N. Denzin, K. and Y. Lincoln, S. Thousand Oaks, London, New

neer figure of organic agriculture; and 3) researchers and the like who have involved in the development of organic agriculture in the country. The formal interviews were recorded.

- Written documentation of external actors, such as ministry and other authorities' reports, other civil society organisations' publications, official statistics and newspaper articles.

- Existing scientific studies.

In data collection, the study focused on the triangulated view; that is to say, it analysed the case of organic agriculture organisations by utilising different data sources, which are from both internal and external to the focused organisations and based on written documents, direct observation and interviews. At formal interviews and direct observations of meetings etc., I took distance from participants and interviewees, so as to mitigate my influence on them. Yet it must be noted that valuable information were gained also through interaction with them under informal circumstances, including chats and conversations without interview settings. Furthermore, the conceptual framework of this study which envisages an integration of different theoretical perspectives naturally triangulates analytical scopes of the focused events. Most significantly, the principle of critical realism that suggests different ontological levels, i.e. the domain of experience (empirical) and the domains of actual and real, necessitates us to constantly consider causal relationship between an event and material and discursive contexts which is not always directly observable. This conceptual orientation does not reject the general phenomenological focus on human consciousness and idea, but extends the view beyond that. Such extension enables a critical interdisciplinary exploration of what is told to have happened, what has actually happened and what caused that (see Chapter 2).

More narrowly, my intention was to collect both positive and critical descriptions of the development. My subjective orientation certainly affects the selection and coordination of those. Yet this constant triangulation is expected to at least mitigate, if not resolve, the subjectivity, and bring this study closer to an objective perspective of the development in question (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003:deVaus, 2004:Silverman, 2005).

Structure of chapters

The first part of this report concerns the theoretical discussions constituting the framework of this study. *Chapter 2* discusses the conceptual foundation for the envisaged integrative approach. It intends to explain why research of the nature-society relationship, which this study deals with, should go down to the bottom of ontology and the domains of structure, nature, culture and agency should be reconciled without "shrinking" their autonomy. The basic conceptual foundation of critical realism and preliminary framework based on SRA are introduced here. *Chapter 3* concentrates on the selected social movement theories which are integrated in this study's framework. It discusses their strengths and weaknesses, and based on this discussion, more recent attempts to overcome the weakness by extending theoretical collaboration are introduced. This chapter also focuses upon the normative role of social movement for social change proposed by the theoretical family of the new social movement. The insights of this theory and applicability for the analysis of the effects of the organisational strategies upon the organic agriculture movement (research question 3) are explained. *Chapter 4* shifts focus to institutionalisation, the central theme of the study. As diverse conceptualisations of this theme exist, an explicit positioning of this study is needed. This chapter clarifies the usage of traditional and newer and more alternative ways of understanding institutionalisation. *Chapter 5* explains

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Delhi, Sage**:** 61-106. Thus when I conducted this type of interview, I concentrated on asking question and gaining concrete answers, while gave little place for interviewee to ask questions. On the other hand, I call it "semi"-structured, since I also intend to capture an interesting turn that may occasionally lead to a more open-ended interview. "Informal open-ended interview" refers to unstructured interview which I do not necessarily play a neutral role. This type of interview includes one which takes place spontaneously without an explicit interview setting, as suggested by Jack Douglas as "creative interviewing" (Ibid., p.80).

how the theoretical insights introduced in the previous chapters are integrated into the inquiry: In other words, how the theories are operationalized for the purpose of the study. It elucidates the conceptualisation of the core analytical domains, such as structure, nature, culture and agency, and the themes such as discourses and frames. It also illustrates how the selected social movement theories are re-formulated to be used as analytical tools for evaluating the effects.

The second part of the report deals with the case study and analysis. *Chapter 6* is the case of Denmark, and *Chapter 7* is the case of Japan. The single case is analysed in the last part of each chapter. They are put into a comparative perspective in *Chapter 8* which presents the answers to the research questions.

Chapter 9 gives concluding remarks and briefly discusses implications for the future development of the organic agriculture movement as a social movement and the future studies.

2. Critical Realism as Conceptual Foundation

In this chapter the basic conceptual foundation of this study will be illustrated and explained. What I call basic conceptual foundation is the framework or backbone of the research orientation on which many other specific theoretical insights can be placed. In constructing this foundation, my major consideration is the integration of material and ideational focuses as well as agency, structure, culture and nature without compromising the significance of each domain. This challenge involves the reconciliation of the long-debated controversies in social theorisation: 1) reality, 2) the material vs. the ideational, 3) nature vs. society and 4) agency, structure and culture.

The first part of this chapter concentrates on clarifying why such reconciliation is necessary for this study, but also for a more integrative turn of social theory in general. It begins with the characteristic components of traditional schools to reveal the inherent differences – key controversies – among them. The next section focuses upon the individual controversies and the shortcomings of the prevailing theories. The succeeding sections illustrate how this study intends to solve these controversies. The first part introduces the basic outline of critical realism, from which this study builds its logical foundation, while the second part discusses the advantage of critical realist thinking but also the still unresolved issues for the envisaged integrative framework. The last part of this section concerns the specific critical realist theory, the strategic-relational approach of Bob Jessop and Colin Hay, which is employed to constitute the most crucial part of this study's conceptual foundation.

Delineating the disciplines

I here illustrate ideal-typical characteristics of the above-mentioned three major research schools, namely rationalist, structuralist, and culturalist, in line with the identification by Mark I. Lichbach (1997). Although his description does not sufficiently cover the existing variety of each school, it serves as a general overview of the most distinctive differences. His classification takes the studies of three authors as typical examples of each research school: characteristic of rationalists, Robert H. Bates (1989) *Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya*; of structuralists, Theda Skocpol (1979) *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*; and of culturalists, James C. Scott (1985) *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.*

Rationalists are methodological individualists, who emphasise individuals as the central component for action (e.g. making choices, preferences, believing, learning, etc.) and social phenomena. In this position, collectivities such as groups and organisations are subordinated to the individuals who comprise them, and they are given no status without reference to those individuals. Individuals are understood to act intentionally in accordance with their desires and beliefs that form reasons for actions. In other words, rationalists think actors' reasons, interests, and actions as an integrated whole. People do not take action without interest that can motivate them, and thus we can make a rational explanation out of their action. Rationalists construe collective processes as consequences of actors' intentional and rational actions, but they also acknowledge, despite the actors' rational intentions, irrational consequences, which are "unintended, unwanted, unavoidable, and unexpected" (p.246) in such collective processes. Rationalists typically search into the relationship between rational individuals and irrational outcomes. They most often construe these outcomes as consequences of disturbances in the existing equilibrium by exogenous shocks, which are most often identified with material conditions. The cause of social change (i.e. disturbance of equilibrium) is found in the material constraints of the "objective external world" that come to affect the "subjective internal world" of individuals (p. 250).

Rationalist inquiries apply a positivist philosophy of science and materialist thoughts of preference and cognition. Actors' preference and beliefs are grounded exclusively in the material world and individuals are expected to act like "hard-headed scientists" in accordance with instrumental rationality. Furthermore, ra-

tionalists see themselves as hard-headed scientists, who conduct *gedanken* envisaging the establishment of generalisable results, and envisage objective argumentations while refuting subjective ones. Their research programme prefers quantitative methodologies such as statistics and targets nomothetic cause-and-effect explanations derived from the pursuit of recurrent law-like processes.

Ideal-type structuralists are methodological holists, who propose the relationships between actors as the bases of their conceptualisation. For structuralists like Theda Skocpol "structures" are primarily material factors emerging and evolving through human behaviours. Thus networks, linkages, interdependencies, and interactions among individuals, groups, organisations, or institutions are important research fields for structuralists. Their fundamental assumption is that in order to understand the subject in focus, one has to relate it with others of which it is a part (p. 247). The level of individuals, unless they are defined in relation with others, is not their major concern. Furthermore, they eschew reductionist caption of individuals by asserting that the analysis of social phenomena should not be deduced from ideologies, goals, preferences, and capability of actors (leaders) and collectivities. Instead, analysts should take an objective and impersonal viewpoint, as opposed to a subjective and a voluntarist one. In summary, structuralists' major concern is actors' relationships in the institutional/structural contexts, due to their conviction that they determine social order and change. Structuralists' preferences often lead to the study of macro-level histories, such as state-building, industrialisation, and war.

Structuralists are also realists. They presume that the role of scientists is to provide the "knowledge of reality 'out there'" through the detection of the real world objects. Social scientists should in particular pursue significant causal mechanisms that social structures generate, though such mechanisms are often hidden or not directly observable. For realist-structuralists, structures have causal power over people's behaviours and thus on social phenomena. Based on this assumption, structuralists claim that structure, process, and outcome are mutually linked. These interrelationships are thought to have law-like processes; "actualities and potentialities" of structures condition outcomes, i.e. structures comprise of causal mechanism. These law-like processes involve the dynamics of "production and reproduction, stability and change, growth and development, and maintenance and transformation" (p.252). In their pursuit of objective reality, they reject the notion of socially-constructed reality found via interpretations of social phenomena.

Finally, culturalists are also methodological holists who believe in intersubjectivity and transindividuality of norms. In other words, members of collectivities or communities are considered to have common or mutual worldviews. Culture represents, on the one hand, common worldviews in a community, i.e. "common knowledge/cognition" of how the world is. On the other hand, culture is also the foundation of common perception about how the world should be, which constitutes "common conscience" of the community (p. 246). It is perceived as the basis of social order, as common cognition and conscience are thought to condition human behaviours and thus social phenomena. Culturalists basically see individuals as culturally embedded, acting along with norms and rules of groups or communities with which they identify. Similar to rationalists, culturalists assume that human actions are intentional. However, contrary to rationalists, culturalists refute interests as given or random and reasons as essential or universal. Actors' reasons for action are "conditional and contingent" on cultural context, and the nature of rationality differs from culture to culture (p.247).

From the culturalists' point of view, researchers can observe reality only by disentangling the frame of meaning used by actors. Culturalists like Scott do not deny the material reality, though they assert that material factors must always be filtered through ideas (p. 259). This task involves the exploration of subjective factors, such as actors' emotions, values, and orientations, since these subjective factors constitute a significant part of cultural meaning and human interaction. Their inquiries attempt to go into the mind of actors and hence take the methodology of interpretation and hermeneutics.

Key controversies

This study aims to formulate an integrated conceptual-analytical framework that can utilise the different efficacies each school offers, though, crucially, without compromising the logical consistency within it. As discussed below, diverse attempts at such integrated frameworks are frequently built upon a weak foundation, since the inherent controversies residing within and between different disciplines are not completely reconciled. Hence, I find that the following well-acknowledged controversies in contemporary social theorisation, as implied in Lichbach's ideal-typical description above, must be reconciled:

1. *The controversy on reality*, which is the most fundamental disagreement among different theoretical disciplines. It derives from the competing worldviews regarding whether the real world exists independently of our knowledge or not. This fundamental difference in ontological position leads to the competing epistemologies and methodologies of the social sciences. Of the three major schools listed above, both rationalism and structuralism assert the existence of the real world outside knowledge, while culturalism argues that the world is constituted of knowledge and conception and thus dependent upon them.

2. *The material vs. ideational controversy*, which concerns the disagreement about social phenomena/events being explained in material or ideational terms. Based on their position on the first controversy, rationalism and structuralism search for explanations in the material domain, among others, respectively, economic interests and institutional structures, while culturalism investigates the ideational domain, such as discursive construction of power and interests.

3. *The natural vs. social controversy* concerns the difference in the point of whether the law of nature is widely applicable to the social world of human beings. This controversy has caused the war on science, which debated whether the sciences of society and humanity should apply or be built on the knowledge and methods of the natural sciences. Both rationalism and structuralism accept, though in different ways, that nature's law is also applicable to the social world, while culturalism rejects this position by claiming that the social world is fundamentally different from the natural world. However, I claim that another nature-society controversy is found in the ongoing disagreement about integrating nature in social research. This point is crucial for this study, as its focus on the organic agriculture movement cannot neglect the aspect of nature in society.

4. *The agency, structure, and culture controversy*, which involves the same question of what determines social phenomena/events, but deals more intensively with which unit of analysis we should prioritise. In addition, relating to the last controversy, I stress the general absence of nature in consideration and propose including nature in this controversy.

An integrated framework that can overcome these controversies necessitates an evaluation of what can and cannot be used together. In other words, some elements of each discipline should be clearly re-formulated and/or sorted out for such a framework to be sufficiently integrative internally; namely to be logically consistent about the relationship between its conceptions of reality, the material and the ideational, nature and society, and nature, structure, culture, and agency. I find that this aim can be achieved by taking a critical realist *strategic-relational approach* proposed by Bob Jessop and Collin Hay. Before going into this, I illustrate in the following sections these controversies and the inherent problems of the above-mentioned theoretical schools to be overcome in order to truly reconcile them.

Controversy on reality

The debate on reality intrinsically involves the very conceptualisation of being, i.e. ontological position, and thus the issue of whether there is a real world out there existing independently of our knowledge of it. Or in other words, it concerns whether our knowledge and conception constitute reality, even though they embody

neither universal nor stable forms of existence as they are interpreted differently from person to person. According to Marsh and Furlong (2002), these different ontological views lead to two fundamental epistemological questions. The first question concerns whether we can identify real relations between social phenomena. If we take the ontological position that reality exists independently of our knowledge or understanding of it, we are geared to establish a knowledge that can explain reality out there. In contrast, if we perceive reality as a human cognitive construction that always mediates through interpretation, the exploration of universal explanation becomes irrelevant, but a better understanding of how and why such construction is made does become relevant.[12] The second question is to what extent we can establish real relationships between social phenomena. In other words, if we think "real" relationships exist, can we observe them directly, or are there some relationships which are not directly observable (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p.18-19)? As briefly mentioned in the overview of the three schools, both rationalism and structuralism presume the existence of a real world outside our knowledge. Yet they go different ways on this question, as the former believes reality can be observable, and the latter asserts that not all things in the real world are directly observable. The former orients toward empiricism by concentrating on the observable evidences, while the latter intends to discover real structures and mechanisms behind observable phenomena.

These ontological questions are crucial, since they shape our direction in epistemology and consequently methodology. As correctly asserted by Marsh and Furlong, "ontological and epistemological positions should not be treated like a sweater that can be 'put on' when we are addressing such philosophical issues and 'taken off' when we are doing research" (ibid., 2002, p. 21). This seemingly obvious aspect is too often ignored in practice, especially when researchers today have to entangle extremely complicated phenomena of the advanced society with diverse theoretical tools of "post- or neo-ism" (seen in post/neo-Marxism, neoliberalism, neo-Keynesianism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, etc.). In such developmental processes in academia, interesting mergers and collaboration across formerly competing conceptualisations are emerging, though they tend to be made too easily without considering their ontological and epistemological consequences (Gofas and Hay, 2008). Overall, the question of worldview concerns the "arbitrary and subjective" aspect of research (Hay, 2002, p.33), as it is tightly connected to how one perceives the world. Understanding this way, this study calls for an ontology that can logically reconcile the view of reality as "interpreted" with reality existing outside interpretation and observability. Such ontology can be found in the negotiation between the idealist/interpretationist and the realist ontologies.

Material vs. Ideational controversy

Closely linked to the above issue of what "real" is, disciplinary divisions in social science manifest themselves in how ideas are treated. As this scientific community from the 1990s onwards started acknowledging the significance of ideas, the long-lasting dominance of materialism has been increasingly tottered. However, what we quite often observe along with this "cultural turn" is a mere inclusion of ideational factors into existing theories without serious considerations about the consequences (Gofas and Hay, 2008). Typical rationalist attempt, to begin with, falls into this fallacy, as the role of ideas is added on only when the adequate materialist explanation is not found. Here effects of ideas on social phenomena are understood in a very limited degree, most often as "empirical anomalies" (Goldstein and Keohane in Gofas and Hay, 2008, p.10) or consequences of uncertainty (Hay, 2002, p.215). According to Gofas and Hay, this results not only in the reduction of ideas to the secondary focus, but more seriously causes internal conflict and inconsistency within rationalism itself. Although rationalist attempts at the cultural turn most often employ ontological/methodological dualism of the material and the ideational, the problem is that this dualism is not fully and constantly applied in their research practices. They continue to deduce the ideas' impact on behaviours from the material/structural imperatives, without considering the reverse possibility, namely the ideas' im-

[12] A more extreme ontology like that of post-modernist Derrida states that "reality" is not only a mere symbolic construction, it simply does not exist.

pacts on certain material structure.[13] The traditional rationalist subordination of the actors' subjective world by the exogenous objective world prevails. This runs counter to the conception of material-ideational dualism that claims the autonomy of ideas from the material. The rationalist attempts at "taking ideas seriously" remain "rather arbitrary and ad hoc" (Gofas and Hay, 2008, p.10).

A more fundamental problem that the cultural turn brings to rationalism could be the self-contradiction with its very foundation on ontological and methodological individualism. Built upon this atomistic ontology that comprehends cognition as essentially individual praxes, rationalism basically claims ideas only within the level of individual actors or as an aggregation of individual cognitions. The current attempts intend to account ideas to be social, and thus, intersubjective; as expressed by Adler, ideas are "not simply the aggregation of the beliefs of individuals" but "collective knowledge" that "persists beyond the lives of individual social actors embedded in social practices as they are produced by interpreters who participate in their production and working" (Adler in Gofas and Hay, 2008, p.12). This envisagement for intersubjectivity, social interaction and collectivity is, however, irreconcilable with its ontological foundation in atomistic individuals. Furthermore, the cost of implementing ideational elements appears to be too high, as it loses not only logical consistency but also eminent value in predictability and generalizability. Considering these aspects, as suggested by Gofas and Hay, rationalism does not offer a suitable ground for negotiating the material and the ideational.

It seems that neither of the culturalist schools which took the lead of the cultural turn has delivered an integrative theory for materiality and ideas. While the culturalist league, often labelled as the post-modernist and "strong/thick social constructivist", entails explicit criticisms of materialism, they entirely reject the significance of material power in their assertion that what appears to be "real" is always mediated through social discursive praxes. This naturally leads them to the focus on discursive practices that are empirically driving reality construction. Reality in this position constitutes only a set of beliefs or "local idiomatic evaluation" (Archer, 1998, p.511) in a specific value system or community. The pursuit of objective knowledge loses its conventional meaning, since such things are considered non-existent. Instead, the focus turns out to be how "reality" is constructed in a specific location. This orientation is typically evident in Foucault's middle and late work and his followers. In the mind of Foucault, power and knowledge in modern society obtain capillary-like micro-technologies that can reach and penetrate all areas of the social world and create regimes of subjugation. Quite differently from the conceptualisations of power/knowledge by Marxians or Weberians who concentrate on the issue of who has power and control over the macro-systems of domination, Foucault's emphasis is on the aspect of power whose control infiltrates the internality of all social parts and organs. In this sense, power – the dominator and the dominated, the exploiter and the exploited, the powerful and the powerless – is no longer obvious and self-evident. They are not identifiable, as they are faceless and spread out everywhere (Lindgren, 2000:Mouzelis, 2008, p.24-27). To Foucault, power further means the capability to create own subject matter or "truth". The subject matter which is focused on and investigated does not exist as an objective reality but as a creation by the "regime of truth". In a well-known example, he asserts that subjects of criminology are, at least partially, creations of specialists, such as criminologists, psychologists, psychiatrists and judges who have formed the subjectivity of "criminal" and definition of crime, normality/abnormality, deviance, etc. via their professional practices. As such, criminology as a scientific discipline constructs own subject matters and "truth". Thus for Foucault there is no border or distinction between a theory and material reality, and therefore the study of the latter cannot validate or invalidate the former (Mouzelis, 2008, 183-184).

However, this line of thinking can easily transform into a strong idealism, which denounces the existence of the real objects and essences (both material and ideational) with causal power. Idealism is indeed further deepened by Foucault and his followers who declare that everything including the bodily/the material is

[13] See Goldstein (1993) for an example.

symbolic construction. Although Foucault applied the discursive and the non-discursive distinctively in certain parts of his theory, the distinction between the two disappeared as he began to lean more towards textualism. This resulted in his strong idealist statements that reduce everything to discourse, by claiming language as the essential element of socialisation (Mouzelis, 2008, p.28). Indeed, much "thick" post-modernist argumentation generally does not point to the blind denial of material existence, say, of the physical existence of cats and dogs, but focuses on "what they are in a society"; cats are "sacred and revered deities as in ancient Egypt or over-breeding pests that befoul the streets and alleys and should be euthanized" (Doty in Gofas and Hay 2008, p.22), or dogs can be defined with "a socially significant property such as 'tameness'" other than the zoological categorisation (Kratochwil in Gofas and Hay, 2008, p.22). Nonetheless, as asserted by critics, their foremost focus on the ideational dimension, rather than the material one, supports a form of analytical idealism (Sayer, 2000:Gofas and Hay, 2008), which can say very little about how and why this specific idea becomes widely diffused on the social level. As Joseph argues, "not just anything can be articulated as a nuclear weapon; it has to have certain material properties… [because] *the physical properties of something, far from being meaningless outside articulation, are the very things that make social construction possible*" (Joseph in Gofas and Hay, 2008, p.23 Italic by Gofas and Hay).

According to Sayer, post-modernist idealism entails, at least, two problematic conflations: firstly, the conflation between the practice of material construction and the practices of discursive construction, and secondly, between actors' and analysts' interpretations (Sayer, 2000, p.91). The first conflation represents the subordination or assimilation of the material/non-discursive to the ideational/discursive that generally induces the elision of the former as autonomous causal factor. What is needed here is an open-minded understanding of both domains as mutually influencing, rather than of the former as the latter's construction. In the absence of such open-mindedness, a simple fact that an idea cannot be powerful if it does not make practical sense in the real world, or even within its regime of truth, is easily forgotten.

The second conflation between the actor's ideational construction and the analyst's emanates from the general culturalist/post-modernist presumption that interpretation creates a photocopy image of actors' "reality". In this light, the borders between the two disappears, as interpreters'/analysts' (re)constructions are construed as equivalent to the real experience of the interpreted/actors. However, as asserted by Sayer, interpretations/constructions of both actors and analysts can be changed at any time, though changes of the former can happen without any change of the latter. While, for instance, Islam can be called a social construction, a large-scale society-wide construction of it is most likely to maintain independently of one or more theorists' or actors' constructions (Sayer, 2000, p.91-92). This overall indicates that, firstly, the difference between the creator of an idea, the evolution/transformation of the idea via diffusion, and the interpretation of the idea by analysts should be understood as three distinctive constructions. Secondly, the effect of cognitive interpretation processes (i.e. inter- or trans-subjectivity of ideas and semiotics) on society-wide constructions should not be seen as "given" or spontaneous. Again, for language and discourse to be effectively "symbolic", they have to make practical sense in a community or society. And that is the position this study supports.

Nature vs. Society controversy

Today the nature-society relationship constitutes one of the most prevalent themes in social sciences. This study deals with the organic agriculture movements, which inevitably concern nature-human interaction. Yet there are traditional and ongoing controversies which the study of this relationship should take into account. This study signifies two major controversies: the conflict between the natural scientific approach and the social science as its own, and the conflict within the latter about how to conceptualise nature in social theorisation.

Regarding the former, the long-lasting controversy between nature and society in academia is embedded in the different philosophies of science regarding what "science" is/should be and how scientific knowledge can/should be acquired. It is not my intention in this report to go into an in-depth discussion on the variety of

debates on this matter. Nevertheless, the core division is between whether social science is seen through the image of natural science based on hard evidence and value-neutrality, and it is envisaged as qualitatively different from natural science. The first position represents the prevailing and traditional conviction of the academic community that recognises science as a prestige act of knowledge production. It argues for its "falsifiability, refutability, or testability" (Popper in Hay, 2002, p.82), derived from analytical externality of researchers to the scientific practices. They aim to protect this distinct status of science as characteristic in the ideal-typical rationalist and structuralist, eschew scientific quality of "ideas", because they believe the inherent character of ideas, which is subjective, ambiguous, non-universal, inconsistent, and potentially emotional and (thus) irrational, makes objective, rational, and materially evident research impossible. Ideas are no more than personal opinions or subjective assessments of social phenomena, since they are non-falsifiable; that is to say, we cannot assess whether an idea is true or false when other ideas are given equal importance (March and Furlong, 2002). Consequently, those who take this stance in science, at best, introduce the ideational focus and the method of heuristics into their theoretical framework without questioning their "science as usual": For instance, in *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, King, Keohane and Verba identify interpretation as "*not* fundamentally different endeavours", as they commonly "rely on preparing careful descriptions, gaining deep understandings of the world, asking good questions, formulating falsifiable hypotheses on the basis of more general theories, and collecting the evidence needed to evaluate those hypotheses" (King, Keohane et al., 1994, p.37, Italic original).

This stance is quite controversial for culturalism and those supporting the other conception of social science as qualitatively different from natural science. Indeed, the very foundation of these oppositions is the disapproval of naturalism as a sort of "doctrine that the social world could be understood in the same way as natural science" (Sayer, 2000, p.6). At the same time, critics of naturalism are equally critical of foundationalism, which claims that observable and physical distinction is sufficient for explaining social phenomena. Such foundationalist thinking is evident in John Gray's book, *Men are from Mars and Women are from Venus* (1992), which claims that men and women are fundamentally different and can only understand each other by recognising their differences (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p.18). Against this line of thought, the critics question the conventional scientific envisagement with generalisation, universality, falsifiability, and value-freeness/neutrality. Social science is (and should be) intrinsically value- and concept-dependent, because such is the social world and its component, namely human-being. Human actions are not solely following the universally applicable law (such as mechanistic judgement of material interests), but, whether consciously or unconsciously, elements like emotions, sense of moral obligations and responsibility that cannot be identified in a decisive, homogeneous, and standardised form. For the oppositions to naturalism and foundationalism, then, what is required is not neutrality but "ethical responsibility" (Hay, 2002, p. 75) of analysts to create meaningful knowledge, even though such meaningfulness is ultimately subjective registration. A characteristic statement of those critics is seen in Bent Flyvbjerg's *Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again* (2001):

> In Aristotle's words *phronesis* is a "true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man." *Phronesis* goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (*episteme*) and technical knowledge or know-how (*techne*) and involves judgments and decisions made in the manner of a virtuoso social and political actor. I will argue that *phronesis* is commonly involved in social practice, and that therefore attempts to reduce social science and theory either to *episteme* or *techne*, or to comprehend then in those terms are misguided… [Natural science and social science] have their respective strengths and weaknesses along fundamentally different dimensions, a point which Aristotle demonstrated but which has since been forgotten. At present, social science is locked in a fight it cannot hope to win, because it has accepted terms that are self-defeating. We will see that in their role as *phronesis*, the social sciences are strongest where the natural sciences are weakest: just as the social sciences have not contributed much to explanatory and predictive theory, neither have the natural sciences contributed to the reflexive analysis and discussion of values and interests, which is the prerequisite for an enlightened political, economic,

> and cultural development in any society, and which is at the core of *phronesis*. This should also be the core of social science if we want to transcend the current malaise of the Science Wars (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.2-3).

This study argues that another controversy of the nature-society relationship can be found in the competing assertions on how to deal with nature in social research, which has long been decisively pre-occupied with human issues. That is why this controversy arises along with the radical criticism of the anthropo-centric and utilitarian foundation of social theory. Theorists in this critical stream, who are most likely to be labelled as post-modernists, problematize the tendency of the traditional approach to perceive non-humans as human objects to be exploited or conquered, and reduce the nature and the non-human to the human use-value. They are geared to deconstruct, instead of reconstruct, the conventional conceptualisation by emphasising the role of nature/non-human in social outcomes, as seen in the actor network theory of Bruno Latour and various types of bio-centric perspectives advocated for instance by Robin Eckersley, Kirkpatrick Sale, and Arne Næss. Their contestation against conventional thinking commonly rests in the defence of nature, and often raises the flag of "ecological egalitarianism". Næss says:

> the reinterpretation of the future-research variable, "level of crowding", so that *general* mammalian crowding and loss of life-equality is taken seriously, not only human crowding. (Research on the high requirements of free space of certain mammals has, incidentally, suggested that theorists of human urbanism have largely underestimated human life-space requirements. Behavioural crowding symptoms (neuroses, aggressiveness, loss of traditions…) are largely the same among mammals.) (Naess, 1973, p.96, Italic in original).

Obviously, this thick version of post-modernism eschews not only materialism but also naturalism and foundationalism. I agree with the critical stance on excessive materialism, naturalism, and foundationalism, but I agree with Andrew Sayer that this strong rejectionist position results in another type of determinism. I find that it is unnecessary for capturing lively and perpetual processes of nature-society interaction. This issue is indeed closely linked to the last point of "science war" as well as the above controversies on reality and material vs. ideational. Unique and distinctive quality of social science *vis-à-vis* natural science does not have to mean its disconnection with natural phenomena and natural scientific knowledge. On the contrary, considering how humans' every-day life is enabled and constrained by the natural environment, it makes more sense to focus upon the interconnectedness. The subject of this study, the organic agriculture movement, is certainly one of many areas whose social scientific inquiries cannot ignore this aspect. Organic agriculture would not be an effective method in the Sub-Saharan region where organic materials usable for agriculture bare exist, while GM crop resisting heat and requiring only minimal inputs might be (though whether such technology can be utilised purely for the objective of the commons or the poor but not for the multi-national agribusiness is a crucial socio-political question). Furthermore, a significant part of decision-making for environmental protection is apparently affected by natural science expert knowledge, since we simply need to know the potential reactions of nature to our actions for our own well-being or survival. (Though why not all natural scientific knowledge is treated equally, why some are taken more seriously than others, is another social scientific question). Thus nature-society interaction is also affected by the available scientific knowledge of nature. *Limits to Growth*, which significantly aroused the environmental consciousness in the world in the 1970s, is a natural scientific publication produced by an MIT professor and his team. Pesticides became a social problem, not only because the social movement cried out, but more fundamentally because their negative effects were proven by natural scientists. Obviously, the environmental policy and management today are largely dependent on professional assessments of environmental factors acknowledged dominantly in the leading natural scientific community.

In addition to being objective facts of nature, however, these aspects also contain the elements of social ideational construction. According to Maartin Hajer (1995), discourses and conceptions of environmental problems, rather than the real existence of the problems (say, whether acid rains really exists as a dreadful threat

to living beings as some natural scientific findings claim), can constitute an undoubtedly important part of how environmental issues are treated in society. It is also possible that natural scientific "facts" are socially constructed (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) and respond to specific social needs or even interests of certain actors who can influence research direction and outcomes. Their research results can also be determined by various factors, such as available economic resources. Yet the excessively determinant view of social construction tends to overestimate the agentic – whether individual or collective – power to create "facts", at a cost of the real property of nature for sustaining own system and reacting to human practices *whatever the socially-constructed reality is*. The rejection or evasion of this simple fact hinders us from taking account of potentials and constraints that nature in its genuine form imposes upon our social and discursive praxes/practices. This is a vital issue for this study's investigation of the relationship between the social-human and the environment. For instance, the conception of "collaboration with nature", which is often expressed by organic activists, is not just a discursive product, but is associated with practical experience gained by famers in everyday interaction with soils, animals, surrounding environment, etc. Farmers constantly get responses, often in observable ways, from nature about their actions, say, whether the use of a natural enemy reduced vermin, the blending of materials for compost was right for growing the produce, etc. Such interaction between farmers and nature certainly mediates through their subjective conception and the shared understanding in the organic agriculture community, though it is not entirely reducible to the ideational process of individual or the community. Considering these aspects, this study asserts that the conceptualisation of nature must integrate both nature existing regardless of knowledge *and* that within knowledge.

Agency, structure, and culture controversy

The debate on agency versus structure concerns the very issue of, on the one hand, how much one emphasises the capability of people to affect their surrounding environment, and, on the other hand, how far one conceives that such capacity is enabled and/or constrained by their surrounding environment. In the words of Margaret Archer:

> For it is part and parcel of daily experience to feel both free and enchained, capable of shaping our own future and yet confronted by towering, seemingly impersonal, constraints. Those whose reflection leads them to reject the grandiose delusion of being puppet-masters but also to resist the supine conclusion that they are mere marionettes then have the same task of reconciling this experimental bivalence, and must do so if their moral choice is not to become inert or their 'political' action ineffectual. Consequently in facing up to the problem of structure and agency social theorists are not just addressing crucial technical problems in the study of society, they are also confronting the most pressing social problem of the human condition (Archer, 1988, p.x).

It is safe to say that after the intensive agency-structure debate in the past decades, a majority in the social scientific community today agrees that both agency and structure are crucial factors for explaining social processes. In addition, with the intervention of the cultural turn, the point of taking not only structure and agency but also culture seriously appears to gain growing support. Yet, as the afore-mentioned controversies, social theorisations founded upon the traditional disciplinary divisions make a logically consistent integration of these domains difficult.

Although the rationalist foundation on atomism, individualism and positivist philosophy of science is certainly effective in generating an abstract but regularised picture of human reason and action, it is inherently insufficient for integrating the role of ideas. In addition, rationalism not only disregards the contextual and contingent nature of interplay between actors and structures, it is also self-contradictory in its conceptualisation of agency (Lichbach, 1997: Crossley, 2002: Hay, 2002). In its ideal-typical form, it construes agencies as the central causal components of social phenomena, who act strategically to achieve their interests. However, their individuality and freedom of choice are apparently discounted in the theory, as they are understood to constantly think and behave in a rational manner. The criteria for "rational" here tend to be explicit-

ly narrow: individuals are expected to act for the maximisation of own interests (versus mutual interests), even though such self-centred actions may bring negative effects on others.[14] Furthermore, the rationalist explanation for one of their core themes, namely irrational consequences of rational individual action, is primarily delivered by either focusing on the emergence of external influence ("the material constraints of the objective external world" in the words of Bates), or by simply eliminating the consideration of actors to make irrational choices (Hay, 2002, p. 52-53). Consequently, rationalists put themselves in the same position as structuralists as they situate individuals in subordination to the surrounding environmental contexts.

Rationalist theory does not allow individuals sufficient autonomy to choose how they act on opportunities or constraints. They are emphasised merely in their aggregated form. Indeed, the more rationalists pursue generalizability and predictability, the more they reduce individuals to a homogeneous and faceless crowd. Thus, while this study makes use of rationalist contributions on exploring (instrumental) reasons of human actions, it eschews rationalism's atomistic view of agency. People do act on the basis of certain objectives, and when we speak of "strategy", it should be precisely so. However, the concept of reasons should not be limited within instrumentality and material gains, but include such things as morality, emotions, human bonds and solidarities. This is because those who are most often labelled as "irrational" by rationalists are not necessarily unimportant but can sufficiently motivate people to act collectively. This point of re-conceptualising rationality will be further discussed in the next chapter.

While rationalism leads to the reduction of agentic power, other schools commit other kinds of reductionism. A characteristic and influential structuralist attempt at integrating culture is the Parsonian cultural system theory. According to Archer, the conception of culture as determinant of peoples' choices and/or social and economic development, as evident in Parsons' middle and late works,[15] entails the "Myth of Cultural Integration"; that is to say, the perception of culture as "a coherent pattern, a uniform ethos or a symbolically consistent universe" (Archer, 1988, p. xv). The myth advocates cultural coherence and consistency, and functionalist thinking systematically shuns the possibility of cultural contradictions, since it basically precludes the autonomy of actors to interact and influence the state of affairs. The theory neglects to explore internal dynamics *within* culture, while the causes of change are searched outside this domain (Archer, 1988, p.6). In other words, in its conceptualisation of culture as an autonomous social system, it depicts actors simply as being influenced by it. As such, the functionalist lens can neatly show the process from culture to actors, namely how core values are internalised in the personal disposition. The shortfall is that it does so one-dimensionally. It does not project how individuals affect the status of core values. Consequently, actors disappear in the Parsonian focus on sub-systems, namely economic, political, social, and value commitment. In his criticism of Parsons, Habermas says:

> Actors disappear as acting subjects; they are abstracted into units to which the decisions and thus the effects of action are attributed. In so far as actions are viewed in terms of their internal analytic structure and conceived as the outcome of a complex joint operation among the specific subsystems, actors are merely circumscribed by the places they can occupy (Habermas in Mouzelis, 2008, p.267).

In addition, Jeffery Alexander finds that the very status of culture remains quite ambiguous in the Parson's cultural system theory:

[14] Garrett Hardin's *Tragedy of the commons* (1968) is a good example of the rationalist explanation of "collective action problem", i.e. why unilateral environmental action is so difficult to achieve.

[15] Here I refer to phase II and phase III of Parson's work categorised by Mouzelis. According to him, phase I can be marked by the publication of *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), while phase II be *The Social System* (1951), and phase III *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (1966) (Mouzelis, 2008, p.12).

> Without a counterweight of thick description, we are left with a position in which culture [for Parsons] has autonomy only in an abstract and analytic sense. When we turn up to the empirical world, we find that functionalist logic ties up cultural form with social function and institutional dynamics to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine where culture's autonomy might lie in any concrete setting. The result was an ingenious systems theory that remains too hermeneutically feeble, too distant on the issue of autonomy to offer much to a strong program (Alexander in Mouzelis, 2008, p.80).

Overall, such structuralist attempts towards culture undermine the view of interplay between systems domains (i.e. structure and culture) and actors. Here, the aspect of cultural transformation as "path-shaping" process, rather than a mere path-dependent process of cultural integration or reproduction, is largely neglected (Gofas and Hay, 2008, p.31). After all, this theory of culture is oriented towards a type of system essentialism that sees the causes of social phenomena only in functional requirements (Mouzelis, 2008, p.14). Similarly, since this essentialism presumes social conflicts are solely derived from internal systemic incompatibilities/contradictions, it can easily confuse actor causality with structure causality (ibid., p.240).

The culturalist school, too, holds inherent risks of undervaluing actors and structures. Foucault's conceptualisation of discourses as all-embracing medium for power and individuals as mere "docile bodies" is characteristic of the subordination of actors to culture, namely, symbolic construction. A more anthropologically grounded line of culturalism appears to advance a less reductionist approach of actors. This type of culturalists primarily searches for understandings, rather than explanation, of meanings and values that actors attach to social action in and outside their societies. They typically argue (re)cognition of "facts" is embedded in tradition and culture. Thus culture is understood to provide "a series of answers to specific questions arising in a historically specific set of taken-for-granted ideas" (Bevir and Rhodes, 2002, p.136). Their endeavour to understand human actions digs into the traditional behaviours that lead people to act in specific ways. With this focus, cultural anthropologists like Clifford Geertz emphasised the ethnographic "thick description" based on "seeing things from the other's point of view" (Geertz in Bevir and Rhodes, 2002, p.136). Interpretation and inscription (by writing down) of ordinary people's everyday life, common sense, taken-for-granted ideas, and actions become the centre of focus, since they entail valuable social discourses for understanding human behaviour. By interpreting the flow of these social discourses, Geertz asserts, we can diagnose the situation. Analyses by cultural anthropologists and the like are self-consciously incomplete and embrace "soft science". They are "marked less by a perfection of consensus than a refinement of debate. What gets better is the precision with which we vex each other" (Geertz in Bevir and Rhodes, p.137)

Culturalists of this type are not necessarily determined to reject the idea of autonomous actors. Yet their focus on shared ideas/beliefs, which most often associates the presumption of local reasoning (the conviction that people in the same community/culture share the same consensus), frequently drives them to prioritise culture over other factors. In this light, culture represents "what *we* believe, not what *I* believe" (Barnes in Lichbach, 1997, p.259. Italic by Lichbach). They tend to conceptualise intersubjectivity in the value system within the boundary of cultural time (e.g. tradition) and space (e.g. community) and thus give local culture and knowledge privileged status over external ones, as James C. Scott did in his study of Sedaka village in Malaysia. While he acknowledges that remarkable changes in that rather primitive village were indeed brought from outside, he filters external and novel concepts and events, such as class conflict and green revolution, through the local culture. For instance, in his analysis of the village's reaction to the introduction of double-cropping and mechanisation by the state, Scott concludes that the biggest determinant was the villagers' interpretation of the new condition, which was mediated through the praxes and material conditions having existed long before the arrival of the event, rather than the objective conditions brought by that technical/technological change(Scott, 1985, p.305). Sometimes, this culturalist orientation falls into ethnocentrism, which more explicitly subordinates actors under culture.

These shortfalls of the traditional schools can signify the tendency to subordinate agency under the external environment, i.e. structure and/or culture, as just mentioned. However, as illustrated by the trend led by Anthony Giddens, today many prefer to see the relationship among them as inseparable. Separation is claimed simply as a technique for social research; in Gidden's words, "methodological bracketing," suggesting the distinction of agency and external environment only for the purpose of empirical analysis, not as an ontological claim. His theory gives valuable insights on agents as being reflexive and strategic towards their discursive and non-discursive circumstances, and their actions' intended and unintended consequences. However, its ontological foundation on duality essentially internalises structure and culture into agents. As such the former is more likely to be "sunk" into the latter, for in so far as they are considered as an internalised part of agents, it is impossible to identify their autonomous mechanisms, even with methodological bracketing.

Considering the deficits of these prevailing theories, what is necessary is, borrowing the words of Archer, "the *linking* of agency, structure and culture without *sinking* their differences" (Archer, 1988, p.xii. Original emphasis). This study finds that this objective can be achieved with a critical realist framework of the strategic-relational approach. The next sections explain the basic conceptualisation and potentials of critical realism for overcoming the afore-mentioned controversies before going into the strategic-relational approach.

Critical realism: Basic concepts

Conceptualisation of knowledge and reality

Critical realism (hereafter CR) puts ontology in front[16], as it opposes the "epistemic fallacy", i.e. the reduction of being (thus ontology) to knowledge of being (epistemology), forged by classical empiricism and positivism, on the one side, and idealism, on the other (Bhaskar, 2010, p.1). For CR this reduction of ontology makes the view of the social world flat, uniform, and one-dimensional, and thus, significantly discounts its real complexity. Furthermore, the epistemic fallacy most often associates the "ontic fallacy" that perceives knowledge as "an unproblematic, direct mapping between subject and being" (Shipway, 2010, p.64). This leads to the neglect of the social aspects of knowledge, its socially constructed properties. For CR the recovery from these fallacies requires the disambiguation of ontology and epistemology; that is, to establish the ontological perception of the world as existing independently of our knowledge, ideational construction, and experience. Based on this assertion, it necessitates the distinction of 1) two sides of knowledge, and 2) the real, the actual, and the empirical.

Regarding the first, critical realists distinguish the *intransitive* and *transitive* dimensions of knowledge. The former, the intransitive dimension is about the object of study (science), i.e. about what really exists, whether physical process or social phenomena. The transitive dimension of knowledge refers to man-made/socially-constructed objects of knowledge or "raw materials of science"[17], such as theories, discourses, paradigms, and models, methods and techniques of investigation (Bhaskar, 1998b, p.16:Sayer, 2000). With this distinction, one can argue that, although Darwin arrived at a theory on the mechanism of natural selection – a transitive knowledge – the mechanism he studied – the object of intransitive knowledge – is not something he created (or any other human beings can create). The objects of intransitive knowledge maintain their "structures, mechanisms, processes, events and possibilities" regardless of our knowledge of them, and "for the most part they are quite independent of us" (Bhaskar, 1998, p.17). In this view, the transformation in the transitive dimension, such as proclaimed paradigm shift or regime change, does not necessarily mean, or cohere to, change in the intransitive dimension; just as the radical conceptual change from the flat earth theo-

[16] Critical realism certainly provides a distinct epistemology, too. It is seen in detail in David Scott (2010) *Education, Epistemology and Critical Realism*, Oxon: Routledge.

[17] While critical realists spend much time discussing scientific knowledge, Sayer asserts that the same notion should be applied to lay knowledge (Sayer, 2000, p. 35).

ry to the round earth theory was not derived from the change of the earth shape (Sayer, 2000, p.11). However, in the social world the influence of transitive knowledge on intransitive objects is bigger than in the natural world, since the social world is indeed socially constructed and knowledge is a constitutive part of it. Thus CR asserts that social phenomena are concept-dependent, though it is more likely the pre-existing knowledge and concepts that they are often dependent on (Archer, 1988: Sayer, 2000).

This conception of knowledge is closely linked to the CR's distinction of the three-layer domains; i.e. *the real*, *the actual*, and *the empirical* (Bhaskar, 1998: Sayer, 2000: Shipway, 2010). CR distinguishes the material from the ideational, though this is not to indicate that one of them is less or more real than the other. In CR thought, "real" indicates, firstly, "whatever exists, be it natural or social, regardless of whether it is an empirical object for us, and whether we happen to have an adequate understanding of its nature". And secondly, real signifies "the realm of objects, their structures and power". Real objects, regardless of their properties as physical or social, have particular structures and causal powers that can behave in specific ways, as well as "causal liabilities or passive powers" that generate a particular type of change. In this view, for instance, people's power to work is real, since this power derives from their physical condition, education, skills, etc. This power is retained regardless of their current situation as unemployed or preference not to work. Social objects like bureaucracy are also real for they entail own structures that are capable of maintaining their everyday routines and norms (Sayer, 2000, p. 11).

The "actual" for CR concerns the exploration of what happens if and when the powers of real objects are exercised, what such powers do, and how the results can be. This distinction between the real and the actual is based on the perception of structures, mechanisms, and powers to exist even though they are not yet triggered to execute their effect. This is to acknowledge that empirical observability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of being, and not all real and actual objects are directly observable in the empirical world. The actual, then, refers to our search and speculation of possible effects of the real object. According to Sayer, taking up the classic terminologies of Marxism, labour power signifies the capacity to work, i.e. physical and mental structures, and thus belongs to the domain of the real. Labour, i.e. working, which is the exertion and effects of labour power, belongs to the actual (Sayer, 2000, p.12).

The last domain, the "empirical", is often confused as real in the epistemic fallacy. In the CR conception, while the real is the domain of objects with own structures and powers (i.e. mechanisms) and the actual is of instances of mechanisms (i.e. events), the empirical is the domain of experience. Experience can be either real or actual, insofar as it is referred successfully. However, in opposition to empiricism and idealism, CR asserts that some real entities are easy to observe, while some are not. And experience represents only what we can observe. Again, observability is neither necessary nor sufficient to be real: As Wall asserts, "'appearance' would not necessarily reveal the 'real' or 'essential' nature of phenomenon" (Wall, 1999, p.10).

The outlook of these three domains can be seen in the table below.

Table 2 Stratified ontological view of critical realism

	Domain of real	Domain of actual	Domain of empirical
Mechanism	√		
Events	√	√	
Experiences	√	√	√

Source: Bhaskar, Roy (Bhaskar, 1998b, p.41)

Causality

Based on this conceptual foundation CR drives our focus to the causal connections between mechanisms and their consequents. The crucial CR understanding of causation is to see the structure of the object as "a set of internally related elements whose causal powers, when combined, are *emergent* from those of their constituents" (Sayer, 2000, p.14. Italic added). And these emergent properties are considered *irreducible* to those of their constituents, even though the latter are necessary for their existence. In this view their powers depend also on other conditions than the one determined by their initial emergence. Based on these presumptions, CR asserts that causal mechanisms are inherently *contingent, tendential, and context-dependent* (Kjeldsen, 2004). Consequently, its pursuit of causality inherently involves complex research processes to disentangle diverse elements that constitute certain tendencies and phenomena. As John Elster says: "To explain is to provide a causal mechanism, to open up the black box and show the nuts and bolts … A mechanism provides a continuous and contiguous chain of causal or intentional links" (Kolberg, 2005, p.6). In CR, causality is thus clearly different from the linear and successive effect of A on B as envisaged in positivism. It conceptualises causation "rather loosely as all those things that bring about, produce, direct or contribute to states of affairs or changes in the world" (Kurki in Gofas and Hay, 2008, p.29). In this conception regularity (i.e. constant conjunction), which is the core assumption for the Humean causality, may happen in a closed system, but that is extremely rare in the social world where constant interaction between people and their surrounding physical and socially-constructed environment takes place. For CR society is constituted of open systems, where the same mechanism in different times and spaces can have different effects, while different mechanisms may cause the same effect. The figure below illustrates this CR view of causality.

Figure 1 Critical realist view of causation



Source: Sayer (2000, p.15)

Dialectical turn of critical realism

In addition, I underscore the newer development of critical realism towards the so-called "dialectical turn," which evolved after and around Bhaskar's publication of *Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom* in 1993. It is a pivotal development, since it makes *relational perspective*, which was rather implicit in the "original" or "first wave" CR, more explicit.[18] This relational perspective suggests that many incidences of causality can

[18] Bhaskar introduces a specific theory of dialectical critical realism (DCR) in *Dialectic* along with his criticism of the Hegelian dialectic. For details of Bhaskar's DCR, see *Dialectic*, but also his recent chapter "Context of interdisciplinarity: interdisciplinarity and climate change" in *Interdisciplinarity and Climate Change* (2010), and Brad Shipway (2010)

be explained through the inquiry of interrelationship between social objects. Consequently, more focus should be to put on geo-historically specific sets of relations that generate specific effects. As Sayer asserts:

> In the social world, people's roles and identities are often internally related, so that what one person or institutions is or can do, depends on their relations to others; thus what it is to be a tutor cannot be explained at the level of individuals but only in terms of their relation to students, and vice versa. The powers which they can draw upon depend partly on their relations to one another, and to relevant parts of the context, such as educational institutions (Sayer, 2000, p.13).

This emphasis on conceptual exercise then further solidifies the ground for the method of *abstraction*. For CR abstraction is a way to collect pieces of the puzzle; a key to approach the relations among different mechanisms and contexts that together generate a specific social event, and thus a more, yet never complete picture of a specific causality. The following quote explains this function of abstraction very well.

> In popular usage, the adjective 'abstract' often means 'vague' or 'removed from reality'. The sense in which the use of the term is used here is different; an abstract concept, or an abstraction, isolates in thought a *one-sided* or partial aspect of an object. What we abstract *from* are the many other aspects which together constitute *concrete* objects such as people, economics, nations, institutions, activities and so on. In this sense an abstract concept can be precise rather than vague… (Therefore) the concept of 'concrete objects' does not merely concern 'whatever exists' but draws attention to the fact that objects are usually constituted by a combination of diverse elements or forces…In order to understand their diverse determinations we must first abstract them systematically. When each of the abstracted aspects has been examined it is possible to combine the abstractions so as to form concepts which grasp the concreteness of their objects (Sayer in Roberts, 2001, p. 671, Italic original).

Based on this conception, we are to move between concrete (e.g. observable empirical phenomenon) and abstract (e.g. general theory) in our research process, as illustrated in figure 2 below. In this process we aim to firstly identify, i.e. "abstract out", the components and effects of the concrete object in focus in our heads by utilising our experiences, perceptual and intellectual skills, existing studies and so forth. We can then see *multiple* mechanisms and contexts that jointly constitute the concrete object, as well as the many-sided or multi-levelled composition of that object. It is only through this identification of composition and relevant contexts and their relationship, which can be derived from repeated movement (or perspectival shift) between concrete and abstract, that we can understand and explain how and why that concrete object functions as we observe. Without this exercise, for instance by depending solely on the first-glance characteristics of the object itself, we can easily identify it in an inadequate category. Furthermore, insensitiveness to the construction of the object can easily lead to false division of the indivisible or, oppositely, conflation of immiscible components. CR argues that such research built on shallow considerations of composition can only result in "inconclusive and/or misleading" conclusions (Sayer, 2000).

A Critical Realist Perspective of Education. Criticism of DCR especially from a Marxist point of view can be seen in Sean Creaven (2002) "The Pulse of Freedom? Bhaskar's Dialectic and Marxism" in *Historical Materialism*, vol.10 (2), and John Michael Roberts (2001) "Critical realism and the dialectic" in *British Journal of Sociology*, vol.52 (4).

Figure 2 Critical realist's perspectival movement between abstract and concrete



Source: Sayer (1992, p.117) and Drummond and Marsden (1997, p.27) in Kjeldsen (2004, p.65)

CR research of social phenomena is distinctive from others. For the awareness of stratified ontology, CR treats empirical evidence with constant examination of what kind of components and relations construct them, what is necessary for them to exist and what exists regardless of our knowledge and perceptions. Here, the stratification of the real, the actual, and the empirical is not to determine which one is more real than others (Bhaskar, 1998, p.43). Rather, this ontological view is used as an analytical device to understand and explain different dimensions of reality. Inquiry of empirical evidence with no consideration of stratified levels can serve for normal purposes, since behaviour indeed relies mostly on the habit of perception in practical situations. However, the ambition of CR is to go beyond the level of experiences and perceptions. As such the repeated perspectival movement between abstract and concrete as proposed by Sayer also associates the movement between transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge as well as among the three domains. Each domain is significant for our analysis and causal explanation. Exploration of the level of experience can provide what makes practical sense in every-day life, while by going further into the levels of what may not be directly observable (i.e. the levels of actual and real), we can abstract out (some of) the causal map which draws mechanisms, structures, powers and relations that together generate the given social event or phenomenon.

Potential for reconciliation

Transcending materialist vs. idealist controversy on reality

This study considers the conceptual foundation of CR has a good potential for overcoming the aforementioned controversies between 1) objective reality and humanly/socially constructed reality, 2) material and ideational, 3) nature and society, and 4) agency, structure and culture. As its assertion of two types of knowledge signifies, CR's approach to reality maintains the traditional realist conviction of "reality out there" and at the same time acknowledges the power of ideas (i.e. transitive knowledge) to generate real effects. What is rejected here is the narrow conception of reality as *either* exogenous to interpretation *or* symbolic construction. As demonstrated a long time ago by Marx, scientific endeavour resides in the explication of hidden mechanisms which are otherwise not directly observable to us. Such endeavour cannot be conveyed if our focus is firmly fixed upon the cognitive level namely, what is already known by people. On the other hand, ideas, appearing in discourses, narratives, symbols and the like, do have potential to obtain causal power, and thus their processes of construction and effects must be taken seriously as an integral part of research. However, in contrast to strong culturalists, CR does not consider ideas entirely independent of the

material processes, since it essentially requires practical adequacy in the material world for them to make sense. Ideational constructions are a subset of social practices, which is closely linked with other subsets of both the discursive and the extra-discursive (Fairclough, 2003). In other words, they are "embedded in material social practices, codes of behaviour, institutions and constructed environments" (Sayer, 2000, p.44). This thinking claims, unlike the Foucauldian statement of "everything is discourse", that not all social objects are discursively constructed. Discourses indeed need the material: For instance, the question of who is the murderer can be interpreted in different ways, and any answer to that question can be affected by how people think. Nonetheless such ideational processes must be related to the committed act of murder itself (Sayer, 2000, p.46). In this light, the fact that ideas can influence physical and discursive practices should not be automatically equated with the latter being the products of the former. The inherent difference between ideas and their effects must be recognised, since ideas contain "conditions and effects (both ideational/textual and material) that differ from those that they acknowledge and intend" (Sayer, 2000, p.45). CR construes ideas (i.e. interpreted reality) to be dependent on material conditions. Yet the relationships between "real" object and thought object as well as materiality and ideas are dialectical, mutually distinctive, and the emergent power each one comprises is irreducible to the other. Hence albeit material condition is a necessary element for discursive construction, it is not sufficient for the crafting of the latter.

In this way, CR reconciles the conflict between materialism and idealism, and pursues the co-existence of realism and "thin" social constructivism as opposed to the "thick" version of it (Gofas and Hay, 2008). As mentioned, CR steps towards the integration of socially-constructed elements such as beliefs, norms and values, without compromising the world outside such social construction. In this direction, the idealist subordination of the material to the ideational (as well as the materialist subordination of the opposite) is rejected. In addition to this, crucially, it cautions the idealist conflation of constructions of the interpreted (actors) and the interpreter (analysts). According to Sayer, intertextuality understood in CR is not so transboundary in practice as envisaged by the idealism in general (Sayer, 2000, p.90-93). Analysts and actors can certainly understand each other's meaning and the former may possibly influence the latter. Yet this is not equivalent to them interpreting and constructing in the same way. Both actors' and analysts' understanding can be changed at any time, and changes of the former can happen without any change of the latter. By the same token, CR is also critical of the conflation between actors, analysts and society at large, as often is the case for the social constructivist research. Society/community-wide conceptions which are entitled to be called social construction basically preserve themselves regardless of multiple peoples' thoughts about them. This is not to deny the possibility that actors and analysts can affect the societal level, but to warn the crude perception of own analytical construction as if it is "social" construction. From this point of view, both cases of conflation are problematic, since it hinders analysts from critically assessing the objects they refer to. Confusing own understanding with their referents, analysts de-capacitate themselves to evaluate their (material and thought) referents from distance. Considering these points, CR situates research externally to the objects of research. Analysis of (socially-constructed) object, actors' interpretation, and the status of the object, are seen as distinctive to each other. Analysis represents the analyst's attempt to capture the real figure of the targeted object, but must be treated as incomplete and potentially fallible. For CR it is the endeavour of social, political and cultural analyses to enhance practically adequate knowledge, rather than the establishment of absolute truth, that constitutes social sciences (Bhaskar, 1998a:Sayer, 2000).

Reconciliation of nature vs. society

This, in other words, is to recognise social sciences as qualitatively different from natural sciences. This direction renounces positivism in the former, since not all mechanisms are empirically observable to us. Yet CR does not reject the existence of real causal mechanisms. On the contrary, it intends to pursue such mechanisms even though they are not yet activated and hidden in the empirical world. As Bhaskar claims:

> For the transcendental realist, our knowledge, perceptual skills and causal powers are set in the context of the ongoing social activity of science; and in the course of it they are continually being

> extended, to which process there can be no a priori limits. Thus though it may be necessary, to the extent that science is always incomplete, that at any moment of time some laws are unknowable; it is not necessary that any particular laws are (Bhaskar, 1998b, p.44).

Furthermore, CR acknowledges the essentially value-laden nature of social scientific research, but also anticipates "ethical responsibility" of researchers towards objective and plausible explanations of social phenomena (Hay, 2002, p.75). Wall describes this point well:

> Typically, Wittgenstein simply stated: "Causes are superstition." In contrast I would argue that any form of social or political research demands a consideration of objectivity in the sense that some conclusions are more satisfactory or "real" than others. If we reject the task of explanation and replace it with one of description, the thorny issue of objectivity remains: which description is the most appropriate? Cutting through this debate by asserting that there is no necessary connection between representation and the subject under examination seems to erode the possibility of undertaking "meaningful" social research (Wall, 1999, p.12)

This stance on social science, which does not reduce objective knowledge to mere ideational construction or myth, opens op the possibility for collaboration with natural sciences. In my view, this possibility also gives a solid foundation for resolving the tension in dealing with the nature-society relationship, as it enables us to approach nature *both* as the non-discursive entity existing regardless of human conception *and* as discursive construction. In the former sense, nature is conceptualised as the realm of intransitive objects, and explained as

> the structures, processes and causal powers that are constantly operative in the physical world, that provide the objects of study of the natural sciences, and condition the possible forms of human intervention in biology or human interaction with the environment. It is the nature to whose laws we are always subject, even as we harness them to human purposes, and whose processes we can neither escape nor destroy (Soper in Sayer, 2000, p.99).

CR can also distinguish this realm of nature from that of discursively constructed nature that is embedded in the realm of society. Consequently, it can make a coherent statement about the proposed material-ideational relationship: Society is dependent on the natural physical environment, though the former is not exhausted by the latter. Structures and mechanisms of the social world have natural tendencies and properties just like those of the natural world, though the former retains its own realm (thus we need the two distinctive families of science) for the inherent openness of social systems and tendential nature of human causation (Shipway, 2010, p.59).

Despite this theoretical capability, I contend that CR, like many others, has paid strikingly little attention to the role of nature in the social world. In its intensive commitment to the discussion on the philosophy of science and ontological issues, it has been dealing with the theorisation of what natural and social is. However, as Bhaskar concedes, it has been largely preoccupied with the "understanding of specifically social and more generally human phenomena" (Bhaskar, 2010, p.8). As a result, critical realist researchers most often neglect the significance of natural environment or take it for granted.

Quite recently, this underdevelopment began to be acknowledged in critical realist circles, as various effects of the bio-physical environment became widely acknowledged as more than empty worries (See for instance, Forsyth, 2001:Bhaskar, Frank et al., 2010). Despite this underdevelopment, CR still has real potential for exploring the inter-relationship between nature/non-human and society/human. Its conceptual foundation is especially beneficial today when the borders between them appear to become increasingly fuzzy. Considering, say, the rapid development in gene technology and disappearance of true wilderness, we are tempted to define nature not only as a discursive construction but also as a social-human construction in the physical sense. This definition indeed makes sense if our minds are firmly set on what we can observe. Yet with the

CR perspectival shift to other levels, we can dig further than the observable. As suggested by Elder-Vass, there is always a side of reality that any scientist or human can ever create. That is to say, although it is seemingly true that scientists can create novel mechanisms necessary for, say, genetically engineered rats, there is always a possibility that such mechanisms have naturally existed but just have not been activated. In this perspective, what these scientists have done (and can ever do) is to discover, in contrast to create, that specific genetic structure and activate the causal mechanism for producing the genetically modified rat (Elder-Vass, 2008).

This conceptualisation paves a way to advance the study of nature-social problems. I consider, while the afore-mentioned post-modernist approach to this problem, such as the Actor Network Theory of Bruno Latour, is particularly effective in imposing meaningful provocations upon the anthropocentric foundation of social sciences. However, the contribution does not go further than the provocations, as its foremost focus is to reveal the deficiencies of such anthropocentrism, rather than to provide plausible solutions to the nature-society problem. From the CR point of view, a theory like Latour's falls into the same empiricist fallacy as rationalism for its flat ontology that limits analytical focus within the single layer, though added the consideration on the role of ideas and the experiences of non-human actors. Furthermore, its determinately actor-centric orientation consciously neglects the impact of social structures; that is to say, the possibilities that social structures are "causally effective in their own right, even though they are composed of human actors", and that humans act as a result of structures' causal powers (Elder-Vass, 2008). However, for the purpose of finding solutions to the nature-society problem (above all the domination or destruction of natural environments by humans), identification of the observable and functional web (or "network" in the Latourian terminology) of non-human and human actors is merely a start but not an end. I see that CR with its depth ontology, in contrast to the post-modernist empiricism, can instead push our focus toward more multi-dimensional aspects of the problem, as well as toward what actually (and really) causes the problem and what we should do to intervene. Social structures must be taken as seriously as human and non-human actors.

In addition, I stress that CR can afford a more explicitly egalitarian orientation of nature-society relationship, though its egalitarianism will be different from the one promoted by post-modernists. Although the advocacy of the latter for the "ecological turn" tends to highlight nature as the determinant element for human life, it often leads to the reduction of social phenomena to a biological/ecological substratum and/or the simple equation of human and non-human. Consequently, nature is typically prioritised over society, and human-social behaviours are interpreted "purely animal-like" (Sayer, 2000, p.97-98).[19] The post-modernist ecologism encourages a strong essentialism or ecological/biological reductionism instead of anthropocentrism. My point is that to be truly "egalitarian", we have to overcome such prioritisation of nature over society and surely vice versa. Obviously, there is nothing egalitarian about pre-determining the importance of one over the other.

Linkage of agency, structure and culture

CR enables the conceptions of nature as the separate domain external to human interpretation, on the one hand, and as the thought object embedded in the realm of society, on the other hand. In this way, the latter, i.e. interpreted nature, is treated as a form of cultural object. Thus the integration of these two dimensions of

[19] An example, though not directly categorised as academic discourse, is David Foreman's argumentation, a co-founder of the radical environmental activist group Earth First!: "wilderness is the real world" while "our cities, our computers, our airplanes, our global business civilization" are "all but artificial and transient phenomena"; "an individual human life has no more intrinsic value than does an individual Grizzly Bear life"; albeit "human suffering resulting from drought and famine in Ethiopia is tragic", "the destruction there of other creatures and habitat is even more tragic"; and "often our gut instincts enable us to act more effectively in a crisis than does careful rational analysis" (Foreman in Dryzek et al., 2003, p.359-360)

nature into a conceptual framework inherently involves the same question of how agency, structure, and culture are reconciled in social research.

As mentioned earlier, a prominent theorist of CR, Margaret Archer[20] asserts the major problem with linking them is the "sinking" of distinctiveness and autonomy of one or more domains. The traditional disciplines overall have inherent deficits at allowing the autonomy of agents in a logically consistent manner, while the current trend of structural-agency duality as represented by Gidden's structuration theory is more likely to result in agent-centric research at the cost of distinction of autonomous mechanisms in other domains. Its duality concept, which is based on the inseparability of agents and "rules and norms" (which are generally regarded as structure), makes the pursuit of the latter upon the former logically impossible. Based on this criticism, Archer claims that CR's endeavour to link agency, structure and culture must apply an "anti-conflationist" strategy. And her proposal is analytical dualism, instead of duality.

She strongly emphasises that this analytical dualism should be distinguished from philosophical or ontological dualism, as the former is used as a heuristic devise and "an artifice of convenience". It is stressed strongly that the ideational and the material, culture and agency, and structure and agency are, of course, intertwined and overlapped in real life. Her approach sees them separately for it is theoretically useful, though it does not concern the issue of whether they are really separate entities or not. What is proposed is not (ontological) "dualism but rather the *utility* of an analytically dualistic approach" (Archer, 1988, xvii. my italics). By setting this dividing line, she intends to overcome the "philosophical intractability" and the "methodological difficulties" of operationalizing such (analytical) dualism (Archer, 1988, p.xiv).

In her theory, the concept of agency and her/his external environment as Janus-faced is rejected. According to her, they are indeed interrelated, but we should avoid seeing both faces simultaneously, since structure/culture and agency do not co-exist. Structures and cultures always pre-exist before her/him, and those pre-existing properties of the former cannot be changed by her/him. On the other hand, agency does have potential to transform some features of the structures and cultures over time as intended and/or unintended result of their interplays. (S)he has "the quintessential power … to react with originality whatever its circumstances" (Archer, 1988, p.187).

Her conceptualisation of structure and culture is strongly inspired by Lockwood's formulation of structure and she applies his analytical distinction between the "social integration" (the orderly or conflictual relationships between actors) and the "system integration" (the orderly or conflictual relationships between the parts of the social system) into them. This leads to what she calls a morphogenetic approach that distinguishes two analytically distinctive cultural levels, i.e. the Cultural System, which is constituted of logical principles, and the Socio-Cultural life, wherein agencies are dealing with such principles. They are analytically situated alongside structural levels, i.e. the Social System and the Social life, and culture and structure are to intersect via socio-cultural interaction. This socio-cultural interaction is, then, the space where people are brought back in, "not merely as static upholders of this or that idea, but as active makers and re-makers of their culture" (Archer, 1988, p.184).

Her theory is to be commended as "the most systematic and clearly stated critical realist treatment of ideas and culture" (Gofas and Hay, 2008, p.29), considering the explicit and consistent attempt to distinguish different levels of conceptualisation (for instance, the ontological and analytical level, as well as the system-logical and agent-causal level), and to link the relationship of agency-structure/culture with the ideational and the material. Her assertion of people as reflexive agency is coherent with CR, which allows ideas to impose real effects. Indeed, as Hay claims, if one accepts that ideas have causal power, then people, as bearers of ideas, must also be understood to entail such power (Hay, 2002). Yet problematically, her analytical dual-

[20] For more about her theory, see *Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory* (1988).

ism is difficult to apply in actual research and may lead to artificial and ostensible results. Or worse, it entails considerable risk of falling into ontological dualism. She seemingly presumes all emergent properties of social and cultural systems to be internal to their autonomous cycles. That is to say, although the interaction between social and cultural systems is allowed in the socio-cultural interaction, the components emerging through such interaction are eventually integrated into one of the systems. Her analytical dualism constantly requires the configuration of the objects in question to be *either* the structural/material *or* the cultural/ideational. Based on this rigid analytical practice of separation, relevant social groups are categorised as either "material/structural interest groups" or "ideational groups" according to their "differences in material and ideal interests" and "differential power and resources *vis à vis* one another" (Archer, 1988, p.188). Needless to say, such rigid configuration is hard to apply in concrete cases, as the borders between material and ideational interests in the real world are not as clear-cut and stable as she imagines.

Operationalizing critical realism

Strategic-relational approach:

Basic concept

Up till now, this report has illustrated the obstacles in constructing an analytical/conceptual framework that can reconcile the traditional controversies. To overcome these obstacles, this study employs a critical realist approach, i.e. the strategic-relational approach (SRA) of Bob Jessop and Colin Hay (Hay and Wincott, 1998:Jessop, 2001:Hay, 2002:McAnulla, 2002:Jessop, 2008).

SRA, like Giddens and Archer, tackles the agency-structure problem, though its ontological, epistemological, and methodological orientations differ notably from them. Regarding its ontology, SRA takes CR as its foundation like Archer, and agrees with her point of analytical separability between structure and agency for mutually distinctive power, i.e. structure with constraining and enabling power, and agency with reproductive and transformative power. However, instead of static analytical dualism like Archer, SRA calls for a view that sees that the very existence of agency and structure needs the existence of each other. That is to say, they can only be "real" as they are mutually constitutive (i.e. their existence is *relational*) and their interaction is irreducible to the sum of structural and agential factors treated separately (i.e. their emergent power/property has relative autonomy). From this view, structure and agency can be described as "metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged", rather than two sides of the same coin as seen by Giddens. Like Archer, it understands them as separable on the analytical level, but "in practice they are completely interwoven". However, it explicitly denies Archer's (and also implicitly Bhaskar's) rigid perception of structural and material conditioning as pre-existing agency. For SRA, since the distinction of these domains is purely analytical, agency and structure must be mutually present in any given situation (Hay, 2002, p.127). In this way, it rejects "episodic, disjointed and discontinuous view of agency" evident in Archer (Hay, 2002, p.126).

With this particular line of critical realist thinking, SRA proposes a shift in central focus from the exhaustive discussion on agency and structure, which after all merely generates "theoretical abstractions", to the *dialectic interplay* between structure and agency taking place in the real contexts of social and political interaction (Hay, 2002, p.126). This is, quite simply, to examine agency (or action) in relation to structure, and structure in relation to agency. The basic procedure is, firstly, to draw a "structured context," which is the context wherein agency is situated, and a "situated agent structure," which is the status of agents in the context. Then by further putting this structured context into a situated agent and vice versa, we can identify *strategic actor (action)* and *strategically selective context*. This conceptual procedure is consistent with the CR perspectival movement between abstract and concrete. In the framework of SRA, this movement goes as follows: 1) the abstract level conceptualisation of structure and agency based on dichotomy or dualism; 2) the mid-level of structured context and situated agent entailing "dualism masquerading as duality"; and 3) dualism is resolved into "genuine dialectical duality" on the concrete level of strategically selective context and strategic actor

(Jessop, 2001). As such, SRA shares Giddens' claim of structure-agency duality *when they are put into action*. However, in clear contrast to Giddens, it does not require methodological bracketing out of one or the other to examine the composition of this duality, since, again, their separation occurs only in our conceptual/analytical exercise of abstraction, but not ontologically. The illustration of SRA's conceptual movement can be seen in the figure below.

Figure 3 Agency-structure relationship in strategic-relational approach



Source: (Hay, 2002, p.128)

Procedure

So far, the basic framework of SRA has presented the significance of dialectical interplay between structure and agency. Yet what further distinguishes it from other approaches is its focus on the strategic selectivity of both agency and structure: i.e. *not only situated actors are strategic*, but *situated context itself is also strategically selective*. In this light, actors are understood to have distinctive power that can potentially affect the environment they find themselves in, and to act strategically in accordance with their perceptions of such environment. At the same time, this environment itself acts strategically selectively by privileging some actors, identities, strategies, etc. over others. In this conceptualisation, the environment (structured context) does not stand merely as a static condition for actors' strategy, but supports certain outcomes while discouraging others. This strategic selection of the environment over time creates systematically structured outcomes, which partially explains the stability in the specific social orders. For example, a so-called ghetto area is structured to attract certain types of residents. In general, people with low income, immigrants and socially isolated populations are attracted to the area, for its cheap real-estate value, bad image, crime rate, racial concentration, etc., while it is systematically avoided by the middle- or high-incomes and/or the "ordinary" native population. However, SRA asserts, the effect of structural context is by no means inevitable, but also contingent on the actions of actors towards it. The crucial point is that context makes some things easier for some actors, and more difficult for the others, so that it enables some actors and constrains others. In other words, outcomes of actions are contingent upon the strategic choice of agencies as well as the preference of the context.

Actors are stressed in SRA as "conscious, reflexive and strategic", and expected to act, in principle, purposively to realise their intentions, interests, and preferences (Hay, 2002, p.131). It presumes they are capable of formulating a strategy on the basis of their evaluation of the immediate as well as long-term consequences of their action. This process is not determined simply by the material circumstances in which individual/collective actors find themselves, but relies considerably on their learning capacities, preferences, and experiences, obtained through their previous actions. Interests and preferences will be formulated differently by different actors even though they are in similar material circumstances. By the same token, as none of the environment's and the actors' internal components are considered static, actors may revise their former strat-

egy later. Also, actors may act intuitively and/or out of habit. Nonetheless they, by and large, act consistently with their perception of strategic context and their individual and/or collective interests and preferences, since even intuitive and routinized practices contain some strategic moments. Such intuitively strategic action can be ideal-typically distinguished from more explicitly strategic action, as the components of the latter are subjected to interrogation and confrontation.

Intuitive or not, strategies of actors inevitably mediate through their perception of the context in which they find themselves. Jessop stresses that "reflexivity involves second-order observation of one's situation, actions, and its repercussions on one's own identity and interests" (Jessop, 2001, p.1229). Put differently, when actors monitor, calculate, and judge the constraints and opportunities of the situation, they are acting recursively and reflexively on the already active and ongoing interplay of structure and agency. More recently, SRA has extended the focus on perception by claiming a dialectical-relational understanding of the ideational and the material to be logically consistent with dialectical-relational understanding of structure and agency. With this extension the discursive dimension – "the intersubjective production of meaning" (Fairclough, Jessop et al., 2002) – is stated as equally significant as the material production, since both have a constitutive, reproductive and transformative role in the development of context-actor interaction. That is to say, the ideational and the material co-produce extra-discursive features of social relations and jointly affect the processes and outcomes of context-actor interplay.

In clear contrast to the rationalist argumentation, SRA asserts that no actor has access to perfect information. In other words, there is always some uncertainty about whether actors correctly evaluate the context and their experiences, whether their strategy is appropriate, and so forth. As there are always unknowable factors, outcomes of interaction between actors and the context are most likely to be "indeterminent, unpredictable and contingent" (Hay, 2002, p.211). Considering these aspects, SRA stresses that actors routinely make "cognitive short-cuts" by following what is generally perceived as more or less ordinary and right in the field they inhibit. The prevailing policy paradigm, for instance, is one of these cognitive short-cuts followed by policy-makers. In this way, SRA perceives that interplays between actors and the context *essentially* pass through the discursive field. (And this sets SRA apart from Archer's occasional transaction between the discursive and the material). The strategy of actors is dependent upon their perception of the context in which they find themselves. The perception itself is restricted to some degree by the *discursive selectivity of the context*, which constrains certain ideas (e.g. discourses and narratives) while encouraging others. This discursive selectivity, however, only has relative autonomy in relation to the selectivity of the non-discursive context, considering the necessity of practical adequacy for an idea to be causally effective.

Lastly, actors' strategic action can generate both intended and unintended consequences, and particularly unintended consequences are expected to encourage *strategic learning* among actors. This strategic learning can trigger reconsideration of prevailing understandings and may eventually reveal the misrepresentation and/or inadequacy of the context. Hence, SRA illustrates strategic-relational interaction as not only a path-dependent but also a path-shaping process. Figure 4 illustrates the SRA process.

Figure 4 Framework of strategic-relational approach



Source: Hay, 2002, p. 131

Outline of this study's conceptual framework

As mentioned repeatedly, this study envisages a reconciliation of the major controversies in socio-political theorisation – namely between reality out there and reality as human ideational production, the material and the ideational, nature and society, and structure, culture, nature, and agency. This objective is pursued by establishing an integrative framework based on SRA and CR.

The previous sections discussed the advantages of CR in overcoming the classic controversies. Yet there are also some shortcomings and risks of this conceptual theory. The major risks are, firstly, hardened ontologism, which drives towards a stiff analytical approach that is decisive about the material and the thought objects as well as structure, culture and agency to be constantly separated (cf. Roberts, 2001:Creaven, 2002:Kaidesoja, 2007). As showed by Archer's analytical dualism, strong ontologism is likely to result in too rigid, mechanistic and artificial separation of these key domains. It compromises a more thorough implementation of the dialectical approach, as envisaged by the more recent version of CR. Secondly, CR holds that construction of ideas necessitates material conditions, while material existence of the object maintains regardless of how it is understood. This ontological presumption can easily subordinate the ideational to the material, and thus excessively undervalues the autonomy of the former. This tends to downplay the causal power that emerges from ideational processes. Such subordination can ultimately downplay the agency's causal power too, as it leads to the neglect of her/his perception. By neglecting this aspect, her/his capability for interpreting the surrounding context is precluded. This type of analysis largely misses the perspective on the interplay between the inter-subjective ideational process and the agent's perception of the idea, which is the crucial element of her/his action. And lastly, similar to the last point, agentic power to act upon the external context can be limited also by downplaying her/his capability to learn reflexively from previous experiences. Many risks of CR raised here concern the different degree of power an analyst assigns to emergent properties, which are the novel elements evolving through interaction with other mechanisms. Reflexivity of agency is one of those emergent properties, though, as it is the case for Archer's morphogenetic theory, it is not always detected as a significant component of agency's causal power.

I find that SRA sufficiently overcomes these risks of CR. It still makes the distinction of the mechanism of context from that of agency possible without compromising the dialectical and inter-relational view of the

key domains. Furthermore, while the integrity of structure-agency is proposed by Giddens and Archer, SRA does not require artificiality of either methodological bracketing or analytical dualism. It instead requires the analyst to constantly go back and forth between one's caption of context and agency on the abstract level and their interaction on the concrete level. Here, (s)he has to always keep in mind to see these analytically separated domains together: That is to say, always try to put the agency in the context and the context in the agency. In this way, both their distinction and integrity can be logically maintained. In addition, in this CR approach structural context, discursive context, and agent are linked as mutually essential for each other's existence, so that structure, culture, and agent, respectively, are reconciled without costing each other's autonomy.

As is the general tendency of CR (and other disciplines), Jessop and Hay tend to refer to "context" as equivalent to the general term of "structure," meaning the man-made material conditions affecting agent's actions in many different ways. Nature is not particularly considered in their theoretical construction. I find that their notion of context can be sufficiently enhanced to "nature out there," that is, the nature (the object of intransitive knowledge) existing externally to human interpretation. This nature deserves to be recognised as an analytical category distinctive from structure, since it is constituted of the non-man-made self-sustaining mechanisms existing regardless of human physical intervention and knowledge. On the other hand, the interpreted nature belongs to the analytical category of culture that enables or constrains agent discursively. Actions of agent are unavoidably affected by both natures in these different categories. Although this study does not directly deal with the first-order nature so much, but more with the interpreted nature, it is still crucial to account for its existence. For such distinction prevents us from reducing nature to mere human cognition, on the one hand, and from excessive human confidence in conquering nature, on the other hand.

Figure 5 below illustrate an overview of this study's basic framework.

Figure 5 Adjustment of SRA to this study



3. Discussing Social Movement Theories

As discussed in the previous chapter, it has been a constant struggle in the social theorisation at large to overcome the disciplinary division represented by rationalists, structuralists and culturalists, and the theorisation of social movements has not been an exception. Disciplinary division in this category naturally focuses upon different things, which are, for instance, punctuated by McAdam and his colleagues as *means* (e.g. the mobilising structures for collective actions), *conditions* (e.g. political institutions and processes shaping collective mobilisation) and *norms* (e.g. meaning construction for collective actions) (McAdam, Tarrow et al., 1997, p.144). Despite the apparent value of these three elements, the general theoretical development has tended towards specialisation of individual disciplines rather than inter-disciplinary collaboration. For quite some time, many analyses of collective actions have been mono-disciplinary, and the crucial insights derived from the different key focuses have hardly made an effective synergy.

Responding to this situation, transcendence or bridging of the traditional difference currently becomes an agenda for many theoreticians in the social movement studies (Kriesi, Koopmans et al., 1995:McAdam, Tarrow et al., 2001:Klandermans and Roggeband, 2007).This study pursues this direction of social movement theorisation towards synthesis. However, as mentioned repeatedly, such efforts often result in internal conflict and inconsistency when the ontological and epistemological consequences of injecting new implications are not taken seriously (Jessop, 2001:Gofas and Hay, 2008). Formulation of a valid interdisciplinary and integrative approach requires a careful examination of fundamental differences between the foundations of each disciplinary thought and of what can go together and what cannot.

On this background, this chapter presents and discusses the recent developments towards a more integrative approach to studying social movements, which are to be implemented in the framework of this study. It begins by delineating the disciplinary fragmentation in the major social movement theories, which, in particular, gained dominance in the USA during the 1970s to 1980s. This is done by depicting the core components and shortcomings of the prominent theories of the rationalist, structuralist, and culturalist camps, respectively resource mobilisation theory, political process theory, and framing theory. It is followed by an overview of the parallel development in Europe as represented by the perspective of the New Social Movements as a preliminary step to bridge the disciplinary division. It is followed by the more current attempts of the social movement scholarship for synthesis, from which this study gets inspiration. The final part of this chapter concerns how to evaluate the achievement of social movement agents. First, the potential of Dryzek's "deliberative democracy" as the core concept for constructing a normative measurement of the movement's achievement is suggested. Second, it deploys Melucci's conceptualisation of social movement as a category of collective action. It presents his characterisation of diverse collective actions, which this study makes use of for the mapping of orientations of the targeted organic agriculture organisations. The implementation of those useful insights is explicated in the next chapter.

Development in Social Movement Focuses

US and European paradigms

The following sections deal with the selected social movement theories, which have been influential in the post-1960s' USA and Europe, and discuss their contributions as well as their shortcomings in terms of being integrated in this study's framework. The theories constituting the US paradigm are the *resource mobilisation theory* (RM), the *political process theory* (PP), and *framing theory*, while the *new social movement theory* represents the European paradigm. These theories replaced the dominant views that largely reduced social

movements to a sort of reflex to social unrest and anomy, psychological behaviours of the mobs, or expressions of class struggle.[21]

These distinct theories of the post-60s wave are chosen not only because of their wide applicability, but also because their evolutionary paths have certain advantages for this study. The development of the US paradigm incorporated a new disciplinary division among rationalists, structuralists, and culturalists in the contemporary study of social movement and collective actions (McAdam, Tarrow et al., 1997); i.e. RM is constructed on the rationalist tradition, PP on the structuralist tradition, and framing theory on the culturalist tradition.[22] For this "specialisation" in own disciplinary focus, each developed distinctive insights on a specific analytical level – macro (PP), meso (RM) or micro (framing theory) – as well as specific explanatory variables, models and hypotheses to work with. This disciplinary division, however, has being pushed towards the agenda of disciplinary collaboration in the last couple of decades (Kriesi, Koopmans et al., 1995:McAdam, McCarthy et al., 1996a:Crossley, 2002a:Jasper, 2007:Klandermans and Roggeband, 2007). Such collaboration, which began more like a sort of juxtaposition of strengths of each other, has more recently developed into a series of attempts to bridge the gaps and build syntheses. Those can serve as effective tools for this study's integrative framework.

Resource mobilisation theory: Rationalist approach

Basic components

Resource mobilisation theory[23](hereafter RM) emerged in the 1970s in the USA. The founders of this theory, John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald, used the prominent mass movements in the 1960s, as represented by anti-Vietnam war movements, civil rights movements and students' movements, as initial research subjects. Often reflecting own experiences in these popular movements, they are critical of the dominant views of social movement as a product of emotional and reactive actions (cf. Smelser) or relative/absolute deprivation in society (cf. Gurr) at the time. Instead, the RM theorists turn focus on distribution, acquisition and utilisation of resources in social movements. Social movements are construed as rational and systematic mecha-

[21] They do not necessarily devalue the traditional approaches. Rather, they constitute a critical assessment of the (over)emphasised elements and blind spots of the overriding perspectives. In this regard, they succeed the fragments of the old paradigms, rather than totally rejecting them. Crossley claims that critics tend to concentrate on the argument of grievance and strain in Blumer's collective behaviour approach by too easily neglecting his account of the relationship between agencies and their "creative and innovative impetus" to cope with the rise of anomie and strain in society. According to Crossley, Blumer has also enlightened such issues as movement cultures, identity, and the emotional bonds, which have only recently begun to catch attention in social movement studies. Likewise, he acknowledges Smelser's overarching capacity to deal with the diverse issues raised by individual theories of the new paradigm, though without making systematic connections among them (Crossley, 2002). New social movement theorists (mainly) in Europe, not only Habermas and his colleagues but also Manuel Castells, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, work on Marxism, though they are commonly critical of the classic tendency to reify class as the only force for social and systemic change. Furthermore, political process theorists like McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow claim Marx as their inspiration (McAdam et al., 2001).

[22] Of course, this is a generalised picture of these theories, and when we look closer they have overlapping elements. Nonetheless I use this generalisation because the core concepts of these theories used in this study, such as social movement organisation, political opportunity structure, emergence of post-modern conflict, are derived from this disciplinary division. The overlapping elements that actually cause inconsistency with their core theoretical framework will be discussed in the final part of this chapter.

[23] Resource mobilisation theory is often divided into two streams: the theory represented by the work of McCarthy and Zald is called the "entrepreneur approach," while the other represented by Tarrow, McAdam and Tilly is normally referred to as the "political process approach." In this study, resource mobilisation theory refers to the former.

nisms carrying specific interests in society, rather than as reflexes to anomie or expression of grievance. In this light, "organisation" is emphasised as the most crucial component of what they call *mobilising structures*, which are defined as "formal and/or informal groups, organisations and networks wherein people create relatively stable routine for their collective actions, and through which makes mobilisation possible" (McCarthy and Zald., 1973). They further developed the concept of *social movement organisation* (SMO), which was originally explained as a "complex, or formal, organisation which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (McCarthy and Mayer, 1987, p.20).

As this conceptualisation is founded upon the presumption of rational actors, SMOs are construed as interest maximisers, who are assumed to utilise their resources effectively to satisfy their common preferences. Consequently, the early studies of this approach tend to especially highlight the tendency of SMOs towards professionalization where paid staff handles the movement's "business" such as political lobbying, fundraising, and protest campaigns. Such professionalised and formalised SMOs are anticipated as key agents, or in the terminology of McCarthy and Zald, "movement entrepreneurs," who comprise the social movement industry (SMI). This view is further extended to the concept of the social movement sector (SMS) composed of existing social movement industries. In this view, individual SMOs, say, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and WWF must compete with each other for public and societal resources not only within their own movement industry, i.e. the environmental movement industry, but also with, say, the feminist movement industry, the peace movement industry, and many others in the SMS (McCarthy and Zald., 1973).

RM proposes a solution to the all too common free-rider problem. In response to the Olsonian collective action theory, which claims that truly rational actors will free-ride when they have a chance to obtain collective goods at the cost of others' effort, it suggests that participation of individuals could continue even when free-riding is possible. That can take place if an SMO manages to develop specific services which only participants can take benefit from, peer moral pressure as a form of solidarity, or "conscience constituencies" driven by the moral aspiration for good causes (McCarthy and Mayer, 1977:Crossley, 2002a:Yazawa, 2003).

Overall, the theory injects the familiar logics of economics and management into the social movement studies. It captures social movements as a space wherein SMOs compete with each other not only for public support (i.e. resources) but also for their own organisational survival. In line with the concept of competition it accentuates the view of individuals as rational actors who are calculating costs and benefits of their participation to a certain SMO. In this thinking, the success and survival of SMOs depend a lot on their efficacy for mobilisation, effective vertical organisational structure and attracting as many adherents as possible. Here, social movement is basically perceived not so far from ordinary business, and its major role is to supply the distinctive services which a certain part of the population wants to utilise. By the same token, the approach draws our attention to economic resources, since, like business enterprises, they are considered as the foundation for SMOs' efficacy and survival (Crossley, 2002a, p.85-86).

Criticisms of resource mobilisation theory

In the eyes of the critics, this (particularly early) thought of the RM puts excessive focus on formal and professional organisations and rational explanation of their actions, while underrating other crucial aspects. Tendencies like professionalization, bureaucratisation and de-radicalisation of SMOs are generally taken for granted or even understood as necessary for their development/survival. As claimed by Crossley, McCarthy and Zald's concept of social movement is "minimal," as they define it merely as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (Crossley, 2002a, p.85). In this sense, what constitutes social movements is, simply, aggregated preferences of individuals. This leads to the view of SMOs as mere carriers of preference. It also sees the preference of constituencies within the individual SMO as homogeneous, understanding them to gather for the same reason. This "minimalist" view inherently succeeds the typical rationalist presumption

that basically downplays the view of individuals as reflexive agents who can act differently upon the situation for various reasons. This presumption, which excludes "irrational" and contingent elements from focus, is the element that makes SMOs' activities predictable. RM is therefore quite effective at drawing diverse hypotheses, models and mappings of the agents in the social movement field. However, apparently, actual organisational life is filled with internal struggles between different values, beliefs, opinions and orientations. Its action always involves insecurity and guess-work as there is no such thing as "perfect information" enabling perfect strategy in the real world. Leaders are thus constantly facing difficult decisions between own and collective preferences and efficacy. Consequently, actual organisational actions often incorporate compromises and case-by-case or quick solutions, rather than the clear-cut search for organisational efficacy to achieve its distinctive preference.

Another criticism of the theory relevant especially for this study is that its rationalist foundation fundamentally conflicts with the proposition of non-rational factors such as the notions of "conscience constituencies" and "solidarity" (Crossley, 2002a). Albeit they constitute the core part of explaining how free-riding is avoided in the social movement field, conscience and solidarity cannot be captured by its very prerequisite of rational actor. These emotional components are, following the rationalist guideline, exactly "irrational". Similarly, by presupposing competition at all levels of social movement, the theory fails to fully explain cooperation and alliances among activists and organisations across different movements. In many parts of the world today, we can observe, for instance, the red and green coalition, i.e. the coalition between the labour movement and the environmental movement. Likewise, the organic movement in Denmark has collaborated with the labour movement, as pesticides were found to harm the health of agricultural workers. The best explanation that rationalist can provide is basically confined to strategic reason; i.e. that coalitions can be made either for mutual benefit or minimisation of mutual damage (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997).

While RM draws our attention to the strategic aspect of social movement, its conception has theoretical boundaries within the scope of the rational actor, who is supposed to work to optimise own benefits at all times. Activists are basically presumed to pursue relatively homogeneous developmental routes as represented by formal organisations and institutionalisation of those. This study shares with RM the focus on organisations' strategies and their tendency towards institutionalisation. Indeed, as pointed by McCarthy and Zald, resources, especially economic ones, are most often crucial for organisations to grow. They further enlighten us that resources may not only be the means but also become the ends of the organisation, as it tends to pursue own preservation after a certain developmental point (McCarthy and Mayer, 1977). These propositions might explain some actions of the organisation in focus. However, economic resource is after all only one of many factors that can determine the trajectory of organisation. Albeit economic resource may be more important for formal organisations – and their theory presumes the development of such organisational form inevitable – this study considers formal organisations neither necessary nor inevitable for social movements. History has shown that activists can still mobilise with loose and less formally organised structures. Non- or less formal structures, which are often characterised as grassroots and ad-hoc based groups and organisations, are detected in many cases as crucial drivers for movements (Canel, 1997:Brand, 1999:Rootes, 1999). That appears particularly to be the case for movements seeking radical change, and whose orientations do not fit with the usual game of institutional politics or even the "social movement industry". As asserted by, among others, McAdam, loose organisational structures as well as loosely connected organisational networks can more effectively boost the energy of the movement by arousing criticism of the dominant system than more formalised organisations (McAdam, McCarthy et al., 1996b). By the same token, as Melucci emphasises, activists may choose a less formal structure of organisation, as the form itself is a purpose of the movement. In this view grassroots activism is chosen precisely because the activists recognise the formalised style, typically based on professional and centralised organisations, as an incarnation of the oppressive power (Melucci, 1985:1996).

These criticisms do not negate the significance of formal organisations in social movement activism. Rather, they recommend a more multi-directional and heterogeneous view of the social movement field, wherein formal and less formal structures, competition and cooperation, economically rational and emotional actions, etc., co-exist. In this respect, RM fundamentally lacks is "contingency, emotionality, plasticity, and interactive character of movement politics" (McAdam, Tarrow et al., 2001, p.15) due to its foundation on an asocial and atomic rational actor.

Political process theory: Structuralist approach

Basic components: Political opportunity structures

This study also makes use of the notion of political opportunity structures (POS), which has currently been one of the most popular explanatory variables in social movement studies. One of the earliest works using this notion is Peter Eisinger's study on riot intensity in American cities (Eisinger, 1973). He describes the relationship between social movement insurgence and openness of the political system as an "inverted U"; that is to say, a very open political system tends to suppress the emergence of social movements by co-optation, and a very closed system suppresses social movements by direct and indirect forces. According to Eisinger and his followers, social movements are more likely to occur somewhere between these two extremes (Smith and Fetner, 2007, p.16). Later this concept of POS has been developed by many, but most remarkably by the so-called *political process* theorists represented by Sydney Tarrow, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. Tarrow's definition of POS explains the general understanding of this concept. He grasps it both in terms of opportunities and constraints:

> By political opportunities, I mean consistent –but not necessarily formal, permanent or national- dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics. By political constraints, I mean factors – like repression, but also like authorities' capacity to present a solid front to insurgents – that discourage contention (Tarrow, 1997, p.20)

Based on this conception, the political process theory (hereafter PP) views social movements as *challengers*, who are operating within the opportunities and constraints given by the political regime. Social movement actors are structurally situated in an inferior position with fewer resources and less access to routine decision-making than actors in the ruling regime. The latter, such as authorities, can influence policy decisions with considerably lower costs than the former, who are most likely outsiders of or the minority in the ruling system. The ruling system can also oppress challengers by enforcing direct and/or indirect force, for example by restricting citizens' gatherings or protest policing by law enforcement officials (Della Porta, 1996).

However, in this political process perspective, challengers can also gain power, particularly when opportunities widen due to, for instance, cracks in a ruling group, shift in political power, mitigation of legal restrictions on political activities, etc. Generally, these changes in POS are initially very subtle and are often caused by an accumulation of minor reforms. PP thus presumes activists' recognition of a slightest change in the POS as a necessary factor for the insurgence of movements. By the same token, it puts weight on how innovatively social movement actors utilise whatever is available for mobilisation. This has led some of political process scholars to extend the focus to cognitive and often psychological aspects, like McAdam's study on Freedom Summer (McAdam, 1986). Nonetheless, the scope of social movements in a challenger-regime relationship highlights the interaction between social movement actors, their potential coalition partners, and their opponents. While POS is regarded as the crucial determinant for the insurgence of social movements, the theory does not see activists (i.e. challengers) as submissive to them. On the contrary, they are to develop tactics and action repertoires which make sense for the population in the historic and spatial location in which they operate (Tilly, 1995). In this light, the theory embraces a much broader sense of "resources" than the RM theory, which mostly concentrates on economic resources. Social movement actors

utilise many other types of resources, e.g. various social and cultural resources, such as traditions, rituals, emotions and solidarity.

Furthermore, the other crucial proposition of PP could be that the causal linkage can be found not only between openness of the political system and the insurgence of social movements, but also between constraint and insurgence of radical movements. For instance, it is claimed that strong pressure from the regime-side on oppositional activities can discourage moderate activism and only leaves space for radical activism. In contrast, the moderate wing of the movement may gain support from the regime if the regime intends to circumvent further radicalisation. This tendency is called "radical flank effect" (McAdam, McCarthy et al., 1996b).

POS is one of the most popular explanatory variables in the social movement studies and has become intensively diversified in the last three decades. Following McAdam, the overall "highly consensual" components[24] of the political opportunity concept can be summarised. He clarifies them on the basis of conceptualisations in the four remarkable studies by Brockett, Kriesi et al., Rucht, and Tarrow: 1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; 2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; 3) the presence or absence of elite allies and 4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam, 1996, p.27). The summary shows a clear tendency of POS to focus on particular units such as formal institutions, political elites and states.

Criticisms of the political process theory

The concept of political opportunity has been criticised from different angles. Firstly, the rising popularity of the concept since the 1980s has generated an uncountable number of variables in different comparative settings, and this has significantly reduced its analytical clarity. At the same time, the huge number of variables generated through various specific case studies not only lacks applicability to other cases, but is also hardly manageable (della Porta and Diani, 2006). According to William Gamson and David Meyer: "The concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment- political institutions and culture, crises of various sort, political alliances, and policy shifts" (Gamson and Meyer, 1996, p.275). In other words, the notion of POS risks its explanatory power by falling into a kind of tautology; i.e. anything generated social movement is opportunity in retrospective perspective (Smith and Fetner, 2007). Besides, the preoccupation with the overly extensive notion basically overshadows the emerging effects that challenger-regime interaction can generate. In fact, taking such effects into consideration, POS does not always function as a determinant variable, but occasionally as a dependent variable.

Secondly, critics stress that, while cultural and cognitive aspects are not totally neglected in PP, its exclusive focus on political structures underplays the significance of aspects like the role of values and norms, construction of common interests, emotional solidarity (Jasper, 2007) and knowledge (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991), etc. Based on this point, the popularity of the political process approach has caused the "political overload" in social movement studies (Melucci, 1985, p.798). The theory draws excessive attention to formal units like political institutions, predominant political/interest organisations and elites, while neglecting less formal movement actors outside the institutional politics.

Responding precisely to these criticisms, there is a growing tendency to extend the concept of political opportunities beyond the traditional scope of political-institutional structures. In this tendency, it is enhanced to the cultural-cognitive domain that deals with interpretation and attribution (e.g. framing process) by social

[24] McAdam extends or excludes several points during this attempt; see **McAdam, D.** (1996). Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions. In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, (ed. D. McAdam J. McCarthy and M. Zald), pp. 23-40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

movement actors (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). This extension was, however, clearly problematized by McAdam in his writing in 1996. At the time, he claimed that the structural reality of political opportunity and the socially constructed political opportunity must be distinguished, since such distinction "not only preserves the definitional integrity of political opportunities, but also allows us to discern two profoundly interesting empirical phenomena." Such phenomena could be the case where a popular political shift is achieved despite the absence of a powerful frame for collective action, and reversely, the success of a certain social movement frame even under closed political opportunities (McAdam, 1996, p.26).Just as RM assumes the rationalist premise, political process theory is "proudly structuralist" (Crossley, 2002a, p.124) focusing almost exclusively on the material aspect of formal political institutions. This does not leave much space for exploring interpretative processes among actors.

Frame theory: Culturalist approach

Basic components

While RM and PP follow traditional rationalist and structuralist foundations, another US-led development, frame theory, represents the "cultural turn" in social movement studies. Compared to others in social theorisation, the focus on culture, ideology, and frame arrived rather late in this field, as it was still preoccupied with criticism of the dominant collective behaviour approaches (Zald, 1996). According to Guigni, the frame conception constitutes one of the three streams of the culturalist social movement approach. One of the other two is the value-oriented approach, which explores relationship between social/macro-level value change and collective actions (Giugni, 1998). This is represented by the new social movement theory, which is discussed in the next section. The social-psychological approach highlights the cognitive processes of individuals who engage in social movements (see Eyerman and Jamison 1991 and Klandermans 1997). In contrast to those two, frame theory more directly focuses on how activists thoughtfully and tactically formulate their argumentation towards their constituencies. It highlights the role of culture in social movements' ideational and cognitive processes, while Eyerman and Jamison emphasise the impact of such a process on culture. This section focuses upon the frame theory of Snow and his colleagues, who are often considered pivotal for this turn with their framing analysis theory.

Based on Erving Goffman, Snow and Benford define frame as a "schemata of interpretation that signifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action in one's present or past environment" (Snow David A. and D., 1992, p.137). Hence frame helps people to "locate, perceive, identify, and label" events on the individual as well as wider social levels (Goffmann in Snow, Rochford et al., 1986, p.464). It organises and guides action by individuals or collectives. Snow and colleagues have also developed various concepts of frame, among them diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational dimension of framing. They claim that by identifying the process of framing conveying articulation of specific events as social problems, proposed solutions, and stimulation of motivation for taking action, we are able to capture how recognition of events and occurrences leads to actual mobilisation. Identification or, as they say "diagnosis", of certain events as a shared problem is the necessary step towards this objective. Without such diagnosis, events can be perceived merely as a natural phenomenon or issue of individuals. This symbolic construction enables a wider population to attribute to the "problem" in the first place. Simultaneously, activists pick their targets: They select which social groups to mobilise, and they appoint who is responsible for articulating their problem. Their formulation of solutions, strategies and tactics in relation to the articulated problem (i.e. prognostic framing) as well as of the rationale for taking action (motivational framing) is, thus, dependent on this selection.

Snow et al. overall conceptualise framing as a crucial strategic tool of the social movement agents for mobilisation, or in their terminology, micromobilisation. It is called micro to distinguish the focus of framing

from macromobilisation as seen in the transformation in political and institutional settings.[25] Here, SMOs are highlighted as the main agents of micromobilisation to persuade or influence target groups, namely, "adherents, constituents, bystander publics, media, potential allies, antagonists or countermovements, and elite decision-makers or arbiters" (ibid., 465). Alignment of social movements' interpretative frames with values, beliefs, and ideologies of the potential constituencies becomes of central importance, since it is an essential factor for the support and participation in collective action. Snow and his colleagues thus argue that participation of individuals in social movement actions necessitates frame alignment in which "some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow, Rochford et al., 1986, p.464). In other words, the success of the movement depends a lot on SMOs' ability to link individuals and social movements' activities, cause and goals. By claiming this, they reject the assumption of grievance – the source of social movements' contestation – as objective fact, which was widely shared in the movement studies back then. Instead, they claim that grievance is a product of interpretation of experiences, which are often evident and documentable. In this light, SMOs frame the world they are acting upon, and in so doing generate and diffuse their version of grievances.

Snow and his colleagues further identify the sub-categorical processes of frame alignment; namely, frame bridging, amplification, extension and transformation. Bridging of frames refers to "the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem". In order to mobilise their not yet organised constituencies, i.e. those who share the same or similar constraints or preferences, SMOs have to strategically connect the movement to the latent "unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters" (ibid. p.467). When this is not enough, SMOs may try to amplify and extend certain values which are well-integrated among the prospective constituents but not yet connected to collective actions. The neighbourhood movement, which was studied by those authors, for instance, associated itself with the values of family, ethnicity, property, and neighbourhood integrity, and by doing so it successfully mobilised sentiment pools. Frame alignment can go even further to implantation of new values while replacing old meanings and understandings. Such transformation can take place when the movement resides in hitherto socially unaccepted arenas and/or requires radical change in conventional practice. In that case, social movement agents may try to "key" constituents' attributional orientation by presenting a plausible alternative to the present pattern. Possibly this can give them clarity in the world and lead to redefinition, reconstitution, and "systematic alternation" of their worldview (ibid., p.474). Snow et al.'s study of several religious sects like Nichiren Shoshu and Hare Krishna illustrates this process that converts individuals' cognitive patterns and lifestyles.

In their earlier works, frames are typically stated as context-, group-, or even movement-specific. Their later work (Snow and Benford, 1992) develops a more generic type of collective action frame – the *master frame*. The master frame is distinguished from ordinary frames in its wider scope and influence. It becomes influential for its "articulations and attributions are sufficiently elastic, flexible, and inclusive enough so that any number of other social movements can successfully adopt and deploy it in their campaigns" (Benford, 2013). As such, master frame epitomizes a paradigm change and integration of the social movement idea in society at large. Meanwhile, becoming one of the popular and generic ideas means becoming more susceptible to appropriation by other movements. The typical case is the American black civil rights movement in the 1950s and 60s whose equal rights and opportunities frame was taken by several other contemporaneous movements such as women's, gay's, native Americans', and many others. Becoming a master frame, thus, indicates diffusion of the movement's theme to a wider public or its institutionalization in society.

[25] This micromobilisation can be better described as micro-meso mobilisation, as what they intend to capture is interaction between SMO and individuals. See more about this point in Steinberg, 1998.

Criticism of frame theory

Frame analysis has indeed brought idea back in the social movement studies and added a cultural dimension in this field, which was often denounced as overemphasising the material environment of political institutions (Melucci, 1996). Still, there are several known shortcomings of the frame concept of Snow and his colleagues, which are relevant for this study.

To begin with, their frame theory is criticised for treating frame simply as a tool for mobilising constituencies (Crossley, 2002a). This generally makes their frame analysis concentrate on symbolic construction during the mobilisation period, while underestimating long-term impacts of cognitive change. As suggested also by Melucci, the effects can be much stronger and long-lasting than the period of physical actions are visible. On a more fundamental level, critics claim that their frame theory overshadows the importance of the very struggle behind the frame. That is to say, it puts excessive weight on how frames are used by the movement actors, but fails to consider why such a frame emerges in the first place, the historical context and who brings it out. For instance, Crossley argues that discursive actions of the mental health movement intend to change the dominant perceptions of mentally ill people that are prone to isolate them from "normal" society. Framing activities for this objective thus are "intrinsically concerned, either in part or wholly, with question of recognition, representation and the dominance of cultural codes in institutionalized contexts of framing" (Crossley, 2002a, p.139). Their frame concept far too simply captures grievances as a product of interpretations, and does not acknowledge that an act of interpretation itself contains cultural struggle.

Enhancing this point, Snow's frame analysis is further criticised for overlooking the selectivity of the cultural-discursive context. According to Weaver's classic view and Bourdieu's more current one, those who are well-educated and (thus) attain high social status are most likely to have better chances than others at diffusing their ideas. Such property is often partially, if not totally, inherited from social-familial circumstances rather than established by individuals from scratch. Based on this presumption they propose an aspect of social class that is deeply rooted in both material and ideational conditions, and indeed, social pathology. The implication is that speakers do not enjoy equal opportunities to express their opinions but are inevitably affected by the contexts, norms, assumptions, and "baggage" of their personal lives. In this light, Crossley argues that the conceptualisation of framing has a tendency to detach issues of symbolic construction from those of power, "ignoring the central role of forms of symbolic power in the process of struggle" (ibid. p.140). Quite often struggles of the social movement against the dominant paradigm contain criticism of expert knowledge, as evident in the ecology and anti-nuclear movements. Movement agents not only compete with the established ideas but also deal with social structures and power relations discriminating the challengers. Crucially, this selectivity is most likely tacit, deeply enmeshed in every-day praxis, and hence are not necessarily noticed by people. Voices of those who are not in a privileged position are thus more easily dismissed and de-legitimised than voices of the privileged.

Steinberg more concretely asserts these deficits to be rooted in the ambivalence in the relationship between frames and discourse residing in the theory. Snow and his colleagues advocate "ideology or belief systems are interactional accomplishments that emerge from framing processes" (Snow and Benford in Steinberg, 1998, p.847). This appears to suggest frames as essential components of ideology, and constitutive of systemic beliefs on the inter-subjective level. However, this point contradicts their notion that frames are aligned with values, beliefs, and meanings of existing and potential constituencies. Their conceptualisation of frame alignment basically situates ideology and the larger belief structures external to the social movement's framing. According to Steinberg, frame theory thus postulates framing as a highly interactive and contested ideological process, and reduces discourse to "bearer of meanings" (Steinberg, 1998, p.845). As such it does not sufficiently explain the dynamic relationship between frame and discourse, as the latter is perceived as a variety of relatively static and objective cultural resources exploitable for the purpose of the movement actors. Steinberg in contrast claims that discourse is "an essentially ideological process when it intersects with the operations of power" (Steinberg, 1998, p.853). In this conception, discourse is embedded

much more tightly in the processes of ideological contention than the frame theorists imagine, and never bears meanings neutrally. Rather, it constitutes "an explicit battleground for ideological wars of position that are dynamic products of dialogic interactions" (ibid.).

Lastly, Snow et al.'s frame theory is problematized for its epistemology. Such criticism stresses limits and contradictions of its implicit foundation on RM, i.e. the rational actor model, and its irreconcilability with the constructivist caption of frames (Steinberg, 1998:Crossley, 2002a). Succeeding the rationalist tradition, frames are largely treated in a similar manner as material resources, which are to be rationally and strategically manipulated and disposed for the purpose of movement agents. However, handling frames as resources ("cultural resources") internally contradicts with their core assertion of frames as communicative and emergent process of reality construction (Swart, 1995). This constructionist claim simply clashes with the basic rationalist account of calculability and controllability of resources. This problem further permeates their connotation of effective frames with "empirical credibility," which appears to assume that some agents have access to objective facts (Crossley, 2002a). In the basic constructionist view, such perceived "facts" are to be critically captured as products of discursive construction. Hence, the direct linkage of frame and objective fact violates its conceptual foundation. In the constructionist stance, reasons for successful frames should not be sought in the correctness of the agent's interpretation in relation to reality, but rather in why that particular construction is recognised as truer than others.

All in all, the rationalist heritage reduces frames to an overly utilitarian, pragmatic, and static view. This reduction is the major element that enables simplification of otherwise complicated discursive processes, and thus, makes them manageable. However as a cost, frame theory largely downplays the much more disorganised and discontinuous aspect of ideational process (Steinberg, 1999). Frames and discourses are after all not "self-contained and given packages of meanings" (Crossley, 2002a, p.140). Equally problematically, the theory's simplification has a tendency to reify analysts' construction of activists' discursive processes. This study intends to overcome this problem of reification by employing the method suggested by Sayer (see previous chapter). Analysts must not only situate themselves as re-constructors of the targeted agent's discursive activities but must also perceive their own reconstruction to be essentially contingent upon their personal perceptions and life experiences. More precisely, analysts of discourses and frames must constantly distinguish their analytical construction and the empirically evident sequences of texts and sayings. The next chapter illustrates this study's approach to frames and discourses in more detail.

New social movement theory

While the above sections concentrated on the post-60s development of the predominantly American social movement theorisation, the following sections firstly sketch the European approach, represented by the so-called New Social Movement (hereafter NSM) theory. NSM theory is based on several different theoretical foundations, not least neo-Marxist and post-Marxist orientations. Thus it may be more proper to treat it in plural. Yet as widely acknowledged, some general features make it meaningful to categorise it as one family of social movement theory. Just mentioning some, the initial NSM thinkers commonly assert the contemporary social movements that surged in the 1960s and 70s, as represented by the peace movement, the ecology movement, the anti-nuclear movement, the women's movement, etc., contain new struggles that are fundamentally different from the "old" mode of social movements, e.g., the labour movement which envisages universal emancipation by a particular class. This assertion was grounded in their emphasis on remarkable social changes in the post-war period in Europe; above all, the transition from industrial societies toward post-industrial societies which are more complex and disorganised in nature. Such societies are regarded to generate new values, which are more oriented towards non-material (or post-material) considerations of well-being and self-realisation, growing focus on living in harmony with nature/non-humans, "quality of life," and identity. Considering this social/societal transition, NSM thought explores the newness of the contemporary movements; for instance, its general orientation that does not directly target the struggle against the "mode of production" and/or the issue of distribution to attain equality in a material sense.

This section focuses on the two major NSM theories: the theory proposed by Jürgen Habermas and his colleagues and Alberto Melucci's. After an outline, the potential of their theoretical insights, despite the often raised criticism, is discussed.

Habermas: Colonisation of lifeworld

Perceptions of the new social movement by Habermas (Habermas, 1981) and his colleagues of the critical school are generally founded on his conception of colonisation: Contemporary social movements surged in their fight to defend the autonomy of the lifeworld from "colonisation" by the state-market system. For Habermas the post-war structure is built upon an institutionalised relationship among capital, labour, and the welfare state, wherein labour almost abolishes its revolutionary goal and accepts capital growth as a necessary engine for distributing the wealth gained by such growth in society. In this situation neither growth-driven capitalist market development nor extension of the welfare state's control over private lives are confronted by the labour movement. NSMs are found to emerge as a result of this new struggle evolving "at the seam between system and life-world". In this view, NSMs are formed and shaped on the critique of the "old" movement path. They problematize the "rationalisation of the lifeworld" taking place in the course of the systemic functioning of the economic-administrative complex. Habermas asserts that such rationalisation is characteristic of modern societies with inherent complexity, which requires more rational media that enable measurement and coordination of individual success in instrumental terms than linguistic and communicative media. As the system's instrumental logic expands, the lifeworld is growingly rationalised or "culturally impoverished". This is because social exchange for establishing common values and/or understanding is supressed under this condition wherein "power and money" are the mediator for exchange. For this reason, Habermas argues, NSMs find their struggle in everyday life, amongst the deeply-penetrated and highly "institutionalised role of the employed and the consumer, the client and the citizen" (Habermas, 1981, p.36).

Extension of Habermas: New Social Movement as New-middle-class radicalism

Claus Offe further extends Habermas' colonisation thesis by emphasising contradictions of the welfare state. One of the main contradictions is the inability of the administrative-political system to transform or limit itself when its tasks expand with the diffusion of welfare state. The system can no longer relate to other subsystems, most remarkably the social and economic systems (Keane, 1984). Based on this presumption he sees NSMs as a civic response to the increasingly dysfunctional welfare state systems in dealing with emergent global and local threats and risks (Offe, 1985:Kitschelt, 1990). Offe asserts;

> All major concerns of new social movements converge on the idea that life itself- and the minimal standards of 'good life' as defined and sanctioned by modern values- is threatened by the blind dynamics of military, economic, technological, and political rationalization, and that there are no sufficient and sufficiently reliable barriers within dominant political and economic institutions that could prevent them from passing the threshold to disaster (Offe, 1985, p.853).

Existing institutions are found unreliable in terms of their citizens, and more fundamentally, their practices and functions are the very problem that NSMs are combatting. This leads to the theorisation that legitimizing their general propensity for non-institutional or even anti-institutional orientation, as represented by the preference for direct actions over conventional tactics and grassroots and flat-structured organisation over centralised organisations. Consistent with this, they generally claim that this system's dysfunctionality can only be corrected by pressure from the outside. NSMs' non-institutional strategies are understood as an effort to break the "vicious circle" driven by, on one the hand, the dominance of the economic-administrative system over individuals' private lives (the lifeworld) and, on the other, the diminishing self-control of such system (Offe, 1985, p.844).

Furthermore, the Habermasian NSM thinkers tend to construe the general feature of NSMs as middle class radicalism, or more precisely *"new"-middle class radicalism*, which was after all "*self-limiting*." This obser-

vation highlights the overall preference of these movements for transformation of the dominant format for morality, while they, by and large, eschew the traditional Marxist ideology of the revolutionary path brought by a specific class (Cohen, 1985, p.664). Instead, NSMs are said to represent "post-material values" that gear the focus towards, among other things, direct democracy, participation, self-help, pacifism, egalitarianism, and ecology (Cohen, 1985:Dobson, 1995:Carter, 2001). In so doing they draw attention away from the issue of redistribution;

> "…the radicalism of the middle class is directed mainly to social reforms which are basically moral in content… (W)hereas [the working class radicalism] holds out the promise of benefits to one particular section of society (the working class) from which its own supporters are drawn, [the middle class radicalism] envisages no rewards which will accrue to the middle class specifically, but only to society at large, or to some underprivileged groups. It argues in fact that the main pay-off for middle class radicals is that of a psychological or emotional kind - in satisfactions derived from expressing personal values in action" (Parkin in Turner, 1994, p.93-94).

Many in this theoretical line observe that the morally-oriented new-middle class radicalism of NSMs stands on a thin line with "moral crusade," which is directed more to the defence of a traditional (or pre-industrial/modern) society and values (Eder, 1985). For them, however, NSMs should be distinguished from anachronism or nostalgia, since they basically envision "an already (yet incompletely) modernized life world" rather than the lifeworld before or without modernity (Cohen, 1985, p.710: Habermas, 1981). According to Jean Cohen, the direction which these movements push forward is the *further modernity*, i.e. "the incorporation of the achievements of cultural modernity into everyday life" that would replace "*gemeinschaftliche* coordination of social life by potentially self-reflexive forms." This process towards further modernity involves, in her citation of Habermas, "selective institutionalisation" of the potentials of modernity, as characterised by "reflexivity, autonomy, freedom, and meaning" (Cohen, 1985, p.711. Italic added). Such a process necessitates institutional developments in society that induce the double-sided effects of "domination," on the one hand, and the basis for "emancipation" on the other (Cohen, 1985, p.712). In this line of thought, modernisation of the lifeworld will

> "differentiate off autonomized subsystems and at the same time opens up the utopian horizon of a bourgeois society in which the formally organized spheres of action of the *bourgeois* (the economy and the state apparatus) form the foundation of the post-traditional lifeworld of the *homme* (the private sphere) and the *citoyen* (the public sphere)" (Habermas, 1998 (1989), p.328 Italic original).

This leads to the conception of NSMs as the "modern critique of modernisation" (contra anti-modernisation) (Offe, 1985, p.850). They are to operate right on the "'democratization dynamic' of everyday life" (Johnston, Larana et al., 1994, p.7), wherein they are imposing the other side of the modernisation process, namely emancipation of individuals and the public sphere.

New social movement trajectory towards institutionalisation: Offe

The normative role of new middle class is further highlighted by Offe in relation to the additional two social groups: the "peripheral" group, typically middle-class housewives, pensioners, adolescents (students), and the unemployed, and the "old middle class," composed of the self-employed such as farmers, shop-owners, and artisans. These groups share two important structural characteristics with the new middle class. On the one hand, the members tend to have cliental relationships with providers of social and personal services, e.g. pensioners and social workers, job consultants and the unemployed, teachers and students, lecturers and housewives taking a course, etc. They are more likely to be affected by the life interests of the new-middle class from which they receive services. Yet, what he regards potentially more significant is their commonly "de-commodified" status, characterised by relatively lower penetration of cost-benefit logic in their professions or the like in comparison to business people. Offe assumes that those in "the peripheral group" become active in social movements by reacting to the commonly shared suppressions: 1) "exclusion" from the con-

ventional forms of political and social participation firmly attached to the labour market and formal large-scale organisations; 2) substantially lower degree of personal autonomy in their conditions of life; and 3) increasing institutionalisation of the norm of how non-work life should be (e.g. the norm of public institutions on the unemployed), which pressures the autonomy of these groups even harder. On the other hand, the participation of "the old middle class" in the contemporary social movements is considered to revitalise traditional conservationism by fuelling the notion of "ethical, religious, and aesthetic values of unspoiled nature" and their "fears about urbanisation and industrialisation." Offe observes this revitalisation typically in the ecology movement (Offe, 1985, p.859-860).

Albeit this heterogeneous component of contemporary movements can cause fragmentation and inconsistency, it is exactly in this heterogeneity, i.e. "ideological plurality," that Offe finds their potential to change the conventional polity. He sees the NSMs' potential for connecting the new and the old political thoughts and praxis and extends the scope of NSMs to the sphere of institutional politics (Offe, 1984, p.295). His theory in this way diverts the tendency of Habermas and other NSM thoughts to determine the contemporary social movement as a socio-cultural type of movement operating outside the political sphere. His observation of the *fundi-realo* (fundamentalist-realist) division in the Green Party of the then Federal Republic of Germany shows a glimpse of such a political alliance in reality. In 1990, he described the actual experience of this party, which is often identified as the NSM party, in the generic cyclical perspective. By applying the Olsonian collective action problem, he states the entry of NSMs in the formal political sphere is inevitable for overcoming the stagnancy of the movements. Yet this entry inherently results in the classic dilemma of "the iron law of oligarchy", which assimilates social movements to "bureaucratisation, centralisation, alienation, and de-radicalisation" (Offe, 1990, p.240): indeed, the Green parliamentary members "quickly and effectively adopted all the essential elements of the parliamentary discourse, and simultaneously abandoned much of the discourse of anti-institutional movement politics" (Ibid. p.245). Furthermore, he presumes that NSMs would not escape from institutional learning for conventional political praxis, due to not only pragmatic reasons for own survival or pursuit of power, but also their "striking absence of models and designs for alternative political institutions" (Ibid. p. 245).

At the same time, Offe observes that the fundamentalists' rejection of institutional rules of the game will not totally disappear in the Greens' politics because, despite the marginalisation, it still makes sense. This "stubbornness" and "persistence" of fundamentalists can be validated, on the one hand, because there are always some areas of everyday life, such as "health (including sexual) practices, nutrition, gender and family relations, socialization and education practices, environmentally relevant styles of consumption, drug use, various forms of crime and violence, or the treatment of ethnic and other minorities", that public policy cannot totally regulate (ibid. p247-248). As such, maintenance of order in these areas requires alternative regulative instruments residing closer to the lifeworld itself. He also suggests that the standards of "constitutional democracy" are most often settled by political elites to suppress activities leading to disorder and disloyalty to the state system. (He here focuses on the Federal Republic of Germany as a strong case of the phenomenon "state fetishism"). Incorporation with routinized institutional politics and forms of action can mean "virtual corruption of the cause of any movement" (ibid. p. 249). In his view, anti-institutional fundamentalism may thus persist as long as some part of the population is sensitive and reflexive enough to the elements of domination and injustice in the existing praxis of "democracy." The implication here is that a pro-institutional strategy cannot be completely integrated in movement politics, so long as NSMs are driven by an "ethic of conviction" and their means and ends are to confront expansion of technical and calculative procedures brought in the course of elite/state-driven democracy programmes (Ibid. p.250).

Melucci's New Social Movement perspective

While the aspect of cultural struggle, which emerged with various post-modern values, constitutes the crucial part of Habermasian version of NSM, Alberto Melucci goes a step further into the exploration of the role of culture in the modern social movement. His theory is often categorised as a cultural version of NSM (Giugni,

1998), though I also regard it as an insightful attempt to link rational, structural, and cultural aspects of social movements. This study takes inspiration from his perspectives of NSMs and utilises his analytical concept of collective actions introduced in *Challenging Codes* (1996) to formulate its own analytical map of the targeted organic organisations' development. This latter aspect will be further explained later in this chapter and in the chapter 5. The next step is to outline Melucci's NSM theory.

Melucci characterises the (post-)modern world by its increasing complexity, which arose with the diffusion of plurality, diversification and an abundance of messages. Due to this growth in complexity, society can no longer be identified in totality, as it began to be composed of a web of highly differentiated networks. As such, it does not contain one centre but many. Here, values, norms and identities are increasingly fragmented, and the unitary principle ceases to exist. Modern complex societies are in a constant state of uncertainty and become extremely dependent on symbolic codes and signs that determine how things make sense to people. What emerge with this process are new forms of social control derived not only from the control over production, accumulation, but also from the circulation of information and knowledge. Power for this control is not only arbitrarily distributed, but also hidden behind the dominant logics, rules, and rationalities of administrative procedures. In other words, the distinctive aspect of power in the modern societies lies in the capacity to manage dominant codes at the symbolic and discursive level. Thus issues concerning knowledge, including access to information and media, collective identity, spiritual guidance and so forth, become new sites of conflict in the modern "information societies". Knowledge production turns out to be a contentious arena where the dominant apparatuses of "facts" are challenged by the oppositions who envisage appropriating the borders and definitions of everyday life.

Based on this thinking, Melucci construes NSMs as a form of collective response to the drastic breaching of individuals' symbolic lives by the instrumental logics of hegemonic codes:

> Movements orient their strategies towards the recovery of the dimensions of symbolic existence eradicated by the operational model of technical rationality: Resistance to instrumental investment and to deferred satisfaction of relational and affective needs, the recovery of fantasy and play, the symbolic relationship between humankind and the environment, the revival of the mind/body relationship (Melucci, 1996, p.358-359).

Hence, the (contemporary) movements are challenging such hegemonic codes (e.g. "the operational model of technical rationality"), with their alternative codes. He asserts such act of NSMs is extremely crucial today, since the fundamental problem of contemporary societies rests precisely in this area of cultural conflict, especially around values, identities, and meanings. Furthermore, challenges in the symbolic field are potentially so powerful for bringing substantial change. It is because mega-apparatuses, such as states, transnational institutions like EU and UN, and domestic and global liberal markets, all rely on information. He further sees the effects of culturally oriented movements to be much greater and durable than the brief moments of mass mobilisation and media attention. Social movement for Melucci keeps residing in society, even when it appears to end, activists leave and their organisations dissolve, as long as the cultural struggle articulated by it is acknowledged. As a result of the growing diversification in the post-industrial societies, the power of the state for integration and centralisation of social functions is clearly decreasing. Consequently, social movements of today can more easily express themselves without mediating centralised institutions and organisations. He asserts that these conditions can allow constant ambiguity in the understanding of "reality" and thus enable even a few, weak, and resource-poor actors to address their issues by sending out information. If this is done through proper channels, they can have an enormous effect far beyond their size. He thereby sees the normative role of NSMs in transforming the dominant symbolic order, and eventually healing the hiatus between system and individual life: "(i)f it is possible to remake the world by adopting new ways to nominate, perceive, and imagine reality, it may once again become possible…to recompose the various parts of the self" (Melucci, 1996, p.358).

Criticism and potential of New Social Movement theory

In contrast to other NSM thinkers, for example Melucci and Alain Touraine, who anticipated more vigorous potential of NSMs for coalescing into a grand movement, the Habermasian theses of the 1980's presume rather limited emancipatory potentials in NSMs. Especially Habermas saw most NSMs, except feminist movements which he witnessed in the then Federal Republic of Germany, as too defensive and driven by particularistic aspirations. He admits that such particularism can have a "new conflict potential" if it generates autonomous subcultural communities for collective identity, and thus can contribute to the revitalisation of communication in the lifeworld. However, in his observation, those movements were more likely to remain "resistance and withdrawal" movements, as they tended to overlook the significance of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialisation in deeper modernity. He found that they too hastily determined modernisation only negatively without recognising that self-conscious and reflexive individuals and civil society develop from it (Habermas, 1998 (1989), p.393-396). Needless to say, such individuals and civil society are the essential element for the theory of democratisation of Habermas and the critical theory school.

This rather pessimistic observation has encountered sharp criticism. According to Cohen, Habermas' early focus was centred on the abstract level of cultural modernity and the micro level socialisation processes of individuals, which he saw as the main locations for emancipation. This focus, however, left him in an abstract overview of these movements and the largely underestimated the power of civil society to diffuse cultural struggles even beyond the cultural sphere. In this view, his scope hinders more vigorous perceptions of NSMs as "carriers of a new collective identity, as capable of institutionalizing the positive potentials of modernity or of transcending particularistic and expressive politics" (Cohen, 1985, p.710-711). Cohen conceptualises civil society as a much more active and dynamic site than Habermas; namely as "the domain of struggles, public spaces and political processes", which "comprises the social realm in which the creation of norms, identities, and social relations of domination and resistance are located" (Ibid., p.700).

Furthermore, the general assertion of the Habermasian NSM theory that contemporary movements are driven by the new middle class, post-material values, and cultural struggles, is often confronted as well. Crossley argues that although the theory acknowledges the overrepresentation of the new middle class in NSMs, it does not go into the analysis of what has caused this overrepresentation and what the nature of this class is, i.e. whether it is a faction of the existing middle class or a completely new sort. As a result, it does not answer important questions, such as what this class is representing, i.e. interests of citizens at large or those of a particular class, and whether their success indicates authentic democracy or further domination by the middle classes[26] (Tilly, 1985:Crossley, 2002a, p.163-164). The Habermasian emphasis on the new middle class is said to fall into the same pitfall as the classic Marxist proclamation of a particular class as the driver of emancipation, which, ironically, these NSM thinkers are explicitly critical of (Panicker, 2008).

The common criticism of both Habermasian and Melucci's NSM perspectives targets their overemphasis on cultural cause of the contemporary movement at the cost of the on-going significance of material struggle. Melucci's opposition to "political overload" results in "cultural overload". This criticism further highlights the theory's foundation on dichotomy between not only "cultural" and "political" but also "new" and the "old" and "system" and "lifeworld." As this dichotomic relationship is drawn in mutually antagonistic ways, their interchange is not sufficiently considered in the NSM perspectives.

Finally, as the NSM theory is initially derived from the focus on social phenomena in Europe, its applicability to a non-European context is frequently questioned. This point also resonates with the general criticism of discussing modernity, which sees the concept itself to present the hegemonic status of the West as more progressed and advanced than other societies.

[26] Offe appears to have better insight on this issue. Yet his view of NSMs' ideological heterogeneity and absence of a clear political programme emphasises the ambiguity of the common political norms for this class.

Acknowledging these criticisms, I find that the insights of their NSM perspectives are still valuable at inquiring the directions of the contemporary social movements, including the target of this study, the organic agriculture movement. As critics correctly point out, empirical evidence does not entirely fit with the propositions of the theory. As illustrated in the previous chapters, organic agriculture organisations have been going back and forth between these boundaries, and even after they accepted institutional strategies, non-institutional strategies persist rather than disappear completely. Thus the characteristics of NSMs are certainly more fluid and non-static than the theory suggests. Yet I stress that the significance of the NSM perspective ultimately does not lie in the precision of propositions in directly observable phenomena. Rather, it is its exploration of emerging roles and effects of social movements in society at large that we can make a good use of. The theory sheds light on the normative aspects of the contemporary social movements, i.e. *why* movements arise today. This aspect is relatively absent in the US approach, which tends to concentrate more on the issue of *how* movements develop. Based on this orientation it makes a plausible linkage between social movements and wider societal/social changes which the general progress of the "modern" society anywhere can encounter.

I also find that many proposed aspects of NSMs are applicable to non-European contexts; the worldwide movement is an example. Diversity within this movement does exist and some are also connected to radical activism oriented to direct actions with or without physical violence. For instance, it is not surprising that many activists of Earth First! or radical animal rights organisations such as Sea Shepherd are vegans or vegetarians who prioritise organic food. Yet it is safe to say that what is generally self-claimed and acknowledged as the organic movement, as represented by the international federation for organic agriculture movements (IFOAM), has manifested itself with some of the NSM characteristics in certain points of its history. For instance, the very demand for organic food is quite often derived from the growing focus on non-materialistic values such as responsibility for future generations, animal welfare, life-style, and so forth. Since organic agriculture puts extra tasks and risks on farmers, it tends to require a certain economic stability among consumers to reward (or compensate) their work and loss in yield. As such, the role of "new-middle class" as the social group that is over subsistence level and can afford to pursue a non-material focus can be crucial.

The NSM perspective is beneficial also because it opens our eyes to interactive and conflictual relationship between activists, the administrative-economic system, and cultural struggles, which emerge through the transformation of society (e.g. negotiation between welfare state, capital, and labour or metamorphosis to information society). Unlike the US approach, discussed above, whose insights are limited in their disciplinary field, the NSM view fits in the overall outline of this study's framework based on relational interplays between actors and their contexts as well as the material and the ideational. It depicts activists as agents representing and defending the lifeworld. They combat the new mode of domination, such as cultural impoverishment by colonisation of the lifeworld or dominant symbolic codes. As a result, they are expected to potentially divert the dominant developmental trajectory, which is built by negotiation between welfare state, capital, and labour or metamorphosis of society to information society, in a more civic direction; for instance, transformation of the dominant shape of democracy programme towards a more communicative and participatory one. The NSM view also crucially suggests that they are reflexive to their circumstances, which are ultimately derived from modernisation. By interacting with this double-edged modernisation process that brings both positive and negative effects on different levels of societies, they are to innovatively form their strategies, including unconventional ones to express their opposition to the dominant conduct. These theoretical insights are used as strong hypotheses, a possible way to explain the inter-relationship between social movement and the large social level transformation.

Towards Synthesis

This section discusses more recent attempts in social movement studies at an integrative approach. While the backbone of this study's conceptualisation is the strategic relational approach, the flesh on this backbone is

the elements of these attempts. The section begins with extended usage of resource mobilisation concepts. This is followed by the leading PP theorists' proposal for the new agenda, which provides a way to integrate the formerly divided theoretical insights in the US approach. The final part of the section illustrates the outline of two theories this study uses to evaluate the effects of the social movement in question in society. The first one is a more recent version of NSM thinking within the conceptualisation of deliberative democracy proposed by John Dryzek. The other is Alberto Melucci's theory of collective action.

Extension of resource mobilisation concepts

While the rationalist foundation of the resource mobilisation theory does not fit with the relational footing of this study, the concepts of the theory, as represented by resources and organisations in the social movement field, are still useful research tools. The attempt at re-formulation intends to extend the concept of resource beyond material terms and towards inclusion of non-material elements such as "authority, moral engagement, faith, friendship", which create solidarity networks (della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.15). As mentioned earlier, those were raised by the resource mobilisation theorists, but they were inconsistent with the rational actor model on which the theory is founded.

The focus is not limited to professional groups and organisations, but includes those with more informal and loose structures, and is oriented towards non-institutional actions, such as direct actions. This study agrees with the resource mobilisation theorists that SMOs are the key social movement agents. However, it sees the path to professionalization as just one option among many, and acknowledges that their capability to innovate own "mobilisation technologies" reaches much broader areas. According to Mario Diani and Paolo Donati, the organisations, for instance, may focus on the maximisation of support from the general public through growth in membership and fundraising (i.e. mobilisation of money), or to motivate members and adherents to contribute to the actual day-to-day organisational works (mobilisation of time). In this view, they can develop different resources by choosing different strategies: They have to choose whether they develop as professional organisations or invest in establishing solidarity networks among constituents. The other choice is between employing conventional tactics such as political lobbying or unconventional ones as represented by direct actions (Diani and Donati, 1999).

A similar perspective of diversity in organisational directions is developed by Hanspeter Kriesi. He identifies different organisational trajectories based on goal orientations and action repertories. Goal orientation concerns whether the main target is constituency/clients or authority, and action repertoires whether the organisation requires direct participation of its constituency or not. Kriesi's typology of social movement organisations, as illustrated in the below figure 6, suggests the following directions (Kriesi, 1996).

- *Institutionalisation* is characterised as a path to becoming more like a party or an interest group. It inclines to result in the moderation of its goal and its integration in the established policy channels for interest representation. While organisations in this category hold clear political goals and target authorities, they do not require direct participation of their constituency.

- *Commercialisation* is characterised as a path to becoming more like a service-oriented organisation which puts remarkable weight on the provision of paid services to the members of its constituency. Organisations in this category tend not to require direct participation of their constituency.

- *Involution* refers to the tendency to become more like a movement-like association, self-help group, a voluntary association, or a club, due to the aim to cater some daily needs of constituency of the movements. Organisations in this category may involve direct participation of their constituency, but it is derived exclusively for the interest of own constituency or client.

- *Political mobilisation* refers to the tendency of organising collective action based on direct participation of constituencies and adherents with a clear orientation toward authority. This is the category SMOs belong to.

- *Radicalisation* is a path to reinvigorated political mobilisation. Organisations in this category obtain



clear political goals, and require direct participation of their constituencies.

Figure 6 Typology of movement-related organisations

Source: (Kriesi, 1996, p.157)

His typology clearly reduces social movements to "political" mobilisation, and non-political aspects of social movements as raised by the NSM theorists are either neglected or reduced to the "movement-like" activities. Nonetheless, I consider his focus on the organisations' choice of participation style (i.e. requiring direct or not-direct commitment) and the target (authorities or constituencies) effective for the objective of categorising organisational directions. This study employs this part of Kriesi's typology together with Melucci's categorisation of collective actions (see below). The concrete shape of its mapping will be discussed and explained in the next chapter.

Another beneficial insight for the re-formulation of resource mobilisation concepts is provided by Rucht (Rucht, 1996). He contends that, although organisations are designed to collect and utilise resources, they also serve other purposes, such as "disseminating information within the movement, forging a collective identity, or satisfying the personal interests of the movement leaders" (Rucht, 1996, p.186). He injects NSM thinking into the conception of organisations not only as interest maximisers but also as mediators of symbolic codes. Rucht argues that while large-scale and complex movements are inclined to develop formal, professional, and centralised structures, small and/or less mature movements tend to prefer structures that can exert various functions. There are two models of organisational structures for large movements: "the interest-group model," which is oriented towards influencing policies, for instance via lobbying, and "the party-oriented model," which targets the electoral process and party politics. The structure of small move-

ments is described as "the grassroots model," with a relatively loose, informal, and decentralised structure of non-conventional protest politics and engaged constituencies (Rucht, 1996).

The Programme of the Dynamic of Contention

In their 2001 book *Dynamics of Contention*, the above-mentioned PP theorists, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly made a notable attempt to revise the orientation of social movement research. What they call the "classical social movement agenda", referring primarily to the key explanatory variables of the three social movement theories, i.e. resource mobilisation theory, their own political process theory, and the framing theory, are revised into a new conceptual framework.

McAdam et al. work precisely with the disciplinary division in the social movement studies into rationalist, structuralist and culturalist. They assert that this division has not been useful for disentangling and understanding diverse processes of social movement, as insights from each theoretical domain are treated in isolation from others. They propose that the important discernments from all three should be adopted into a more relational framework. Their *Dynamic of Contention* (hereafter DoC) programme intends to shift research agenda from vilification of selected variables towards identification and analysis of similar causal *mechanisms* and various *processes* recurrent in diverse political contentions. The key targets are:

- *Mechanism* refers to "a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations."
- *Processes* are "regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar transformation of those elements" (p.24).

Based on this focus, different developments of political contentions are investigated through an analysis of diverse combinations of mechanisms that have generated dissimilar processes. The research anticipates identifying, specifying, and comparing general mechanisms and processes to arrive at a partial explanation for the dynamics of social struggles, i.e. interrelationship between actors, mobilisations, and trajectories (p.34). Furthermore taking this relational and dynamic footing, DoC conceptualises all mechanisms as interlinked and combined in the continuum of contention, rather than each one being able to single-handedly determine the outcome. These mechanisms are roughly depicted as follows:

- *Environmental mechanisms* refer to externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life.
- *Cognitive mechanisms* that transform individual and collective perception (understanding, recognition, interpretation, etc.).
- *Relational mechanisms* that transform connections among people, groups and interpersonal networks (p.25-26).

The DoC programme further re-formulates the classic key explanatory variables. First of all, it claims that political opportunities and threats are not "objective categories" but are intrinsically dependent on *collective attribution*, i.e. collective interpretations and understanding. From this point of view, "no opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilisation unless it is visible to potential challengers and perceived as an opportunity" (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001, p.43). The traditional POS perspective is denounced here, since "[C]ommon properties across historically and culturally distinct settings do not consist of similar large structures and sequences but of recurrent causal mechanisms concatenating into causal processes" (p.24). This proposal for POS revision does not deny the significance of political settings which exist before and after the rise of activism. Rather, it suggests that the social movement inquiry must shift focus from political-institutional settings *per se* towards how such settings are *perceived* widely by challengers and ruling elites.

Furthermore, as the conception of opportunities and threats is understood to be contingent on collective interpretation, they are subject to be misunderstood, intentionally dismissed, or simply overlooked. As these points suggest, the DoC programme clearly departs from the structuralist foundation of the political process approach and moves towards what they call "relational realism" (p.23). This conceptual direction intends reconciliation of the constructivist accounts of interpreted reality with the presence of "reality" outside interpretation. And it resonates with this study's position of critical realism.

DoC programme further revised the perception of other classical social movement agendas, such as "mobilising structures" and "frames." In this revision, agents of social movements, SMOs, are understood to actively adapt to new situations. It also borrows from RM thinking, which presumes them to be atomic, homogeneous and rational. In contrast, the programme highlights the role of actors, most notably, challengers (activists) and members of the system (elites) to act upon the changing environments. Crucially, this new formulation emphasises their ability to utilise cultural resources over economic resources, since in real life, challengers are more likely to practice under economic deficits and uncertainty. Hence McAdam et al. assert that it is often "creative cultural/organizational work" that enables mobilisation of resource-poor or oppressed populations, as demonstrated by the case of the US civil rights movement. Leaders of the movement enabled the historically large mobilisation of the Afro-American population by effectively transforming conservative black churches, which had been inactive in politics and functioned simply for religious practices, into a vehicle of protest. This transformation was brought about largely by their effort to redefine the church and collective identity for the objective of combatting racial inequality. Consequently, the concept of frames is extended from a simple strategic device to "interactive construction of disputes" emerging among "challengers, their opponents, elements of the state, third parties, and the media" (p.44). In so doing the DoC programme draws our attention to interpretive processes between rivalry agents: among other things, those processes that lead to the attribution of new threats and opportunities and "the reimagining of the legitimate purposes attached to established social sites and/or identities" (p.48) are found especially important.

This revised frame concept brings collective cognitive-interpretative processes of agents to a much more contested place than the original formulation of frame theorists. By situating processes of movement agents face to face with those of the governing agents of the system, it scrutinises how certain symbolic constructions are formulated, appropriated, and innovatively re-formulated through interactions. This conceptual drawing has a better capacity to explain the developmental process of masterframe than the proposal by Snow and his colleagues, which tends to reduce it to a product of the agents' strategic efficacy. Furthermore, its new formulation of opportunities to be contingent upon collective interpretations can conjoin with the emerging concept of discursive opportunity structures (DOS), which signify the influence of widely spread notions in the political culture on the capacity and success of frames (Koopmans and Statham, 1999:della Porta and Diani, 2006:McCammon, Sanders et al., 2007).

The revised framework of the DoC programme is illustrated in the figure below.



Figure 7 DoC view of member-challenger dynamics

Source: (McAdam, Tarrow et al., 2001, p.45)

Reformulation of new social movements: Dryzek's theory of discursive democracy

While the DoC programme suggests a way to integrate POS (structures), actors, and frames (culture) into a relational perspective, this study finds John S. Dryzek's (Dryzek, 1990:2000) theory of *discursive democracy* useful. The study employs his theory as a plausible extension of the NSM theory, which can connect American insights with the larger social processes of modern society called democracy. Furthermore, it provides the worthwhile discussion on the normative role of social movements today.

Social movement and democracy

One of the central themes evolving in the struggles of the contemporary movements is democracy (della Porta and Diani, 2006), and the theorists dealing with this issue commonly suggest the significance of a vibrant *civil society* and *public sphere* to achieve such a goal. This study resonates with Dryzek's theory of discursive democracy (for him synonymous with deliberative democracy). He asserts that the conceptualisation of democratic forms must be grounded on the critical theory of communicative action which anticipates the rise of oppositional civil society and public sphere; and the theoretical construction of such a *democracy must safeguard pluralism, non-coercion, transnationalism, and ecology*. Maintaining a critical edge in the democratic theory is essential, especially today when "democracy" is increasingly defined by the statist and liberal constitutionalist models. He claims that these dominant models are proven to be insufficient to deal with plurality and difference; the liberal version of deliberative democracy is after all only limited to citizens' participation in symbolic terms, but not quite in substantive terms. Conditions for real deliberation will not be facilitated under a liberal state, because, considering the post-Cold War context in which the state itself is unavoidably under pressure by the transnational capitalist economy, the extension of civic influence on the policy-making sphere does not benefit the state. Rather, the state must concern itself with its own sustenance and is driven to secure the investors' interests rather than civic participation.

Dryzek's theory of deliberative democracy, then, anticipates a politicised civil society, which entails *critical* public spheres, as the major alternative to state for pushing the "authentic" deliberative democratic process forward. Civil society is focused here, since it is considered to have real potential to function as an autonomous and "relatively unconstrained" domain (Dryzek, 2000, p.103). Approaching an autonomous critical

civil society requires several ideal conditions for deliberation. First of all, by extending Habermas' theory of communicative action, he emphasises the centrality of communication –"be it storytelling, testimony, rhetoric, greeting…and argument" (ibid. p.68) – among engaged and competent citizens through political interaction. He further asserts that deliberation must develop distinctive kinds of communication that neither concerns nor invokes any kind of coercion, such as "domination via the exercise of power, manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, deception, expression of mere self-interests, threats, and the imposition of ideological conformity" (ibid., p 8). Secondly, deliberation must allow people to reflect upon preferences, values, and judgements; in other words, people are open to transforming their preferences during the course of interaction. In this light, preferences are understood to be fluid and contingent on the processes of communicative interaction, since communicative interaction aspired here is oriented towards mutual understanding rather than aggregation of preferences. And lastly, extending the last point, the desired deliberation is essentially dependent on *communicative rationality*, which is antithetic to instrumental rationality. Communicative rationality for him is the capacity for mutual understanding, nourished via interaction among engaged political actors. In this thinking, rhetoric and discourses as well as humour and emotion, which are often considered irrational, should be highlighted, since "rationality" also becomes a subject of social communicative construction.

State imperatives and social movement

His theory particularly stresses the significance of the critical civil society and public sphere as the key domain for the "authentic" deliberative democracy. However, this is not to exclude the democratic potential of the state. On the contrary, he asserts that the state continues to be the main apparatus which obtains the actual capacity for making collective decisions on social problems. The true sense of democratisation certainly requires a truly democratic state, and it is possible to transform the state in that direction: Yet for this transformation the vibrant critical civil society and public sphere must be established. Consequently, he explores the relationship between state and social movements, the latter as the womb of the critical public sphere. The proposition here is that the development of a critical public sphere is largely dependent on the character of the state, most notably the degree of inclusiveness of the state structure to interest representation.

The assertion of the state's structure resembles the traditional POS approach, and indeed Kriesi and his colleagues had earlier suggested the same terms as inclusive and exclusive to exemplify the characteristics of the state (Kriesi, Koopmans et al., 1995). However, Dryzek's proposal is different from the general POS approach in some crucial respects. Above all, his theory gives clearly more power to social movement actors to choose their own direction based on their ideological packages and movement's interest. (Yet for some his theory still does not give sufficient power to social movement agencies. See the discussion on state imperatives in the next chapter). He proposes that the movement's effective inclusion in the state sphere relies heavily on whether its objective of activism can be connected with one or more *state imperatives*. He identifies the following five core imperatives of state:

1. domestic order,
2. survival,
3. revenue,
4. securing of economic growth, and
5. legitimation.

If the social movement can attach its defining interest to one or more core state imperatives, then "there are in principle no limits to the degree to which the movement can penetrate to the state's core" (Dryzek, Downes et al., 2003, p.164). Therefore, the pursuit and entry of a movement in the state can pay off. An ex-

ample is the inclusion of environmentalists under the Nixon administration in the legitimation crisis. Around 1970, the administration opened the door to environmentalists to divert a further rise of oppositional movements of the New Left, especially anti-war, civil rights, and women's liberation. Dryzek argues that the administration deliberately selected the environmental movement among other contemporaneous movements because it was expected to have the least potential for radicalisation. Some of the environmentalist interests managed to reach the core of the state during that phase, as seen in the establishment of various public and semi-public agencies for environmental protection and resource management as well as the implementation of instruments such as impact assessment.

On the other hand, he asserts that inclusion of movement actors in the absence or failure of this linkage with the state's core imperatives often results in co-optation and draining of the movement's energy (time and resources) for formal procedures without producing significant impact on policy. For instance, the aspect of co-optation can be seen in the experience of Germany, where inclusion of environmental groups in the apparatus of the Ministry of Environment has been so evident unlike in other policy areas. In his observation, the Ministry was weak in relation to the more classic ministries and government departments that deal with the core issues of the state. The Ministry of Environment tended to function as a co-optive device, hindering the penetration of environmental objectives in the more substantial part of, say, social, economic and security policies. Overall, in his proposition, it is not beneficial for social movement to enter the state if its interest cannot be connected with a state's core imperative. Under these circumstances it would be better for the movement to cultivate its oppositional position outside the state and take para-governmental actions. Entering the state by simply compromising its goal is more likely to result in a mere symbolic accomplishment, or otherwise the rewards may be very little.

Implications of social movement's strategy

He strongly focuses on this aspect of a movement's choice to be included or staying in opposition, since this is the issue that directly affects the nourishment of the critical public sphere and hence democratisation. His major point is that *inclusion of social movements in the state apparatus is not always good for democracy or achieving the substantive goals of the movement*. Hereby the general assumption of the state's inclusion of movements as positive is reversed. Dryzek and his colleagues' study of the environmental movement in four countries, i.e. Germany, Norway, the UK, and the USA, (Dryzek et al. 2003) demonstrates this point: The oppositional green public sphere has developed less in Norway, where the "actively inclusive" state allowed the entry of major environmental groups into the relatively wide-ranging official committees and facilitated subsidies for them. As a consequence, Norwegian environmentalists hardly bark even when they should (e.g. at Norway's involvement in commercial whaling), and the government has even more rarely given heed to their bark. In comparison, a more substantial development of the critical green public sphere has taken place in Germany, considering that its "passively exclusive" state does not provide easy access to the state core, but, crucially, allowed relatively autonomous space for public discourses to grow outside the state. Based on this observation, Dryzek et al. argue that, although higher inclusiveness can mean a more democratic state, this should not be regarded to coincide with the development of a vibrant critical civil society. An inclusive state and political system can indeed deplete the democratic potentials of the public sphere, since such a state is more likely to interfere with the autonomy of the latter. And as the public sphere is construed as "a reservoir for future democratization of the state" (Ibid, p.106), its depletion is estimated to have negative effects on the development of an authentically democratic state.

His theory provides a causal-relational perspective on why some actors choose to enter the formal institutional sphere while others do not, and also, crucially, whether that choice can be beneficial for the movement or not. Furthermore, as mentioned in the last sub-section, he links the deliberative turn of democracy with communicative processes, civic participation, and critical civil society and public sphere. In this view, discourse is the foremost significant process of public communication (or debates) wherein diverse and competing perspectives are negotiated through contestation. Like other theorists of deliberative democracy, among

others Habermas, his theory is normative in character, requiring ideal conditions for communication. Yet, it is safe to say that his normative perspectives more explicitly emphasise the participation of citizens, rather than elites, in this discursive contestation. This leads the social movement research to the exploration of whether the actual development is approaching such ideal conditions, and, more concretely, whether social movement actors still contribute to the nourishment of a critical public sphere that opposes to the hegemonic discourse. Considering today's situation, the strength of such a public sphere to confront the (neo-)liberal discourse is particularly crucial for searching for models of democracy *beyond* the limitations of representative democracy, capitalist state, and laws. Social movements are thus assigned to be the major catalyst of critical discourse which can eventually lead to the significant, not merely symbolic, social change; that is to say, "whatever the character of the state, movements can affect social outcomes by changing the terms of discourse and so political culture, and contribute to the production of paragovernmental solutions" (Dryzek et al., 2003, p.195). This study integrates this normative view of role and potentials of social movements.

Melucci's theory of collective action

Basic concept

Alberto Melucci's culturalist perspectives of new social movements were introduced above, and this study makes use of his analytical perspectives more concretely in its framework. The conceptual foundation of his theory of collective actions (Melucci, 1984:1985:1996) shares a lot with critical realism in claiming that the inquiry should not restrict itself to the observed empirical phenomenon. If our minds are firmly set on observable events only, we naturally conclude that any social movements, whether new or old, are always composed of convergent elements, and thus the claim of newness is easily disputed. Instead he argues that the question of "whether there are dimensions to contemporary collective action which belong to a system analytically different from industrial capitalism" remains important (Melucci, 1996, p.202). What is required to pursue this question is an epistemological shift towards the view of *social movement as an analytical category of collective actions*, rather than as an empirical category whose entire content is observable to us. This distinction of analytical from empirical and of social movement from other types of collective actions are crucial for this study, since it can reveal the multiplicity and contradictions comprised within what is called the "organic movement". More precisely, his analytical method is applied to examine how the strategies of the organic organisations at different times have moved from one type of collective action to another.

Procedure

In this outline, it is possible to identify in which system social movement action (or more loyal to Melucci, collective action) predominantly occurs, as well as at which system it is directed. This procedure naturally necessitates the specification of what system one (as an analyst) is referring to. Melucci claims there are at least four distinct systems: the system ensuring the production of a society's resources (e.g. capitalist mode of production), the system making decisions about the distribution of resources (i.e. the political system), the system of roles governing the exchange and deployment of resources (i.e. the organisational system), and the system of reproduction in everyday life (i.e. the lifeworld). This analytical conception of systems is not to claim the clear demarcations between them. Each is understood to be "incomplete in itself", and as entering and interacting with other systems. Their relationship is built on a hierarchy. However, at the same time, such hierarchy is enabled by "dependence" and "autonomy" of the systems. A dominant system is dependent on other systems, since its function is essentially enhanced or restricted by them. Autonomy thus coexists in this relationship, as each system has potential to influence other systems (Melucci, 1996, p.25-28).Having understood the contingency of this relationship, analysts are to identify *the prevailing system* which the focused activists are struggling with and acting upon, i.e. in his terminology, the analytical field of collective action. At the same time, his classification of diverse collective actions focuses upon *orientations of action.* Based on these criteria, the collective action in question is categorised by evaluating:

1. whether it associates *solidarity* or *aggregation*.
2. whether it involves *conflict* or *consensus*.
3. whether it involves a *breach of the limits of compatibility of the targeted system* or *maintenance of the system's order*.

Melucci broadly defines solidarity as "the ability of actors to recognize others, and to be recognized, as belonging to the same social unit" (ibid., p.23). Aggregation, on the other hand, points to an accumulation of atomized behaviours. The collective phenomenon with this orientation is then an end result of unorganised individuals' behaviours, which is only temporary and not embedded in the group. Concerning the second criterion, conflict or consensus, the focus of the former is control of valuable resources; namely conflict in the antagonistic relationship between one or more actors who intend to gain control of social resources valuable to each of them. By contrast, the latter (consensus) points to the collective phenomena mediating through the pre-existing rules and procedures for governing valuable resources. On the other hand, the third criterion, "compatibility" of the system signifies a variation of systemic mechanisms for enabling a system to maintain its structure. The boundaries of this compatibility are breached when collective actions are conveyed beyond the range of structural variability that the system can tolerate without changing its structure. This stance can be characterised as, for instance, interference with shared norms or simple violation of the law for the certain objective. The opposite orientation of this, i.e. the order-maintenance, does not induce effects that alter such variations, as it resides within the pre-existing and routinized structural boundaries. Based on this conceptualisation, diverse combinations of collective action orientation are possible. In other words, say, conflict-laden actions are not necessarily linked with breaching the system's limits. Breaching can also take place through collective actions which are not based on the adversary relationship. In the same way, orientation towards breaching of the boundaries does not always involve solidarity. Those which are often identified by collective behaviour theorists as behaviours of the mass are a good example. They can disrupt the order. Yet the participants do not necessarily act under the common identity or purposes, and their disruptive acts do not always specify a particular adversary (Melucci calls this type of collective action "deviance").

These categorisations of Melucci are drawn into a figure below.



Figure 8 Types of collective action

Formulated based on Melucci, 1996.

4. Conceptualising institutionalisation of social movement

This chapter discusses the conceptualisation of the central theme of the study, namely institutionalisation. While this phenomenon is quite often theorised as a natural course of development or evidence of a social movement's "success", this study sees it as a contentious, versus merely procedural, process that the social movement can potentially, in contrast to will inevitably, enter.

This study basically deals with three different levels of institutionalisation. Institutionalisation on the macro-level in the general sense signifies the integration of organic agriculture in the policy and administrative systems. Institutionalisation on the meso-level, the primary focus of this study, refers to the tendency of organic agriculture organisations to be closer to conventional organisations in terms of structure and performance. And lastly, the overarching level of institutionalisation concerns the integration of (some) ideas of the organic movement into the general public, collective actors outside the organic agriculture community and formal institutions; or, more precisely, transformation of the organic discourse to a public discourse. The ideational change brought by this integration is regarded to generate change in prevailing rules and practices. These institutionalisation processes on the different levels can be interlocked, but that is not inevitable. That is to say, institutionalisation of an organisation does not necessarily lead to policy integration or a new public discourse and masterframe. Interlocking effects to other levels also depends on the internal and external contexts of the organisation, as this study illustrates in the case study.

Based on this thinking, this chapter intends to clarify, firstly, the characteristic feature of institutionalisation of organisation acknowledged generally in the traditional theories. This is the foundation for this study's classification of organisational strategy between pro-institutional and anti-institutional. The second part introduces Claus Eder's more discursive and social-constructivist approach to this concept, in which this study's conceptualisation of the overarching level of institutionalisation is embedded. Based on these traditional and the more alternative views, the last part of this chapter states the orientation of this study towards the concept of institutionalisation. This orientation extends focus from state and formal institutions to civil society.

The traditional explanation and its limitation

Institutionalisation is a classic theme and there exists a variety of definitions. According to Richard Scott (Scott, 2001), theoretician of new institutionalism, the approach to institution can be classified into three pillars: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. His distinction represents the traditional division in focus on rules, norms, or cultural schemes as vital components of institution. The understanding of institution differs remarkably especially between the first two pillars, which commonly see rules and norms as objective factors either imposing upon or internalising in individuals, and the cultural-cognitive one, which sees these factors as social ideational constructions. In this last perspective, the legitimacy of institutions to exert rules and norms is created in institutional life, while the former presumes that they are given (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). Naturally, such fundamental conceptual difference creates dissimilar visions of the actor-institution relationship among these three pillars. Despite the differences, though, there appears to be a certain agreement about institution as "a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property" (Jepperson, 1991, p.145), or that institutions "embody a rationalised perception of the world" that can devise rule-like principles for social actions (Scott, 2001, p.72). Institutionalisation can thus in a broad and simple sense refer to the process of attaining the status that can produce conventional and standardised orders or patterns in social (inter)action (Jepperson, 1991, p.145).

Social movement studies frequently approach institutionalisation as a certain pattern of organisational development in the movement field towards a more formal and bureaucratic structure and conventional tactics. This pattern is summarised by Hein-Anton Van der Heijden into three mutually reinforcing stages:

1) *Organisational growth* brought by increase in membership numbers and financial resources.

2) *Internal institutionalisation*, which is a consequence of organisational growth, is characterised with *professionalization* and *centralisation* of the organisation. Professionalization is represented by the replacement of organisational works, which were usually done by volunteers, by paid staff members. A typical evidence of centralisation is seen in the weakening of its decentralised structure, such as its local/regional units with certain competences and functions for mobilising members for the objective of the organisation.

3) *External institutionalisation* points to the way an organisation performs externally. In general, such organisational performance (action repertoires) can be characterised into the five categories: i.e. conventional actions such as lobbying and press declarations; direct-democratic actions such as referenda; demonstrative actions such as demonstrations and petitions; confrontational actions like occupations and brokerage; and violent actions such as arsons and physical violence against individuals. The first two can be categorised as the *conventional action* group, while the latter three as the *unconventional action* group. External institutionalisation then typically incorporates decline in unconventional action (radical, non-conventional, and extra-parliamentary actions) while increase in more cooperative practices with formerly adversarial actors, most remarkably, governmental ones (Van der Heijden, 1997, p.31-33).

Organisational development depicted as institutionalisation has long been considered a natural consequence of rationalisation prominent in modern society. And it has been prospected to replace the original movement's desire for radical change by reformism, which is not driven by the intention of challenging the existing order (Doherty, 1992). As such, institutionalisation of organisation is presumed to invoke de-radicalisation and/or de-democratisation of social movements at large. One of the strong classic theses advocating this scenario is Robert Michels's "iron law of oligarchy", according to which any type of organisation, including social movements, cannot avoid elite control, for tactical and technical necessity. Organisational growth due to increase in membership and resources induces complexity of tasks, and this naturally encourages bureaucratisation – creation of internal hierarchy – and specialisation. In the course of this development, the organisation becomes increasingly dependent on the administrative group composed of those with professional skills in handling complex managerial tasks. A development toward hierarchical organisation also brings centralisation of power by the leaders, enabling them to control rank-and-file members through selective recruiting of those who match their own preferences and manipulating what they know and do. Overall, the iron law of oligarchy asserts that any organisation sooner or later will be ruled by a small group of elitist leaders, who develop their cravings for power and access to the ruling elite. Thus, democracy and organisation cannot be fundamentally reconciled (Carter, 2001:Michels, 2001). In other words, organisation is by nature the problem for democracy –"Who says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels, 2001, p.241), while today's complex society cannot function without rationalised organisations.

His thesis published in 1915 is still of relevance in various current contexts. For instance, the development of the environmental movement into political parties in the last three decades is the highest level of institutionalisation of a social movement, while it contained the feature as a (new) social movement project for counteracting oligarchy. Taking the most institutionally successful case of the German Green Party, *Die Grünen* (since in 1990 *Bündnis '90/Die Grünen*), the iron law appears to have prevailed, as its founding principles of anti-party party (APP), which represented exactly these objectives, were largely given up along with its regular entry into *Bundestag* in the 1980s. APP envisaged two major components, i.e. the principle of grassroots democracy on the one hand, and anti-coalitions with established parties on the other hand. Based on this principle, the party started with an organisational structure alternative to the established political parties, the latter characterised by a hierarchical, bureaucratic, centralised, and professionalised structure led by a small elite and no requirement for members' active participation in party practices. Opposing these features of the traditional party, it initially implemented various unconventional attempts, such as the prohibition of party

post and MP post to be occupied by the same person simultaneously. Furthermore its MPs were not only rotated mid-term, they also received the average salary for skilled workers, and the rest of their parliamentary salary was donated to environmental causes. Moreover, the party honoured the principle of collective leadership, and did not have a party leader position. Instead of a single leader, it elected several national speakers to cover the task together with the federal party executive consisting of 27 unsalaried members. Another attempt at circumventing small group domination was free access to meetings for members as well as non-members. All these attempts were anticipated to prevent personalisation of the party as well as what Van der Heijden calls internal institutionalisation. On the other hand, the principle of anti-coalition was devised exactly to avoid what is termed external institutionalisation above. Alliance with other parties was rejected, since the pursuit of its grassroots democracy and extra-parliamentary objective was to be prioritised over political compromise inherent in parliamentary negotiation and desire for being re-elected (Bomberg, 1998:Carter, 2001). Yet despite these aspirations, the party underwent a division already in the mid-1980s between Fundamentalists (*fundis*), who were loyal to the original radical principles, and Realists (*realos*), who were more oriented towards the moderate reformist strategies (Offe, 1990:Doherty, 1992:Brand, 1999). At the end, the Realists won when the party encountered electoral challenge in the 1990s as the public focus shifted to economic and social problems, especially those caused by the German reunification. In the course of this development, some APP principles, most remarkably the principles of unsalaried staff (non-professionalization) and non-alliance, were dropped. The party's programme and principles in 2002 called *The future is Green* publicly announced this shift.

> Without our idea of "something totally new" we surely would not have achieved the successful introduction of ALLIANCE90/GREEN ideas into the political systems in east and west. Now, we are no longer the 'anti-party party' but represent an alternative in the party system. The decisive difference for us was that, in order to stay successful, we wanted and needed to develop into a party of reform. Today we are setting out to attain our political goals and realise our vision by implementing a long-term reform strategy (Alliance 90/The Greens, 2002, p.16).

Die Grünen's development can also be explained by another strong thesis of Mancur Olson, namely the free-rider problem; its membership growth stagnated when it reached a certain size, which ironically shows that the party's open democracy spirit worked against it. A wider public hesitated to join the party, which expected its members to engage in heavy volunteer tasks. After all, why did people have to be members, when non-members could participate in party meetings and debates and moreover reap the benefits of the party members' efforts? This point also suggests the oligarchic tendency of the party, as it, unintendedly, resulted in the overrepresentation of a small group of members who had time and money for regular commitment to the demanding party tasks (Carter, 2001).

The thesis of institutionalisation –organisational growth, professionalization, centralisation, and strategic shift towards cooperation with institutional actors – as inevitable trajectory for social movement appears to hold. However, these functional explanations of institutionalisation should be approached carefully. As claimed by Robyn Eckersley (Eckersley, 2004), the claim for "objective" necessity is difficult to disprove, since it can generally make sense in a wide range of contexts. Yet what this type of explanation is most often driven toward is an "overly deterministic understanding" of relatively persistent and/or recurrent social phenomena as if they are indisputable course of development (Eckersley, 2004, p.60). She suggests, from what she calls a critical constructivist point of view, that seemingly objective necessities are always mediated by cognitive practices and inevitably filtered through different social frames, conflicts and standpoints. The typical tendency of institutionalisation emerges precisely because there is general social consensus that this development is essential, rather than the self-manifestation of such essentiality. Furthermore, her view reminds us of the potential of social agencies to breach the hegemonic order, and history has showed that a breach can come from within the hegemonic system and from the outside. Considering these points, a functional explanation of institutionalisation must seriously bear the fragility of the predominant consensus on

necessity in mind. Consensus can be altered and crucially does not necessarily present the real existence of necessity for institutionalisation.

For this study, the traditional conception of institutionalisation focusing on empirical, material, and functional aspects of organisational development is still useful. Especially Van der Heijden's characterisation of different stages of institutionalisation, i.e. organisational growth, professionalization, centralisation, and decline in unconventional action, provides a simple and convenient overview of this process. The description of pro- and/or anti-"institutional," which is also the recurrent terminology of this study, refers more directly to this traditional sense of institutionalisation (see also the below section "Institutionalisation revised"). However, this traditional outline limits our focus on the anticipated correlation among organisational growth, need for economic resources and efficacy, and compromise emerge through entering the institutional political game. As a result, it does not sufficiently cover the issue of diversity and co-existence of contradictory strategies (pro- and anti/non-institution strategies) in the social movement field, which is the core focus of this study. Traditional outlines, after all, barely reveal the surface of institutionalisation process.

Alternative explanations of institutionalisation of social movement

Anticipating a more holistic and relational understanding of institutionalisation and persistence of non-institutional strategy, focus must be extended to the discursive-cognitive dimension that rationalises certain types of organisational strategy over others. In other words, the traditional explanation based on instrumental rationality and functionality which exclusively focuses on material change in organisation must be transcended.

This study's emphasis on the discursive dimension as equally important as the material one resonates with the typical NSM theory's presumption of organisations; that is to say, in the matured capitalist society with growing complexity and functional differentiation, organisations are highly dependent on their *cultural* capacity for rationalisation and legitimatisation. In other words, as claimed by Meyer and Rowan, what they actually do and what they claim they do are most likely only "loosely coupled". This does not mean the two parts are falling apart. Rather, they are complementing each other in attributing legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). Under these circumstances, the major political contestation moves to the discursive field. As a result, the discursive praxis of social movement actors for diffusing, coordinating and shaping movement discourses and frames becomes a crucial part of the activism, while the relative significance of collective action with physical presence decreases in comparison to before (Eder, 1996:Melucci, 1996:Dryzek, 2000). This leads to the idea of cultural struggles for symbolic codes as a major cause and driving force of the contemporary social movements. Based on this conceptualisation, this study includes an additional dimension of institutionalisation, namely, cognitive and normative institutionalisation.

Cognitive and normative institutionalisation

This additional perception of institutionalisation is taken from the work of Klaus Eder. In his *The Social Construction of Nature* (Eder, 1996), he theorises institutionalisation on the discursive, virtual level by tracing the path of environmentalism, which has undergone a remarkable transformation from a movement discourse towards one of the common principles of society in the past three decades. In his view, this development of environmentalism is composed of the continuum of two processes, i.e. *cognitive institutionalisation*, which is followed by *normative institutionalisation*. These inter-linked institutionalisation processes signify the integration of the environmental movement's idea into society, which, in turn, leads to a change in roles and rules which eventually brings change in practice.

His perspective of institutionalisation firstly understands institutions as rule systems. Rule systems have specific functions: organising social activities and structuring social experiences. While traditional and prominent conceptualisation –including Weber and Habermas – largely treats rule systems as norms based on formal rationality, he raises a critical point. Although such traditional conceptualisation explains an important

deal, it puts excessive focus on state and law by perceiving the legitimacy of formal rationality as given. Acknowledging this limitation, Eder instead calls cognitive focus back in institutional analysis, since cognitive mechanisms for symbolic construction are found to have increasing importance in modern institutional dynamics. Here, Meyer and Rowan's position is central. Legal rules and the state gain superiority over other rule systems, precisely because they are attached to formal rationality constituting the very mechanism of assigning legitimacy to an organisation. At the same time, such legitimacy is ever more dependent on a collectively shared "myth," rather than on actual practices of the organisation. Putting this cognitive/constructivist perspective into the organic agricultural context, one can say the organic standards are so powerfully diffused today, not because they automatically improve the environment and food quality but because they are constructed in the way people perceive they do by, for instance, massive information campaigns telling the reliability of inspection and accreditation systems. From this view of cultural-symbolic institutional analysis (Scott, 2001), organisational stability and growth rely much on incorporation with institutionalised myths. Institutionalised myths constitute effective cognitive rule systems, which are not essentially consensual but function *as if* they are consensual. Thus they can organise and shape a shared world, for instance by defining right, real, and important.

Organisations that do not attach themselves to formal rationality, must struggle for another form of rationality through collective actions. Organisations of NSM are a good example, as they manage to have their particular myths, which were different from those of traditional organisations, effectively rationalised and institutionalised. For Eder, the rise of such alternative form of rationality, as established by the contemporary social movement, is signified as cultural rationality[27] (versus formal rationality), which is formed in a life-world with its specific form of practical rationality. This point resonates with the general NSM thinking highlighting the significance of extra-institutional (parliamentary/government) activities of movement actors. Many environmental movement organisations intentionally choose a non-institutional strategy as they commonly consider formal institutions fundamentally flawed in terms of coping with environmental problems. Hence the movement myth diffused the idea of those institutions as the problem, not as the solution.

Eder's perspective emphasises the cognitive side of rule systems, which classify and order the symbolic world. These cognitive rule systems are seen as the foundation of the normative rule systems (e.g. laws, rules, and roles), guiding and orienting action. Negotiation for cognitive rule systems is necessary for normative action, since collective action for a certain goal will not take place without a shared understanding that the goal is important. However, an equally important point is that construction of cognitive rule systems or, in other words, reconstruction of social reality and institutionalisation of particular myths, can be realised only through effective reflection of the material reality of the world by collective actors (organisations): "There is no social construction of the world that does not use the elements of existing world" (Eder, 1996, p.199).

Furthermore, considering the present world, where diffusion of knowledge by individuals is becoming ever easier, integration of rule systems depends crucially on the organisational capacity for institutional learning. In other words, organisations today attain and maintain legitimacy not only by (re-)producing their conception of reality – myth – and frames but also by adapting to the new cognitive structures. Organisations are understood to inherently bring changes in rule systems and, at the same time, self-organise their transformation to adapt to the new state of rule systems. They routinely transform and adjust by selecting certain rule systems over others. And they have to, as they are connected to the dynamics of surrounding social and natural environment with which they interact.

Case of environmentalism

According to Eder, environmentalism has in the past decades fed such rule systems and become institutionalised both cognitively and normatively. Yet this institutionalisation has brought not only substantial develop-

[27] Eder prefers the term "cultural rationality" over Habermas' "communicative rationality".

ment in cognitive and normative praxis for environmental protection, but also a new struggle for the environmental movement and its discourse. He claims that the institutionalisation of the movement and environmentalism punctuates the end of environmentalism as a counter-discourse and the changing role of the movement. The former represents cognitive institutionalisation, the latter normative institutionalisation.

While the latter section of this chapter explains more in detail about this study's approach to discourses and frames, I draw briefly the basic outline of Eder's perspective on cognitive and normative institutionalisation of environmentalism. He begins with the rule systems spawned from environmentalism, which first diffused in the environmental movement through the efforts of collective actors. At this stage, environmentalism as a movement discourse was constructed by these actors who organised and structured variant frames. They rationalised the alternative mode of understanding nature that goes counter to the dominant modernisation thought proclaiming the exploitation and control of nature as necessary for human progress. This effort, *symbolic packaging* of variant frames, brought a cognitive order in the movement space, facilitating the sense of common culture and experiences among environmentalists, though these symbolic packages still maintained their distinctiveness, which he characterises as conservationist, political ecology, and fundamentalist (the last represented by deep ecology).

Along with the growth of the environmental movement, environmentalism as a counter-discourse was further diffused in a wider discursive space, which Eder calls the "public discourse marketplace". Unlike the previous time when the ideas of the movement remained within the movement space where the participants more or less agreed on the vital point of environmental protection, the entry of the environmentalist discourse into this marketplace indicates that environmentalists now must compete with their oppositional actors for the control and survival of their symbolic packages. Such discursive struggle in the marketplace generated self-propelling innovative processes, among others discourse coalition (cf. Hajer, 1995) which unites formerly unrelated frames. The discourse of ecological modernisation and its sister discourse "sustainable development" are prominent examples, which represent the reconciliation between ecology and economy. This reconciliation was extremely important, since it punctuates the significant transition in the discursive course of the environmental movement. Along with this coalition, the movement reversed its explicit criticism of modernisation thought, which condemns economic progress as not only incapable of solving ecological problems but as causing them. The discourse coalition has emerged through more frequent participation of environmentalists' former adversaries, as represented by states and corporations, in ecological communication. At the same time, the counter-cultural and protest claim-making by the movement declined, and advocacy of cooperation with former adversaries increased.

In Eder's view, the struggle turned environmentalism, particularly one of its variants, political ecology, into a *masterframe*. This shows that the discursive versatility of environmentalism transgressed the narrow territory of the movement but beyond it. He also stresses that its transformation into a masterframe demonstrates the penetration of "ecological reason" in people's daily lives. For instance, rapid diffusion of e-documentation elsewhere is driven not merely by the motive of convenience and cost-benefit, but surely also to reduce the consumption of natural resources. The emerging norm of corporate social responsibility reflects the increasing significance of integrating environmental protection in the corporate profile as it constitutes a general standard for legitimacy ("good practice") now. Obviously, the environment has turned into a routine and principle norm of the society at large.

Eder describes the development as cognitive and normative institutionalisation of environmentalism and the environmental movement. *Cognitively*, "ecology" now constitutes a "collectively shared masterframe of social reality". It has reached the stage of a political ideology that fills up the hole which the traditional ideological cleavage between left and right could not fill. The symbolic package of ecology has managed to bind

the elements of different political ideologies together for the political struggle of the environment.[28] In this process of symbolic construction in the public discourse space, other symbolic packages of environmentalism, namely conservationism and ecological fundamentalism, have lost their battle as they did not offer the ideological complementarity that ecology did.

Normatively, the environmental movements have integrated their forms of collective actions into an institutional order. Environmentalists have constructed certain organisational forms and action repertoires in accordance with their cognitive rule systems. And as discussed in the preceding chapter, those frequently took unconventional methods by reflecting their critical ideological foundation against the dominant order. Actions of the environmental movement organisations are based on their shared cognitive rule system (the shared ideational order of what should be done), but such actions also constituted a means for driving change in the institutional field. That is to say, while the diffusion of environmentalist discourse in the public discourse marketplace has brought the paradigmatic change in society about rationality, the extension of environmentalists' collective actions beyond the movement space has generated new institutional interaction and learning. Those have transformed the functional difference among the main institutions, according to him, *state*, *market*, and *civil society*, and thus changed the role of these institutions. As asserted by many, the environmental movement, particularly in its counter phase, has revealed the "state failure" to handle the environmental risk, and has often fiercely attacked the capitalist market as the root of today's environmental problems. The multitude of the criticism, which was launched by the movement but later extended to a wider public space, has significantly degraded the status of the state as the reliable regulator and guardian of citizens. By the same token, the ongoing ecological crisis in the age of neo-liberal globalisation dilutes the typical liberal idea of the market as a self-regulating system. Meanwhile collective actors of the environmental movement have established themselves as a representative agency of civil society. In so doing they have stabilised the institutional status of civil society. A new institutional order has emerged, which Eder calls the "post-corporatist order" (see Table 3 below).

Table 3: Overview of institutions

Institutional location (specific environments)	**Market institutions**	**State institutions**	**Civil society institutions**
Basic cultural consensus	Profit	justice	good life
Carriers (collective actors)	industrial actors	political parties and public administration status groups	NGOs, movement organisations
Social units	Classes	status groups	moral communities
Resonances	consumer behaviour	electoral support (voting behaviour)	media resonance
Media of communication	Money	votes	public discourse
Target publics	consumers	voters	opinion holders
Institutional myths	rationality	efficiency	Discursivity

Source: (Eder, 1996)

[28] One example is the distinction between "environmental" economics and "ecological" economics in academia. While the former is an attempt of orthodox economics to integrate environmental concerns, the latter intends to integrate economics into ecological dynamics. The latter requires more substantial conceptual change in the orthodox economics.

Institutionalisation revised

In this study, institutionalisation of the organic movement is seen in the continuum between cognitive change and normative change. The process of institutionalisation is understood to already begin when the ideas of the movement become a public consideration, namely, when they enter the space for public discourse. By entering this space outside the movement space, the ideas of organic agriculture/food which used to be shared only within the organic movement community became appropriated also by the state and the market. As presented in the above table, this struggle in the discursive field is considered to create a new institutional order, as the dominant cognitive rule systems and, subsequently, the normative rule systems are re-formulated and/or replaced. In this new order, the issue of "organics" is no longer neglected, but becomes an integral part of the general discussion. However, state, market and (organisations of) the organic movement continue to operate on fundamentally different objectives, routines and roles to tackle the organic issue. Thus the survival of the organic movement continues to rely highly on its discursive capacity to influence the thinking in the public via symbols, codes, images and narratives. This is not to deny the effect of the movement's capability to physically mobilise constituencies and economic resources. Rather the point is that the mobilisation of economic and human resources unavoidably requires the common recognition of the proposed collective action as essential.

This study considers professionalization, centralisation and conventionalisation of movement strategy not as the inevitable trajectory of institutionalisation but just as one possible path. Furthermore, it extends the focus of institutionalisation on the cognitive and normative integration of the movement's idea in the major institutional fields, i.e. state, market and civil society. Explicating this extension more concretely in its research topic, institutionalisation is pursued as the process of *transforming "organic" into a public discourse and a masterframe,* which can also lead to a change in the norms of agriculture and food across these institutional fields. This discursive process can potentially push the organisation towards the traditional sense of institutionalisation (as signified by Van der Heijden). Yet from the view of this study, such orientation is a product of cognitive changes within the organisation and, most prominently, the movement community. Professionalization, centralisation and conventional tactics are seen as the organisational choice rather than the "law of nature" for organisational evolution.

On the other hand, this study preserves the use of the term "(pro-)institutional" strategy in the traditional sense of institutionalisation of social movement organisation. Here, *the (pro-) institutional strategy refers to the approaching of the organic organisations towards state/formal institutional politics* and their *orientation towards professionalization, centralisation, and conventional action*. "Non-institutional" strategy, in contrast, refers to the organisation's strategic orientation towards staying outside state/formal political institutions. Following the insights from the NSM theory, *non-institutional strategy ideal-typically aims at differentiation from the institutional strategy*, i.e. grassroots organisation characterised by "loose, informal and decentralised structure" (Rucht, 1996) sustained by engaged members contributing to the organisation not for economic rewards. It is further expected to orient towards unconventional action forms, such as direct actions[29]

[29] There are competing definitions of direct action. The major dispute is whether the definition should be limited to non-violent actions. See, for instance, Carter, A. (2004). Direct Action and Democracy Today Cambridge, Polity. My understanding of direct action is based on Offe's view on "non-institutional action" in 1985, which I find still relevant for today. One of the two criteria he raises in his categorisation is whether the actor's means for action are recognised by the political community as legitimate or not. Taking this view, both legitimate and illegitimate actions within the existing political/legal system can be captured. Although violent actions by citizens are most likely to be recognised as illegal and thus illegitimate by the legal and political systems, I find that the concept of direct action should include violent action too, as "[T]he space of the action of the new movements is a space of non-institutional politics which is not provided for in the doctrines and practices of liberal democracy and the welfare state" (Offe, 1986, p. 826). That is to say, direct action is, whether it involves violence or not, rationalised by the actors, and this rationalisation (reason for action) often involves the observed limits of the existing institutional system. Restricting our focus on non-violent action can

and establishment of "alternative" community, market, consumer-producer relationships, etc., which are nonetheless dissimilar to the conventional forms of actions as represented by interest representation (lobbyism). Lastly, *"dual" strategy is the orientation towards the both strategies*, most frequently, the approaching to state/formal institutional politics while maintaining actions targeting civil society.[30]

Furthermore, the study emphasises the role of social movement in one of the core institutional fields, i.e. civil society.[31] Despite diverse and competing definitions, civil society is widely acknowledged as "the sphere of social life" (Alexander, Thompson et al., 2011, p.539), which is functionally and qualitatively different from state and market: It is composed of the sphere of intimate relationships (above all the family), the sphere of associations, social movements, and forms of public communication (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p.ix). It is an ongoingly idealised and imagined community demarcated by "feelings and values that stress solidarity among members of society, no matter what their status or power", and such solidarity defines democracy (Alexander and Thompson, 2008, p.538). Besides this virtual property, civil society also entails institutions, governed by particularly legal norms, which execute rewards and punishments for civil behaviours/actions. It is generally agreed that civil society is a specific institutional field, where forms of social and political interaction distinctive from those of state and market develop, and as the home of social movement (Cohen and Arato, 1992: Dryzek, 2000).

For theorists like Cohen and Arato, empowerment of civil society is inherently embedded in two processes: the self-constitutive and the self-mobilising process, on the one hand, and institutionalisation of envisaged norms, on the other hand:

> "The expressive, normative, and communicative modes of collective action have their proper place here [lifeworld]; but this dimension of collective action also involves efforts to secure institutional changes within civil society that correspond to the new meanings, identities, and norms that are created" (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p.531). [32]

In addition, owing much to their requirement for institutionalisation and "politics of influence", they further tend to argue positive effects of the "dualistic strategy" of social movement (Ibid., p.551). (Their remark is based on the "success" of the feminist movement in the US and Europe). This point, like Eder, is firmly grounded in the conviction of the effect of cognitive change (the rise of consciousness) on the actual institutional practices, including those of state and market.

Here, however, we are reminded of the persistence of functional and qualitative differences among these three institutional fields. The notion of state imperatives stressed by Dryzek (2000) is a crucial component of this reminder, warning us that, despite its significance in changing norms and practices, *cognitive change does not necessarily penetrate into the core of the state*. Environmental or feminist consciousness, for instance, has been diffused on the governmental level worldwide, though substantial solution implicating radical structural change has been constantly hindered by state and market. Acknowledging the limits of the state as the driving force for social change, he argues that developing a true sense of democracy requires a criti-

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overlook this very reason and background of the action. My understanding of direct action includes violent as well as non-violent, legal as well as illegal actions. Thus it refers to civil disobedience, strikes, marching, terrorism, ecotage, etc.

[30] My focus on and definition of these terms as "institutional", "non-institutional", and "dual" strategy are primarily inspired by Dryzek (2000), Cohen and Arato (1992), and Brand (1999).

[31] Rucht and Neidhardt propose an interesting thesis on institutionalisation of social movements in contemporary Western societies on the basis of revised theories of differentiation. Rucht, D. and F. Neidhardt (2002). "Towards a 'Movement Society'? On the possibilities of institutionalizing social movements." Social Movement Studies **1**(1): 7-30.

[32] These passages can also present their understanding of civil society as "institutionalized lifeworld".

cal/oppositional civil society, which is strong enough to resist subordination by state or economy. Outcomes of dual strategy and/or institutional strategy depend on the character and condition of the state at the time (see a more extensive discussion of this issue in the section in the next chapter "Outcome of movement's strategic actions"). Whether these strategies result in political efficacy, i.e. empowerment of civil society or co-optation, must be inquired in the actual cases rather than taken as given.

Considering these theoretical insights, this study explores outcomes of movement organisations' institutional strategy in relation to the degree to which it contributed to the empowerment of critical civil society. Put bluntly, if the organisation's institutional strategy has resulted in a decline in oppositional action (in both a discursive and a non-discursive sense), it is negative for the organic movement as a social movement and for the furthering of democracy. Like Dryzek, my normative perspective highlights critical civil society, since we today live in a world where "organic agriculture" is increasingly recognised *not* as a challenge to the existing political and economic order, but merely as one "sustainable" farming method/technique. Such recognition is not only shared by state and market actors, but is also an increasing part of the organic agriculture community. As explicitly stated by Melucci (1996), social movements can be defined by their collective envisagement for participation and breaching boundary of the system. In order for the organic organisations to drive a social movement, they must show their teeth against state and market when necessary. It is this study's intention to investigate the outcomes with this focus.

5. Towards Operationalization

As expressed in the preceding chapter, this study takes the strategic relational approach (SRA) suggested by two critical realist theorists, Colin Hay and Bob Jessop, as its basic conceptual framework (see Chapter 2). The insights of the social movement theories discussed in chapter 3 are implemented in this framework in a cohesive manner.

This chapter explains how the integrative framework is formulated and operationalized in this study. The first section states the concrete description of the operationalized conceptual framework for its specific research focus. The following section supplements the clarification of discourses and frames and the procedure for analysing them. The final section explains how this study intends to explore outcomes of the organisation's strategic choice for the organic movement.

Application of theoretical insights in the conceptual framework

Outline

As already stressed several times, this study envisages an integrated conceptual framework that can capture interplay between such collective agency as organisation for the organic movement and its external structures. This framework is based on the strategic relational approach (SRA) of Colin Hay and Bob Jessop, though their simple framework has to be elaborated and adjusted to the objective of this study. The most basic part of these elaborations was already introduced in Chapter 2. In this section, firstly, the application of the major insights of the selected social movement theories is introduced. Secondly, it explains an additional elaboration necessary for examining the internal dimension of organisation.

To operationalize this study's core external environments for the actor, i.e. nature, structure, and culture, it needs to reconfigure the simple implication of structure and culture by SRA. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Jessop and Hay construe structure (or in their terminology, "the strategically selective context") as the material sphere, and culture ("the discursively selective context") as the non-material. Following this, nature and social structure are bluntly configured as the former, and culture as the latter. More in detail, I recognise these three domains of external environment as mutually distinct for their characteristic properties: Nature contains self-sustaining ecological systems, social structure comprises institutions, and culture entails symbols and codes. Furthermore, they are seen as analytically distinctive structures that impose a selective environment of constraint and opportunity to different social actors. In other words, nature entails environmental opportunity structures; structure, political opportunity structures (POS); and culture, discursive opportunity structures (DOS). These opportunity structures are further unpacked to mechanisms.[33] In the broadest sense, environmental opportunity structures consist of various kinds of *natural environmental mechanisms*, which are phenomena of non-human and natural environment that directly affect human life. Examples are natural disasters, geo-climatic conditions in a location, resource depletion, etc. As such, they comprise the foundation for what kind of agriculture is naturally functional for the location. In contrast, POS is constituted of *institutional-relational mechanisms* driving relationships in the institutional sphere. Such relationships can be signified, for instance, as coalitions and/or cleavages among specific individuals, groups, and networks. And DOS is driven by *symbolic-cognitive mechanisms* that organise relationships between a set of symbols and codes, which in turn affect cognitive rule systems (templates/schemes) of individuals as well as collectivities. What Eder calls "public discourse marketplace" and Snow et al.'s master frame belong here. Based on this conception, this study targets more concretely the following areas as the external contexts of the or-

[33] "Mechanism" in this study follows the DoC programme claiming it as "a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" (McAdam et al., 2001, p.24).

ganic organisations; natural environmental conditions/circumstances; state and civil society; and discourse of organic agriculture. See the following sections for more details.

These external structures are, then, put into the core unit of this study, organic organisations. Here, organisations are seen as strategic, reflexive, and also emotionally/morally-motivated collective agencies. In this way, they are not just subordinated to the external environments they are situated in. These natural, structural, and cultural environments privilege some actor but discriminate others, though, as history has showed, they are by no means stagnant and unchangeable by the agentic power of people.

Following the strategic-relational perspective of SRA, these external environments and actors must be put into each other's context. Yet the agent's internal context that brings particular strategy is still underdeveloped by SRA and social movement theories in general. I inject the concept of *organisational orientation* as the characteristic mechanism of the domain of actor. This mechanism is unpacked into four elements. Firstly, *organisational disposition* represents well-integrated cognitive schema and preferences of the organisation that reproduce a relatively stable equilibrium in organisational practice. My inspiration for this concept comes from Nick Crossley, who similarly envisages an integrated framework for social movement studies (Crossley, 2002a:2002b:2005), and from Nicos P. Mouzelis (Mouzelis, 2008), who deals with such a framework more broadly for social theory at large. Both develop Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, especially his concept of habitus. Three additional elements of the internal context suggested by this study are *organisational structure*, *relations among members*, and *resources*.

The overall conceptualisation of this relationship between actor and external environment is illustrated in the figure below.



Figure 9 Conceptual framework of this study

Structures

State

"(Social) structures" can mean many things. In this study, which explores different institutionalisation paths of social movement organisations, my focus is on institutions, especially *state* and *civil society*. As discussed

above, the state is still the most significant institution in terms of setting limits for and giving opportunities to social movements (Wapner, 1996:Tarrow and Imig, 2001:Dryzek, Downes et al., 2003:Eckersley, 2004). Particularly in terms of the organic movement in the two countries pursued by this study, this is the case. Thus the inquiry underscores the context of formal political/policy institutions in the targeted countries.

I think the concept of the political opportunity structure (POS),[34] which brings attention to such aspects as openness or closeness of the state, routinized political coalition pattern among elites, political cleavage, and change in those (Kriesi et al., 1997), is still a useful analytical tool for tracing the political context of the state. Yet its traditional formulation based on the static, homogeneous, and one-directional view of the state must be revised for a more dynamic and relational perspective envisaged by this study. At this point, the proposal of the DoC programme for revising POS by injecting the view of actors' cognitive attribution to threat and opportunity is a valuable first step. Yet this study would prefer preserving the perception of POS as an objective category as much as implementing such proposal. Although the former perspective was abandoned in the DoC programme (McAdam et al., 2001, p.46-47), opportunity and constraint allocated by the social structure can affect actors regardless of their interpretations. This is not to deny that such influence itself is a product of a complex process of interpretation. The crucial point is that social structures entail autonomous mechanisms outside people's perception. Taking this point, this study locates the more phenomenological view of "perceived (attributed)" POS in the realms of culture and (collective) actor. It enters the cultural realm when the recognition of specific political opportunity or threat reaches the social level, while it is found in the actors' realm, when it is a subjective perception of an individual or a shared perception of the specific collective actor. (See more in the next section about culture). The analytical distinction between objective POS and interpreted POS is significant for this study since it targets an explanation of organisations' strategic choices, not only from what an organisation has thought but also from the external systemic context that gave sense to the organisation's decision. This relates to another research question of this study concerning the outcome of the strategic choice.

Civil society

I construe civil society as an emerging institutional sphere where social movements are given birth and nourished. Based on this conception POS within this institutional field should also be explored. Those who intend to capture civil society as a non-political sphere may disagree with this sphere being treated with POS, which is most often used to signify the context of formal political institutions. At this point, the conception of "politics" must overcome the traditional division in the social movement studies between politics and culture. This can be done by transcending the narrow definition of politics within the boundary of formal institutional politics, while extending the notion towards involvement in the issues of "distribution, exercise and consequence of power" (Hay, 2002, p.3). In this extended view, political struggles do not reside only in the formal political system, but also in everyday life of households, schools, churches, mosques, temples, working places, etc. This vision resonates with Colin Hay's words:

[34] Rucht and Neidhardt propose an attractive concept called "societal opportunity structure" as an innovation of POS. They find that POS should be further developed, since "[a] truly sociological approach" necessitates the questions such as "which relevant reference groups determine the field of action of social movements? Which internal conditions of the reference groups and which connections between them promote or impede the possibility that social movements will succeed or become stabilized?" (2002, p.13). I agree that the traditional sense of POS must be developed. However, I prefer this development to be done by a reformulation of the basic understanding of "political" toward the direction that "encompass(es) the entire sphere of the social" and as the process of power relations rather than the space in which such power relations take place, as suggested by Hay (2002, p.5. See more in the final section of this chapter). Thus envisaging this reformulation of the "truly sociological approach", this study does not use the new term suggested by Rucht and Neidhardt. However, their terminology is also attractive for those who detect the significance of "non-political" aspects of social movements. This study, however, focuses on the political aspects of its target, namely, the organic movement, even though it has often been self-claimed as a non-political movement, with this new formulation of the political.

> The political should be defined in such a way as to encompass the entire sphere of the social. The implication of this is that events processes and practices should not be labelled "non-political" or "extra-political" simply by virtue of the specific setting or context in which they occur. All events, processes and practices which occur within the social sphere have the potential to be political and, hence, to be amenable to political analysis. The realm of government is no more innately political, by this definition, that that of culture, law or the domestic sphere….A political analysis is, then, one which draws attention to the power relations implicated in social relations. In this sense, politics is not defined by the *locus* of its operation but by its nature as a *process* (Hay, 2002, p.3 Italic original).

I also consider this vision much closer to reality. As mentioned above, movement actors do not necessarily aim to gain access to the state. Furthermore, their strategy of institutionalisation is not merely a result of the actors' preference or the POS predefined by the state; it also depends on the conditions of the civil society in question. For example, as signified as "radical flank effect" in the social movement studies, possibilities for relatively moderate movement group for allying with the formal actors can increase when there is a radical movement group, since the state actors intend to hinder further radicalisation of the movement (McAdam, McCarthy et al., 1996b:Tarrow, 1997:Gupta, 2002). As often recognised by organisation theorists, the success of certain organisational forms, say, professionalised and centralised NGOs, can generate a pattern of similar organisational forms in the field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As such, the tendency of the dominant civil society organisations can suppress other actors in the same field. Again, the analytical division between the objective condition and the interpreted one becomes useful for exploring the area where the existing suppressions are even not detected by the social movement. For instance, Kriesi and his colleagues (Kriesi, Koopmans et al., 1995) show that the overrepresentation of labour unions in the movement field in France has hindered the nationwide growth of the environmental movement.

The intention of this study is not an extensive investigation of the civil society at large, but barely to extract some significant elements and developments of the organic movement community as a sub-component of civil society. My more precise target with regard to POS in civil society is the relationship between the leading organic organisations and other civil society actors, such as traditional farmers' unions, consumer groups/organisations, anti-pollution movement groups/organisations, labour unions, etc. By collecting the pieces of these aspects of the organic movement community, I hope to draw an outline of civil society in the two countries.

Culture

Perhaps the concept of culture is more contested than that of structure in social theorisation. As discussed in chapter 2, one of the biggest and most crucial disagreements is whether to understand culture as an internal and integrated part of actors or an external and autonomous entity. In the Foucauldian school of thought, culture, which is presented in the form of discourse, is the most dominant force of life, penetrating our mindset and thus our daily practices. Culture is already an integral part of individuals' mind and body. In Parsonian functionalism, culture, as one of the three systems (the other two are the social and the personality system), is perceived as "an ordered symbolic system" (Parsons, 1977, p.168) made of a symbolically-mediated pattern or standards of values. While this three-level system considers these components (i.e. values) on the level of cultural system in a rather "disembodied" way (Mouzelis, 2008, p.723), they are, via institutionalisation, to become norms that form social role expectations and daily routines on the level of the social system. As these norms go through socialisation and internalisation, they become dispositions and needs in the personality system. In his later work, Parson became more explicit about the supremacy of culture for determining the outcome of action. As such, culture is not only clearly distinguished from other social structures and systems, but also seen as the most dominant external environment for actors.

In a more current revision of Parsonian thought, Alexander claims culture as one of the two internal environments for the actor (the other is personality/motivational patterns), by construing the internalised cultural

codes to consequently motivate individuals to take certain patterns of action (Alexander, 1998). Such conception of culture as internal to the actor is also affirmed by Habermas in his drawing of the lifeworld as clearly distinct from the "system" (i.e. political and economic systems – state and market). In his clear-cut division between system and lifeworld, the former is understood as the autonomous space where bureaucrats and monetisation can almost automatically and systematically reproduce itself, while maintenance of the latter needs communicative understanding among people. In this line of thought, which views the lifeworld exclusively as a communicative arena, culture and the lifeworld tend to be conflated and understood as an internal environment of the actors and for their communicative action. On the other hand, the system is regarded as the external environment wherein lively communicative media does not matter much but money and power do.

In contrast to these views of culture either as most determinant or internal to a personality/everyday life system, I recognise *culture as an autonomous environment which externally influences actors*. Here, I find it is more beneficial to distinguish cultural structure as a symbolic whole from the sphere of actor as suggested by Mouzelis, Archer, Jessop and Hay. Put simply, in real life there are situations where cultural-symbolic codes of the community are not yet internalised or even not known by the actors, for instance, newcomers or immigrants (Mouzelis, 2008). And needless to say, in contradiction to Parsonian functionalism, there is no guarantee that such codes are internalised via institutionalisation and socialisation. An immigrant may sustain her/his core values and beliefs which are fundamentally different from the general values of the host country, even after years of residence and generations. Taking this suggested divisional view, then, *symbolic codes – culture – are first internalised into the actor when it becomes her/his dispositions*, that is to say, "habitus" a la Bourdieu (Mouzelis, 2008). As such, this *internalised culture (dispositions) is separated from cultural structure*. (In this study, this dispositional aspect is integrated into the sphere of actor. See the next section). Thus from this viewpoint, the fact that people belonging to different cultures can potentially reach a "consensus" or common understanding/agreement via communication, as suggested by Habermas, does not necessarily mean that certain cultural ideas manifested in the consensus become an integral part of the participants' mindset. They can certainly maintain own ideas and preferences which may conflict with the consensus, while agreeing and materially supporting the latter (Dryzek, 2000). A good example is the typical practice of policy-making, where decisions are nonetheless made even though it is unlikely that all policy-makers come to share the same reason (preference, standpoint and interest) after discussion. Considering these aspects, I find this analytical distinction between culture as objective entity and that as integrated in the personality system helpful, as it elucidates why the "cultural struggle", as underlined by the NSM perspectives, emerges in the specific society. In other words, it makes us aware of compatibilities and incompatibilities of certain cultural codes to the actor. This aspect cannot be pursued when culture is conflated with the actor's mind and bodily stand.

Furthermore, as already obvious, this study distinguishes cultural structure from other structures, in this study, social structures (state and civil society) and nature. Unlike Habermas, who largely conflates the lifeworld, culture, and communicative action (actors), I follow Mouzelis and the above critical realists who understand culture as an analytically distinct sphere which operates on the discursive and virtual level *without* entailing actual human or material relations or role relations within itself, but on the basis of relations among symbols/symbolic codes, such as values, beliefs, ideologies, scientific ideas, etc. In this conception, culture and the other structures are fundamentally different, since the former functions without containing internal environment for action, while the latter containing both virtual role relationship and actual actor relationships within itself (Mouzelis, 2008). Symbolic codes are materialised and become actual when they are formed into artworks, religious monuments, rituals, machines, books, etc. Nonetheless, such materialisation takes place only through the act of some actor who interprets and internalises such codes and is motivated to actualise them. In this view the actions which are often labelled as culturally-oriented, for instance, those observable in the Muhammad cartoon controversy, are not driven by the specific mutually incompatible cultural structures themselves. Rather, they are driven by strategic actors who internalise specific cultural codes (e.g.

"freedom of speech" and media's autonomy in Denmark and Christianity/the West vs. Islam/terrorists dichotomy sensed by many Muslims) and interlink these codes with the reason for collective action. Again, this analytical division is considered crucial, since it makes us see culture not as a pre-set value trajectory within the actor, but more as the factor facilitating opportunities and constraints to her/him on the discursive level. This also enables the exploration of discursive selectivity, DOS, i.e. why certain cultural codes are more valid for some actor in the specific time and location while not for others.

Finally, while autonomy of culture from other structures and actors is more acknowledged today, the degree to which this autonomy exists is debated (Mouzelis, 2008). Structuralist like Saussure and post-modernist like Foucault tend to give absolute autonomy to culture and conceptualise it as the determinant for social behaviours. Their (though more strongly the former) methodologies thus encourage exclusive focus on language/discourse by understanding them to sufficiently represent social structures. This typically leads to the idea of cultural Reason (with capital R) as the true cause of social patterns (Alexander and Seidman, 1990). On the other hand, the NSM thinkers mentioned above, especially Melucci, McAdam et al. for the DoC programme, as well as the critical realists and Bourdieu, just to name some, similarly suggest relative and/or relational autonomy of culture to social structures and actor. But even they assign cultural autonomy different degrees. For instance, Archer situates culture under social structure by arguing the pre-existence of structure over culture (as discussed in Chapter 2). In contrast, Bourdieu, who views culture as a crucial resource (capital), emphasises the correlation of cultural capability, which is the mastering of the most valuable cultural codes, and power. In this view, certain groups of people are in a socially stronger position, for they have privileged access to the necessary codes for handling complexity in today's society. For him social institutions, most prominently, families and schools, are carriers and facilitators of this socially-embedded inequality of cultural capital, and this in turn leads also to inequality in a material sense. He conceptualises social structures and actors to be much more culturally determined than Archer.

My approach to culture is relational; it puts the actor in the centre and focuses on interrelationships between her/him, culture, and other external environments. Again, I see culture as a domain consisting of relations between symbolic codes. It contains cognitive rule systems that operate as cognitive templates for actors. Culture functions as the discursively selective mechanism transmitting power relations in society (social structures) through codes. Indeed, our understanding of structural context, as represented by political opportunities in formal institutional and/or extra-formal institutional spheres, must go through this selective filtering process. Hence, this study construes action to be basically restricted by the dominant cultural codes. Yet at the same time, taking account of human capability, I believe we must consider the potential of actors to fight the hegemonic cultural codes (see next section for more about this perspective on actors). My approach matches Alexander's words:

> We cannot understand culture without reference to subjective meaning, and we cannot understand it without reference to social structural constraints. We cannot interpret social behaviour without acknowledging that it follows codes that it does not invent; at the same time, human invention creates a changing environment for every cultural code. Inherited metaphysical ideas form an inextricable web for modern social structures, yet powerful groups often succeed in transforming cultural structures into legitimating means (Alexander, 1990, p.26).

Nature

The bridging of nature with other core domains is taken into this study, since the nature-human/culture relationship is so profound in the very existence of organic agriculture and its movement (cf. Kaltoft, 1999:Campbell and Liepins, 2001): that is to say, their ideological construction is built upon the consciously chosen knowledge of the nature-human relationship that supports certain preferences in society while excluding others. The explanation of this movement's development thus cannot be separated from the exploration of how such specific constructions of knowledge have been manifested in the movement community. I also

consider the real biological and physical process of the natural environment/non-humans and human-being, which can be directly or indirectly experienced by humans. For this reason, I construe nature as one of the significant contexts, which is as important as social-institutional structure and culture, affecting the process of the organic movement. With this view, we can acknowledge that factors like natural-environmental conditions of the location and negative physical consequence of pesticides, not only as knowledge but also as real things, have been vital for organic agriculture to be registered as a plausible option in the first place. These factors certainly matter: Farming without pesticides and herbicides in a warm and humid climate intrinsically requires more on-farm labour than in a cold and dry climate. Consequently, exercising organic farming may be more costly and physically demanding in regions with the former climate. By the same token, natural catastrophes like the tsunami in Japan 2011, though the effect was multiplied by a chain of man-made causes, may radically change people's perceptions and behaviours as well as activist strategies. This change can be both opportunity and constraint for the organic organisations.

Like social structure and culture, these two components of *nature*, namely *as the socially constructed* (i.e. human knowledge/interpretation), on the one hand, *and a real entity with self-sustaining system* (i.e. the object of human knowledge/interpretation), on the other hand, are analytically distinguished. The analytical distinction can lead my focus to such points as how the same natural feature/phenomenon has been interpreted differently by different collective actors, and what kind of sign from nature has aroused the actors' advocacy for organic agriculture. To note, evaluation of which interpretation is more appropriate to the reality of nature is beyond this study's reach. The actual inquiry of this study rests more in the actors' discursive construction of nature. Nonetheless, by acknowledging the objective existence of nature as an external structure that inherently enables and/or restraints certain intentions of human beings, it demarcates itself from the tendency of strong social constructivism, which reduces the significance of nature exclusively to human ideational process. This issue of how discursive construction of nature (and other external structures) should be treated also concerns how actors' autonomy and capability for detecting, learning, and acting upon it should be understood. This aspect of actor is discussed in the next section.

Agency

The primal focus of this study is collective actors, i.e. organisations for the organic movement, as strategic and reflexive actors. As they are placed in the centre, other collective actors, such as state agencies (most prominently the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and the Minister of Environment, or the like), political parties, and other civil society organisations, are also put into focus peripherally.

Taking this focus on actor/agency, I consider organisations' strategic actions as products of interaction between the internal and the external environments of the organisation, rather than the dominant single factor. The content of external environments has already been discussed. I see the internal environment as consisting basically of two parts: *organisational orientation* and *revisionary force*; the latter can emerge with the schism between the former and the perceived necessity. First of all, organisational orientation refers broadly to regular patterns of the organisation for strategy, namely what types of common objectives and ideologies, organisational structures, resources, and understanding of POS and DOS are generally selected and formulated within the organisation. It is a set of organisations' collective discursive and material properties that reproduce common experience and organisational unity. Such general direction of organisational strategy is, to a certain extent, visible for ordinary audiences, as they are often written down and spoken out. Yet, how and why such an orientation is created is not necessarily directly observable, as they have most often penetrated daily practices of the organisation and are more or less taken for granted. Inquiry into an organisation's strategic actions must explore such not directly observable elements of organisational life – highly routinized and habitualised practices and their origins – as well as directly observable elements. In my opinion, at least four internal elements can be raised as core components of organisational orientation: *organisational disposition*, *organisational structure*, *internal relations*, and *resources*.

Organisational disposition

French scholar Pierre Bourdieu has played a prominent role in developing the concept of actors' social disposition. Yet this concept (in his terminology, habitus), in line with his theory of practice, needs some clarification and elaboration to be used in this study, which deals with collective actors for social movement. For Bourdieu, the concept is explicitly linked with the actor's social origin and position:

> The habitus is a set of dispositions, reflexes and forms of behaviour people acquire through acting in society. It reflects the different positions people have in society, for example, whether they are brought up in a middle class environment or in a working class suburb. It is part of how society reproduces itself (Bourdieu, 2000, p.19).

This line of his assertion is often criticised as overly deterministic and pessimistic, as if individuals' destiny is already set by her/his social background. Furthermore, its inconsistency and ambiguity about the role of agency are seen as the weakness of his theory (Crossley, 2002). Despite his own embedding in political activism, he deals with the analysis of social movement relatively little in his academic work (ibid., p.183).

Yet, Bourdieu's notion of habitus is recognised to have "more potential for an elaboration and deepening… than his work to date has achieved" (Crossley, 2002a, p.81 :Mouzelis, 2008). I agree with this comment; particularly that his theory can contribute to the development of a more integrated conceptual framework, wherein more specific and scattered insights of social movement studies (or else) can be unified. In my view his theory is overall quite consistent with this study's conceptual framework and the perspective of SRA, as both depict actors as autonomous, reflexive, and strategic, though still constrained and/or privileged by the environment in which they are physically and/or discursively situated. Besides, Bourdieu's theory (and elaboration of it) can fill some underdeveloped parts of SRA. Firstly, the concept of habitus reminds us of the significance of unpacking "normality" and routines – indeed, habits, which have already penetrated the level of actors and are thus undisputed. With this reminder, we can detect how such "habitualised" ways of thinking and practice frame organisations' strategic orientation. Secondly, unlike SRA, which does not explicitly specify regular components of actors' strategic action, Bourdieu prescribes a simple formula, i.e. [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (Bourdieu, 1984, p.101). My drawing of organisations' internal environment is inspired by such supplementary and complementary insights to SRA. In Bourdieu's formulation, actors develop specific group dispositions, that is, common "perceptual and linguistic schemas, preferences and desires" etc. (Crossley, 2002a, p.171-172), in the course of their interaction. In this light, an organisation can be understood as a space where its members with different social backgrounds and competences can share, negotiate, develop, and contest their ideologies, preferences, experiences, competences, etc. for their commonly acknowledged cause.

Like habitus is described as "second nature" – the well-integrated cognitive schema and preference in the personality system – I see organisational disposition as a collective property that has penetrated both the most daily organisational practices and its high-level decision making. Organisational disposition structures things like collective preferences for certain strategies, actions, organisational forms and discourses as well as collective ways of understanding the world, almost spontaneously. And as Bourdieu points out in the above citation, disposition carries social structures, such as social classes and status groups. This is the part expressed as the internalised social, cultural, and natural structures (cf. Mouzelis, 2008: Bourdieu in Alexander, 1990). The following quote by Crossley describes this point well:

> Agents act, think, reflect, desire, perceive, make sense, etc. but they always do so by way of habits inherited from the social locations in which they have socialized, which are in turn shaped by wider dynamics of the social world (Crossley, 2002a, p.175).

His theoretical line shares with the SRA perspective and the conceptualisation of POS and DOS the point of unequally distributed resources among actors and the consequences for their opportunities and life chances.

Yet, this implication of disposition as "(pre-)structured" by social relations particularly catches criticism. In my view this insight does not have to be interpreted as a square structural determinism, in so far as it embraces the view of actors to act intelligently and strategically, not just in reflex and habitually, and understands that their actions can potentially affect the external structures. Historically, social movements tend to be led by certain types or groups of people, identified by social class, specific identity, ethnic group, gender, etc. Especially in dealing with the social movement after the 1960s, the insights of NSM theorists pointing to the centrality of the new middle class should be taken into account. However, as stressed by Crossley, identification of who manifests in the movement is just a useful tool for predicting differences and mapping the genealogy of the movement (Crossley, 2002a, p.175). What is also required (among others by Bourdieu) is a further exploration of what these dispositions bring about and why. This coheres with the social sciences agenda to reveal the not directly observable and the not yet recognised, as raised by among others Marx long ago.

Internal mechanisms affecting organisational disposition

In addition to this internalisation of external structures, however, the exploration of organisational disposition must consider the objective structural components exerted also within the organisation. I designate such internal objective structural components as *organisational structure*, *internal relations*, and *resources*. While these are themselves products of organisational disposition, they begin to operate as major objective entities that autonomously affect the reproduction of organisational disposition. This is because they contain the element of power in themselves. As mentioned, organisation is seen as a collective agency endowed with organisation-specific dispositions, wherein particular world-views, preferences, forms of competence, experiences, etc. of different personalities are gathered but also negotiated into a certain collective unity. This negotiation inherently depends on the internal social relations and resource condition. That is to say, there are always a limited number of core persons (or groups) in the organisation who are in a better position to determine organisational orientation than others. At the same time, organisational structure entails normative formulation of the organisation, which is built upon the commonly anticipated roles and rules. These roles and rules expect people to act within the organisation's specific rule system (e.g. as administrative committee members, group leaders, or subscribers without voting right at the general assembly). It begins to legitimise certain individuals to be in charge of the assigned areas, and often creates internal hierarchy. (This is also the case for flat organisational structures as envisaged formerly by *Die Grünen*, since they must also assign certain persons to be in charge of specific tasks. The difference in the case of the German Green Party was that the power circulated among the members). In this way, organisational structure, internal role and hierarchy mutually reinforce each other.

In real organisational life, such normative structure does not always correspond to the "actual" power structure. The latter sometimes determines more decisively how organisational disposition is framed. People with actual power can, whether they hold the executive position or not, engrave their own preferences more deeply than those with less power. A distinction between the two power structures is, however, necessary since consistency and/or friction between them can show to what extent the organisation achieves cohesion as a collective unity. Inconsistency between them can also imply democratic deficiency in the organisation, and thus, retreat in the empowerment of lively civil society necessary for authentic democracy (Dryzek, 2000). This point of inquiry is especially crucial for this study's research question three, which explores the outcomes of the strategic choice of the targeted organisations.

Furthermore, the issue of power within the organisation is very much related to the resources individual members obtain. However, the concept of resource must be extended here beyond the traditional economic/monetary thinking as envisaged typically by RM. Although economic resources are still important, it is after all only one of the many forms of resource which organisations can make use of. Indeed, resources like trust, solidarity, networks, communicative competences are increasingly taken up in social movement research (Tilly, 1995:Diani and Donati, 1999:Kaase, 1999:Goodwin, Jasper et al., 2001:Diani and McAdam,

2003).[35] In addition to the understanding of diverse resources, this study considers the strategy for resources to be different from organisation to organisation. This is because agents are seen to target a specific system for their activism. This study, which focuses on competing institutional strategies among the organic organisations, highlights two systems, namely the formal political system and the lifeworld (see Chapter 2 and the sub-section "Operationalizing Melucci"). Based on this, the organisational orientation towards pro-institutional or non-institutional strategy is seen as a result of organisational choice for targeting the state or civil society respectively. For this choice organisations enter the specific category of institutional field, where particular resources work more efficiently than others. For instance, being influential in civil society may require fewer economic resources, but more trustworthiness, social networks, engaged participants, practical knowledge and skills for layperson communication. In contrast, participation in the political game in the formal political institution requires connection with relevant bureaucrats/state agency and political parties, and this generally necessitates considerable economic capacity and personal relations, which often come together with status and reputation (in Bourdieu's terminology, "symbolic capital").

Changes in organisational dispositions are imposed by the internal revisionary force, which refers to the incidents that bring the urge for reform among certain members. Such incidents can be changes in the internal environment, such as membership decline, consequent economic difficulty, increase in new types of members who inject new ideas, etc., and/or perceived changes in the external environment, which are unsatisfactorily managed according to the present organisational strategy. In SRA this is called "strategic learning", and in the DoC programme "organisational appropriation", which similarly regard reflexivity of the organisation.

The outline of the internal environment is illustrated in the below figure.

[35] Diverse types of resources are also seen in Bourdieu's conceptualisation of capitals; i.e. economic capital (e.g. money, property and precious commodities with a monetary value); cultural capital (e.g. cultural goods and dispositions, including educational qualifications, which have a value in specific social fields and which allow their holder to procure further goods); symbolic capital (e.g. status and reputation, which again have value or generate power in specific fields); and social capital (e.g. connections and ties which can be used to the agent's advantage in specific fields) (Crossley, 2002).



Figure 10: This study's operationalized framework

Discourse and frame: Position of this study

Basic definition

As already stated, this study intends to take the ideational focus back in and acknowledge the ongoing significance of contestation in the cultural field as expressed by, among others, framing theorists and NSM theorists. The latter half of the last chapter took a glance at recent efforts in these classic disciplines to integrate the cultural and ideational dimension into their key concepts. Following this spirit, this study sees discourse and frame as important elements of inquiry, as they enable the analysis of symbolic-cognitive templates, which organise actors' understanding and shape their decisions.

As the concept of discourse and frame is so diversely formulated (Halkier, 2003:della Porta and Diani, 2006), a clarification of the concept might be necessary. To begin with, I understand frame as a component of discourse, and discourse in its simplest form as Fairclough says:

> a particular way of representing some part of the (physical, social, psychological) world...Discourses differ in how social events are represented, what is excluded or included, how abstractly or concretely events are represented, and how more specifically the processes and relations, social actors, time and place of events are represented (Fairclough, 2003, p.17).

Equally simple, though from an agentic point of view, discourse can also be defined as a "shared means of making sense of the world". Here discourse is seen as a tool for enabling intersubjective understanding. Also in this thinking discourse can bring such effect, because when people adhere to a particular discourse, it helps them to assemble bits of sensory information into coherent wholes (Dryzek, 2000).

Speaking more of distinction between discourse and frame, my understanding of "discourse" is often equivalent to what is called ideology, while "frames" entail different basic features. This is well described by Eder: "frames are the micro-units of a discourse" (Eder, 1996, p.166). Compared to frame, discourse is more likely

to have a broader scope and reflection of longer-term processes, and thus stay longer in the discursive field. Frames, in contrast, are oriented more towards making sense of the world, and therefore do not need to contain a consistent package of integrated principles or conclusiveness and determination in the argumentation. They are utilised to sort the stream of information to establish relatively stable patterns of understanding social reality. Consequently, frames tend to be more flexible, time specific and generic than discourse (della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.79:Gillan, 2008). Although the idea constituting a specific discourse and frame was initially made by someone, it begins to transcend the author of the idea when it is organised into discourse and frames. As mentioned above, discourses and frames constitute "objective meaning" (Eder, 1996, p.166), generally perceived as common sense, rational, and/or right.

Major discussion and approach of this study

Based on this conceptualisation, the study does not treat the analysis of discourse and frame as two different methods but as an integrated and mutually supplementary one. Nevertheless, I should briefly clarify my position on discourse in relation to the major discussion on this subject, since such discussion signifies clearly different directions of understanding discourse.

First of all, my understanding of discourse differs from Foucault and his followers' characteristic perception which stresses the role of hegemonic discourse. The theoretical concept of the latter, in particular the one developed in Foucault's late phase, largely conflates reality as ideational construction – "everything is discourse" – and humans as mere "docile bodies" (Lindgren, 2000:Mouzelis, 2008). Such conceptualisation clearly contradicts my basic envisagement of treating nature and structure *both* as objects of our knowledge (i.e. real entities to be studied by us) and socially constructed knowledge. In contrast to the Foucauldian orientation, I claim that "there is much more to life and politics than discourses" (Dryzek, 2000, p.79). I do acknowledge the presence of "hegemonic" discourse, whose influence has penetrated different social levels and relationships.[36] However, I believe what is more true today is the constellation and plurality of discourses, whereby the dominance of a single discourse can hardly emerge. Unlike the Foucauldian view of discourse's effect as decisively coercive, I consider it inevitably context-dependent and non-prescribed, and thus that it can be coercive as well as empowering. Environmentalist discourse can be easily connected and aligned with aggressive action like ecotage, but also with non-violent actions as demonstrated by the Chipko movement. And indeed the dominant discourse of democracy can also be coercive for some groups in society, though it does not necessarily involve physical coercion, like the current dispute on the Muslim burqa in many European countries shows.

Taking this view of increasing plurality in public discourse and non-decisiveness of its effects, Habermas also reveals his deficiency. His conviction that ideally rational and informed dialogue in the public sphere brings pure consensus clearly rests in the universalistic aspiration. Consensus envisaged by him refers to an argumentative discourse, whose validity is approved by the participants in coercion-free and open dialogical situations ("ideal speech situation"). The discourse built through such process is considered communicatively rational, strong in argument, and orienting towards universal principles of emancipation. Albeit he certainly

[36] On the other hand, the concept of hegemony is differently focused by the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and their followers, and their reintroduction of Gramsci in the conceptualisation of discourse is equally valuable. In the Laclauian conceptualisation hegemony is more about the achievement of supremacy by a particular force to exercise own interests on to the rest of society "through the creation of consent and the incorporation of interests of rival forces" Norval, A., et al. (2000). Discourse theory and political analysis. Manchester, Manchester University Press. P.229. As such, its presence and effect does not necessarily entail coercion and control, as asserted by the Foucauldian school. This conceptualisation of hegemony is closer to mine in terms of allowing space for imagining how hegemony can be achieved (by the oppositions) in a democratic way. Equally important is also plurality of hegemonic discourses, in contrast to the idea of diverse and competing discourses to be unified into one through communication as proposed by Habermas.

aspires to the rise of lively communication particularly in the public sphere, his formulation of communicative and discursive process as universally consensus-building has a fundamental problem in dealing with the reality of continuing diversity and heterogeneity in the discursive and non-discursive world. Consider that "difference" is not only the state of matter but also constitutes a social and political norm today (e.g. "cultural diversity" as raised by the EU). Habermas has been blamed for promoting old Euro-centrism, "wanting to see one particular culture, delimited historically and geographically, as an expression of a new universal epoch in history, as a homogeneous whole, rather than as one culture among several" (Banerjee, 2005, p.38). Furthermore, as strongly expressed by the critics, among others from gender studies (cf. Benhabib, 1992:Fraser, 1992), dialogues do not always entail rationality or targeting consensus. Habermas' concentration on rational communication underplays "non-rational" forms of communication involving, for instance, emotion, jokes, hyperbole, seen in storytelling, greetings, and rhetoric (Young, 1996), although those can also generate intersubjective understandings.

Discourse analytic approach of this study

Based on these points, my conception of the discursive sphere follows Dryzek (2000) and Eder (1996), who see it as the space where diverse discourses are contested. I focus on *the development of organic discourses from a movement discourse towards a public discourse*, wherein diverse collective actors participate in the discursive shaping of organic agriculture/food. Such development of organic discourse indicates that organic activists as collective actors have been capable of mobilising their "communicative resources" to compete with others in the "public discourse market." In other words, processes of discourse and frame entail struggles, competitions, exclusion, as well as negotiation, alliance and inclusion. They are intrinsically ambivalent and unstable entities.

From this angle, discourse and frame analysis can be said to be an attempt at abstracting this complexity. Reflecting upon the above discussion, such abstraction should not compromise the multiplicity of discourse. Hence I resonate with Gillan, who suggests that we "give up the attempt to describe an idea-set that a collective of individuals will whole-heartedly agree to" (Gillan, 2008, p.254). This thinking suggests, again, that discourse and frame are products of negotiation and competition among different values, worldviews, ideologies, evaluations etc., which will never be merged into a homogeneous one. Furthermore, unlike the concept of identity, which requires engagement of individuals, discourses (by themselves) do not necessitate engagement. Thus, one can change ones former preference of discourse more freely than identity (Dryzek, 2000). However, as stressed by Dryzek (ibid.), discourse can be categorised into a relatively small number of groups as they are contested and sorted out in the public sphere (public discourse market). This is the part involving "discourse coalition" (Hajer, 1995) and "frame alignment" (Snow, Rochford et al., 1986). This study intends to pursue a caption and categorisation of complex discursive "moments" of struggles among different, incompatible, and incommensurable ideas and interests of organic agriculture/food shared broadly (versus agreed unanimously) among targeted collective actors.

The basic procedure of discourse analysis in this study follows Eder (ibid., in particular Chapter 6), who is inspired by frame analysis of Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and Snow et al. Following him, the analysis goes through three steps: identification of cognitive *framing devices*, which construct frames; analysis of this construction of frames in terms of a process of *symbolic packaging*; and identification of *masterframe* manifests in the contestation of diverse framing strategies in public discourse.

He distinguishes between three types of cognitive framing devices in modern societies: *moral responsibility*, *empirical objectivity*, and *aesthetic judgment*. Each can be bluntly summarised as following:

- moral responsibility is the device for forming the idea of "how, and according to which principles, to behave in this world". For instance, the idea of human responsibility towards nature;

- empirical objectivity is based on empirical knowledge of the world. This cognitive device shapes empirical observations and the scientific mode for "objectifying" the observed subject;

- and aesthetic judgment organises "the subjective experience and perception of the world". This device rests in the qualities of human expression (Eder, 1996, p.171-176).

Each framing device is related to distinctive dimensions of modern societies: the social, factual, and subjective. Accordingly, our frame analysis will be based on three cognitive orders: the world of social norms (e.g. laws and rules), of empirical facts (e.g. science), and of aesthetic judgments. According to Eder, this classification of specific framing devices creates the cognitive foundation for forming identity as a collective actor. All three dimensions are more likely to be evident within the single collective actor's actual framing practices. The task is, then, to identify the cognitive hierarchy among them; i.e. which dimension has been assigned more importance than the others by the targeted actor.

The focus of the second step of discourse analysis moves forward to the analysis of how such framing devices are converted into collectively shared symbolic codes. This process is called *symbolic packaging*. Through this process, chosen framing devices are attached to the wider social world, circumstances, and actors than those within the movement. The analysis of this second part focuses upon narrative structures of discourses, in contrast to the first step which concentrates on cognitive structures. In addition to the function for putting framing devices to the actual context, symbolic packages are also the means of collective actors for *strategic framing*. Based on this view, collective actors are searching and working for socially plausible narratives, which can differentiate theirs from others. For this reason, according to Eder, movement actors package their framing devices in "oppositional symbolism," by using terms like "'alternative', 'counter' and 'critical'" to the dominant discourse (Offe, 1985:Eder, 1996, p.168). Other actors, such as industrial/market actors and state actors, follow the same procedure, though with their own packaging to convince the public. For instance, in the context of organic issue, market actors today are more likely to formulate organic agriculture/food as a promised niche market, which can deliver economic well-being for farmers and innovative enterprises, but also good taste and better health to the people (consumers). The symbolic package of the state actor may stress its responsibility for citizens regarding protecting environment, food safety, and the expected economic revenue gained through organic production and consumption. Cognitive framing devices are, in this context, used to validate the symbolic package. When such a symbolic package becomes an element of public discourse, it turns into a "fully fledged 'frame'" (Eder, 1996, p.169). This study identifies three symbolic packages of organic agriculture based on the general discussions about this agriculture (cf. Kaltoft, 1999:DARCOF, 2000:Fomsgaard, 2006), and applies them to the targeted two cases. These packages are discussed in the next sub-section.

While this second step deals with narrative construction of frames for organic discourse, the third step is about how collective actors in the public discourse market compete for organic discourse. The focus shifts from the level of organic frame construction by collective actors to the level of organic discourse as a public discourse. Unlike the former stage, where frames were managed by the intention of the collective actors, the latter signifies that organic discourse moves beyond their control when it enters the public discourse field. It is because they are mediated and exchanged with different actors in the course of communication. And the more organics gain attention in society, the more diverse collective actors, who convey competing framing strategies, participate in organic communication. As a result of this communication, "public organic discourse" is formulated, and certain frames are stabilised in it. Crucially, this road to public discourse is not a peaceful process. Public discourse is inherently a product of competition among different frames imposed by diverse collective actors. They are contesting for the control of frames. Here, collective actors' capability for strategic framing and for mediating own frames to the public significantly matters. The frame that constitutes a stable component of the public organic discourse, then, becomes a *masterframe*, which is accepted by the general public and used as a common reference point to talk about the organic issue.

The procedure of this discourse analytic approach is followed by this study, which takes organic organisations as the central target. The basic proposition is that the development of the organic movement discourse towards public discourse signifies institutionalisation of organic agriculture in the discursive sphere. In other words, it means the end of organic agriculture as a counter discourse but the beginning as one of the dominant discourses. The first two steps of the procedure discussed above can crystallize the internal collective process of the organisation for formulating organic agriculture into sentences and legitimising those on the basis of specific framing devices. The third step deals with the impact of the organic movement in the discursive construction of organic agriculture outside the movement community: In other words, it concerns to what extent the frames imposed by organic organisations have been penetrated in the policy and civil society, and what elements (cognitive frame devices and symbolic packages) have been transformed (included, combined and neutralised) from the original formulation. The results are further analysed in the empirical context of the internal and external environment of the organisations. This study overall anticipates such analytical focus on organic discourse and its relationship with the non-discursive world (in this study, social and natural environments) to disclose the organisations' strategic intention, how they perceived their outer environment, and to what extent they did or did not achieve their objective and, ultimately, nourish or did not nourish the critical public sphere.

Three symbolic packages of organic agriculture

As just mentioned, this study applies the three symbolic packages of organic agriculture: 1) organic agriculture as scientifically-based, 2) organic agriculture as alternative to conventional, and 3) organic agriculture as integral to conventional. They are based on the existing discussions and studies on the conception of organic agriculture, among others "Principles of Organic Farming" by DARCOF (2000), a study of organic principles in the international organic agriculture community by Fomsgaard (2006), and an ethnographic study of individual organic farmers' understanding of organic agriculture by Kaltoft (Kaltoft, 1999). They are also inspired by Eder's formulation of the major symbolic packages evident in the development of environmentalism, namely, conservationism, political ecology and fundamentalism (deep ecology) (Eder, 1996).

The first package, *organic agriculture as science*, can be characterised with the rationalisation of organic method as an evolving kind of science (agroecology), rather than an ideologically driven social movement. This kind of formulation is most evidently equipped with the cognitive device of what Eder calls empirical objectivity. Here, nature is often depicted as a self-organising biological system, rather than something to be evaluated by economic or aesthetic value of humans. However, at the same time the organic agricultural community has greatly enhanced the natural scientific (or more narrowly, biological) conception of ecology to the relationship of nature and humans. Such extensivity is generated from its holistic footing, which brings the "functionally integral" view of these two, as represented by the expressions of nature as "inseparable aspect of society's sustainability" (DARCOF, 2000, p.12) and Eva Balfour's words, "indivisibility of soil and health". In this formulation, human/social well-being or survival is punctuated to coincide with care for nature/soil. The focus is not limited to on-farm practices but rather encompasses the interrelationship between farms and the neighbouring, local, national, and even global environments and societies. In this extension, the science package can give sense to the nurturing of nature by humans, since it is essential for sustaining human lives.

Discursive construction of organic agriculture can more directly involve the world-wide, let alone nationwide, ecology movement that *politicises* nature. That has been co-evolving with intensive extension of ecology towards economics and politics in academia. Since the 1960s we have witnessed the emerging "hybrids" of the biological concept of ecology with social scientific disciplines, as represented by ecological economics and political ecology. Integrating the principle of ecology into the field of economy and society/politics, this emerging field has questioned the most fundamental dispositions of the modern nature-human relationship shared in academia. It has called for a new formulation of the relationship on the basis of critical reflection on the prevailing paradigms. Ecological economics, for instance, in its focus on thermodynamics does not

allow virtually "externalising" the impacts on the environment, as environmental economics, which is founded upon orthodox economics, does (Takeda, 2002). The attempt to ecologise economics intrinsically necessitates an unorthodox framework for the nature-society dynamics. Emerging together with this is political ecology, which captures unecological pathways of industrial society as a political question. Crucially, this emerging field of science and the ecology movement have been feeding each other and simultaneously constructing the politics of nature.

The second symbolic package, *organic agriculture as alternative to conventional*, belongs to the emerging field that critically evaluates the prevailing mode of development. It is rooted in the criticism of conventional agriculture, but in the deeper part, of modernity/modernisation, which not only gears the neglect of human dependency on nature, but also diffuses the idea that this dependency can be and must be conquered by technological development. In this view, nature is reduced to just another commodity under the norm of modernity. In confrontation with this hegemonic norm, this package wraps critical descriptions of the very foundation of the dominant agricultural/food system, including production, distribution, consumption, and political decision-making. Based on this thought, organic agriculture in this package envisages a fundamental transformation of the dominant system. It underlines organic agriculture as qualitatively distinctive to conventional agriculture by drawing them in the dichotomous manner; conventional agriculture is drawn as polluter, while organic agriculture is expressed as a protector of the environment. This package tends to feed the fundamentalist orientation, for its anticipation for systemic change, and its perception of organic development as a zero-sum game in the competition with conventional one.

By contrast, the third symbolic package, *organic agriculture as integral to conventional*, is characterised by its rejection of the dichotomised view of organic and conventional agriculture. Unlike the package of alternativeness, it is not based on the criticism of conventional agriculture or modernity. Instead, the two forms of agriculture are found to be co-evolving, and their developments are not described as mutually exclusive or a zero-sum game. Like the package of alternativeness, it politicises organic agriculture. Yet, it tends to be oriented more in the reformist direction, which targets improvements in the current system rather than discarding it. The package of integrity does not call for a fundamental change in the conventional food system. Rather, it emphasises the impact of organic agriculture on general agricultural practices, pulling the latter forward in a more environmentally friendly direction. It basically formulates organic agriculture as something not stagnant and fixed, but something to be developed in accordance with the actual conditions of society. Integration in the conventional food system is encouraged. Organic agriculture is assumed to turn into a sacred community which isolates itself from the general society without integration.

Outcome of a movement's strategic actions

Based on the above outline, this study considers the decision of the organisation for taking pro-institutional strategy or not depends on the relationship between organisational orientation and its external contexts. This outline is used to explain the how and why of that specific strategic choice and orientation (i.e. research questions one and two). However, when this study also intends to explore the outcomes of the organisations' strategic direction for the organic movement (research question three), additional frames are necessary and I turn to Dryzek and Melucci.

Operationalizing Dryzek's theory of deliberative democracy

This study employs Dryzek's proposal of the five state imperatives, as they can provide a proposition on how and when the social movement can and cannot be effective with a pro-institutional strategy. His basic claim is that *pro-institutional strategy*, as represented by the entrance to the conventional institutional politics, *pays off, only if the movement can attach its defining interest to one or more core state imperatives*, i.e. domestic order, survival, revenue, securing economic growth and legitimation. Participation in the institutional politics

without this attachment is then more likely to result in cooptation of the movement, and hence it might be a costly investment. By contrast, if the movement can link its interest with the interest(s) of the state, the reward can be substantial, such as change in policy direction/orientation (Dryzek, 2000:Dryzek, Downes et al., 2003). Dryzek's claim matches this study's basic concept of institutionalisation, which allows both conventional and unconventional strategic actions to be "rational" for the movement, depending on its organisational orientation and its surrounding context. His theory of discursive democracy, which takes ecological democracy as a core component, also poses a normative assertion of critical civil society/public sphere as essential for pushing democracy forward. This normative envisagement brings our attention to the social movement's struggle to negotiate its efficacy and conviction. Considering these benefits, his state imperatives are used as the major reference in analysing the outcomes of a movement's struggle, which is raised as this study's research question three. Application of them for this purpose initially generates the following focuses;

- Have the organic organisations had some interest(s) that can be connected to the state imperative(s)?
- Have they connected such interest(s) to the state imperative(s)?
- What were the outcomes? Did it result in cooptation and/or contribution to the development of a critical public sphere?

Yet from the view of this study's conceptual framework, which is based on the critical realist SRA, Dryzek's state imperatives tend to overemphasise them as inevitable requirements for the state's function. The focus apparently restricts the space and context in which the movement can influence the existing mode of hegemonic systems/institutions. The risk of this restriction of the transformatory potential of the movement is a deterministic perspective of the state as a rigid political opportunity structure that one-sidedly determines the destiny of the movement.

Another risk of the over-determination of state imperatives may be, as asserted strongly by Robyn Eckersley (2004), the neglect of transformatory potential of the state. While these two scholars both pursue the vision of "green state" with critical theoretical perspectives, Dryzek tends to be more pessimistic than Eckersley about the prospect of the state being a driving force for ecological/green democracy. He finds that the state has no reason to develop ecological democracy in a true sense, since any strengthening of a critical public sphere, which is essential for such democracy, clashes with state imperatives. In consequence, he is quite clear about the boundary between the state and the public sphere (civil society), and to what extent the former space allows civil society actors to impose their interests namely within the range of its imperatives.

Eckersley's theory of "critical political ecology" is, like Dryzek's discursive democracy, normatively oriented. It similarly asserts the necessity of transforming the liberal democratic state and capitalist society to a post-liberal democratic state and post-capitalist society to emancipate humans and non-humans. Yet she is much more optimistic than Dryzek about the transformatory potential of the state in that direction. Her "critical constructivist" perspective is convinced of the reflexivity of social agents, and, more distinctively, stresses the amenability of the state to reflexive processes. Her argumentation is that the role, rationale, and functions of the state have changed historically, as the emergence of the welfare state is one example of such change. Furthermore, resonating to Ulrich Beck, she claims that "reflexivity forces a *self-confrontation*" by industrial/capitalist society. Self-confrontation emerges along with decline in trust and liability of existing ideas and practices of institutions for governance in the era of ecological risk. This triggers "*critical reflection*" of society, which enhances critical assessment of *status quo*, including the present status of policy and technocracy (Eckersley, 2004, p.79 Italic from original). While this perception of reflexivity is also shared by Dryzek, she stresses more explicitly that the change in the ideological framing of the state's role and rationale can have significant effects on its conventional norm and function. With this conviction, her theory highlights the degree of the state's reflexivity, which ranges from change in policy instruments to change in

policy goals, paradigms, and its highest form, its role. In contrast, Dryzek's general depiction illustrates the limit of state in reflexivity.

Eckersley's dispute has roots in the criticism of the dominant state theories' (including general critical theorists') tendency to see accumulation and legitimacy as *a priori* for all states. In this criticism the tendency of the state theory, like Dryzek's, emerges from the overly systemic-functional view of the liberal capitalist state to be inherently reliant on private capital accumulation. Based on this premise, contradictory interdependency between capital and legitimacy is found essential: That is to say, the state must safeguard the interests of capital for gaining economic resources. At the same time, it also has to facilitate protection for all, including those who are exploited and harmed in the course of private capital accumulation, for this is the foundation for state legitimacy and social acceptance of the capitalist system (Habermas, 1975:Offe, 1984:Eckersley, 2004). However, as described above, preoccupation with this premise clearly limits our scope of social transformation. In this sense, the criticism of the mainstream state theory calls for the reflexivity of academia itself to recognise ongoing "normative poverty" and transcend the "overwhelmingly functionalist, risk-generating and asymmetrical organization in the tension-laden field" of the modern complex society (Strydom in Giri, 2012, p.3). It asserts that if we aspire to establish the ideas for desired social development (like democracy), we have to begin by approaching the knowledge which already obtained the status of "objective reality" critically. The important point signalled by Eckersley rests in this line of envisagement (which she refers to immanent critique envisaged in critical theory). This leads us to re-think a concept like state imperatives, which appear to be so solid, rigid and indisputable, to be subject for change. Dryzek's intention is to draw the general tendency rather than to propose decisive criteria. He also acknowledges change in the state imperatives over time. However, since his explanation is still embedded in the systemic-functional reasoning, he does not seriously explore the potential of substantial transformation of state imperatives in the near future. He does not pursue the impact of the ideational aspect of those that let them function *as if* they are objective reality. This is rather contradictory to his conceptualisation of discourse as a means to push authentic democracy forward.

Based on this discussion, this study's analysis of the organic movement's outcome utilises Dryzek's insight of state imperatives, but also envisages detecting their transformation over time. Indeed, both theorists discussed in this section claim the necessity of empowerment of the public sphere and civil society, to force the state to revise its stance on the hegemonic social framework in the ongoing capitalist system. Then the analysis of this movement's effect on the state imperatives is complemented by the focus on breaching the system's boundary pursued in the mapping of organisational direction. This mapping based on Melucci's theory, which is the topic of the next section.

Operationalizing Melucci's theory of collective actions

As discussed in the last chapter, Melucci proposes in his theory of collective action (1996) a categorisation of diverse collective actions based on *fields of collective action*, i.e. what kind of systematic context the collective action targets. Another factor for classification is *orientation of action*, and he lists three criteria by focusing on whether it is oriented towards 1) solidarity or aggregation, 2) conflict or consensus with the targeted system, and 3) breaching of the capacity/order of the targeted system or not.

As regards the first factor, systemic context, Melucci suggests four major systems as stated in Chapter 3. This study especially highlights two: the *political system* and the *lifeworld*, as they are most central to the research questions on pro- and anti-institutionalisation trajectories of the organic organisations. The political system has for a long time occupied focus in US scholarship, in particular the political process approach. Under the dominance of this approach, movement agents were presumed to target policy, authorities and elites for political efficacy. However, as already discussed extensively in this report, activists do not necessarily see their battle in the formal politics. What they do might actually be political in nature, but their actions are not always recognised or framed that way by the activists themselves. Reacting to these tendencies,

NSM scholars emphasised instead the evolving engagement of the social movement in the lifeworld. Based on their focus on qualitatively different orientations and objectives of movements, they make a sheer demarcation between political and cultural as well as formal institutions and people's everyday life. This study takes this viewpoint of demarcation: In other words, it expects that *the envisaged "organic movement" by the organic organisations differs profoundly in accordance with whether they take action towards formal institutions or people's everyday life*.

The study intends to re-formulate Melucci's notion of "solidarity" by injecting the concept of deliberative/discursive democracy and the focus on participation. In his attempt to classify diverse types of collective phenomena, he defines solidarity as the opposite of aggregation. The distinction drawn between them is that the former involves embedding with a certain social group or identity, while the latter refers to accumulation of atomistic behaviours emerging in absence of a unified group or collective identity. This sense of solidarity, together with the struggle with adversaries and erosion of the system's control, constitutes his analytical criteria for social movements. His theory shares some crucial dimensions of discursive/deliberative democracy; that is to say, the inquiry of whether actions or behaviours present some common struggle; whether they interfere with the dominant norms or values; and in so doing whether they enhance the vibrant critical civil societies that are capable of differentiating themselves from states or other similar governing systems. However, when his focus on solidarity is preoccupied with the actors' attachment to a certain social group or identity, participation and engagement of constituencies (i.e. deliberation) tend to be taken for granted. This owes much to his classification aims to encompass a broad range of collective actions, including those that do not intend coordinated mobilisation (e.g. one of his categories "individual mobilisation" is when, for instance, consumers abstain from purchasing a certain product, but not in a coordinated action). When we explore competing organisational paths towards institutionalisation, we must focus more specifically on people's participation in and commitment to physical actions as well as ideational processes. Solidification of shared identity or social grouping might be effective for mobilisation, but this does not directly and sufficiently concern the question of deliberation. Solidarity may result in burning, rather than building, bridges with other actors, and thus isolation (Calhoun, 2011:Öberg and Svensson, 2012, p.251). In other words, the question of action's effect on deliberative democracy must focus on whether the contents of the action enhance participation and communication in the public sphere, not just a closed group (Calhoun, 2011). For this reason this study prefers the focus on *whether direct participation – engagement – is required or not*, as suggested by Kriesi's typology of movement-related organisations, over solidarity. It considers that correlations between institutional strategy and constituents' engagement can better explain the organisation's contribution to democracy.

Taking these revisions in, this study's mapping of organisational actions simplifies Melucci's vision. Characteristic strategic actions of the focused organic organisations are located in this map based on the three criteria mentioned above: 1) whether the action primarily targets the formal political system (state) or the lifeworld (civil society); 2) whether it requires engagement/direct participation of the constituencies or not; and 3) whether it intends to maintain the order of the targeted system or breach the system's limits. This mapping is anticipated to crystallise *to what extent the organisation's action has been in the analytical category of social movement* that targets either formal politics or lifeworld, demands engagement of the constituencies, and envisages eroding the control of the targeted system. The blank map of this study is seen below.



Figure 11 Map of collective action

6. Case of Denmark

This chapter concentrates on the case of Denmark; more precisely, the development of the leading organic organisation, Landsforeningen for Økologisk Jordbrug (hereafter LØJ) and the environment affecting the course of its development. Based on the empirical evidence, the development is divided into five phases: the pre-organic movement phase, the founding phase of the organic organisation, and the three phases of institutionalisation. Details of these phases will be introduced chronologically in most sections by depicting the development of organic agriculture, first in the policy field and then the strategies of the organisation. This is followed by an analysis of this single case based on the conceptual framework of the study.

Overview of Alternative Agriculture Community in the 1970s: Selection of Preliminary Trajectory

This section begins by illustrating the biodynamic movement in Denmark, which is generally seen as the sole movement for alternative agriculture before the organic agriculture movement. It is followed by the stage of the unique co-existence of the biodynamic movement and the organic movement, though it is the latter that later took over the leading position from the former. The last part of this section focuses on the development in the 1970s, which influenced the trajectory of the organic agriculture movement in Denmark directly. During this period, the attempts at alternative agriculture were consolidated under the frame of "ecology" via enhancement of the existing alternative farming community, which brought along its struggle with another option, namely the communist/socialist-oriented agricultural development.

Biodynamic movement

By the 1970s, the biodynamic movement had monopolised alternative agriculture (Holmegård, 1997:Ingemann, 2003:Brandt, 2005). The root of biodynamic agriculture is traced back to 1924, when the founder of anthroposophy, Rudolf Steiner, held an *Agriculture Course* at Schloss Koberwitz in what was then Germany (today Wroclaw in Poland). This was 20 years before the term "organic agriculture" first appeared in 1943 in *Agricultural Testament* by English agronomist Albert Howard. The course was held as a response to some farmers detecting deterioration of soil and health of livestock after they started applying chemicals (Diver, 1999). The eight lectures at the course targeted the implementation of Steiner's anthroposophical thoughts to agriculture, and a series of ideas to be tested in experimental farm were born. Those lectures and four supplemental experiments were soon put into a book entitled *Spiritual Foundations for the Renewal of Agriculture (Geheimwissenschaftliche Grundlagen zum Gedeihen der Landwirtschaft)*.

The arrival of biodynamic agriculture in Denmark was punctuated with the foundation of the Association for Biodynamic Agriculture (Foreningen for Biodynamisk Jordbrug: hereafter FBJ) in 1936. FBJ was born when Danish agriculture, in particular the livestock production, was under crisis with the import restriction of England (Pedersen, 1988). It was also the time when modern livestock production was found problematic and the first boycott by "political consumers" against unethically produced food was organised (Jensen, 1996). Since then, Danish biodynamic agriculture has been operated in small communities of full-time and part-time farmers, businesses, consumers, associations and research centres for biodynamic agriculture in other European countries, particularly West Germany and Sweden. Self-regulation and accreditation of biodynamic produce has operated under the label Demeter since 1963.

Despite those experiences, biodynamic agriculture remained a minor trend in society. It was hardly diffused among farmers. In 1973, there were only 45 members of FBJ[37] (Foreningen for Biodynamisk Jordbrug,

[37] According to Jens Holmegård, the number of biodynamic farms had grown from 35 to 100 until the 1970s. Holmegård, J. (1997). Økologiens Pionertid. Odense, Erhvervsskolernes Forlag.

1973), while the total number of farm-holds in Denmark counted 140,200 in 1970 (Dansk Landbrug og Landbrugsraadet, 2005). To some extent, this resulted from an internal conflict in the community about whether use of synthetic fertilisers should be allowed or not according to Demeter rules, which eventually led to the creation of another biodynamic organisation, the Co-operation for Biodynamic Agriculture (Biodynamisk Jordbrugssamvirke: hereafter BJS) in 1973. The fragmentation of an already small community was not received well among the new generation, who was about to enter the alternative agriculture community (Brandt, 2005). Yet a more substantial reason for the isolation of the biodynamic community can be found in the nature of this movement. Biodynamic agriculture often encountered harsh criticism, not only because its method emerged fundamentally from the criticism of conventional farming, but also due to its focus on spiritual elements. This linkage of farming with the extra-scientific focus was simply rejected and even hostilely attacked by some agricultural professionals. For instance, an associate professor in agronomy wrote in an agricultural journal that the biodynamic movement was equivalent to "romanticism, illusionism, occultism, dilettantism, and fanaticism" (Kovacs, 1973). The biodynamic community has traditionally been quite passive in the face of criticism. The generally non-aggressive attitude is well described by Niels Stokholm, who has been a leading figure in the biodynamic community over the past three decades;

> I think developments differ from person to person. And if my neighbour, who is a conventional farmer, is happy about what he is doing, I think it is a good thing. I do not say what I am doing is the right thing and others should follow my way. If other people see what I am doing, and if they want to do the same thing as I do, that's nice. That's why I welcome people to come to my farm.[38]

All in all, the biodynamic movement tends to concentrate on self-development/realisation of individuals, rather than seeing its movement as a political project for agriculture or society as a whole. Indeed, the biodynamic community has a history with the political turbulent during the Nazi period. The regime changed drastically from enthusiastic support of biodynamic agriculture by agricultural minister Richard Walther Darré and Rudolf Hess to suddenly banning the method after Hess' asylum in England in 1941. Except during the war period, the community has distanced itself from the major political ideologies and actions. For example, FBJ reacted negatively to the eco-socialist book linking biodynamic agriculture with Marxism. It was claimed in the organisation's magazine that the politicisation of anthroposophy with Marxism was a result of a shallow understanding of the former and would harm the biodynamic movement. The words of Steiner were quoted to make this point: "Freedom –equity in the rights – lies in brotherhood in the life. The completion of those is a revolution not outside of you but inside of you" (Hald, 1977). Politics – at least institutional politics – is conceived to be less important than a deeper understanding and practices of inner unity within oneself. Political ideologies are even understood to be "harmful," since they could be intolerant of the diversity in individuals' opinions. In the biodynamic community, neither Marxism nor liberalism was thought as a solution, but anthroposophy which cherishes individuality and benign relationships between people, animals, plants and nature was understood as "the only way" (Hald, 1977). Yet, perhaps due to this strong emphasis on individuals' self-development, it has been difficult for the biodynamic movement to form a common definition of how the future society should look like, and, more crucially, a collective programme for how to realise such a society. In addition, the engagement with Steiner's philosophy was also perceived as unattractive by the new generation of alternative agricultural community. As a leading pioneer organic activist said: "To believe in what one person told in so many years ago sounds dogmatic".[39]

[38] Interview with Niels Stokholm. 21 August 2007.

[39] Interview with Bo Læssøe. 18 June 2007.

Introduction of organic agriculture

While the connection between agriculture and environment was not quite established in the public debates, some new initiatives for alternative agriculture started in the early 1970s. Among them was the magazine *Bio-Information* started in 1973 by organic farmer Niels Erik Jensen (Ingemann, 2006). The aim of the magazine was to provide practical information to people who were interested in alternative ways of farming and gardening. Thus it targeted a wide population encompassing professional and hobby farmers and gardeners as well as consumers. At the same time, Jensen started operating an educational farm in middle Jutland, where people could learn about alternative farming methods. Since knowledge about alternative farming methods was mostly limited to the biodynamic network or foreign literature, often written in German, Swedish, or English, the practical and theoretical information provided by Jensen was influential at the time, particularly among those who started organic agriculture without farming experience (Holmegård, 1997, 13). Furthermore, the list of biodynamic/organic farms and their produce put on his magazine functioned as one of the few means for connecting those farmers and consumers in the 1970s. The growers on the list, which started with only 14 farms, reached 36 in 1979. This collectively organised consumer purchase was so successful that ten of them had to close for new customers (Brandt, 2005). Back then, non-chemical fresh vegetables were only available at limited places, such as health and natural food shops, some farm-gate stands, and in the biodynamic community's network.

In 1975, NOAH, a newly formed environmental group, published its fifth book, *The industrialised agriculture* (Det industrialiserede landbrug). It was based on a master thesis by eight students of University of Copenhagen and claimed that the ongoing technological development in agriculture based on "specialisation, mechanisation, and application of chemicals" was the direct cause of the environmental problems "within and outside agriculture" (NOAH, 1999). It pointed out a series of problems, such as the excessive energy consumption caused by the use of synthetic fertilisers, pesticides, machines, and long-distance transportation, deterioration of groundwater quality by nitrogen, poor exploitation of organic fertilisers, application of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides, lack of crop rotation, burning of straw without using them as recyclable resource, pollution of food, poor animal welfare, and unfair distribution of nutrition in the world (Ansbæk, Bennekou et al., 1975). It emphasized that these were consequence of the dominant mode of development fed by short-term economic interests. The suggested remedy was "ecological thinking" that understands agriculture as "an ecological system with structures, material, and energy stream" (Ansbæk, Bennekou et al., 1975:NOAH, 1999). Until today, agriculture has constituted a crucial part of NOAH's agenda. However, as an environmental organisation, NOAH has been tackling many other issues, and its part in the alternative/organic agriculture movement has been more likely to remain in a supporting role. Furthermore, its decentralised structure built upon local groups tends to concentrate in relatively big cities, and in this way, its basis in rural communities, i.e. among farmers, has been very weak.[40]

Niels Erik Jensen's and NOAH's initiatives for alternative agriculture in the early 1970s were not directly linked. However, both had ecology as their core concept and used the term "organic". Here it is important to note that organic agriculture was called "ecological agriculture (økologisk landbrug)" in Danish, while other terms for alternative agriculture, such as biological agriculture and biodynamic agriculture, were also used in and outside the country. After all, the activities in the 1970s as represented by Niels Erik Jensen have spread the term organic/ecology to others. The term was meant to signify a common definition of diverse alternative farming methods, of which biodynamic agriculture and others could constitute a part (Brandt, 2005). While it appears that the intention of using the term organic agriculture was not to subordinate biodynamic agriculture

[40] Troels V. Østergaard mentioned it was difficult to be tightly connected with NOAH in the development of organic agriculture due to its decentralised form of organisation. Furthermore many in the organic movement did not live in the city, where NOAH's activity mainly took place. Arranging regular meetings was also difficult. Interview on 19 July 2007.

under that, but rather to pursue the co-existence of the two, the embedding of organic agriculture in the scientific discipline of ecology fit well in the emerging environmental and political consciousness of the time, as also expressed strongly by NOAH. One of the pioneers in organic agriculture in Denmark, Troels V. Østergaard (the founder of the organisation Praktisk Økologi), explained that this preference for ecology over, say, biology in the alternative agriculture community, came from the intention to define the emerging alternative farming with a wider perspective on the dynamism of each farm, while biology as a scientific discipline tends to focus on plants or animals.[41] As the term diffused, "ecology/ecologists" (økologi/økologer) often referred to organic farming/organic farmers in Denmark.

Formation of grassroots' political initiatives: Agricultural Study Group

In 1975, a new initiative for alternative development of agriculture was taken by two young students at a farming school, who established a group called the Agricultural Study Group (Jordbrugsgruppen). This group later evolved into the organisation for organic agriculture in the early 1980s (see below). The objective of the Group was to learn about and discuss the actual political, economic, and ecological situation of agriculture in Denmark, and to develop "a tradition for economic and social communities inside Danish agriculture" (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1975). It attracted different types of people, ranging from students to the above mentioned Niels Erik Jensen, young farmers, academics interested in alternative technology in general, political gender equality activists, co-operativists for alternative housing etc. (Brandt, 2005:Ingemann, 2006). The group was de-centralised, based on local groups organising meetings and activities on their initiatives, while the common themes to be discussed in the local groups were decided collectively at general meetings held four times a year. The bond among them was criticism of the agricultural development in Denmark. However, as the Group was to be "cross-political" (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1975), the critical perspectives differed from the start and soon became manifest in the Group. In broad terms, there were two wings: one seeking a *socialistic/communistic alternative* to the agricultural development, and the other focusing on *ecology* with focus on organic agriculture (Brandt, 2005:Ingemann, 2006)[42].

For the socialist/communist wing, the primary problem was the subordination of farmers and agricultural workers in the capitalist system. Farmers were reduced to slaves of machines and financial institutions for surviving the ever increasing competition. Due to the pressure for rationalisation and optimisation, farmers were forced to carry heavy loan for better facilities and bigger lands. Moreover, the high interest rate and the rising land price deteriorated the farmers' conditions even further. Based on these points, the communist/socialist wing put focus on the issue of alternative farm ownership, such as cooperative farms (andelsbrug) and nationalisation of agricultural land (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1977b:Jordbrugsgruppen., 1978). With these interests, the Group often picked up the issue of agriculture in communist countries, such as China, DDR, Poland, Tanzania, and the Soviet Union. In addition to the seminars on this subject, a study trip to DDR was planned.

In 1977, cooperative farming was pursued by some members. Among the earliest were the two founders of the Group, farming school students affiliated with the Danish Communist Party (DKP). Their original aim for "truly" cooperative farm was not achieved, since the Agricultural Property Law at the time did not allow other forms of co-ownership than limited liability company (interessentskab; I/S). Yet, the attempt did not end in vain, when the idea of different forms of ownership was recognised by the authority as adjustable to

[41] Interview with Troels V. Østergaard. 19 July 2007.

[42] Ingemann categorised the members of the Agricultural Study Group into three by adding one more group of young people, i.e. hippies who envisaged alternative rural life. Ingemann, J., Holm (2006). The Evolution of Organic Agriculture in Denmark. OASE Working paper. Aalborg, Institut for Økonomi, Politik og Forvaltning, Aalborg Universitet. A similar perspective was mentioned by several interviewees who have been involved in the organic agriculture movement from the early phase.

the new objective of the Law for liberalisation of agricultural land. The proposal for further discussion on this issue was supported by the Ministry of Agriculture, the majority of the centre-left parties, i.e. Social Democrats, Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre: hereafter RV), Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti: hereafter SF), and the Communist Party (Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti: hereafter DKP), and the Danish Family Farmers' Association (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1977b:Brandt, 2005). The Board for Alternative Forms of Farm-ownership was established under the Ministry of Agriculture, and already in 1978 the official consideration which opened dispensation possibility for co-ownership was issued.

All in all, the intention of cooperative farms driven by the members of the Group gained some political success, since, firstly, it was understood as a liberalisation (de-regulation) of agricultural real estate, which did not conflict with the existing policy of "the Effective Farm" (Ingemann, 2006). Secondly, under the two oil crises and the subsequent drastic structural reform in this period, agricultural subsidy was one of the reform targets. Under these circumstances, collective ownership of farms was considered as an option for, in particular, small-size farmers, who otherwise would be abandoned under the ongoing liberalisation and rationalisation. Yet, it is fair to say that support to the idea of an alternative farming community remained within a very small part of the policy and the traditional farming community. For instance, the then chairperson for a local family farmers' association, who was also the chairperson for the committee for the Agricultural Property Law and a member of the Social Democratic Party, claimed that he did not consider cooperative farms as a plausible option, since it would be difficult for farmers to agree on things. This view reflected the general preference of farmers to own their land. He suggested that tenancy of state-owned land would be a better solution than cooperative farms (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1978b). Furthermore, the reaction of the traditional agricultural organisations to cooperative farms was far from supportive. The largest organisation, the Farmers' Union, responded negatively, though a local family farmers' organisation responded positively (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1977b).

Nationalisation of agriculture was taken up by the Group not only as a potential means to solve the financial instability of farmers in general, but also to overcome the particular difficulty of young farmers to start out due to the high price of agricultural land and facilities. This problem was widely considered as a main cause of exodus from rural communities. However, the idea was not received with full sympathy in the Group, and its political viability was questioned in discussions (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1978b).

In general, the ideas typically raised by the socialist/communist wing of the Group, such as collective farming and nationalisation of agriculture, were supported by distinct socialist/communist parties at the time, namely, SF, DKP, and the Left Socialist Party (Venstresocialisterne: hereafter VS), which, however, did not see them as priority issues. After all, agriculture and rural issues were still underdeveloped areas for those parties, while their main supporters lived in the cities. A member of VS claimed that, as a socialist party, its main task was to "fight for the working class and the working class's alliance", and as a small party with limited resource it had to prioritise that task. He also explained that the absence of agricultural politics in his party was "politically and historically grounded" (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1977b).

While the communist/socialist wing focused on the structural aspects of agriculture, the other wing of the Group emphasised the potentials of organic agriculture in the scope of an alternative society based on the ecological cycle. However, the different focuses of the two wings were not always reconciled in the Group. The communist/socialist wing did not see organic farming as benefiting the well-being of farmers. The additional burdens needed for this farming method were way too much and farmers "should not destroy themselves physically for organic agriculture" (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1977b:1979). On the other hand, the ecologist wing did not recognise radical structural reform in the agricultural sector as the essential means, but rather as a spontaneous outcome of the establishment of an ecological society (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1978a). Nonetheless, the endeavour of the ecologist wing was consolidated symbolically with the establishment of Svanholm, a cooperative manor on the outskirt of Copenhagen in 1978 (Brandt, 2005). Svanholm came into reality when the dispensation possibility for ownership form was widened, but also after pressure by SF and DKP to

issue the dispensation. Svanholm has, until today, claimed to embody ideals of a self-governed community, ecology, and mutual cooperation along with ecological and economic sustainability. These objectives were conceived to be an open and long process that was not necessarily directed under "fixed ideologies".[43] Ultimately, the ecologist wing succeeded in mobilising the members of the Group and others to establish organic agriculture organisation. In contrast, the socialist/communist articulation of alternative options gradually disappeared from the front stage as the ecological articulation began to be widely diffused in the society (Ingemann, 2006).

Meanwhile, the traditional agricultural community most often neglected or heavily criticised organic agriculture as a programme for "pure Marxists" (NOAH, 1999). Although many who nurtured organic agriculture were in fact politically oriented towards the left, many others were more cautious about their activity being labelled politically. The organic agriculture organisation, discussed in the following section, took the latter orientation.

Formation of the Organic Agriculture Movement (1980- the mid-1980s)

Formation of nationwide organisation: LØJ

Following Svanholm, some members of the Agricultural Study Group and others in 1980 agreed to establish an organic agriculture organisation. In March 1981, the Association for Organic agriculture (Foreningen Økologisk Jordbrug) was formed, though the name was already changed in 1983 to the Danish Association for Organic agriculture (Landsforeningen for Økologisk Jordbrug: hereafter LØJ) to express its existence as a nationwide organisation. 140 people attended the founding meeting in Roskilde, among them organic farmers, members of the Agricultural Study Group, individuals self-studying organic agriculture, and members of other grassroots environmental groups. Four points were raised as the objectives of the organisation: 1) to diffuse organic agriculture; 2) to unite organic farmers; 3) to help new organic farmers to start; and 4) to mediate contact between consumers and organic growers (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1981). LØJ envisaged being an organisation for the mutual interest of agricultural professionals and non-agricultural professionals and started with two membership categories: growers and consumers. In this way, LØJ intended to be distinctive from the existing farmers' organisations, which traditionally focus on the interest of farmers exclusively. In its first members' newsletter, it was stated that the members counted 92 in August 1981, 35 were registered as farmer members (LØJ, 1981). In comparison, the Association for Biodynamic Agriculture, FBJ, at the time had approximately 800 members (Brandt, 2005, p.97). The organisation was built upon a de-centralised structure throughout the 1980s, which gave local groups direct influence on organisational decisions. The activities of local groups and minutes of board meetings were informed through its monthly newsletter, whose editing task was taken annually by each local group in turn. The annual general assembly was the organisation's highest decision-making body, and each attending member had equal say until LØJ started different membership categories, including those without voting right in the 1990s.

LØJ in the early phase (1981-mid 1980s): Establishing coalition

From start the organisation targeted the development of organic control (i.e. organic regulation, inspection and certification of organic produce, and accreditation of organic labels), organic market and sales, research and education for organic agriculture, and advisory service for organic farmers. Soon after the establishment in 1981, LØJ started its own organic control based on own regulation, and it began to accredit LØJ's organic label to the certified organic farmers. By August 1981, 23 farmers were certified by LØJ (Brandt, 2005, p.97), and the number grew up to 48 by the end of 1983 (LØJ, 1984a) and 125 in 1986. LØJ's own organic regulation was initially made and shaped collectively at occasional meetings and board meetings, but soon annual general assembly became the place for final decision-making. In comparison to the system today, the

[43] Svanholm's homepage http://www.svanholm.dk/kol/english/ [checked 24 July, 2007].

organic control at the time was much simpler and less demanding. The conversion period to organic agriculture was only one year, but state organic rules in 1987 adjusted it to three years. Furthermore, LØJ's certification back then differentiated 1st class and 2nd class organic produce, where the 2nd class still allowed limited use of synthetic fertilisers in fodder and crops using green manure (LØJ, 1984b, p.5). The inspection was basically organised by the geographically closest local group.

Early on, the organisation looked for sales possibilities for organic produce in the conventional market. Already in 1981 the sales contract for certificated organic produce was made with a consumers' cooperative, FDB (though it began with one of its branches, Brugsen). LØJ's newsletter stated that delivery by growers or pick-up by customers, the most familiar forms for organic trade at that time, were crucial for establishing direct contact between growers and customers, and contained many social aspects that "cannot be replaced with money". However, it was also expressed that:

> "(Yet) this sales form requires a lot of time. Harvesting of produce in small portions, packing in small units, making out many bills etc., are big workloads compared to the tasks for bigger lots. The delivery of small lots to many addresses takes a long time and costs more in petrol. This results in higher prices for the goods. At the same time, it requires more time and effort for new growers to create creating such sales networks. The first year for organic agriculture is often very strenuous with extra efforts to avoid failures. Labour-intensive and uncertain sales can destroy all the efforts…The degree of problem is very different from farm to farm. Some can be nearly economically independent from production, while economic result means a lot for some other farms. There is also a big regional difference. In the Copenhagen area there are big demands for organic goods, while growers on Funen and Jutland can have problems" (LØJ, 1981, p.2-3).

Considering these aspects, the sales contract with nationwide consumer cooperatives was considered as a useful option by the organisation. At the same time, according to an interviewee, this sales contract was realised not just because it was made with the consumer cooperative, which was considered different from ordinary supermarket chains as it was rooted in the social movement (consumer movement), but also LØJ's leader and the specific person of this cooperative hit it off personally.[44]

In 1982, the National School of Organic agriculture was founded in Aabybro in Northern Jutland as the first educational institute for organic agriculture. As regards the realisation of the School, LØJ played a crucial role in negotiating with the authorities and opponents. For instance, LØJ told an opponent from a workers' union that his protest against the School was contradictory to the policy of his organisation fighting for a safe and healthy working environment, which pesticide-free organic agriculture could contribute to (LØJ, 1981). It is also important to note that the biodynamic activists, too, applied for establishing the school for biodynamic agriculture around the same time. However, this proposal was rejected, and an educational institution for biodynamic agriculture has still not been realised in Denmark. Regarding these two opposite results, the rejection of the biodynamic school stemmed from the authorities' uncertainty about the scientific validity of this farming method (Brandt, 2005). Erik Fog, who was a teacher of the National School of Organic agriculture in the founding phase, says the proposal for the School of Organic Agriculture strategically built its basic educational programme as similar to ordinary farming schools but added several specialisation courses targeting organic agriculture. According to him, this made the authority accept the school.[45]

Meanwhile, the actual action for the establishment of an organic advisory service had started when the *Folketinget* allocated DKK 10 mil. to research on organic agriculture in 1982 (LØJ, 1982). The budget came through with support from SF, which took the application by some agronomists of the Royal Veterinary Uni-

[44] Interview with Jesper Rasmussen. 24 August 2007.

[45] Interview with Erik Fog. 10 July 2007.

versity most seriously. The prospect for organic advisory service significantly generated collaboration between LØJ, two biodynamic agriculture organisations and eventually the Family Farmers' Association. It in 1984, they agreed on facilitating advisory services under the Family Farmers' Association, which, in reality, indicated the flow of organic farmers in the local family farmers' organisations.

Along with those activities, LØJ established its own networks with other organisations. The contract with the cooperative supermarket chain attracted the biodynamic agriculture community to collaborate, and this resulted in the establishment of the Common Board for Organic and Biodynamic agriculture (Samarbejdsudvalget: hereafter SU) between LØJ and the above-mentioned two biodynamic organisations in the summer of 1982. This collaboration between organic and biodynamic agriculture organisations for the sales was further extended to the effort for establishing a common advisory service in 1983, and in the same year the idea was introduced also to the Family Farmers' Association. In consequence, a new Common Board (in addition to SU) between LØJ, two biodynamic organisations, and the Family Farmers' Association (Fælles udvalget: hereafter FU) was established, and hereby the collaboration between these alternative farming organisations and a traditional farmers' organisation began to be routinized.

Agriculture and environment: Response from the international and domestic policy community in the early 1980s

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, agriculture's effect on the natural environment gradually became articulated in and outside the country. Crucial for the Danish development was the emergence of support for organic agriculture in the EC. It rose with the criticism of CAP, but also a positive remark on organic agriculture by USA's Department of Agriculture (USDA). On the European level, the retired but still influential former Commissioner for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, began to express openly his support for organic agriculture as a way to keep rural populations and maintain small farms in the late 1970s. In his new thought, which turned 180 degrees from his own Mansholt Plan in the 1960s based on modernisation and rationalisation of agriculture, the major problems in the sector were found in such factors as large-scale farms and intensive agricultural production. It was considered that large-scale farming resulted in fewer employment possibilities in the agricultural sector and hence an increase in public expenditure for unemployment benefits. Intensive farming was claimed to be problematic due to its negative impact on the environment, but also its long-term consequences in terms of limited resources on the earth for producing synthetic fertilisers and agricultural chemicals (Lynggaard, 2006).

Shifting our focus back to Denmark, the first major conference on "Agriculture and Environment" was held in Rønne in September 1980. This two-day conference was initiated by the traditional agricultural organisations and the Ministry of the Environment, and attended by the representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, several municipality (kommune) representatives, and foreign delegates (Landbrugsraadet and Miljøministeriet, 1980). On this occasion, the environmental authority punctuated the linkage between agriculture and a series of environmental problems, such as deterioration of ground water quality, smell from animal husbandry, destruction of diversity in nature and landscape, consumption of fossil energy, and many others. Here, it was clearly asserted that those environmental problems were a consequence of the ongoing structural development in the agricultural sector. According to the environmental authority, today's specialised farming based on big-scale production, concentration in the production of single species/crop, and mechanisation, was giving more environmental damages than the traditional way of farming with mixed production and relatively small units. Furthermore, the negative impact of pesticides on human and animal health and the environment was mentioned, and the role of stringent regulations for the use of "plant protection materials" was stressed (Landbrugsraadet and Miljøministeriet, 1980, p.17).

However, the representatives of the agricultural community did not totally agree with the correlation between the structural development in agriculture and the environmental problems made by the Ministry of the Environment. The agricultural representatives claimed, for instance, that rationalisation did not necessarily cause

environmental problems but "on the contrary, it often brings improvements from earlier times with mixed farming" (Landbrugsraadet and Miljøministeriet, 1980, p.6). Furthermore, the agricultural organisations generally saw the restrictive measures as "a big burden for the business", and preferred a voluntary approval of farms for the environmental demands (Ibid.). The ministries merely made a common statement that they often had the same goals to improve the environment, but the methods to realise these objective often conflicted. The opinions of environmental and consumer groups regarding, for instance, food additives and straw burning as a waste of recyclable resource, were set aside, as their actual damage on the natural environment and human/animal health were not agreed on even among experts at the conference. Overall, the general opinion in the agricultural community was, as expressed by the then president of the Agricultural Council, H.O.A. Kjeldsen, that the instruments for environmental protection had to be considered "in its entirety with great economic coherence" (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, the environmental authority's official articulation of the effect of agricultural development on the natural environment was one of the earliest in Europe and the world. Yet, the environmental authority was very cautious to label agriculture as "polluters." While it underlined the current trend of agricultural development towards specialisation and the use of chemicals and machines as the main causes of environmental problems, it suggested "better collaboration between the environmental authority and agriculture" by acknowledging the need for "the current development in agriculture to continue" (Landbrugsraadet and Miljøministeriet, 1980, p.58-59). A remedy proposed by the environmental authority was introduction of an effective regulative system for materials and facilities whose health and environmental damages were already well-documented. A reduction in the use of pesticides, let alone organic agriculture was not mentioned in the programme of the conference.

1st Phase of Institutionalisation (1986-1992): Unstable Opportunity

Official acknowledgement of organic agriculture

The acknowledgement of the environmental impact of agriculture was gradually strengthened in the policy field towards the mid-1980s. In 1984, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Ministry of the Environment conducted a research project to investigate the deterioration of the aquatic environment (de-oxygenation) causing fish kills and excessive levels of nitrate in drinking water. The research report pointed to nitrogen discharge from agriculture as a cause of de-oxygenation and proposed instruments like a green tax on fertilisers and an action plan. These proposals were rejected by the Ministry of Agriculture, which supported the opposing scientific evidence over the EPA's analysis. The Ministry of Agriculture did not see the effect of nitrogen from agriculture as being more conclusive than, e.g., waste water from households, and the nitrogen level of agriculture could be managed, for instance via better information to farmers. Despite these disagreements, the Ministry of the Environment asked the EPA to head the preparation of an action plan in collaboration with the agricultural organisations. The final plan set a storage capacity for manure as well as economic support for building storage plants, but did not set any goals for reduction of the nitrogen level. The plan was not implemented to the extent envisioned as a result of the negotiation between the agricultural organisations, EPA and the National Association of Local Authorities (Kommunenes Landsforening: KL), who were responsible for farm inspection. After all, the plan did not have much substantial effect on changing the farmers' behaviour, i.e. the reduction in the use of (synthetic) fertiliser, but served for the interests of agriculture by facilitating a new subsidy for building storage facilities. In the meantime, the Ministry of Agriculture formed its own commission to tackle the issue of structural development and environmental protection in 1984. The environmental sector was not invited to this commission, and the report issued by the committee in 1986 did not present new perspectives compared to the Ministry's former report (Ingemann, 2006).

In 1986, de-oxygenation of the sea re-emerged in the media. There were dead lobsters in Kattegat in October, and the Danish Society for Nature Conservation (Danmarks Naturfredningsforening: hereafter DN), the Dan-

ish Sports Fishing Association and other organisations took action. In particular, DN and its "6 points plan" were mentioned several times by the national TV channel, and the director of the DN expressed on air that the *Folketinget* had to make an immediate resolution on this issue (Hansen, 1998). Public concern rose considerably after the media coverage (Pedersen, 1988:Holmegård, 1997:Ingemann, 2006). The first Pesticide Action Plan was made in 1986, and it set a goal of 50% reduction in pesticide consumption and treatment frequency by 1997.[46] The action plan further stated instruments such a mandatory official spraying certificate, advisory and information activities, and, above all, a pesticide tax. However, it is worth mentioning that the tax was placed on the trade of pesticides but not on the on-farm consumption (Ingemann, 2006).

In response, the green opposition of the *Folketinget*, i.e., the Social Democrats, RV, SF, and VS, demanded in November 1986 that the centre-right government, i.e., the Liberals, Conservative Peoples' Party, Central Democrats and Christian Democrats, come up with an action plan. At first, it proposed a 50% reduction of agricultural nitrogen discharge within three years as well as a green tax on fertiliser as formerly suggested by the EPA. The Christian Democratic environmental minister and the Liberal agricultural minister, both of whose major electoral support came from the farming community, were expected to resist the proposal on behalf of the agricultural sector. However, they could not successfully impose their influence during the procedure as the public concern turned out to be so strong (Hansen, 1998). On the other hand, the agricultural community managed to stop the fertiliser tax, and RV dropped the idea due to pressure from the Family Farmers' Association (Ingemann, 2006). Ultimately, the first Aquatic Environmental Plan (Vandmiljøplan I) came to life in 1987 with the objective of 50% reduction of nitrogen discharge from agriculture as suggested by the proposal. However, the Plan did not include strict regulatory measures and many instruments relied merely on the distribution of better information.

Then leader of the political department of the Farmers' Union, Jørgen Skovbæk, stated that the media was too "bizarre and unprofessional," and the criticism was "an attack to the whole foundation (of agriculture)" and therefore "it hurt the professional pride" (Haubroe, 2006). At the same time, however, along with the growing public concern, organic agriculture was gradually taken up in discussions in the traditional agricultural community. At the Farmers' Union meeting in 1986, the Union's total dismissal of organic agriculture, despite the rising consumer demands for organic food, was questioned for the first time. Opinions of the members were still divided, since many were suspicious about the real profit gained by organic agriculture and afraid that it would label conventional produce as unhealthy and environmentally harmful. However, social pressures on conventional agriculture on the one hand, and the fear of giving too much precedence to family farmers in organic agriculture on the other hand was recognised by the majority (Brandt, 2005). This led the Farmers' Union to join the above-mentioned organic advisory service, which consisted of LØJ, biodynamic organisations, and Family Farmers' Association, from 1987. Simultaneously, the Union became part of the Common Board (FU).

In conjunction with this entry of the biggest farmers' organisation in organic agriculture, the positive effects of organic agriculture on the environment were eventually announced both by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Environment in 1986, and hereby the official "inclusion" of organic agriculture into the policy field was a fact.

[46] According to an expert, this 50% reduction as satisfactory in terms of protection of the environment and humans was not based on scientific knowledge but on a "political will to satisfy a public demand for changed practices in agriculture" and "great public concern" http://agrsci.au.dk/institutter/institut_for_plantebeskyttelse_og_skadedyr/medarbejdere_old/lnj/danish_pesticide_action_plans/ [checked 1 July 2008].

National Organic Food Act

In the latter half of the 1980s, organic agriculture made a rapid entrance into the formal institutional field, and this was symbolised by the establishment of the Organic Food Act (Lov nr 363 om økologisk jordbrugsproduktion) in 1987.

In parallel with the above-mentioned acceptance of organic agriculture among the authority and the agricultural community, the creation of the Act began with two separate proposals made by SF and RV in November 1986. As mentioned above, SF's interaction with organic activists dated back to the late 1970s when organic agriculture became a part of its evolving agricultural programme (Jordbrugsgruppen, 1977a:Brandt, 2005). As regards RV, its MP, Hans Larsen Ledet[47], who was also the then vice-president for Danish Family Farmers, was of a particular importance. He worked to build the above-mentioned organic advisory service, which generated collaboration between the organic/biodynamic organisations and the Family Farmers' Association. He expressed that organic agriculture was an opportunity for family farmers, not a threat (Brandt, 2005:Ingemann, 2006). As illustrated above, family farmers in general had already crumbled under the growing competition with big-scale, effective farms. Under these circumstances, opinions like Ledet's which saw organic agriculture as a means for family farmers' survival was approved relatively easily in his organisation. Organic agriculture was also found suitable for the condition and ideology of family farmers; organic agriculture at the time was, like family farms, small-scale, and was perceived as consistent with its ideology of farmers' social responsibility to society as declared in the Køge Resolution (Ingemann, 2006).

The Organic Food Act took in some core elements of the two proposals, namely the establishment of an official certification system for organic goods, an advisory board under the Ministry of Agriculture, and subsidies for converting to organic method. The budget was settled with 10 million DKK for the first year. However, as asserted by Brandt (Brandt, 2005), the context of the Act turned out to be more technical than SF's and RV's original proposals, which stated the ideological foundation of organic agriculture in holistic thinking beyond the technicality of this farming method.

Strategies of LØJ

Shifting focus back to the organic agriculture organisation LØJ, the National Organic Food Act was a significant turning point for the organic movement. Some members saw the development toward the law as problematic. From this critical view, the Act still contained many issues to be improved; for example, the period for conversion subsidy was shortened from five years,[48] which was proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture and SF, to max. three years. Perhaps more seriously, the organic community worried about intervention by the state and traditional agricultural organisations in organic issues. A member expresses this view:

> "Now it is obviously illegal to use the expression organic without the state's approval…What is organic agriculture is now decided by the agricultural organisations and the part of the state administration which is built on the marriage with Axelborg. The outlooks are bleak: the concept of organic as a commodity label in the agricultural catalogue for niche productions page 347" (Ketil Skovgaard-Petersen in LØJ, 1990b).

Despite this internal struggle (see more in the next section), the leaders of LØJ nonetheless welcomed the Act which promised conversion subsidy and other support, for instance for distribution of information on organic food production. Furthermore, LØJ got an official position in the newly-formed specialist board,

[47] It is worth mentioning that the then-secretary of Hans Larsen Ledet was a member of the Agricultural Study Group. Ingemann, J., Holm (2003). Økologisk landbrug mellem historie og principper. Aalborg, Institut for Økonomi, Politik og Forvaltning, Aalborg Universitet

[48] In the later phase, however, LØJ began to propose shortening of the conversion period to only one year, by asserting that the three-year requirement is a political decision not based on scientific grounds.

namely the Organic Agriculture Council (Det Økologiske Jordbrugsråd), which could give direct influence on policy-makers. In the Organic Agriculture Council, LØJ gained one seat like other members, such as FBJ, SU, the Farmers' Union, Family Farmers' Association, the Consumers' Council, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of the Environment. The composition of these members, especially in this early phase of the Council, was actually advantageous for the alternative agriculture sector, when three members were directly from the interest of alternative agriculture, and the Family Farmers' Association and those alternative agriculture organisations had already established collaboration under FU. Furthermore, the representative from the Consumers' Council was in fact one of the pioneer advocates of organic agriculture, Troels V. Østergaard, and the Ministry of the Environment was generally in favour of organic agriculture. Furthermore, according to the several interviewees with detailed knowledge about the Council's actual circumstances at the time, the representative of the Farmers' Union was personally positive about further support and development of organic agriculture, although his union was still lukewarm about supporting this agricultural form.[49] Thus, consensus building in the Council was generally easy (Michelsen, 2001a).

At the same time, LØJ's administration felt that the organisation had to be stronger in order to exploit these rising opportunities; otherwise, organic agriculture would be taken over by the conventional farmers' organisations and reduced to a mere market instrument (Tønnesen, 1989). LØJ's administration implemented a series of considerable organisational changes in the late 1980s. First of all, LØJ's sister organisation, Trade Coordination Committee (Branch Koordinationsudvalget: hereafter BKU), was established in 1989. BKU was an umbrella organisation of seven associations for special branches, with dairy among the largest. This organisational form mimicked the general structure of conventional farmers' organisations founded upon "two strings" (Ingemann, 2006). The intention of the two string structure was to divide responsibility for political and business tasks between two separate but closely embedded organisations. In other words, LØJ would continue its work on the ideological development of organic agriculture and political representation in the Organic Agriculture Council, while BKU would concentrate on the distribution of information and coordination of supply (Lynggaard, 2001:Ingemann, 2006). Following this development, LØJ established a committee for agricultural politics to handle consolidated organisational strategy for this area (LØJ, 1990c).

In 1990, LØJ's office moved from one of the two secretaries' house in the suburb of Aarhus, Denmark's second largest city, to an office building in the centre. With this change the organisational expense expanded to 262,000 DKK, which was 70,000 DKK more than the year before; the increase in rent accounted for 45,000 DKK (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1990a). In addition, more secretaries were employed in the following years, often unemployed in the re-employment programme, whose salaries were paid by the unemployment insurance fund. In this way, LØJ could use them nearly for free.

Along with the release of *Brundtland Report* in 1987 and rising social debate about sustainable development triggered by the report, "sustainable agriculture" gradually became a political agenda in Denmark. In October 1990, the Ministry of Agriculture held a conference which took this report as starting point, and LØJ was invited as a panel. The conference was, from LØJ's point of view, "window dressing," though it was seen as a good opportunity for the organisation to exchange opinions with politicians and ombudsmen (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1991b). Around the same time, the Ministry of Agriculture and the traditional agricultural organisations released their own action plans for Danish agriculture. According to Thomsen and Ingemann, those action plans were typically driven by the notion that eschewed the necessity of regulations unless they are internationally adopted, while stressing the necessity of strengthening agriculture's competitiveness (Ingemann, 2006). In the plan, the then Minister of Agriculture, Laurits Tørnæs, asked LØJ to formulate an alternative action plan for sustainable agriculture. In its plan, LØJ suggested, for instance, 100% conversion of the Danish agricultural land to organic within 15-20 years and taxation on synthetic fertilisers, pesticides, CO_2, and SO_2. The organisation claimed that although the plan sounded costly (it estimated the 100% con-

[49] Such opinion was heard by the consultant for organic farming by Erik Fog and Troels V. Østergaard.

version would cost 2000-2500 DKK per hectare), it was actually not costly from a socio-economic point of view, since it could, among other things, reduce energy consumption in agriculture by 50%. LØJ criticised the current agricultural policy, which sustained the existing support for conventional agriculture despite its negative environmental impact. It asserted that more substantial support for organic agriculture could solve not only environmental problems, but also the problem of overproduction which was being raised on the EU level (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1991a).

Internal struggles within LØJ

The National Organic Food Act did have immediate effects on the organic development. In 1989, 57 million DKK was allocated to support and develop organic agriculture (LØJ, 1989). As a consequence, the number of state authorised organic farmers rose significantly from 219 in 1989 to 672 in 1992 (Plantedirektoratet, 2005). However, LØJ had difficulty capturing those farmers as members. The rapid growth in the overall membership largely stemmed from an increase in consumer members and a newly-established subscriber membership from 1990. Farmer membership actually began to decline since 1989 as seen in the table below. LØJ took the limited participation of, in particular, newly-converted organic farmers in the organisation seriously. In 1992 less than half of the authorised organic farmers were LØJ members, though the numbers improved slightly in 1993 (LØJ, 1994:Plantedirektoratet, 2005).

Table 4: Development in LØJ's membership (1981-1992)

	1981	1983	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1992
Farmer members (certified by LØJ)	35 (23)	(48)	222 (125)	340 (165)	384 (280)	375 (310)	330 (280)	296 (*)
Consumer members	57	*	350	500	530	860	290	*
Subscription only	-	-	-	-	-	-	760	*
Total	92	*	572	840	914	1235	1380	*

*Number unknown. Source: Økologisk Jordbrug and internal documents of LØJ

The actual situation was that although LØJ was a central figure that represented the organic agriculture "sector" as well as the organic agriculture movement, there were few practical incentives for (organic) farmers to be the members of other organisations than the traditional agriculture organisations. The two main traditional farmers' organisations already had stable political channels through the Agricultural Council (Landbrugsrådet), whose institutional strength was bigger than the Organic Agriculture Council. Newly converted organic farmers therefore generally thought that membership in these traditional organisations would represent their interests properly. As mentioned earlier, the advisory service for organic agriculture was already built in the general agriculture organisations.

In addition to those, the demands for the official organic certification system necessitated by the National Organic Food Act ironically removed the monopoly of the alternative farming organisations in this field. By the final resolution of the Ministry of Agriculture, the existing private systems of LØJ and FBJ became supplementary to the state's system and the national organic label "Red Ø". This indicated that it was no longer necessary for organic farms to be certified by the organic/biodynamic organisation but by the Plant Directorate[50], which is an agency under the Ministry of Agriculture. What is more, as the private authorisation

[50] Organic processed food as well as distribution and retail sales of organic goods are inspected and certified by the veterinary authority.

became merely supplementary, the use of LØJ or biodynamic organisations' certification would burden organic farmers with extra costs and paperwork on top of the compulsory state authorisation. The double cost for LØJ's organic inspection was a major reason for farmer members to leave the organisation around this time (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1990b).

During discussions about what the official certification system should look like, some members of the Organic Agriculture Council, such as LØJ, FBJ, and the Consumers' Council, attempted to support other options that could preserve the principal role of private actors (LØJ, 1988:Tønnesen, 1989). Ultimately, however, the majority of LØJ also supported the above-mentioned resolution with strong state involvement. The self-regulation of organic goods was the task that drained the energy and resource of the organisation. As such, it was found unnecessary especially among new members. Furthermore, as seen in the branded butter Lurpak, state-authorisation of agricultural products had a century-long tradition in Denmark, and its well-known effects in the domestic and international markets were considered attractive by many members. Support for the state authorisation even reached the point of suspending LØJ's own standards and certification in 1991, since it was thought that the state organic regulations was very similar to LØJ's standards after several years' collaboration.[51] This proposal was rejected at the general assembly and the continuance of the own system was approved (LØJ, 1991). Nonetheless, in March 1992 LØJ's system became voluntary for members[52] and user-paid (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1992).

Another disagreement arose in connection with articulating the direction of organic agriculture. In FU's annual report of 1990, the then chairperson claimed that organic agriculture must be pursued in the conventional system:

> "…we are linked to the ordinary market mechanism in society, and the farm which understands the best way to adapt itself to the economic situation can survive and bring a further development…The harsh experiences of those years' works in production branches have taught us that we have to unite with the existing traditional and experienced market channels in order to get the most effective distribution. I am convinced that this will be the development we will see in the coming years, and I assume this will bring a meaningful progress in the sale" (cited in Bjerke, 1991).

FU's chairman's statement was criticised by a university researcher, Flemming Bjerke, in *Økologisk Jordbrug* (Bjerke, 1991). He warned that the current rapid growth in the number of newly converted organic farms was about to cause the traditional economic problems in the organic sector, since the market channels for organic food were not sufficiently developed. Although he and FU's chairperson were not far from each other in recognising this problem, they clearly disagreed on how to solve it. Bjerke claimed that the "experiments" for alliance seen in the diary sector (e.g. the agreement between an organic dairy cooperative, Dansk Naturmælk, and MD/Kløver Mælk for common marketing and distribution of organic milk, and the employment of two leaders with experience in the conventional diary sector), the distribution sector (e.g. the employment of a salesperson with experience in the conventional market and close cooperation with conventional grossers by the then biggest organic distributor Fælles-Grønt[53]), and the sales of organic pork at FDB all failed. For him such failure was inevitable, as conventional actors would always seek to maximise their profit by pressuring the production cost. Based on this line of thought, he claimed that LØJ should put more

[51] It is worth mentioning that LØJ fought for its one-year conversion period instead of three years in the state organic standards. However, the one-year conversion period shared in the Nordic private organisations at the time was not approved by an international umbrella organisation IFOAM (International Federation for Organic Agriculture Movements) either.

[52] Members with dairy were exceptional due to the agreement between LØJ and the Association of Organic and Biodynamic Milk Producers.

[53] Fælles Grønt was bankrupted in 1990.

weight on strengthening growers' influence in the market and securing premium price for the survival of small and medium size farmers (Ibid.) However, his comment immediately aroused strong criticism, from, among others, one of the board members of LØJ, Kristian Andersen. He asserted that the objective for developing organic agriculture was not to solve the structural development in Denmark, but to "grow an environmentally defendable agriculture" and, for this objective, bringing "as many conversions as possible" was to be prioritised. In his opinion, Bjerke's suggestion to first resolve the market problem and then the development of conversion to organic agriculture was "impossible," since the organic market would not be able to develop without (sufficient) production. Andersen expressed that LØJ should still work to improve conditions for small and medium size farms, and developing farmers' market was one option. However, he basically disagreed with the fundamental problem of the conventional market, and did not consider growth in organic sales via the conventional market chain as problematic (Andersen, 1991).

This discussion basically correlates with the emergence of the dilemma between being critical of and collaborative with the state and the traditional agricultural organisations. After all, the latter line of collaboration was favoured more than the former, which, in its strong form, meant to develop a "sector-driven protest movement without engaging with rest of agriculture" which can "critically point the finger at the mode of conventional agriculture" (LØJ, 1989). As underlined also in the last argumentation by Andersen, the idea of "diffusion first", which was commonly shared among the leaders, appears to have brought this choice. This idea matches the general conception of the organic community that "conversion to organic brings internal conversion"; put simply, once a person is in touch with organic, the development will come naturally, as (s)he starts thinking in a different way (Noe, 2008). Based on this belief, LØJ's leaders were more confident of traditional actors' entrance into the organic sector. Hence it was claimed to be a better choice to "go for dialogue with the rest of the agricultural community and try to convince them about the advantages of organic agriculture" (Ketil Skovgaard-Petersen in Økologisk Jordbrug 1989).

Furthermore, internal struggles during this period of early institutionalisation stemmed also from the emerging gap between "new" and "old" members in LØJ. A board member expressed at the time that whereas the old members shared common norms, routines, and social network, and hence could easily agree upon what issues to target right now, the new members tended to be excluded from such networks and eventually find the old members "inactive, uninteresting, and immature" (LØJ, 1990a). Furthermore, the local groups were considered to be "the most anarchic link of the movement" and "unforeseeable and uncontrollable" (LØJ, 1990a).

In 1992, a new internal struggle emerged around the future organisational structure. The direct trigger was resource shortage for maintaining BKU. At the general assembly in 1992, the dissolution of LØJ and BKU to establish a new organic organisation for consumers, organic producers and businesses was proposed. This new organisation was anticipated to be more competitive with the traditional agricultural organisations, though the crucial difference would lie in its incorporation with not only organic producers' interest but also consumers'. The proposal further pointed out that BKU was ineffective without sufficient work force, and that LØJ "won't dare to compete with the old agricultural-economic organisations" since it "does not have enough confidence in pursuing and covering the broader organic interests in the country as whole". For supporters of the proposal, interests among production, sales, and consumers in the organic sector were mutually isolated today, and an organisation that would be able to link those different interests was needed (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1992). The proposal was not supported by LØJ's board, which did not think that should be an agricultural-economic organisation similar to the traditional agricultural organisations, since that would make future collaboration with the Farmers' Union and Family Farmers' Association difficult. Furthermore, competition with these organisations might split organic farmers (LØJ, 1992). The proposal was officially dismissed by the majority vote at the general assembly, and as a successor of BKU, a new sister organisation, Organic Service Centre (Økologisk Landscenter: hereafter ØLC) was established. The

new organisation would be financed by the members paying five per cent of their sales (Borgen, 1992). After all, this basically meant the continuance of *status quo*.

All in all, it is safe to say that this first phase of institutionalisation of organic agriculture aroused internal discussions in LØJ on how to maintain its grassroots' aspiration along with the demands for professionalization and rationalisation as well as the growing number of newcomers in the organic sector, who did not necessarily share the pioneers' aspirations. The leaders explained that interactions of such conflicting interests and opinions were generally the source of dynamism and "richness in standpoints and visions" (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1991b). It was further emphasised that LØJ's practices should reside in giving "provocation, inspiration, and true alternative" (LØJ, 1990a), and "if LØJ stops being offensive in pushing forward our views, organic agriculture will become stagnated and a technical description of an agricultural system, which only deals with the use or not use of chemicals or synthetic fertilisers" (LØJ, 1992).

2nd Phase of Institutionalisation (1993-2000): Widened Opportunity and Division in the Movement

The new centre-left government: Widening political opportunity

When the National Organic Food Act expired in 1990, it was generally agreed in *Folketinget* to prolong the law as it was until 1993. A revision of the law was still necessary, as the introduction of common EU organic regulations (Council 1991, Reg. 2092/91 and Council 1992; Reg. 2078/92) required coherent organic regulations in the member states. The discussions about the new national organic law started in 1992, and the Ministry of Agriculture drafted a proposal in November, which maintained the overall framework of the old law, but, crucially, suggested extending the organic subsidy scheme. Subsidies for organic agriculture, which started from 1989, were until then only for the conversion period, that is, maximum three years (LBK nr 955 af 04/12/1992). The amount was different depending on whether a farm included animal husbandry or not and on how many animals the farm owned (see table 5 below). The proposal was then to facilitate the maintenance subsidy for organically grown acreage after completing conversion. The opposition, especially the Social Democrats, criticised the proposal, claiming that the organic subsidy could be more ambitious by exploiting the available environmental measures provided by the new CAP reform more. The party claimed that especially the maintenance subsidy had to be higher than the suggested 400 DKK per ha when conventional farms were given 900 DKK in acreage subsidy (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1993e). The decision on the law was delayed further as the government dissolved the day before the resolution was to be made in *Folketinget*. The Conservative-Liberal coalition left government, and was replaced by the so-called "red-clover government" composed of Social Democrats, Centre Democrats, RV and Christian Democrats in January 1993. Under the centre-left government headed by the Social Democrats' Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, which lasted onwards till November 2001, the organic sector underwent further institutionalisation and expansion.

Table 5: Subsidies for organic farms between 1988 and 1993

		1st year	2nd year	3rd year
Conversion subsidy	Animal per ha under 0.3 0.3-0.7 Over 0.7	1.500 800 300	1.970 1.055 375	2.200 1.180 420
Extra conversion subsidy [54]	Consumer crop per ha	700	700	700

Source: Jacobsen 2001, p.13.

[54] Extra conversion subsidy was introduced in 1991 to comply with the newly established EU regulation, which dictated a two year conversion period instead of one year under the Danish regulation (Jacobsen 2001, p.13).

Even though the core parties of the new government demonstrated their favour to organic agriculture, developments did not occur immediately. The new proposal for the revision of organic law, which was issued in March 1993 under the new Minister of Agriculture, Bjørn Westh, was deeply criticised by LØJ and other environmental organisations. This proposal not only sustained the low organic maintenance subsidy, that is, 400 DKK per ha, but suggested 1250 DKK per ha for conventional farms' efforts to reduce fertiliser use. LØJ, along with other organisations such as DN and Greenpeace, protested the ministry's proposal and advanced alternative proposals. LØJ's proposal required the highest subsidy for environmental protection, i.e. 2400 DKK per ha, to be given to organic farms (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1993f). The Social Democrats were still hesitant to increase the organic subsidies, since the half had to be financed by the national budget, and the other half by the EU (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1993c).

As a result of intensive debates on this issue, the ministry's proposal did not pass *Folketinget* in April 1993 without a concrete prospect for the new law. Another extension of the 1987 law was resolved with the majority of 106 votes; only the far-right party the Progress Party (Fremskridspartiet) opposed. This decision was considered a temporary solution to the legal problems with allocating subsidies to organic farmers (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1993a). In the following months, the original proposal was attacked by the government's coalition partner RV and also by SF, and in June, Bjørn Westh accepted the change in the content of the proposal, especially regarding the subsidy for environmental reasons. While the amount suggested by LØJ was accepted by neither the minister nor the majority of *Folketinget*, the new proposal promised organic farmers the annual subsidy with 1400 DKK per ha, while the subsidy given to conventional farmers for 40% reduction of fertiliser was reduced to 650 DKK (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1993b). This new proposal was passed with a clear majority. State support for organic agriculture for the sake of the environment was hereby enacted.

Developments in the mid-1990s (1994-1996)

More support for organic agriculture began in September 1994 as another Social Democratic politician, Henrik Dam Kristensen, took over the Ministry of Agriculture. According to the media, he was already known as "organic's (ecology's) man" (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1994a). Unlike traditional agricultural ministers, he was not a direct adherent of the agricultural community, though he had served as the party's spokesperson on agricultural issues the last couple of years. In an interview soon after his enrolment as the minister, he stressed the intention to "gear the Danish agriculture towards a more organic direction," and claimed that he personally thought "this is the only right way to go". He also underlined that it would be logical for Danish organic production to develop for the world market (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1994b).

The new agricultural minister soon launched initiatives for organic agriculture, and the most symbolic one was formulation of an action plan for the development of organic food production. The Organic Council was appointed to draft the action plan in 1995, and the final plan was published in 1996. In this first Action Plan the following points were raised as primal recommendations: 100 million DKK for organic research; improvement of organic advisory service; increased economic support for organic farmers; establish support for product development/innovation; and improved animal welfare. Furthermore, while the fee for the Plant Directorate's inspection was supposed to be user-pay from 1995, the Plan suggested it should continue to be free of charge. Responding to these recommendations, more support for organic production was introduced in 1996. The government, i.e. Social Democrats, RV and Centre Democrats with support from SF and Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten, hereafter EL) strengthened a series of organic-related subsidies in the Budget year 1997: 35 million DKK for the extra conversion subsidy for organic plant and pig production (see the table 6 below); increased subsidy for organic farms with environmentally sensitive agricultural areas from 250 DKK to 500 DKK per ha; and the new organic package with 125 million DKK for the coming four years. Some of the accomplishments with this organic package were the establishment of the Danish Research Centre for Organic Farming (DARCOF) and the experimental farm for organic agriculture, Bygholm (Brandt, 2005, p.158-159). In addition, it targeted conversion of public kitchens, a "grassroots research" scheme paid

for organic farmers' experimental efforts, and establishment of rules and development activities for organic non-food products (e.g. cosmetics and household products) and sustainable fishery (LØJ, 1997b). Furthermore, the fee for the Plant Directorate was removed in 1996 as the Action Plan recommended, and state financing for organic control was sustained.[55] And as LØJ demanded, GMO in organic fodder was prohibited by law in April 1996 (LØJ, 1997b).

Table 6: Subsidies for organic farms from 1994 to 2001

Type of subsidy	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998-2001
Conversion	300	275	200	200	450
Maintenance	750	600	400	850	600
Reduced fertilisation	650	525	400		
Extra conversion subsidy					
Crop					
First two years				2000	2000
3rd year				1200	1200
4th and 5th year				500	500
Pig production					
All five years				2000	2000

Source: Jacobsen (2001), p.13

In 1996, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery became the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Fishery, and in 1998, the Organic Agriculture Council became the Organic Food Council. This was more than a change of name; rather, it reflected the ongoing extension of agricultural politics from the narrow sectoral focus towards a multi-faceted direction. By using the frame of "food," scopes can be extended from those shared in the agricultural policy community, which are most likely to be resistant to change (Daugbjerg, 1998), towards the emerging multi-dimensional interests, as represented by animal welfare, food safety, and eco friendliness.

Developments in the late 1990s (1997-2000)

Discursive cleavage between the centre-left and the right

A further integration of organic agriculture in the general policy continued in the late 1990s. In 1997, the Social Democrats/RV coalition government made an agreement with SF and EL to expand efforts on the aquatic environment and strengthen organic agriculture. This resulted in more funding for the development of organic food production in the Budget 1998, and this funding was partially provided by the newly reformed pesticide tax. For LØJ, it had a significant meaning when the organisation could now get a part of the revenue from the tax for its activities for advisory service, information and marketing of organics. This brought 11.5 million DKK to LØJ in 1998 (Ingemann, 2006).

Furthermore, along with the second objective, the government made a proposal for the purchase of organic food in public institution's kitchens in the autumn of 1997. Regarding this issue, standpoints of political parties showed a clear division between the centre and left parties and the right-wing parties; that is to say, the former was positive about the more intensive public sector support for organic agriculture. RV and EL claimed: "Whole public purchase of food should convert to organic." The latter clearly did not support the favouring of organic food by public institutions. Liberals expressed concern that public purchase of organic food would send a "totally wrong signal," since it sounded like "the other one does not work". Conservatives had a similar point claiming that organic production should handle the normal market conditions by developing its competitiveness "without all kinds of cunning support measures (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1997a).

[55] This decision was temporary and the issue of fee still depended on the regular negotiation for the national budget, and it continued to be free until 2013 (The homepage of the Action Plan for the Aquatic Environment III. http://www.vmp3.dk/Default.asp?ID=41&M=News&PID=144&NewsID=53 [Checked 22 April, 2013])

During the late 1990s, organic agriculture was much more explicitly linked with the policy for the aquatic environment and pesticides. As such, it was stated in the central part in the formulation of the second action plan. As regards to the aquatic environment, the goal of 50 % reduction of nitrogen discharge stated in the first action plan from 1987 was confirmed unachieved. Thus the new action plan of 1998 was to continue with the same goal for reduction. Just as the previous plan, it did not go beyond the voluntary schemes, but organic agriculture was clearly acknowledged as an instrument for improving the aquatic environment. 170,000 ha organic conversion was set as goal, and the plan allocated 50 million DKK to advance sales of organic produce. In parallel with this, the second action plan to reduce pesticides was formulated. Like the aquatic environment plan, the goal of 50% reduction of consumption and treatment frequency from the first Pesticide Action Plan was not reached by 1997 as targeted. The second Pesticide Action Plan, which was eventually issued in 2000, thus continued with the same goal as the last plan. Here too, a further expansion of organic area was encouraged (LØJ, 1999:Ingemann, 2006).

Still, deterioration of water quality of well, groundwater, and reservoir continued to be detected, and chemical and synthetic inputs from agriculture kept attracting a political attention. Political cleavages among the parties were also seen in approaches to the issue. The centre-left parties generally agreed on stricter policy instruments to reduce the use of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals. Among others, RV, EL, and SF separately made proposals to prohibit harmful agricultural inputs. For instance, RV in 1997 advocated the total prohibition for the coming ten years to be included in the government's next target: "There are apparently no safe agricultural chemicals." EL had a similar opinion about no safe agricultural chemicals, but required a swifter measure to stop purchase and sales of all agricultural chemicals that would target the phasing out of agricultural pesticides by 2000, as well as the doubling of pesticide tax. EL further suggested the creation of a chemical tax to finance cleaning of polluted areas and faster conversion of agriculture to organic agriculture. SF made similar proposal with total prohibition (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1997b). In contrast, the right wing generally took a more hesitant approach. Unlike in the 1980s, there was no longer dispute about coupling water pollution with agricultural chemicals in *Folketinget*. Hence the political discussions directly concerned what to do about it. However, the right wing was clearly against the total prohibition of agricultural chemicals and argued that not all agricultural chemicals are harmful. For instance, the Conservative Peoples' Party claimed that "green" politicians were not driven by solid science, and the total elimination of agricultural chemicals could result in unwanted consequences such as the outbreak of plant disease and famine. The party referred to agricultural chemicals (or a more pragmatic term "plant protection products") as medicine, and asserted:

> "When we look at history, an excellent degree of development research has already been achieved. Sometimes medicine men go back to the traditional Danish natural medicine, and sometimes they are inspired by nature in other parts of the world, but there are also remedies which are totally new from the laboratory. Pesticides or plant protection products are plants' medicine…The healthy plants can manage without plant protection products, but few have not had a need for and appreciated medicine. It is not a coincidence that the average life expectancy grew significantly once we could improve our health with vitamin pills and combat tuberculosis, pneumonia and ague with medicine. It is not a coincidence either that the yields grew and continue to grow, for we have plant protection products developed and refined" (Niels Jørgen Langkilde in Økologisk Jordbrug, 1997a).[56]

In this point of view, the cause of the present problem was limited agricultural chemicals, which turned out to be poison for the environment, and the solution was found in the prohibition of those, but not of all agricultural chemicals. Furthermore, the Conservatives basically claimed the goal for an acceptable level of aquatic environment could be achieved for instance by setting a ceiling for the use of plant protection prod-

[56] Niels Jørgen Langkilde was the Conservative People's Party's spokesperson for environmental policies at the time.

ucts in "non-agricultural land" and research in the development of resistant plants, which can reduce pesticides or make them obsolete. For the latter objective, it especially anticipated the development of gene technology (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1997a). The party's proposed measures did not take up organic agriculture.

Potential for 100% conversion to organic agriculture

Despite the right-wing opposition's protests against the total phasing out of agricultural chemicals, the potential of this scenario was investigated by several official projects in the late 1990s. Crucially, such attempts often accompanied the focus on organic agriculture. The earliest was a project by the Danish Institute for Agricultural and Fishery Economics, which published a report (so-called Wynen Report after the leader of the project Els Wynen) in 1998. It concluded that with up to 25% conversion to organic agriculture, Danish agriculture would be able to maintain the current level of income, but over 25% conversion would cause socio-economic consequences (Brandt, 2005). Another report regarding 100% conversion to organic agriculture published by the Technology Council the same year claimed that organic production can compete economically with conventional production if producer prices increased by 30%. The report indicated that this would raise consumer prices by 10-15% (LØJ, 1999). Following those reports the biggest project was conducted by the so-called Bichel Committee.[57] The Bichel Committee was formed under the Ministry of the Environment and Energy by the request of the Minister Sven Auken just after the Kyoto Climate Conference in 1997. The original objective of the committee was to give expert remarks on the Pesticide Action Plan II. However, it was later asked to draw scenarios for total conversion of agricultural land to organic, as a result of the national budget negotiation among the government, SF, and EL. The conclusion of the project published in autumn of 1999 (generally called Bichel Report) assessed that organic agriculture is the best option in terms of improving agriculture in an environmentally friendly direction, and that a 5-10% reduction in pesticides frequency would not reduce production. Overall, the Bichel Report asserted the lack of research to make a clear conclusion, and 12 recommendations in the report did not indicate numbers, per cent, and other calculations. This was targeted by critiques, who questioned the validity of the report's assessment (Brandt, 2005). Nonetheless, the common point of these studies was that while organic agriculture is a better option than conventional agriculture especially in terms of environmental protection, it will cost money for society under the current market system. They nonetheless opened discussions in a wider public about a further expansion of organic agriculture. It is fair to say that they had a symbolic meaning for showing the government's intention for environmentally friendly agriculture. At the same time, the second Action Plan introduced another symbolic initiative for organic agriculture. As with the first action plan, the Organic Food Council was in charge of the plan throughout 1998, and the final plan named *Action Plan II – Development in Organic Agriculture* was published in January 1999. It contained 65 recommendations and envisaged being a policy tool for the development of organic production 1999-2003. In comparison with the first action plan, the new plan extended its focus to further integration of organic agriculture in the EU and the expansion of organic production in the conventional production and market system. Concerning the latter point, rapid growth of organic production in a wide range of food industry and organic sales via conventional retail trade was designated as positive development. Hence a further development in these areas should be encouraged. Action Plan II overall stressed that organic production had already passed the phase as niche production, and it is now considered realistic to develop export market, when organic milk production was estimated to hit over-production in 1999. At the same time, it suggested the potential of alternative sales chains such as farm sales and alternative energy sources such as biogas to reduce fossil-based energy consumption.

[57] Svend Bichel, the head of the committee, was president of DN from 1984-1996 Brandt, N. K. (2005). Den økologiske jordbrugsbeværgelses historie: fra 1970'ernes græsrødder til 1990'ernes professionelle. Saxo Instituttet. Copenhagen, Copenhagen University. **Ph.D**.

Internal struggles in LØJ

Demarcation between organic politics and businesses

As seen above, organic agriculture has undergone a rapid integration in the general policy during the 1990s, and LØJ's task as the largest organisation for organic agriculture increased remarkably. However, its accomplishment was not always found satisfactory among the members. The economic situation was certainly not optimal for the organisation to invest in the development of its own competences. The organisation's budget was generally tight despite the progress in membership. The increase in membership was in fact derived from the growth in subscribers without voting rights at the general assembly. Since this type of member fee was much lower than farmer members' fees, it did not contribute to the growth in income. LØJ did receive a symbolic amount of public support with 11.5 million DKK in 1998, but the money was allocated to the designated objectives of development of organic food production – most often information campaigns and marketing – and not for the organisation's own interests, for instance political lobbying or developing its employees' competences.

In addition to these difficult economic conditions, the relatively weak and still isolated position of LØJ in the general agricultural politics was an issue around 1996. The concern was often shared by organic producers, among others the leaders of ØLC and the Association for Organic and Biodynamic Milk Producers (Økologiske og Bio-dynamiske Mælkeproducenter i Danmark, hereafter ØBM). These producer groups were closest to the harsh competition with the conventional businesses which already entered organic production as a side line of their conventional production. And they anticipated gaining more direct influence in the general agricultural community, most of all the Agricultural Council. Gaining a seat in the Agricultural Council was attractive for them due to its political influence on *Folketinget* and the agricultural authority. More narrowly, they wished to gain influence on policy decisions about how the revenue from private taxes on production would be used for the common purposes of agriculture (the money was most often allocated for the purposes of marketing and information). Yet, LØJ's board rejected this idea by claiming that the autonomy of organic agriculture should be maintained outside the conventional agricultural interests. It was concerned that being part of the Council would mislead the general public as if the organic sector became absorbed into the conventional agricultural sector. After all, LØJ's sister organisation ØLC entered the Agricultural Council in the summer of 1997, while LØJ withdrew from the ØLC's board to "avoid confusion". It argued that "LØJ should continue being an agricultural political organ for organic farmers, but it does not present its politics through the Agricultural Council" (LØJ, 1998b:Ingemann, 2006).

Meanwhile, another difficulty in internal collaboration was observed, when ØLC's participation in LØJ's Technical Committee, which was the body for drafting LØJ's own organic regulations and organic inspection, was discussed before the general assembly in 1997. Ultimately, the idea of ØLC's participation was given up, since discussions went into a dead-end with technical details rather than the overall content. LØJ's leadership explained that it did not succeed due to many different formulations of problems specific to each production branch, which LØJ found it better to distance itself from (LØJ, 1998b).

Nonetheless, with LØJ's organisational reform in 1998 the Technical Committee was transformed to the Technical Management Group. ØLC was allowed to join in this group and thereby gained direct influence on LØJ's organic regulations and inspection. Its position was also strengthened with the elevation of its status in the Organic Food Council from observer to regular member. This organisational reform had other significant aspects: LØJ established the Political Management Group to build the organisation's political strategies on the national and international levels (rising political tasks and LØJ's orientation are discussed further below). Furthermore, with this reform consumers got their own committee which sends representatives to the two newly-established management groups. This reflects the organisation's intention to re-emphasise the role of consumers.

Despite those discrepancies, both organisations worked together to establish House of Ecology in 1997 (officially started January 1998). House of Ecology soon gathered the organisations in the organic/biodynamic sector: LØJ, ØLC and FBJ and various organic producer groups/associations. The state financed the House of Ecology with funds from the pesticide agreement made along with the second Aquatic Environment Plan in 1998. The agreement delivered 15 million DKK (5.5 million DKK for the establishment of the House and 6 million DKK for the four-year period for its concrete activities, 1.5 million DKK for international collaboration, 2 million DKK for information, advisory, development, and demonstration projects) (Det Økologiske Fødvareråd, 1999:LØJ, 1999). Thanks to this public funding, the organic/biodynamic organisations that joined the House of Ecology moved their offices into the same building in central Aarhus in 1999, and Paul Holmbeck[58] was hired as director to lead the House together with a director for economy and development. LØJ claimed that this initiative was necessary, since it was "practical and effective" and would give more opportunities for the organic organisations to find "common solutions for dealing with officials and other collaboration partners on the basis of a common principle". It was also underlined that "there were differences in opinion among the organisations under the House of Ecology, but such differences is that give dynamics" (LØJ, 2000, 6).

All in all, the project of the House of Ecology aimed to create a more solid network between different and conflicting interests of organic activism, consumers, producers, and businesses, which co-existed in the organic food community. Furthermore, since the involvement of the organic collective actors in the policy field, as represented by the new Action Plan and Aquatic Environmental Plan, was increasing, the solidarity of the sector was found more important than before. LØJ stated that the House of Ecology was becoming the "organic Axelborg" (LØJ, 2000). Yet, it is safe to say that the actual effect of the House, except that it pushed the organisations to gather in the same building, was far from obvious. An interviewee who used to be a board member of LØJ said that the role of the House was unclear, and perhaps owing to the ambiguity, the director Poul Holmbeck could be relatively influential in the later organisational development.[59]

Debates on LØJ's self-regulation: Struggling for legitimacy

Another internal struggle was observed during the discussion about LØJ's own standards and inspection system, which appeared repeatedly throughout the 1990s. The main problem remained unchanged; i.e. whether an own system was necessary when LØJ's system burdened farmers with extra costs and cost the organisation extra resources.

There were some negative developments during this period, for instance the suspension of the state authorisation fee from 1995 and the withdrawal of the consumer cooperative FDB from the contract for requiring LØJ's authorisation in the mid-1990s. Even in this situation, members still widely agreed that LØJ must work for its own organic regulations to be the model for state regulations. In reality, however, LØJ could not reach internal agreement on challenging issues such as the reduction of fossil-based energy consumption (e.g. the energy use of greenhouse) and self-sufficiency of organic farms for fodder and manure. For the opposition, the actual implementation of those objectives into the regulations was too hasty under the present conditions. It was underlined that as long as the state regulations did not include these restrictions, they would merely torment the users of LØJ's authorisation. In fact, many organic farmers are still dependent on manure and fodder from conventional farms, and without them they will not be able to fulfil orders from retailers. After all, the inclusion of those points were postponed as the regulations "should be developed according to a bigger wisdom and consequences"(LØJ, 1997b).

[58] Paul Holmbeck had worked for the political department of LØJ since 1995.

[59] Interview with Claus Heinberg. 22 August, 2007.

Meanwhile, serious conflicts on LØJ's own organic regulation took place, firstly, between LØJ and the Plant Directorate, and secondly, between LØJ and the dairy sector. LØJ and the Plant Directorate had a somewhat complementary relation before the introduction of the EU organic regulations in 1993, due to the state authority's lack of know-how on the organic standards and inspection. LØJ was until then in charge of an administrative part of inspecting the farms which aimed to convert whole yield to organic[60] (Michelsen, 2001a). Even after EU entered the organic issues, the collaboration between LØJ and the Plant Directorate for inspection continued for a while. This collaboration became more important for LØJ in the mid-1990s, since it decided to outsource its authorisation service to the Plant Directorate because it seemed more economical. However, LØJ soon found this collaboration unsatisfactory. Purchasing the task from the Plant Directorate was not only costly but also generated many problems due to its slow and complicated bureaucratic process. Furthermore, the Directorate announced negative descriptions of several organic farms in its annual report, which LØJ found unnecessary (LØJ, 1997b). LØJ resumed inspection services from November 1996 with a new model for the fee; half was financed by LØJ's budget, the other half by users (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1997c). In 1997, it withdrew from collaboration for inspection with this state authority (LØJ, 1998a).

Following these developments, LØJ's system was subjected to strong pressure by the Danish Dairy Board, which represents the large dairies running organic production as a sideline of conventional production (Michelsen, 2001a). The conflict broke out when the Dairy Board in 1997 resolved to use only the Plant Directorate's organic certification for the official declaration, even though inspection was done by LØJ. The Dairy Board demanded, firstly, to continue accrediting their products with LØJ certified status even though the inspection was not done by LØJ's body, and secondly, to apply only LØJ's 1997 regulations at inspection. LØJ rejected these demands for the integrity of its own system as well as for the further development of organic regulations. As a consequence, the cooperation between LØJ and the Dairy Board stopped (LØJ, 1999:Michelsen, 2001a). As the organic milk sector had been the largest branch that still required LØJ's certification, the Dairy Board' withdrawal hit LØJ's economy. In 1998, only 42% of the certified organic dairy producers were certified by LØJ in comparison to the former 100%. As a result, LØJ had to increase the fee for inspection by 50% (LØJ, 1999).

All in all, the discussions and conflicts that emerged around LØJ's organic regulative system revealed other evidence of LØJ's declining influence in the organic sector. Around 1998, the farmers certified by LØJ counted only 13% of all certified organic farmers, and merely 42% of LØJ's own farmer members used LØJ's certification (LØJ, 1999). Under these circumstances, the termination of LØJ's inspection and certification was repeatedly raised at the general assemblies in 1998 and 1999.[61] Yet, despite the board's desire for total termination (LØJ, 1999), the proposals were postponed each time by, among others, ØLC, which claimed that it was necessary to preserve LØJ's system (Michelsen, 2001a). When LØJ was struggling with organising the organic sector, ØLC as the representative of organic producer groups was perceived as increasingly crucial. Besides, a significant part of LØJ's members still considered LØJ's own system a guarantee for the organic movement (Kloppenborg, 1998).

Rising organic vs. conventional controversy

The struggles in LØJ fundamentally lie in the dispute about whether organic agriculture should or should not maintain its critical position to conventional food system when it has been increasingly integrated into the latter. The organisation was divided on this question.

[60] Denmark's national organic regulations have been allowing partial conversion of the farm acreage, while in some countries, for instance Switzerland, the entire acreage of a farm must be converted to organic.

[61] In fact, LØJ's inspection was temporally stopped in 1999 by the board's decision without being put on the general assembly. It started again at the end of 1999.

The critical voice against conventional agriculture was still evident in LØJ. For the first time the organisation dealt with the structural problem of Danish agriculture in 1993 in the revision of agricultural law planned for the following year. Despite his former refusal to engage with the structural problem of agriculture, Kristian Andersen, as the chairperson, required mitigation of "harsh specialisation and concentration of animal production found today" by setting a ceiling for the number of animals per farm. Such a measure was expected to lead to a more balanced and diverse farm production. In relation to the expansion of organic farm-size LØJ claimed that small farms must be preserved and that further closing of such farms had to be stopped (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1993d). Furthermore, the growing tendency towards conventional mode of development in the organic sector was feared to cause the dilution of organic production. In 1999, the board stated that too many organic producers started producing organic too easily without considering all the work needed to develop product and marketing (LØJ, 2000). The board also denounced the tendency of "shallow ecology/organic (økologi), where a short-term economic goal goes before the long-term organic development and specialisation in single crop threats organics in its wholeness." At the same time, it was emphasised that the need for the food industry to convert all production to organic, and that the current condition with organic production as a side-line to other conventional productions was causing confusion and many obstacles for the organic standards and inspection (LØJ, 2000).

Yet, LØJ's critique of current organic development created schisms in the organisation, which became evident in 1998 when the newly converted organic farmers criticised LØJ for being too negative towards conventional agriculture. They also attacked LØJ's goal of total conversion of Danish agricultural land to organic agriculture, which was stated in the organisation's organic standards, as "inappropriate" and "power seeking" (Ingemann, 2006, p.36). This issue was raised again in 1999-2000 by the organic producers' associations. As their common criticism of this phrase, they asserted;

> The formulation [of total conversion] sounds sacred/religious, while organic agriculture should be based on free choice for everyone, like the board members themselves have made their own choice to convert to organic. It sounds as if we want to impose organic on others. The formulation should be positive for people. Furthermore, considering organic is not something static, it is too squarely formulated (Økologiens Hus og Økologisk Landscenter, 2000).

Such conflicts reflected the actual situation of the organic agriculture sector. In 1998 there were 2228 authorised organic farms (Plantedirektoratet, 2005), but only 674, i.e. 30% of all organic growers, were members of LØJ (LØJ, 1999). This may indicate that the organisation could not successfully organise organic farmers, and thus, did not actually represent their voice in entirety. According Michelsen's survey, several issues raised by LØJ as main objectives for organic agriculture, such as 100% conversion of organic agriculture, recycling of town waste as fertiliser, minimal use of fossil energy, and the use of local resources, were not generally recognised by the population of organic farmers as their core values, while issues like no use of pesticides, healthy food and soil fertility were (Michelsen, 2001a). Simultaneously, the average size of organic farms was growing remarkably up to 44.5 ha in 1998, which outstripped the average of conventional farms (Plantedirektoratet, 2005). Along with this rapid rise of larger farms, organic farmers tended to be associated more with the traditional farmers' organisations. This structural development also brought the conflicts between the two traditional farmers' organisations into LØJ. In 1998, several local chairpersons of the Farmers' Union thus threatened to leave LØJ because of LØJ's tendency to support the claim of Family Farmers regarding the structural development (Ingemann, 2006).

Strategies of LØJ

Double strategy

During these internal struggles, LØJ basically pushed a double strategy intended to affect both policy and farmers/consumers.

In terms of the former, the organisation intensified its political lobbyism. The establishment of the aforementioned Political Management Group is a part of this effort. In general, its political line was not far from the government's at the time. Both agreed on the development of organic market, and especially, export, as necessary. Market expansion was found essential for, on the one hand, keeping the motivation of farmers to convert to organic especially when over-production of organic milk turned out to be the reality. The organisation claimed that the surplus for organic farmers must be secured so that "the farmer would be able to live on with own production and develop humanely" (LØJ, 2000). The chairperson asserted that "Organic agriculture is not philanthropy", that organic farmers should be rational and have large turnovers if they want to live off agriculture, and that "Organic agriculture should not be philanthropic spare-time activities for the few, but has to go for a professional way, small or big" (Andelsbladet, 2000).

LØJ's lobbying effort to secure state support on organic production was successful to a certain degree. Despite the regular support by the centre-left government, organic subsidies initially targeted conversion only but not maintenance of organic farm. Hence, as organic conversion appeared to grow, the reduction of a series of organic subsidies was taken up by the government around the late 1990s. In 1998 the government suddenly reduced the maintenance subsidy from 850DKK/ha to 600DKK/ha without notice (LØJ, 1999). Similarly, removal of the conversion subsidy was proposed in 1999, and the fee for national organic authorisation was, despite the recommendation by the two Action Plans to be state-financed, constantly discussed to be user-pay. The reduction or removal of organic subsidies was considered to cause serious consequences for organic farmers, since the producer price was most often set as low as possible by taking account of the subsidy. In response to these policy decisions, LØJ's chairperson claimed that:

> "Subsidies are certainly not life-long payments. It is a political instrument, and who knows which politics will lose tomorrow. Our price setting should therefore take into account that the public financial support will be withdrawn. But we have to fight hard to prevent the extra support for plant production from being taken away already now" (LØJ, 2000).

Crucially, such argumentation implies the acceptance of subsidies as temporary instruments. It also reflects the general recognition within the organisation that considered the main driving-force for organic development to rest in the expansion of organics in the ordinary market. After all, the removal of conversion subsidy met protest from LØJ and other environmental and consumer organisations, but also from the Agricultural Council. Eventually the proposal was cancelled by the government (LØJ, 2000).

LØJ also succeeded in realising the state support on grassroots research in the 1996 organic package. It bore fruits through dialogue with the consumer committee of DARCOF, in which the organisation got a seat. As far as attending this committee it asserted that "researchers themselves will not necessary follow the organic principles, but through continuous dialog we can ask the projects to be grounded on organic thinking and the conclusions to hold the basic idea of organic agriculture". The idea of grassroots research came through such dialogue and support by EL and SF (LØJ, 1997b).

Meanwhile, as the self-regulations by private organisations were losing significance after the state authorisation, it was found essential to get direct influence on the national organic regulations. For this objective, LØJ required the Ministry of Food to establish a committee wherein the organisation and other private actors could negotiate the content of the regulations with the state authority. This request was not accommodated. However, the organisation got a seat in FAO's specialist committee in Denmark from 1996 together with other NGOs such as WWF, Danish Association for International Cooperation (Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke: MS), and Women and Development (Kvindernes U-landsudvalg: KULU). This committee led by the Ministry of Food was to construct Danish standpoints to be presented to FAO and other UN agricultural and food organisations (LØJ, 2000). Although organic agriculture was targeted by several small sub-committees of this organ, the main committees like the Committee on Commodity Problems tended to see environmental measures as trade barriers. For this reason, organic regulations were not always perceived positively. Under

these circumstances, LØJ advocated standardisation of organic regulations on the international level as an instrument for trade rather than an obstacle (LØJ, 1999). It is worth mentioning that FAO was working on defining organic standards in its body for food standards, Codex Alimentarius,[62] and this came true in the summer of 1999. LØJ naturally responded positively to this development and called FAO a "good and important fellow partner for the continuous development of organic agriculture on the globe", and it was particularly important that this international organ recognised that food production in developing countries should be based on local self-sufficiency and the principles of organic method (LØJ, 1998b:2000).

In addition, LØJ's activities targeted the EU. Since 1996 LØJ had allocated a person (the above-mentioned Paul Holmbeck) to political analysis of EU, and its participation in the European regional group of IFOAM was more routinized. LØJ claimed that CAP did not sufficiently support organic production compared to conventional production. This insufficiency was asserted as contradictory to the CAP's explicit objective to drive agriculture in a more environmentally friendly direction. LØJ further criticised the lack of initiative on the EU level to tax pesticides, excessive use of fertilisers, and alternative energy sources in agriculture. Based on these criticisms, it targeted the establishment of an advisory committee for organic agriculture under the Directorate General for Agriculture, when this DG, with 2500 employees, did not have a section specialised in organic agriculture (LØJ, 1999). Furthermore, it focused on lobbying the EP committees for environment and agriculture in collaboration with other organic organisations in Europe. It was considered that those EP committees were effective places, since important decisions (e.g. proposals for change in regulation) were often taken there by only one or two votes (LØJ, 2000). LØJ gained an opportunity to influence the EU agricultural policy at home through the so-called Article 2 Committee under the Ministry of Food, which was an advisory body for the Minister of Agriculture (LØJ, 1998b). Involvement in EU politics also intensified with the dispute on GMO. LØJ's goal was 100% prohibition of GMO and the exclusion of GMO in organic production in the EU member states (LØJ, 1997b). Thus it ran the campaign for no GMO in organic agriculture together with the organic organisations in Europe. It also lobbied EP members and consumer, agriculture, and environmental organisations for the total prohibition of GMO in EU organic regulations. On 12 May 1996 the proposal for organic regulations gained official support at EP (LØJ, 1997b).

Along with lobbying in the formal political system, LØJ also took up energy consumption, reduction of fossil fuel-based energy in organic agriculture and self-sufficiency of organic farms at several general assemblies. The organisation put focus on the recycling of nutrition and using household garbage as fertiliser by establishing city-countryside recycling systems (LØJ, 1997b). In addition, initiatives for local activities were raised along with focus on local farm sales and farm visits (LØJ, 1998b), and LØJ held several "vision meetings" in 1998 to vitalise local debates. At the same time, LØJ started two new on-farm projects. The first is the Plans for Farm Development (Bedrifts Udviklingsplaner), LØJ's advisory service for organic agriculture, which emphasised achievement of organic farmer's personal values and implementation of the fundamental values of organic agriculture in practice. The other is LØJ's first demonstration farm started in May 1999. Both projects were born from the critical reaction to the ongoing conventionalisation of organic knowledge diffused via the advisory service organised under the traditional agricultural organisations and research institutions. As such, they represent the remaining spirit of LØJ to claim organic agriculture as distinctive from conventional agriculture.

Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the "old" grassroots characteristics of LØJ had rapidly faded out. There were only a few well-functioning local groups, and the meetings targeting farmers rarely had many participants (LØJ, 1996b). Around the late 1990s, local groups no longer constituted an active part of LØJ.[63]

[62] Codex Alimentalius is operated under the collaboration between FAO and WHO.

[63] Interview with Monica Stoye. 22 June 2007.

Focus on consumers

During the 1990s the organisation's activities had drastically extended to a wider public. In 1995 the first organic autumn market (høstmarked) was organised by LØJ and ØLC with the participation of 45 organic farms. In the same year, LØJ and other green organisations and politicians organised the Green Farm Exhibition (Grønt Landsskue), which gathered 10,000 participants.[64] Those events targeted not only own members but also politicians, agricultural organisations, other NGOs, food businesses, retailers, and those who can be categorised as environmentally conscious/political consumers. LØJ was also one of the main hosting organisations for the IFOAM (International Forum for Organic Agricultural Movements) Conference in Copenhagen 1996.

While LØJ has always presented itself as an organisation for consumers and producers, the role of consumers in the organisation became increasingly ambiguous in this period. In the pioneer time, its consumer (or non-producer) members had devoted themselves to the organic movement and were often organised on the local level.[65] Now the majority of consumers in the organisation were "subscribers" of LØJ's newspaper *Økologisk Jordbrug*, had no voting rights at the general assembly, and they spread over the country without being organised. In addition, LØJ had not formulated clear consumer politics. At meetings it was difficult to pinpoint "consumers' opinion" when farmer members also identified as consumers.[66] Along with the growth in consumer members/subscribers, different degrees of engagement as organic consumers emerged. A member observed back then that there were different types of consumers in LØJ, which can be characterised as "deep-green," "light-green," and "blue" consumers (LØJ, 1996c:LØJs Forburgergruppe, 1996). Responding to this situation, LØJ stated in the Annual Report:

> "…the consumers have certain weird status, which, in contrast to the growers, is not specialised in a distinct field (and if they are, they are not perceived as representing a "normal" consumer!). And they can only rarely substantiate their statements with others when something goes wrong. It is actually this floating argumentation and this blurred and indeterminable group, which LØJ has invited into its driving organs, and which it must have space to listen to and follow partially" (LØJ, 1999, p.13).

Besides, the consumer group underpinned LØJ's negligence in allocating resources to consumer issues at the general assembly in 1997. It was claimed to be paradoxical that the development of organic agriculture eventually led LØJ to become "organic farmers' organisation" (LØJ, 1998b, p.24).

During this period, LØJ's consumer group took a series of initiatives. In 1995 it suggested organising "political consumers", which was defined in their study material as the specific consumers who "pursue own interest not through participation in diverse movements, organisations, or political parties, but acting politically on their own", for instance by boycotting and purchasing environmentally benign products (Jensen, 1995, p.52). SF politician Jørn Jespersen was invited to the consumer seminar held in 1996, since he was the only spokesperson for food issue at the time (Økologisk Jordbrug, 1996). Furthermore, the group proposed establishing a forum or organisation for organic consumers, though it was not decided what it would look and how to make it happen.

Nonetheless, the consumer group constantly faced the question of whether (organic) consumers could be or should be organised within the framework of LØJ. They acknowledged that the interests of farmers and con-

[64] Events like autumn market and farm exhibition are traditional practices organised by the agricultural organisations.

[65] It is often observed that many consumer members in the initial phase of LØJ were wives of LØJ's organic farmer members. It is still debatable whether they really represented consumers or not.

[66] Interview with Monica Stoye. 22 June 2007.

sumers in the organisation were often quite different. Many active organic consumers were not members of LØJ but of other green organisations. It was thus discussed that the building of new organisation or participation in the existing consumer organisations was necessary to raise consumer awareness more effectively and bring them to common action. Following this line, a broader network was established between LØJ's consumers and other green and consumer organisations (LØJ, 1996a:1997a). The consumer group organised the Consumer Forum in 1999 with Biodynamic Consumers' Association, Denmark's Active Consumers, Green Family,[67] Praktisk Økologi, and LØJ, where organic farmers were welcomed to participate (LØJ, 2000). The group also allowed consumer activities to be organised locally via local groups, though achievements were not substantial. An interviewee mentioned that LØJ's effort to organise consumer interests depended a lot on engaged persons. The organisation tried telephone meetings among active consumer members, but it was too expensive and difficult to arrange.[68]

As far as the organisational structure, the consumer group was elevated to one of the committees of LØJ in 1999. With this change the consumer representatives began to be a part of the newly-formed policy-making organs of LØJ, the Technical Management Group and the Political Management Group.

3rd Phase of Institutionalisation (2001-2008): Consolidation of market-driven organic development

Government shift: Backlash

Entering the new millennium, the tailwind continued with the Social Democratic government. The Budget 2000 and 2001 guaranteed high amounts of state funding for the research and development of organic food innovation, market and information. In Budget 2001, organic research at DARCOF was allocated 20 million DKK each year and extra eight million/year particularly GMO-free organic seed; grassroots research received four million per year; organic export promotion and quality development 50 million DKK; development and campaigning of the state-authorised organic label as a reliable "quality label for good food" 30 million DKK.[69] Furthermore, House of Ecology received one million extra for 2001 to establish the organisation. The future financing of the House would be decided during 2001 in accordance with its prospect. State funding for organic research and development in the budget year 2001 alone reached 48 million DKK, and 209 million DKK for the total four year period. Finally, Budget 2001 allocated 50 million DKK to the pilot project "nutritiously correct food and organic food" at schools and day-care institutions. The project was agreed among the government, SF and EL, and anticipated to co-evolve with the existing green food purchasing initiative at public cafeterias/kitchens.

By initiative of the EU Commissioner of Environment and a leading Social Democratic politician, Ritt Birgaard, the European conference for *Organic Food and Farming- Towards Partnership and Action in Europe* was held in Copenhagen in May 2001. 11 European ministers and four major organisations signed the Copenhagen Declaration that called on the Council, the European Commission, and European governments to develop a common European action plan within the next two years. With the outbreak of two serious animal diseases, i.e. Mad Cow Disease (BSE) and Foot and Mouth Disease, the issue of food safety attracted major

[67] The de facto leader of the consumer group, who was also elected as a board member, at the time was the editor of the Green Family's newsletter.

[68] Interview with Monica Stoye. 22 June 2007.

[69] Aftaler om Finansloven for 2001. Homepage of the Ministry of Finance. http://www.fm.dk/publikationer/2000/aftaler-om-finansloven-for-2001/ [Last checked 15 May 2013]

attention all over Europe in 2001. Consumer perception of organic food as safe food grew in European countries, especially England and Germany which experienced the outbreak, and organic regulations and inspection were anticipated to make the production method transparent and assure food safety (LØJ, 2002).

However, 2001 turned out to be the last year with stable and generous state support to the organic sector. After the Danish national election in November 2001, the Liberals and the Conservatives formed a coalition government with extra-cabinet support from the right-wing party, Danish Peoples' Party (Dansk Folkeparti, hereafter DF), which made significant progress in the election.

The impact of the government shift became evident in early 2002, when the Liberal-Conservative government proposed to reduce the economic support for the organic sector by changing the annual budget plan. Support for organic-related projects, especially organic development, grassroots research and the House of Ecology would be cancelled. Subsidies for organic research, annually 20 million DKK, would be abolished and many projects halted. Instead 10 million DKK would be given to the general scheme for organic projects. The closing of grassroots research which represented unconventional spirit of organic agriculture was more symbolic. In the proposal, this research scheme would be dissolved into the general scheme for organic projects. State support for the House of Ecology, 4.5 million DKK, would also be stopped. The Minister of Food claimed that the overall reduction in organic support in the new Budget 2002 was 21 million DKK, but the director of House of Ecology claimed that it was 76 million DKK (Landbrugsavisen, 2002). The proposal met strong objections from not only the opposition parties[70] but also the government's supporting party DF. The initial proposal was reversed, and the funding for organic research, market development and export promotion was saved, and so was the funding for conversion of public kitchens. Furthermore, the agreement between the government and DF secured the support for the House of Ecology until 2005. Yet as the actual amount of the support changed constantly, its economic situation continued to look instable (Økologisk Jordbrug, 2002b:LØJ, 2003). In the end, the subsidy for grassroots research was not saved, and the scheme ended in 2003 (Udviklings og Forskningskontoret, 2002).

It was a positive surprise for the organic community that the proposal to establish the Fund for Organic Agriculture passed *Folketinget* in 2002 and was implemented the following year (Økologisk Jordbrug, 2002b). This fund is used exclusively for organic research or projects, and the allocation of money is decided collectively in the committee, which consists of private and public actors. Since the major financial source is pesticide tax, it is, ironically, dependent on the consumption of pesticides. The Social Democrats proposed state assurance for the budget of the fund regardless of the income from pesticide tax, but this proposal was rejected (Økologisk Landsforening, 2003b).

It is safe to say that, in the following years, organics were more explicitly used as one of the government's defences for the budget cut in the agricultural sector. At the settlement of Budget 2003 with the overall sectoral reduction of 72.6 million DKK (Meals, 2002), the Minister of Food, Mariann Fischer Boel, claimed that the reduction was necessary to, for example, tackle food safety (e.g. 75 million DKK was allocated for the BSE plan alone), but the government made "a strategic commitment to organics, which would in the long run would turn the tide, so there will be a sales basis, which leads many more farmers to switch to organic farming" (Meals, 2002). In fact, the Budget 2003 allocated 25 million DKK more than the previous year to organic projects for profit development, export promotion and conversion of public kitchens and restaurants (LØJ,

[70] EL asserted that these series of budget cuts for the organic sector presented the new government's intension of removing "not-government-dependent and ecologically envisioned voices". The spokesperson of the party was dissatisfied with the termination of grassroots research, which was, according to her, an excellent research method giving "the shortest way between idea and reality". She further claimed that stopping funding to the House of Ecology would give more power to the conventional farmers' organisations to make decisions on organic agriculture. http://www.enhedslisten.dk/om-oekologi-delen-af-finanslov-2002 [Last checked 28 April 2013].

2004)[71]. Furthermore, she expressed that the government "continuously puts a high priority on organics". She listed a series of basic elements for organics that were not influenced by the general budget cut; among them the subsidy for organic farm was secured for the period 2001-2004 (Meals, 2002). A similar point of the government's prioritisation on organics was also expressed by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: "We will support the development of organic agriculture", in *Folketinget* on 3 October 2002.[72] In addition to the above-mentioned relief from the budget cut, he further stressed the government's initiatives for new supports; for example, support for the Fund for Organic Agriculture would be raised from five million DKK to 10 million from 2003 and five million DKK was to be given to information projects for the Danish organic label and the establishment of export strategy for organic food.[73] Despite the claim of those ministers, state funding for organic marketing, food innovation and information declined drastically in 2005 to the 2000 level of only 11 per cent (Daugbjerg, 2011).

Basic orientation of the government towards organics

Those first couple of years' experience clearly showed that organic agriculture was not prioritized by the Liberal-Conservative government as much as the former centre-left government. This so-called "blue" government's basic stance was, firstly, that organic production should be developed by a market-driven strategy. Already in the late 1990s, this point reached broad consensus among policy-makers, the traditional agricultural sector and the organic sector (Daugbjerg and Halpin, 2010). Furthermore, as mentioned above, such a consensus was presented in the Action Plan II. Yet the connotation of this government tends to express organics more exclusively as a means for the market, rather than for environmental protection and other objectives. House of Ecology, which was threatened by closing, managed to survive since it came to be recognised to "secure the synergy in the market efforts" (Udvalget for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri, Alm. Del bilag 115, 2003). Furthermore following the typical liberal market logic, the government stressed that organic agriculture must develop voluntarily rather than under pressure from the state. This is represented by the government's slogan "Growth with Will (Vækst med Vilje)".

With this orientation, organic agriculture was often not clearly linked with other social benefits, such as environmental protection and food safety. For example, the Minister of Environment's and Minister of Food's 2003 initiative *Environment and Health: proposal for strategy and action plan for protecting peoples' health against environmental factors*[74] raised 10 objectives, and although a part of the conclusion suggested the conversion of public kitchens to organic food, the overall plan did not mention organic agriculture and organic food at all. This aspect was criticised by the *Folketinget's* Committee for Food, and the two ministers responded that they would integrate organic production more in their ministries' effort (LØJ, 2004). After this, the homepage of the campaign by the Ministry of Food called *All about Diet* started making a section about organic food and referred to it as "good for the environment" and "non-GMO". It also stated that "it is not clear whether organic food is healthier than conventional food, due to the lack of scientific evidence".[75] Much more explicitly, the Minister of Food,[76] Hans Christian Schmidt, claimed that organic production was

[71] http://www.meals.dk/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticles&newsarticle=552

[72] http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling/20021/salen/R1_BEH1_3_3_264.htm

[73] http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling/20021/spor_sv/S167.htm

[74] This proposal was made as a part of the Working Group activities settled by the plan of the government. The plan was published in 2003 as *Environment and health are closely related: strategy and action plan for protecting peoples' health against environmental factors*.

[75] Homepage "Alt om kost": http://www.altomkost.dk/Forside.htm [Last checked 1 November 2007]

[76] Since the government shift in November 2001, the first Minister of Food was Marianne Fischer Boel until she became EU Commissioner for Agriculture in August 2004. Hans Christian Schmidt, who was the Minister of Environ-

mostly considered as "supplementary" rather than an "alternative" to conventional production. In this perspective, certain functionalities of organic agriculture in the environment and health were often not understood as distinctive to organic production, but something that could be achieved by conventional agriculture, too. As Schmidt said: "not only organic agriculture but also conventional agriculture contributes to cleaner drinking water" and "I do not order the public sector to buy organic food. It is not necessary" (Økologisk landsforening, 2005a).

The government's stance was also engraved in the new subsidy scheme for environmental service (miljøbetinget tilskud, so-called MB-ordningen) when 515 million DKK were allocated; 257.7 million DKK provided by EU. A reduction to 240.6 million DKK was planned (120.3 million DKK from the EU) from 2005 (Miljøministeriet and Fødevareministeriet, 2003). As mentioned, since the 1990s, subsidies for organic farming had consisted of maintenance subsidies, conversion subsidies (of two years' duration) and extra conversion subsidies (supplerende økologitilskud) which targeted specific commodity groups and given for the first five-year period. The content of the organic subsidies until 2003 is seen in the table 7 below.[77] This new scheme for environmental service as seen in the table 8 simplified the organic subsidies from the differentiated system based on commodity group towards a "flat-rate" system (the conversion subsidy for dairy was not introduced until 2007). The state intervention to boost undeveloped branches, such as organic plant and pig production, thus ended (Daugbjerg, 2011). However, the scheme does not require organic certification, and as such, put organic agriculture in the same box as conventional agriculture. Technically, this subsidy for environmental service is not exclusively for organic farms, but also for conventional farms fulfilling the requirement for environmental protection, that is, non-use of plant protection products and restrictions for nitrogen level (Environmental Assessment Institute, 2004). In other words, corresponding to the policy of "market-driven organic development", organic farms, like conventional farms, were to "produce based on the market demands" and "can only get the environmental subsidy when they achieve the criteria as the conventional farmers can" (Wier, Christensen et al., 2007, p.9). The government indeed located organic agriculture in the broader programme of "environmentally friendly agriculture" (Miljøvenlige jordbrugsforanstaltninger, so-called MVJ ordning) containing several other subsidy schemes including one for general farmers and landowners whose properties have environmentally sensitive area (ESA). This scheme required certain criteria of environmental protection, but had no restrictions on pesticides and other chemicals. The budget grew drastically from 36.5 million in 2001 to 360 million in 2002. However, according to the environmental organisation NOAH, the EU funding for agri-environmental objectives had substantially increased around the time. Thus counting the growth in the EU funded part, the actual state expenditure for the environment/organic related programmes in 2002 was 69 million DKK lower than the previous year.[78]

Table 7 Content of subsidies for organic farm until 2003

Applicants	Type of subsidy	Area under conversion (/ha)		Area conversion completed (/ha)			New 5 year period (/ha)
		1st year	2nd year	3rd year	4th year	5th year	1st-5th year
All	Maintenance	600	600	600	600	600	600
All	Conversion	450	450				0
All	Sustainable grass	600	600	600	600	600	600
With ESA	ESA	500	500	500	500	500	500
Non-dairy	Extra conversion subsidy for crop farm	2000	2000	1200	500	500	0

ment, took over, and from September 2007 Eva Kjær Hansen served. All are from the Liberals. Schmidt and Hansen are not affiliated with the agricultural community; Fischer Boel is a co-owner of a large-scale farm.

[77] As the organic subsidy scheme required five-year commitment, it continued until 2007. Organic farmers with the old programme were allowed to transfer to the new scheme.

[78] http://www.noah.dk/aktualitet/ak130202.html [Checked 29 April 2013]

All	Maximum	5000	5000	4000	3500	3500	3500

Source: Directoratet for FødevareErhverv (2003)

Table 8 Content of subsidies for organic farm after introduction of the scheme for environmental service (EA) in 2004

Applicants	Type of subsidy	Area under conversion (/ha)		Area conversion completed (/ha)			New 5 year period (/ha)
		1st year	2nd year	3rd year	4th year	5th year	1st-5th year
All	ES (2004-2006)	870	870	870	870	870	870
	ES 2007	750	750	750	750	750	750
All	Conversion (2004 - 2006) excluding dairy	1150	1150	100	100	100	0
	Conversion 2007 including dairy	1050	1050	100	100	100	0

Source: For 2004 Direktoratet for FødevareErhverv (2004). For 2007 Landbrugsavisen (2007)

Nonetheless, the new scheme for environmental service (which is still generally called organic subsidies) gave 20% more than the old organic scheme for the maintenance of organic farm. In contrast to the old one, organic farmers got easier access to combine it with other environment-related subsidies up to the ceiling. However, while the number of recipients grew significantly with the new scheme, the size of the subsidies in total did not always correspond to this growth (see the table 9 below). This can be partially explained by the removal of differentiated subsidies and the transcendence of termination over entrance of new organic farms, which led to the reduction in the total number of organic farms, as seen in the figure 12 below. This did not result in a coherent reduction in the total organic area (figure13), for the general enlargement of individual farm size (figure 14).

Table 9 Subsidies for organic farms

Year	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Certified organic farms ultimo	677	1.050	1.166	1.617	2.228	3.099	3.466	3.525
+Applicants	98	417	161	499	670	950	450	276
Average size of farm (ha)	31.2	38.9	39.6	39.8	44.5	47.3	47.7	48.9
Total area in organic production (ha) ultimo	21.145	40.884	46.171	64.329	99.163	146.685	165.258	173.497
Recipients	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	706
Average per recipients (1.000 DKK)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	177
Per ha. (1000DKK)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total subsidy paid (million DKK)	22.2	37.0	37.8	58.7	95.8	145.7	134.5	124.8

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Certified organic farms ultimo	3.714	3.510	3.166	3.036	2.794	2.835	2.751
+Applicants	241	52	86	110	103	253	105
Average size of farm (ha)	48.0	47.9	52.8	52.2	54.2	57.6	62.2
Total area in organic production (ha) ultimo	178.359	168.022	160.209	150.815	144.303	150.207	166.738
Recipients	877	908	2.959	2.147	3.285	1.916	2.171
Average per recipients (1.000 DKK)	124	152	151	103	107	113	95
Per ha. (1000DKK)	-	-	3.6	2.5	3.9	4.8	4.4
Total subsidy paid (million DKK)	108.6	138.3	447.5	221.3	350.5	217.4	205.6

Source: For subsidies, Direktoratet for FødevareErhverv (2009) *Proposal for Budget 2010*. http://2.naturerhverv.fvm.dk/oekologi_i_tal.aspx?ID=8676

For the number of organic farm and their average size, NaturErhvervstyrelsen (2012) *Statistik over Økologiske jordbrugsbedrifter 2011*.

The data of total given subsidy 2001-2003 are from the homepage of Direktoratet for FødevareErhverv. http://2.naturerhverv.fvm.dk/Default.aspx?ID=16795

Figure 12 Development in the number of organic farm in Denmark



Figure 13 Development in organically-grown area in Denmark



Figure 14 Development of organic farm size in Denmark



Sources for figure 12, 13, 14: Plantedirektoratet's "Statistik over økologiskejordbrugsbedrifter"

Following this development, a national research institute, Environmental Assessment Institute, wrote a report, *Ecology and Economy* (Økologi og Økonomi), in 2004. The report did not represent the government's policy line, but the director of this institute was Bjørn Lomborg, whom the Anders Fogh Rasmussen's administration frequently used as a brain for the environmental policy. The report reflects Lomborg's main line of argument, "environment for money". It asserted there was not enough scientific evidence for many of the generally anticipated advantages of organic agriculture, such as health, taste, and animal welfare. The exception was the effects on the environment, where organic agriculture's advantages in biodiversity, soil quality, water environment and genetic diversity are documented. However, the report also listed its negative effects on the environment, e.g. mechanical weeding which uses fossil-based energy, and the extensive agricultural

acreage necessary for producing the same amount of food. Thus it asked "is organic food production the cheapest way to ensure [positive environmental effects] or similar effects?" The report stated that overall "it is not possible to answer this question…because there are different environmental effects, many of which are difficult to value". Nonetheless, it estimated that the extra cost for organic production in comparison to conventional production would be at least 430 million DKK (Environmental Assessment Institute, 2004).

Positive shift? Support from the supporting parties

While the opposition parties continued their support for organic production, the government's supporting parties, DF and the Christian Democratic Party, also increased their intention to strengthen their "green" profile. Furthermore as the electorate success of both parties depends largely on the rural populations, their political programmes have traditionally been influenced by the general stance of the agricultural community. At the time of the first Pesticide Action Plan and Aquatic Environment Plan in the 1980s, statements on the risk of pesticides and agricultural chemicals were basically avoided by the Christian Democrats' environmental minister. However, it moved toward support for organic agriculture in the 1990s. DF was initially not particularly enthusiastic about organic agriculture and, more explicitly negative about organic food being treated differently from conventional food when it was an opposition party in the 1990s. Yet, the party started supporting organic agriculture under the new government. In particular, the benefit of organic agriculture for animal welfare was enthusiastically advocated by the party member, Christian H. Hansen, who had personal focus on animal welfare. DF gained the third most seats in *Folketinget* after the Liberals and the Social Democrats since the 2001 election, and at the 2005 election its success continued. As such, this party determined the result of the political game and of the organic policies.

Indeed, the government's general reluctance to privilege organic agriculture was often compromised by these supporting parties, though more strongly by DF. To begin with, again, the government's proposal for the new Pesticide Action Plan for 2004-2009 in 2003 was transformed largely by pressure from these parties. The original proposal did not make a clear linkage between organic agriculture and its environmental effects, and prioritised the pesticide treatment frequency, rather than the quantity of applied pesticides. Although the goal recommended by the Bichel Committee was targeted, organic agriculture was not raised as an instrument for pesticide reduction. This went quite contrary to the former Pesticide Action Plan II and Aquatic Environment Plan II. The proposal was protested by organic agriculture organisations and environmental organisations, who claimed the reduction in treatment frequency would not be an effective means when stronger pesticides such as Roundup continued to be used (Landsforeningen Praktisk Økologi, 2003b:LØJ, 2004), and this point was also supported by DF and the Christian Democrats. In the final document issued in October 2003, conversion to organic agriculture was encouraged along with the above-mentioned new subsidy scheme for environmental service.

In April 2004, the third Aquatic Environment Plan was issued, and "the strengthening of organic agriculture" was stated as one of the nine objectives of the plan. It allocated the highest amount of single support for the new organic research programme at DARCOF with 200 million DKK and 15 million DKK (three million DKK each for five years) to the information activities at the House of Ecology. It also emphasised a new funding possibility for market promotion activities for organic goods under the rural development programme (Miljøministeriet and Ministeriet for fødevarer, 2004). The plan was agreed among the government, DF and the Christian Democratic Party. The above-mentioned large economic support for organic agriculture could not be realised without pressure from DF (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b).

Around the same time, facing the potential ending of the EU moratorium for GMO crops in 2004, the discussion on the national strategy for dealing with GMO intensified from 2003. In May, the government proposed the strategy of "co-existence with GMO", as a further extension of the EU moratorium was assumed unlikely considering the rising pressure from the North American states. Nor did total prohibition of GMO at the member state level seem likely to happen collectively. This co-existence strategy raised strong protests from

the organic agriculture community and environmental and consumer organisations, who basically eschewed the idea of co-existence and preferred total prohibition (Landsforeningen Praktisk Økologi, 2003a). When the government later proposed the GMO co-existence law, a compensation scheme for the damage in conventional or organic farms by GMO was promised. Yet, the proposal did not get majority support, as all the opposition parties, DF and the Christian Democrats were against it. The opposing parties attacked the proposal as its compensation scheme only intended to cover the minimum damage without taking into account the effects on animals which ate GMO crops and the cost to re-establish inflicted soil. Furthermore, the parties required the law to be a stringent hurdle for GM crops to enter the country, and for this objective, a clear polluter-pays principle and an effective authorisation system had to constitute the law's fundament. The final content of the law was changed from the original government's proposal, and the oppositions' criticism was largely accommodated. Compensation would not be paid by tax or public funding, but by farmers who grow GMO crop. The payment for growing GMO crop, 100/ha DKK per year, was actually higher than the suggestion by LØJ, Consumer Council, DN and Greenpeace with 60/ha DKK per year. GMO-growing farms must follow strict restrictions on distancing with neighbours, etc. and go through annual inspection. Furthermore, while the original proposal focused only on the GMO spread between farms, the law extends the focus to the spread via transport, treatment, and seed (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b).

The GMO co-existence law (Lov om dyrkning m.v. af genetisk modificerede afgrøder. Lov nr. 436) passed in June 2004 as the first law on GMO in Europe. Its content turned out to be stricter than the original intention of the government. Generally, the final shape of the law was received positively by different actors, including the opposition, as it was perceived to be sufficiently strict so that the actual growing of GMO crops became costly and unattractive for farmers.

Recovery of state support: market-driven development

Rationale of state support

Despite the first couple of years' remarkable de-prioritisation, the Liberal-Conservative government has positioned organic production in the evolving agri-environmental policies (e.g. Pesticide Action Plan III and Aquatic Environment Plan III), protected the authenticity of organic agriculture to be GMO-free (i.e. GMO co-existence law), and acknowledged the market potential of organics. The Fund for Organic Agriculture came into reality under this government. The purchase of organic food at public institutions was implemented in the plan "The Organic Initiative" in 2004, which gave public institutions a subsidy for converting their kitchens to organic meals. This plan was also put into the rural development programme 2007-2013 (Økologisk Landsforening, 2007a). Another symbolic achievement was that the government and DF agreed at the Budget 2007 negotiation on the new "Organic Package (Øko-pakken)" as a core part of the coming rural development programme. This package promised a plan for the coming seven years with 27 million DKK each year, that is, total 189 million DKK during 2007-2013 (Landbrugsavisen, 2006). The money was to be used for, among other things, organic market development with special target on the export market development in Germany, England and Sweden, as well as the development of domestic markets including retail trade, catering and direct sales from organic farms. Moreover 170 million DKK were allocated to the new research programme with 15 projects at DARCOF in 2006 and 2007. These projects were to cover "the whole organic value chain, among others, activities for processing, quality and consumption", thus to go beyond the mere focus on practical problems on farm-level so as to bring "a bigger profit for organic goods in the Danish as well as the export markets" (Koordinationskontoret for Landdistrikter of Erhvervsudvikling, 2007, p.6). These reflect the objective of the Package for a "positive development towards a market-driven organic sector" (Ibid.). In December 2008, it was revised and voiced even more explicitly with the government's new strategy of "Green Growth (Grøn Vækst)" agreed with DF. In this revised package, climate change became an additional focus for organic agriculture. Up to 10 million DKK per year were set aside for the development of organic agriculture in particular consideration of, e.g., the impact on climate, animal

welfare and environmental protection. Furthermore, it allocated three million DKK annually to consumer-related projects at the House of Ecology during 2010-2013 (Krogh, 2008). The sales of organic food doubled during 2005-2009, which accounts the growth from 3.5 per cent of the whole retail sales towards 7 per cent (Danmarks Statistik, 2011). In 2009 at Biofach, one of the biggest organic trade fairs, Denmark won the prize as organic county of the year.

The general economic support for organic farms continued under this government. Particularly after the organic subsidy reform in 2004, the number of recipients for the subsidies tripled in the first year and it continued that year to about double of 2003. However, as already showed in table 9 above, this growth in recipients simultaneously reduced the slice of pie each one get and thus offset the increase in the total subsidy. Moreover, the abolishment of the extra conversion subsidy for plant and pig farms also reduced the portion. Nonetheless, the state support for organic farms was kept higher than conventional farms; organic farms on average received 1.46 times more subsidies than conventional farms during 2006-2009 (Andersen, 2011:Ørum, Jensen et al., 2011:Jensen, Jespersen et al., 2012). In addition, with the new scheme organic farmers became entitled to apply for other agri-environmental subsidies in addition to organic ones.

From the opposition's point of view, however, the growth of organic subsidies was not big enough, especially considering the conditions brought about by the EU's CAP reform. Whereas the agricultural subsidies were increasingly under pressure under the WTO's neo-liberal regime, organic subsidies were relatively secured as they were put in the CAP's so-called second pillar rural development programme. For this embedding, they could be augmented as a state initiative for the various aims of "improvement of the environment and rural areas" (2006/144/EC), rather than subsidies for production.[79] Taking this aspect into account, the opposition, and NOAH, claimed the organic subsidies should be larger, since the support for organic agriculture can be sought in the several measures of the EU funding programmes. The study by Jensen et al. similarly shows that other member states like Austria, whose organic area reached about 16% of the total agricultural area during the same period, have exploited the EU funding more extensively. For instance, Denmark did not use the measure for animal welfare in the EU rural development programme (Jensen, Jespersen et al., 2012). Albeit not as harsh as the Netherlands, which does not give any organic subsidy, the blue government did set a moderate subsidy level with the intention of developing less subsidy-dependent organic farms effectively forcing them to adapt to market conditions.

Structural development of the organic sector

Focusing on the structural development of the organic sector during the 2000s, the trend can be characterised with, on the one hand, the full-time dairy farm with one fourth or fifth of the total organic farm population, which makes the dominant part of the organic production and extensive area. On the other hand, dominantly part-time, crop farm under 40 ha continued to be a largest part of the population (Jacobsen, Madsen et al., 2005:Noe, 2008). Albeit the number of the dairy farm-hold has not been overwhelming, it occupied half of the total organic area, nearly 70 % of the organic production, and 80% of the organic animal husbandry in the 2000's (Andersen, 2011:NaturErhvervstyrelsen, 2012). The dominance of dairy has been characteristic for the organic sector, as it has generally constituted only around 10% of the population and from 23 to 28% of the production in the conventional sector. Compared to that, crop farm has been small in the organic production; it constituted merely around 10-15 % of the total organic production and 35% of the total organic area, whereas in the conventional sector it accounted for 20-25% of the total production (data between 2006 and 2009 by Andersen, 2011). In terms of the number of farm holds, however, crop farm has been the majority, which made a little above 50% of the total organic farm, though the rate of the conventional counterpart

[79] In 2010 the new scheme, "Extensive agriculture", started. Organic support is put in the CAP's first pillar, which concerns the general economic support for agriculture. The maintenance subsidy for organic farms became one-year based (instead of the former five-year), and financed totally by the EU. So far the old five-year scheme for conversion subsidy and the subsidy for environmental service continue with this new scheme.

was a bit higher, close to 60% (data between 2006-2009 by Jensen et al., 2012). Furthermore, dairy and crop farm have showed a clear difference in the working form; i.e. dairy has been the branch (regardless of organic or conventional) part-time farm-hold has almost completely disappeared. This indicates that dairy farmers' main income was exclusively from agriculture. In contrast, part-time farm hold was quite large in numbers in the general agricultural community, and the organic sector was not an exception; it has occupied above the half of the total crop farms. According to the study by Jacobsen et al., dairy farms were more dependent on subsidy and market price condition than crop farms, which were more likely to have other sources of income than farming (Jacobsen, Madsen et al., 2005). What is more, organic milk had already since the latter half of the 1990s reached the level of overproduction, occupying 20 % of the market share for consumer milk. In addition, the merger between the two biggest dairy cooperatives in Denmark, MD food and Kløver Milk, and soon after between that and the Swedish Arla in 1999 terminated the competition among conventional dairy firms for the organic milk market. The newly established multi-national dairy enterprise, Arla Foods, reduced the contract price for organic milk (Noe, 2008, p.275). Despite this situation with market satiety and declining price premium, several reports in the 2000s showed the organic milk production generally made a better economy (or less vulnerable) than conventional (Jensen et al., 2012; Danmarks Statistik, 2011), though its relative benefit owed considerably to the higher subsidy rate (Jensen et al., 2012). It appeared to be crucial that the Liberal-Conservative government introduced conversion subsidy for dairy for the first time in 2007.

These developments, which came under the banner of "market-driven organic development", "Green Growth" and "environmentally-friendly agriculture", were often received positively by diverse actors, from the government and opposition parties and agricultural bureaucrats to the organic and traditional agriculture organisations and academics. From a policy-analytical perspective, Daugbjerg (Daugbjerg and Halpin, 2010:Daugbjerg, 2011), for instance, views the development in Denmark including the time under the blue government as clearly "successful" for expanding the organic market. Although the government for a certain period interrupted especially what he calls "indirect demand-side policy instruments", above all the funding for organic research and development, marketing, information and food innovation, the funding by the time of "Organic Package" in 2007 recovered nearly to the level of 2002. He asserts it was because the potential of the domestic and import market for organics was realised by this government, too. This government's attitude shift also corresponds to the market situation: Since the mid-2000s organic production had not caught up with the rapid growth in consumer demand in the domestic and export markets and a shortage in the organic supply recurred (Noe, 2008).

However, the Danish success appears to be much more limited when we shift our focus away from the market growth. The number of organic farms had almost constantly declined after it peaked in 2002. According to the latest statistics from 2011 (NaturErhvervstyrelsen, 2012), which were collected under the final phase of the blue government, the decline continued with 28 per cent of the 2002 level.[80] As seen in figure 12 above, there was a drastic reduction in new applicants for organic conversion from 2003, while reversion of organic farms to conventional method had transcended the former to a substantial degree. In particular, the number of new converters and terminated in 2004 was 86 and 430 respectively; the reduction was thus five times bigger than the growth in organic farm. This indicates the subsidy reform towards a more simplified system – what Daugberg calls "direct supply-side policy instruments" – did not have a significant effect on motivating farmers to convert nor to continue with the organic method. A valuable survey conducted in 2005 by Noe (2008) also confirms that the majority in the farming community was not considering conversion to organic method; 91% of the respondents answered absolutely not planning to convert, whereas only 2.3% said to a high or some degree considering conversion. Another survey from 2006 and 2007 by Jensen shows a similarly strong disinterest in conversion among the members of the Farmers' Union (Noe, 2008).

[80] The current centre-left government composed of Social Democratic Party, SF and RV was formed in October 2011.

This tendency of declining interest among farmers did not automatically result in the reduction of the national organic area. As seen in figure 13 above, the decline stopped in 2006, and from that year onwards the organically-grown area has been increasing constantly again. Yet this condition of the clear reduction in organic farms and the recovery/re-growth of organically cultivated area can present itself the reality of structural development of the organic sector, which occurred in the agricultural sector in general. As the qualitative study by Kaltoft and Risgaard (2005) reveals, small-sized part-time farming has not simply been economically profitable, while letting their lands has. Furthermore the cooperative for supplying grain declined to take small portions of grain and/or collect grain from distant farms, forcing organic farms to sell their produce at the same price as conventional. This evidence suggests that continuing organic method, especially for small farms, (which often grow grain), requires other incentives than economic profitability, such as realisation of dreams and enthusiasm. Yet such non-economic motivation became more and more difficult to sustain as economic viability was low and farmers grew older. For dairy farmers, extension of land has been necessary for increasing production, as the organic regulation controls the density of animals. However, extension was nearly impossible for some regions, due to the high land price caused by the lack of land for farming. As Kaltoft and Risgaard depict, many dairy farmers were forced to choose between reverting to conventional, which enabled them to increase their herd on their current land, and continue organic without expansion, which gave no increase in production.[81] The growth of the national organic area was after all brought largely by those dairy farms, which generally occupy one-third of the organic population, while the deterioration of economic profitability for small-and-medium sized dairy and other types of farms increased their termination. This indicates the growth in farms over 100 ha, but a clear decline in the farms between 10 and below 100 ha (Plantedirektoratet, 2005:2007:2009).

Behind this structural development was growing similarity between organic and conventional agriculture practically (Jacobsen, Madsen et al., 2005:Hermansen, 2008) and mentally (Kaltoft and Risgaard, 2006:Noe, 2006:2008) since the late 1990s. During the pioneer phase, organic farmers had to work hard not only for technical and practical issues but also for social networking in the farming community, since organic agriculture was often seen as eccentric or as an opposition to conventional agriculture. Yet as observed by some, the organic development in Denmark, from its early phase, departed from the stage of explicit differentiation from conventional and turned towards closing the gap between them (Kaltoft and Risgaard, 2006:Kjeldsen and Ingemann, 2009). This has often been viewed as a result of their creatively conflictual relationship rather than cut-throat competition, which has had a synergic effect on the policy (Lynggaard, 2001). According to Kaltoft et al., many reverters to conventional farming in the first half of the 2000s felt "two modes very alike". They propose that their frustration possibly stemmed from the development of organic agriculture, which promised an alternative to the conventional agricultural modernisation, but in the end traced the same trajectory (Kaltoft and Risgaard, 2006, p.138). Furthermore, Noe's studies show that the organic farmers who converted after the late 1990s were more likely to have different ideas and stances on organic agriculture. Compared to the pioneers, they focused more on the economic factor[82] and had much less conflict with conventional agriculture, though concern for the environment still scored high as their reason for conversion (Noe, 2008, 2006). Investigation of correlation between such structural development and farmers' values/attitude is out of this study's objective. These studies together with the statistical evidence suggest that the organic development in the 2000s (though the scope of this study is up to 2008) was not successful in

[81] Hermansen et al. (2008) report that, according to data from 2006, organic dairy produced 1000 kg/beef less than the conventional counterpart. This lower result is also a reason why organic dairy is pushed forward to larger farmhold than conventional.

[82] The increasing weight on the economic aspect among the 1995 organic converters in comparison to the former converters was also reported by Michelsen, J. (2001a). "Organic farming in a Regulatory Perspective. The Danish Case." Sociologia Ruralis **41**(1): 62-84. His study also stressed the continuance of similar values and attitudes as the earlier converters (organic pioneers).

motivating more farmers to convert. Despite the expert opinion of better profitability, higher subsidy rates than conventional agriculture, and market growth, the majority of farmers still tend to be sceptical of organic agriculture.

Strategies of the organic organisations

Merger: from LØJ to ØL

Discussion of the new organisational structure was on the agenda of LØJ's board meeting in June 2001 (LØJ, 2001). This evolved towards a board proposal for a merger of LØJ, ØLC, and other producer groups' organisations, which were composed of organic suppliers and companies. In the proposal, the existing organisations were to dissolve, and a new organisation formed. The biggest change and challenge expected with this merger was an official inclusion of organic producers' and businesses' interest, brought by ØLC and other producer groups' organisation. This proposal of merger assured the producer-business interests to be an integrated element of the organisation, as eight of the board members would be elected directly at the general assembly, while another seven would be elected within each producer branch. The chairperson of LØJ, Knud Erik Sørensen, claimed at his support for merger that a new political strategy with new relations had to be built, since the time of political tailwind had gone with the new government. He stressed the merger would make organic organisation strong and "the more members are the better" (LØJ, 2002). He further stated that;

> "We will drive agriculture in another way than conventional, but I reject organic production to be so special that only few can follow. Then we end up with a small organisation merely keeping our own banner up. It won't change anything. We have to find a balance, where we do not forget the visions, but perhaps have to accept that it takes a bit longer time to realise them" (Økologisk Jordbrug, 2002b)

ØLC and producer branch groups supported the proposal, and before LØJ's General Assembly, ØLC had already anonymously agreed on the merger at its general meeting. The chairperson of the Association for Organic and Biodynamic milk producers underlined in this light that the merger was crucial for organic organisations to establish their positions in the organic politics (Økologisk Jordbrug, 2002b).

Yet, there were some critical voices raised in LØJ about the merger, typically expressing the following issues; 1) the fear of watering down the ideological foundation of LØJ; 2) ambivalent role of consumers; and 3) limitation on democracy for the only half of the board members being elected at general assembly; Regarding the first point, one can observe the conflict between the "organic fundamentalists" who are the old-school members of LØJ and the "market organics" who prioritise the economic aspects of organic production. From the former standpoint, enlargement of the organisation with members with apparently different political interests might make the collective decision difficult. Thus it was feared that the organisation would result in taking only easy ways in order to avoid disagreement. Similarly, some saw LØJ and ØLC as a "mismatched couple", since the former aimed to deal with the value and ideology of organic agriculture while the starting point of the latter was commerce. The chairperson of ØLC objected to those arguments by saying that ØLC and branch organisations were often more progressive, and they would continuously insist on the strengthening of value foundation of organic agriculture in the new organisation. He emphasised that ØLC was critical of the past years' development that prioritised economy over the values and the tendency of "discount organics" (Økologisk Jordbrug, 2002a).

Critics were also suspicious about the role of consumers in the new organisation. While consumers were understood as a guarantee for LØJ to be different from ordinary agricultural organisations, they still tended to be considered as an unorganised group encompassing different identities, for instance, ordinary consumers who buy organics once in a while without attaching a strong political meaning, and political consumers who

always do.[83] Although consumers finally got their own committee in 1998, their integration in the organisation continued to be an unsolved project (LØJ, 2002:Økologisk Jordbrug, 2002b). There was fear that the new structure with increased influence of producers and businesses would further undermine the position of consumers.

Regarding the fact that seven out of 15 board members would be chosen directly within the individual production branches outside the general assembly, the leaders argued that the reason for this arrangement was that organic production became so diverse, and so did the needs of each branch. If all board members had to be elected at general assemblies, it could risk excluding small branches. (Økologisk Jordbrug, 2002b).

Nonetheless, the merger was anonymously approved at the general assembly in March 2002 with 95 votes. The new organisation was named the Danish Organic Association (Økologisk Landsforening: hereafter ØL), and LØJ's chairperson, Knud Erik Sørensen, was elected to be the first chairperson of ØL (Økologisk Landsforening, 2002). As suggested in the proposal, the backbones of the new organisation were to be farmers, consumers and businesses. Since 2003, an organic producers' group Ø-Gruppen and the Organic Distributors' Association have also joined ØL (Økologisk Landsforening, 2004). It was expected from start that this organisational structure contained diverse internal conflicts between "small vs. big producers, retailers' channels vs. alternative sales channels, to agree or disagree fast growing races of hens," and many others. Yet, such conflicts were endorsed to be "a part of the dynamic that makes ØL a unique organisation," and "with good will from all sides, it will succeed" (Økologisk Landsforening, 2004).

The merger brought a slight increase in the membership, particularly consumer and business members, in 2002 and hence stopped the decline since 2000. Yet, the number of farmer members declined drastically again in 2003, partially due to the increased membership fee after the merger, but also due to the nationwide halt in organic conversion mentioned earlier (Økologisk Landsforening, 2004). Farmer members have traditionally contributed most in terms of members' fee. In 2003 they contributed 1.6 million DKK, while the total amount the consumer member fees reached only approx. 140,000 DKK. Corresponding to this decrease in farmer members, the revenue from the membership dropped by about 500,000 DKK in 2004 and 750,000 DKK in 2005 in comparison with the result of 2003 (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005c). As the economy of the organisation has increasingly been dependent on support from outside (see table 11 in the next subsection), the decline in this member group risked its economic autonomy and stability. In response to this situation, ØL conducted a campaign to target more farmer members through telephone and farmer-farmer contact in 2004. The organisation managed to gain 400 new farmer members, though the total for this member group still counted only 500 (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b). Considering that there were 3166 authorised organic farmers in the same year (Plantedirektoratet, 2007), ØL only managed to organise below one-sixth of the organic farmers in the country. The fee was reduced again in 2004, and the number recovered to 855 in March 2005 (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b). In the beginning of 2007, the farmer members counted 851 (Økologisk Landsforening, 2007b), which indicates that ØL organised nearly one-third of the organic farmers in Denmark, when the total number of authorised organic farm hold was reported to be 2794 at the end of 2006 (Plantedirektoratet, 2007). As mentioned above, this improvement largely stemmed from the nationwide shrinking of organic farmer population.

The distinction between consumer members and subscribers, the latter without voting rights, was removed in the new organisation. All non-producer and non-business members became consumer members, and all members had voting rights. Furthermore, to organise organic consumers, ØL soon started a consumer magazine *SPIR* (from 2008 the name changed to *Økologisk*) in addition to its long-lasting newspaper *Økologisk Jordbrug*. Unlike the time of LØJ when all members received *Økologisk Jordbrug*, consumer members and farmer/business members were now going to get the separate publications. *Økologisk Jordbrug* was crucial

[83] Interview with Monica Stoye. 22 June 2007.

information material, in which members updated the activities of the organisation, but also functioned as a forum where all types of members can participate in debate. It was criticised that the division of member materials generated separation between consumers and agricultural professions, and did not help communication between them.[84]

In the beginning of 2007, ØL had 1758 consumer members (Økologisk Landsforening, 2007a), which was still below the number of 2001 (LØJ's last year) counting both consumer members and subscribers.

These changes in the organisation's membership are seen in table 10 below.

Table 10: Development in LØJ/ØL Membership

	1993	1994	2004	2005	2006	2007
Farmer members	360	325	450	855	849	851
Consumer members	447	503	approx 860	1000	1075	1758
Subscription only (no voting rights)	405	523	-	-	-	-
Firms/organisation members	-	-	34	50	60	80
Total	1212	1351	1344	1905	1984	2689

*unknown

Source: LØJ/ØL annual reports and Økologisk Jordbrug

Adoption to the new political climate

The first couple of years after the merger were a time of "crisis" for the ØL, as the political climate for organics turned out to be much colder with the new government. The budget for the organic sector in general was cut, public support for the House of Ecology temporarily halted after the first quarter of 2002, and funding from the Green Fund under the Ministry of the Environment and Energy to the organisation finished in the end of the same year with the termination of the Fund. Nine out of 33 employees had to be fired, and the remaining employees voluntarily agreed on the provisional solidary reduction of salary or pension in 2002 (Økologisk Landsforening, 2003b, p.11). LØJ's chairperson said at the time that "the political tailwind is turned around, or, at best, stagnant" (LØJ, 2002, p.1:Økologisk Jordbrug, 2002b, p.1:Økologisk Landsforening, 2003b). However, he called for a collective effort to change the tide:

> But it does not mean organics cannot and should not continue moving forward. It just now needs a new strategy, which can find the political opportunities under the new relations… It will also need a greater effort, and we are ready to deliver it. The need for a strong organisation, which has insight and expertise in promoting and developing organics and can well present an ecological direction based on own positions and visions, gets more strengthened, when the tailwind is weaker (The then chairparson, Knud Erik Sørensen in LØJ, 2002, p.1).

[84] Interview with Monica Stoye. 22 June 2007.

Indeed, the rapid growth in conventional farmers' conversion to organic method from the late 1990s to 2003 represented the further diffusion of organic agriculture in the traditional farming community. As noted above, organic agriculture was no longer found exotic and weird, but was increasingly recognised as not so different from conventional farming. Correspondingly, the political demography of the organic organisation has also changed. In the earlier phase, the Family Farmers' Union, which historically supports RV, was the sole collaborative partner in the traditional agricultural community. In contrast, newly converted organic farmers tend to be full-time farmers with a relatively large areal, and they are typically members of the biggest farmers' organisation, which is a traditional supporter of the Liberal Party. The first chairperson of ØL was one of them, and he made a complaint to the party on behalf of the Danish organic farmers about its failure to support organic production.[85]

This may indicate that the overrepresentation of left-wing or, perhaps more correctly, critics of capitalism, has already diminished in the organisation at this stage. Even more evident was the strengthening of political lobbyism, which turned the common focus away from the explicit political-ideological cleavage towards the game of institutional politics. The particular target was quite often DF. ØL held close contact with the party members, most notably Christian H. Hansen, who was the chairperson of *Folketinget's* food committee. As acknowledged by the leaders, political achievements – recovery of political support – for the organic sector were highly dependent on the support of this party (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b:2006:2007a). Hansen, who had a strong personal interest in animal welfare, and ØL could easily make an agreement. The aspect of the organisation's political strategy is discussed further in the next section.

At the same time, the crisis drove ØL to further professionalization. Many of the organisation's activities became nationwide and big-scale (e.g. annual organic autumn festival and organic conference) and were most often conducted in collaboration with other agricultural organisations, food businesses, or public institutions. ØL's strategy was to make synergy effects through such collaboration. For instance, facing the new government's failure to link organic food and health, it started targeting public schools and sports clubs to promote organic food as healthy diet. ØL also made a partnership agreement with FDB to sponsor several projects such as information campaigns for clean drinking water on milk cartons in 2005 and publication of educational material for elementary schools (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b:2007b). It was also told as a success story of ØL that one of the discount supermarket chains, Netto, agreed to open access to smaller organic businesses and giving those platforms to their shops abroad (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b). Furthermore, from the mid-2000s ØL started close cooperation with multi-national dairy company Arla, despite the long history of conflict between small dairy producers and (the predecessors of) this company which dominated the domestic market. In addition, as survey and information distribution tasks were overloading, they were increasingly outsourced to other professional agencies. In 2003 it was approved by the state as a non-profit organisation, thus became entitled to a subsidy (tipstilskud).

After a couple of years, the organisation began to show signs of recovery. Already in 2003 seven out of nine were re-employed, and the annual economic result showed a surplus of over 200,000 DKK (Økologisk Landsforening, 2004, p.10). The recovery was partially due to more independent sources of income, such as the advisory service (see the next section) and selling of other services. Still, public support, including the Fund for Agriculture[86], the newly started Fund for Organic Agriculture and the new subsidy for non-profit organisations contributed most (Økologisk Landsforening, 2007b). The organisation generally gained a seat in the funds' committees deciding the distribution. According to ØL's director Paul Holmbeck, despite its small-size, the organisation had as much power as big agricultural organisations, and he realised there was so

[85] Interview with Monica Stoye. 22 June 2007.

[86] The Fund for Organic Agriculture (promilleafgiftsfonden) is currently financed primarily by the tax on plant protection products.

much freedom to decide how to spend the money from the funds. [87] The development of the organisation's budget is seen in table below.

Table 11: Development of LØJ/ØL budget

Year	1986	1999	2003	2004	2005	2006
Income from members fee	90,400.0	1,777,200.0	2,864,834.0	2,403,958.0	2,155,043.0	2,369,492.0
Income from sales (publication, advisory service, etc.)		134,853.0	514,531.0	490,753.0	563,412.0	627,120.0
Income from gifts and sponsors			51,170.0	200,700.0	412,911.0	384,036.0
Total self-earned income	104,197.0	1,912,053.0	3,430,535.0	3,095,411.0	3,131,366.0	3,380,648.0
Income from public support	-	737,266.0	20,277,283.0	16,412,655.0	19,768,327.0	17,870,328.0
Total income	104,197.0		23,707,818.0	19,508,066.0	22,701,782.0	21,099,085.0
Dependency on external support (%)	0%		86%	84%	87%	85%

Source: LØJ/ØL's annual reports

Double strategy

ØL's strategy to adapt to the new political circumstances continued with its double-sided facets; one which supports the direction agreed in the general policy community, and one which stresses the differences between organic and conventional.

A characteristic example is the organisation's statements and attitude towards the market-driven development. On the one hand, the market was raised as one of the three driving forces of the organisational focus together with policy and knowledge (Økologisk Landsforening, 2004). Based on this focus it established the Market Department to handle market development including conducting and outsourcing of market surveys and campaigns for the promotion of organic production. The objective was to secure the expansion of organic sales. And the organisation strategically aimed at the places where organic goods can be sold in great quantities, most notably retail chains and public kitchens. As discussed in the last section, it succeeded in making formal agreements with big retail chains, including discount supermarket chains, to promote organic goods. At the same time, organic food in public institutions' food service gained the government's support (Dahl and Kristensen, 2006). In addition, the organisation's focus on the market was not just the national market but also export. Danish organic export dropped by 23% in 2003, mainly due to the lower growth in the major markets, especially England. ØL found that one barrier was increasing consumer preference for national-local products and the inflexible certification system for foreign products in the main export destinations for Denmark. It also stressed that more collaboration with the Agricultural Council was necessary to strengthen the Danish performance in the Nordic market, since the growth of organic consumption in other Nordic countries was faster than the domestic one (Økologisk Landsforening, 2004). It also started contacting retail chains in Germany.

It appears that this strong focus on the domestic and export market was partially driven by the political vulnerability of agricultural subsidies under the deepening of the WTO's free market regime. Already around 2000 it was discussed in the organic sector that organic agriculture should not rely on the state support. One reason for this argumentation was that the demands for organics were rising not only among consumers but also within the agricultural sector for animal feed. Agricultural experts and leaders of the agricultural organi-

[87] Interview with Paul Holmbeck on 1 February 2008.

sations agreed on de-subsidisation of organic agriculture, as the same level of area subsidy as conventional agriculture and market premium was found sufficient for organic farmers to make profit.[88] Although de-subsidisation was not raised as a target by ØL, it claimed to push political lobbying forward to shift the objective of organic subsidies towards the environmental argument rather than general help for production (Økologisk Landsforening, 2003b, p.7). Furthermore, market development was a versatile term not only for all actors in the Organic Food Council but also for the new government. ØL used the unexploited market potential of organics as a forefront argumentation for turning the government's indifference on organics around.

While this line of focus was aimed at the conventional market, the organisation at the same time criticised the increasingly diffused frame of market-driven organic development. The Annual Report of 2003 states that politicians, by advancing this political programme, toss responsibility to the market;

> They discuss on the basis of free competition and a free market, which are pure fantasy regarding agriculture and the food sector today. EU's agricultural policy distorts the competition, and the intensive concentration of both food production and marketing creates big barriers for new producers… ØL fights for market share by gathering power from enterprises, farmers and retailers, and conveys campaigns in the retail branch. It has made progress in 2003 for the first time in five years. The market is a driving-force, but we should not talk about a development can be driven only by the market! (Økologisk Landsforening, 2004).

Along with this critical position to the mainstream market trajectory, ØL developed alternative sales chain for organics. On-farm sales, box-scheme and farmers' markets were highlighted again. For instance, it tried to encourage farm shops and other alternative sales channels by creating an advisory team, which assisted with optimising shops, marketing, installation etc. It also organised a network in 2006 for sharing experiences and inspiration for alternative sales. ØL supported activities for farmers' markets in Copenhagen, though its assistance was still *ad hoc* and not integrated in the organisation's strategy. Furthermore, a project was conducted by its Market Department and Communication Department in 2006 to give small mills and bakeries business know-how (Økologisk Landsforening, 2007a).

Other evidence of the continuing critical spirit is the creation of an advisory service in response to the criticism of the existing service operated under the traditional agricultural organisations. This service, which advanced the Plans for Farm Development, was approved at the general assembly in 2002. While the integration of organic agriculture in the general framework of the agricultural sector was successful, ØL members increasingly recognised the instruction by the existing advisory institution inclined to impose the orthodox agro-economic rationality and agronomics over the values and non-economic objectives of organic agriculture. The new advisory system was considered to be a way to revitalise organic practices beyond economic gain and a narrow sense of efficiency, which drives organic farmers to mono-cultural specialisation. As one of the organic advisors of ØL asserted, the spirit of organic agriculture is to "think unconventional".[89] This independent advisory service was an effective way to encourage and diffuse unconventional on-farm practices. Already by 2006 its service made a profit of over 500,000 DKK (Økologisk Landsforening, 2007b).

Lastly, evidence of the double strategy, in terms of protest and collaboration with the state, is the surge of the GMO dispute. When the policy discussion on GMO crop began to intensify in 2003, ØL called for collective campaign with other organisations. It resulted in a nationwide campaign "GMO? No Thanks! (GMO? Nej Tak!)" in 2002, which soon gathered 13 organisations from different fields (e.g. cooks, dieticians, labour

[88] Sørensen, Bent Højgaard (2000) "Økobønder vil af med tilskud fra staten" in Berginske Tidende, 12 October, page 7.

[89] Michael Tersbøl at the conference "Future's Organic Research (Fremtidens Økologiforskning)" on 18 August, 2009. The conference was organised by the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Aarhus University.

unions, environmental and consumer organisations) in 2003 (Økologisk Landsforening, 2003a:2004). ØL also initiated an action to put the sign of "This is GMO-free farm" in farm yard, and 600 signs were set up during 2003 (Økologisk Landsforening, 2004). The starting point of the collective campaigns was to maintain Denmark's moratorium, i.e. the total blocking of GMO crop. Thus, the proposal of GMO coexistence proposed by the government was initially clearly rejected. However, as the moratorium would not be sustained by EU in the near future, ØL shifted its priority to secure demands for distance, compensation for organic and other non-GMO growers, and labelling of GMO products (including seed). This shift was, to some degree, a result of the difficult negotiation between ØL and the Agricultural Council on the issue. The majority of the Council members were not against the GMO crops, and hence did not basically support the protest initiated by ØL. After the negotiation, however, the Council agreed on the demands for distance and information to neighbours to be included in the law (Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b). Overall, ØL was satisfied with the general results with the GMO coexistence law, since it has, so far, barred GMO from entering the country(Økologisk Landsforening, 2005b).

Analysis

Surrounding environment for LØJ/ØL

Towards a wider opportunity

When LØJ (originally FØJ) was established in 1981, the existing two biodynamic organisations, the organisation Praktisk Økologi led by Troels V. Østergård, environmental organisations such as DN and NOAH, a few agronomists at the Royal Veterinary University, etc. were already working for organic or alternative agriculture. Although agriculture's negative environmental effects had been intensively raised in public since the late 1970s, the traditional agricultural policy community could still impose its clear denial of this correlation at that time. The policy community consisted of the iron triangle of agricultural bureaucrats (Ministry of Agriculture), the Agricultural Council, and parliament, though the influence of EU should not be neglected as the sector was dependent on the CAP financing. This triangle relationship was built upon the long-lasting coalition between the groups of farmers and particular political parties: big-scale farmers with the Conservatives, middle-sized farmers who were, and still are, the majority, with the Liberals, and family farmers with RV. The first two groups of farmers were generally organised under the biggest organisation, the Farmers' Union, and the third under the Family Farmers' Association.

This iron triangle collectively eschewed alternative agriculture as "unscientific," "irrational," and "unprofessional." However, *each part of this triangle has had internal struggle*. Collective bargaining of the agricultural community was often divided between the competing two organisations. The governing parties were changing relatively often and coalition with other parties was almost always necessary. This political circumstance historically hindered centralisation of power to a single party. In addition, the power of the Ministry of Agriculture was shaken from the mid-1980s, as the Ministry of the Environment made deterioration of the aquatic environment by agriculture its main agenda. The fragmented and internally competing character of the agricultural policy community has given new actors like LØJ and environmental organisations political opportunities. Especially the symbolic incident of dead lobster in Kattegat in 1986 was effectively politicised by DN. This resulted in the official acknowledgement of agri-environmental problem by the first Pesticide Action Plan in the same year, accommodating the preliminary taxation on pesticides. The Plan showed that the iron triangle could no longer ignore the problem. Both the Minister of Environment (Christian Democrat) and of Agriculture (Liberal) intended to privilege interest of the agricultural community, but they were not able to suspend the Plan due to strong public pressure.

The Plan triggered a rapid institutionalisation of organic agriculture, which is represented by the establishment of the so-called Organic Law in 1987. Here, the initiative came from RV and SF, the parties which had already recognised their own interests in organic agriculture. The former, as the family farmers' party, con-

sidered organic agriculture a means of survival for the struggling small-scale farmers. After the national modernisation process of "the effective farm," they had difficulty competing with bigger and more efficient farms. They saw a potential in organic agriculture as there appeared to be a market for it, and it could superimpose the value of being small. SF, as a socialist and urban party, had not developed its own agricultural policy, since it was mostly occupied with labour and equality. For this reason, it had joined the discussions of the Agricultural Study Group, which played the crucial role in the pre-movement phase in the late 1970s. Around that time, the centre of the alternative agriculture discussion shifted towards agri-environmental problems over collective farm ownership, which in fact became legally possible with the establishment of ecological community (commune) Svanholm. The party supported this development as some of the founding members of Svanholm were active party members. The party's model for the future agriculture, i.e. the eco-socialist agricultural model, began to be built upon organic agriculture which was gaining popularity in urban populations.

However, the more substantial integration of organic agriculture in the policy field had to wait until the coalition government between the Social Democrats and RV, both of which held up the identity as frontrunner in environmental protection, was stabilised. Under this government, which lasted from September 1994 to November 2001, the institutional power of the Ministry of the Environment grew remarkably with the inauguration of high profile Social Democratic politician Svend Auken as minister. A series of progressive environmental measures such as green tax and systemic support for renewable energy were introduced. More directly for the organic sector, two ministers of Agriculture, Henrik Dam Kristensen and Ritt Bjerregaard (for the last two years), were both in favour of organic agriculture and thus gave tail wind to the organic sector. Substantial state support not only for the production but also for non-production fields such as organic research, product innovation, market development, and information was established. This support resulted, among other things, in the establishment of the national research institute for organic research, the grassroots research scheme, and the House of Ecology. Furthermore, as represented by the two action plans, the status of the Organic Food Council as the major expert committee which the policy-makers relied directly on was also strengthened. In addition, the two extensive studies of the possibilities of organic agriculture, including the scenario of 100% conversion, show how organic agriculture was politically perceived as a real option for the country.

The organic sector has experienced a strong growth since the mid-1990s, and particularly the growth in the late 1990s was explosive. The development was boosted by the start of routinized sales in the biggest supermarket chains as well as extensive state subsidies. The number of organic farms, which counted only slightly over 200 in 1988, reached over 1000 in 1995, and towards 2000 the number had multiplied by 3.5. This development also included larger organic farms. The average size grew from 22ha in 1990 to near 40ha already in 1995, and almost 50ha in 2000. Consequently, organic farms became a visible part of the agricultural community. It filled nearly 2% of the national agriculture (farm number and acreage) in 1995, over 5% in 1998, and 6.5% in 2000.

Stabilisation of opportunities

However, the situation suddenly changed in the early 2000s when the newly established Liberal-Conservative government pushed substantial budget cuts in the organic support. In contrast to the centre-left parties, these parties did not view organic agriculture as unique and were against special treatment. Environmental benefits could also be gained by changing conventional agriculture in a more environmentally-friendly direction, and that solution was found more cost-effective than the organic path.

This crisis reversed after a couple of years, and the support by this so-called blue government grew significantly. It appears that *the favourable environment for LØJ's successor ØL was stabilised regardless of the decline in the enthusiasm of the governing parties*. There are some grounds for this stabilisation. Firstly, the recovery in organic support owed much to the increase in EU funding for the agri-environmental objective

under the new CAP's rural development pillar, wherein organic agriculture can comfortably find its place. It is also safe to say that the realisation of extra injection from EU owed to the emerging consensus of environmental protection as a valid rationale for agricultural support in the age of the WTO regime. Due to this extended economic resource from the outside, the member states were able to afford the expansion of organic support without pressuring the domestic budget too much. Secondly, the growth in organic support stemmed also from the new fund, which was financed by the revenue from pesticides. The organic support turned out to be paid by "polluters" rather than general tax payers. This resolution is coherent with the liberal ideology of the government; namely, less state intervention and leaving responsibility to individuals – in this case to conventional farmers as users of pesticides. Lastly, the recovery of the state support was a result of the maturity of the organic sector for interest representation. As the government did not constitute the majority by itself, there was a good chance to divert the direction by convincing the supporting parties, especially DF. In the 2000s, DF was much more in favour of organic agriculture than before, especially due to its concern for animal welfare.

Discursive construction of organic policy and structural development

Focusing on the discursive construction of organic policy, the stabilisation was achieved in the packaging of "*market-driven development*." The foundation of this organic policy discourse was in fact already built in the 1990s through interaction among stakeholders in the Organic Food Council. As expressed in the first Action Plan in 1995, the central target was "*integration of organic agriculture into the conventional system*" of agricultural research, education and training, advisory services, and food industry and sales. This integration was stressed as essential for generating a "dynamic process of development," wherein the conventional system, in compliance with the organic principles, creates strong credibility and growth of organics (Structurdirektoratet, 1999, p.20-21). In the second Action Plan in 1999, this was extended to the "development-oriented path," which proclaimed "the best way to develop organic farming is in response to the market which is generated by demand for organic food." This was distinguished from the other option, the "regulatory-driven path," which is built upon strong state intervention to induce organic conversion. By contrasting these two options, the Council rejected the state interventional path and chose the developmental path that motivates conversion by a "voluntary and positive principle" (Ibid., p.10). The common thread of these discursive constructions was the liberal orientation in terms of letting individuals (e.g. farmers, producers, consumers) make their own decisions, presuming the market's intrinsic capability for supply-demand adjustment, and eschewing state intervention. This line of reasoning has been more explicitly coordinated under the policy package of "market-driven organic development" by the Liberal-Conservative government. The package wraps the diverse objectives, such as integration into the conventional system, growth and achievement of the general organic objectives (environmental protection, animal welfare, resource use, landscape aesthetics, quality and food safety) into one. Imbuing this with liberal politics, as represented by the development of the competent national agriculture for surviving the global competition, organic agriculture was rationalised as a new "industry" for the nation. Discursive opportunity for organic policy has therefore become enclosed primarily within what Eder (1996) calls the "cognitive device" of "empirical rationality," such as cost-effectiveness, while toning down the metaphors of moral obligation and values. It must lastly be stressed that this development has come about under the consent of the diverse political parties from the left to the right and, crucially, the organic sector.

This discursive development also reflects the reality of structural development in the organic sector. Having gone through the rapid growth in the 1990s, organic farming has encountered the traditional treadmill problem caused by the quantitative growth in production and the consequent decline in production value (Ingemann, 1998). In order to adjust, farmers are pushed to maximise efficiency, typically by new investment in machines, facilities and bigger farm land. Under these circumstances, many organic farmers have reverted to conventional method, and since 2003 the number reversions to conventional began to outnumber new conversions. Dairy has been driven towards remarkable enlargement of farm-size, since increase in pro-

duction requires bigger land as the organic regulation controls the number of animals per ha. Dairy is indeed the section that underwent the strongest effectivization in the last two decades. One of the symbolic cases is the merger of major dairy cooperatives under the multi-national corporation Arla Food in the late 1990s, which induced the reduction of producer price when organic milk began to reach overproduction. Growing organic often made less economic sense for small-scale farmers, since it turned out to be more economically profitable to let their land.

Considering the aspects of organic development, "conventionalisation" of organic agriculture has already taken place to a certain degree: Firstly, the above-mentioned effectivization and emergence of conventional problems. Secondly, the increase of converted farmers has transformed the characteristics of organic farmers. Newly converted farmers continue to attach to the conventional farming community and the traditional agricultural organisations. As suggested by Kaltoft and Risgaard (2006) and Noe (2006), this transformed the shared idea of organic agriculture. They commonly assert that the central weight of organic farmers was shifting from moral and emotional aspirations towards technical compliance with the organic regulations and economic viability. Their findings overall imply that *the foundation for integrating organic agriculture into the conventional system, namely the ordinary capitalist market system, the conventional farming community and the dominant policy paradigm, has been established quite well during the 1990s.* Along with this integration, over-production of organic goods was perceived as an inevitable development and this was to be solved simply by expanding the market.

Organisational orientation of LØJ – a general overview

LØJ was established as an organisation for organic farmers, enterprises and consumers. It originally took the organisational form of what Rucht (1996) calls "grassroots model," which was based on several local groups which took annual turns for administrative task. The founding members were those with high education, though many of them did not have long farming experience. The residents of the ecological commune Svanholm played the pivotal role in the preliminary phase.

The norm of the organisation was from the start *pragmatic*. Its utmost emphasis was the "*diffusion of organic agriculture*," and cooperation with other actors and development of broad support were prioritised. The organisation also from the early days prioritised the establishment of own organic standards and labelling system by *anticipating the diffusion of organics in the ordinary market*. Already during the 1980s, it managed to establish the official collaborative relationship with the biodynamic agriculture organisations, the nationwide chain of consumer co-operatives, and the Family Farmers' Association. This early collaboration particularly with the last two actors, i.e. the market/business actor and conventional farmers, is a distinctive element of the Danish case, since organic activism abroad, as seen in the case of Japan, has been inclined to struggle with this relationship. The typical hurdle is a fear of diluting the movement, which is supposed to be critical of conventional modes of business and agriculture.

This collaborative orientation in the Danish organisation can be explained at least from the three major points. Firstly, as detected in interviews and texts, the leaders of the organisation perceived such collaboration almost as "natural for Danes." The norm of "collaboration across different interests," as traditionally practiced in collective bargaining on the labour market, penetrated them deeply. As Bo Læssøe said,

> You don't need to look for a leader to do things. You can manage if there are enough people. It is called "union Denmark". If you meet three people who are interested in beer, you can make an organisation for beer lovers. We have so many of them… (Interview with Bo Læssøe, 18 June 2007).

Similar point was also made by ØL's director Paul Holmbeck:

> LØJ was a political organisation, but ØLC was not started as a political organisation. So 1994, 1995 suddenly there were two organisations with political agenda also… Because of some good

> collaborative behaviour…, and I think it is also because of the Danish collaborative tradition, the two organisations a kind of managed to make things out…(Interview with Paul Holmbeck, 8 February, 2008).

Secondly, it was possible to frame this collaboration with consumer co-operatives and family farmers as an alliance within the social movement, rather than with the pure business and the traditional agricultural interest organisation. Although both are in reality quite conventional today, the value foundation of consumer co-operative and family farmer commonly originates from the milestone social movements in this country. Thus by framing them as movement actors LØJ was able to defend itself against the criticism of dilution. Lastly, all three actors had their own incentive for collaboration. Consumer co-operatives reacted to the market potential of organic food, which, despite the growing consumer needs, was only available in small health food shops or direct purchase from organic farmers. Family farmers joined organic agriculture because they were struggling with its weakening position in the agricultural community. The leaders of the Family Farmers' Association could convince its members by asserting that as a way for their own revitalisation. The incentives of these actors were noticed by LØJ, which already saw coalition with the market and conventional farmers as essential for diffusion of organic agriculture.

Along with the institutionalisation of organic agriculture from the late 1980s, LØJ has also institutionalised itself drastically. This process has gone through the typical three steps illustrated by Van der Heijden (1997): 1) organisational growth in membership and economic resources; 2) internal institutionalisation characterised by professionalization and centralisation; and 3) external institutionalisation referring to the routinization of action towards the outer world in either conventional action or unconventional action. Regarding the first criterion, the organisation, which had only 92 members in the first year, grew to 1235 in 1988 and in 2007 reached over 2700. It received income from membership fees and from the organic labelling service from early on. The general organisational growth has continued also afterwards, with some periods of waning membership. In terms of the organisational economy, the growth was remarkable, owing not only to the development in membership and the sales of service, but more dominantly to the external support from the state. Particularly since the latter half of the 1990s, its economic dependency on the state subsidies has exceeded the self-earned income. During the 2000s, this dependency radically increased from10 to 20 million DKK as the additional funding sources, as represented by the Fund for Organic Agriculture, were facilitated.

Internal institutionalisation, i.e. professionalization and centralisation, occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the organisation transformed its grassroots structure from local groups to a centralised office in Aarhus and paid staff. The organisation's internal institutionalisation at start mimicked the existing agricultural organisations in the way it divides the task for politics and market. This nourished the two organisations with separate characteristics; namely, as mentioned by several interviewees, one characterised by "well-educated idealists" taking the lead of LØJ and the other represented by "business school graduates" in its sister organisation for organic producers. Internal institutionalisation was remarkably deepened with the merger of these organisations in 2002, which was driven by the aspiration to be strong enough to compete with the traditional agricultural organisations (which were in fact also undergoing the restructuring process towards mergers and centralisation). Competition was perceived as necessary to reverse the emerging tendency of "conventionalisation" of organic agriculture in mentality and practices. And this further accelerated the focus on professionalization. For instance, the meeting for brainstorming the organisational mission in 2005 appointed the word "professional" repeatedly; "professional approach to the assignments", "Even though we are a value-based organisation, we have to act professionally by all means", the attainment of "professional recognition" as an overall aim, etc. The objective of professionalization basically emphasised competence of staff, especially in agriculture, strategic partnership with other environmental and consumer organisations and development towards consultant agency (Internal document "Fælles idéstorm på Økologisk Landsforenings mission i dag" på strategidag 22 September, 2005). These all reflect the self-

recognition as a professional provider of service; professional in the sense that its income depends upon the quality of the service.

As regard to the third step of institutionalisation, external institutionalisation, LØJ had not initially engaged in what Van der Heijden categorises as unconventional actions, as represented by demonstrations and petitions, confrontational actions like occupation, barricading and violent actions. Nor did it engage in conventional actions in the 1980s as it concentrated mostly on internal affairs. Besides, its external actions for collaboration did not target political or state institutions. However this has changed radically after the Organic Law in 1987 and LØJ's subsequent inclusion in the Organic Food Council. Since then, LØJ has raised political lobby as one of the main tasks, and utilised the Council as the direct channel to policy-makers/making. Its external institutionalisation in the past two decades has predominantly come with the routinization of pro-institutional and conventional actions. This does not mean the organisation abolished its "alternativeness" in relation to conventional; as explored further in the below sections, the "alternative" and "unconventional" metaphors, identity and actions were certainly preserved. A double strategy took form that intended to maintain the organisation's alternativeness in parallel to the pursuit of influence on policy. The nationwide campaign against GMOs, for instance, was explicitly stated as a protest against the government and the Agricultural Council and deserves to be categorised as an unconventional action. Yet observing the past development, confrontational actions were generally rare, and crucially, protest-oriented metaphors and identity have increasingly been toned down. Its eventual compromise with the GMO co-existence law partially represents this tendency of declining alternative/direct action forms. The following sections deals with the discursive development of the organisation to explain why this path was paved.

Symbolic packaging of ecology

Choice of ecology

In the discursive construction of LØJ/ØL, the formulation of *ecology* plays the pivotal role. The organisation employed the term "ecological (økologisk)" agriculture, which had already begun to diffuse in the 1970s, to describe its envisaged agriculture. In my view, this selection of "ecology" over other terms has been of extreme importance for the discursive development of the organisation but also for the organic movement. The Anglo-Saxon region (e.g. the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia) has traditionally employed the term "organic"; the francophone region "biological"; China "green" or "environmentally friendly" and, as discussed below, Japan developed the original Japanese term "*yuuki*". Later the term has been institutionalised by the Organic Law in 1987 as the official name for organic agriculture in the country. Through this development, organic farmers are in Danish not only ecological farmers but also ecologists (økologer). The issue of organic agriculture/food is also often pronounced as the issue of ecology. As such, the word ecology covers a broad range of organic-related items, among them organic agriculture, organic food, agri-environmental politics, and, crucially, the organic movement.

LØJ's initial choice of ecology can be explained by the interplay between the ideological preference of the leaders, their strategic choice and the discursive scrutiny in the pre-movement community. First of all, when LØJ was created in 1981, ecologism had already won over the progressive political ideology like communism in formulating the desirable model of agriculture within the Agricultural Study Group, where the main founders of the organisation participated during the 1970s. Through this discussion, it became noticed that the communist ideology envisaged in the Group did not concern agri-environmental problems but structural reform of agriculture and particularly the reform of farm ownership to a more collective form for the purpose of releasing farmers from heavy debt. For the communists, organic agriculture was not only uninteresting but also "unjust" because it forced extra physical burdens on farmers. In comparison, the ecologists in the Group targeted precisely the environmental problem caused by the conventional mode of agricultural development. For the ecologists, primarily academics from the universities and the agriculture school, communism was not an effective basis for engaging with this problematique, as it, at least at the time, was more

occupied with the modernist technological development to create efficiency to achieve sufficiency. For this reason, it was judged to accommodate as the same agri-environmental problem as capitalism by gearing industrialisation of agriculture. Ecologism, by contrast, was considered to imbue a holistic worldview leading to inclusivity and extensibility. It made the integration of environmental consideration in the agricultural development possible. For such extensivity ecology was more favoured by the pioneers of the organic movement over biology, and the latter became so established that it tended to be rigid in the focus of limited subjects such as the plant and the soil. Crucially, ecology could be formulated outside the prevailing political-ideological packages without rejecting them. Transcending the existing boundary of political ideologies without being hostile to them, the concept of ecology united people who were seeking alternative lifestyles and food production. The concept was also employed by the founders of LØJ to transcend the limitation of the existing biodynamic thinking, which is bound to the individual person's (Rudolf Steiner's) philosophy and thus hard to diffuse among the general public.[90] These aspects suggest that the leaders saw a bigger discursive opportunity of ecology in the emerging field of the alternative agriculture movement than the institutionalised political cleavages of left or right, traditional category of biology and the existing alternative agricultural trail of biodynamics.

The following sub-sections focus upon what kind of symbolic packages of ecology can be identified in the organisation's argumentations by following the procedure proposed by Eder (1996). Unlike JOAA in Japan, LØJ did not develop a concrete common ideological statement for organic agriculture or the organic movement, but concentrated more on technical aspects entrenched in the organic standards. Consequently, the simple definition of organic agriculture made at the establishment of the organisation, "agriculture that works for sustaining or improving the soil's fertility, avoids application of synthetic fertiliser and pesticides, and endeavours to produce food with high quality" (LØJ, 1981), had constituted its official statement for a long time. Besides, rather than developing its own definition, the translation of the IFOAM's "Principle Aims of Organic Production and Processing" was presented as the common foundation for organic agriculture. The Principles were a list of itemized points that the organic movement should target, but did not illustrate the coherent conceptualisation of why such targets must be pursued. LØJ's conceptualisation of ecology (=organic agriculture) has often been mostly tacit. Despite this lack in the common ideational formulation, this study detects the discursive construction of this organisation to be captured by *the three core symbolic packages of organic agriculture* (ecology) as illustrated in Chapter 5: as *agro-ecosystem*, as *alternative to conventional*, and as *integral to conventional*. The sub-sections below illustrate the basic context of LØJ's symbolic packaging. The last sub-section depicts the end-result of the discursive development, namely the dominance of the ecology package as integral to conventional.

Agro-ecosystem package

The first package, *agro-ecosystem*, asserts *ecology as a scientific discipline* that enables rational and objective explanations of why organic agriculture must be advanced. The definition of organic agriculture with scientific disciplines was an explicit demarcation between the biodynamic movement and the organic movement. As just mentioned, LØJ's leaders were negative about the former being bound to the particular philosophy (anthroposophy) that intends to transcend the boundary of science by pursuing spiritual aspects of the world. For this reason the organisation has utilised this ecology-science packaging for rationalising organic agriculture, and that made immediate results. For instance, the establishment of the organic agriculture school was already approved by the state authority in the 1980s, while the proposal for the biodynamic agriculture school around the same period was rejected. A main reason for this success is that organic method was expressed as an evolving science (above all, agroecology), rather than an ideologically driven social movement.

[90] Interview with Bo Læssøe, 18 June 2007.

LØJ/ØL has exploited this scientific property of organic agriculture, which had already been explored within the small organic movement community and some academics in the agricultural schools and universities. It described, for instance, organic milk as healthier due to scientific evidence that it contains more equol, vitamin and anti-oxidant than conventional milk. The organisation further claimed that this positive effect was due to the standpoint of organic agriculture that requires "what is good for cows to eat." It was also claimed that organic milk gives better drinking water –"every time you buy one litre of organic milk, 200 litres of ground water will be saved from meeting pesticides" (Økologisk Landsforening, 2008, p.4). ØL's campaigns in the 2000s deliberately made this discursive linkage between organic agriculture and clean water, for example in "Ecology is pure piss (økologi er ren pis)."

Politicisation of nature: packages of alternativeness and integrity

The second and the third symbolic packages were both born from the wave of politicisation of ecology. The first, *ecology as alternative*, is based on the dichotomic relationship between organic and conventional agriculture. In this view, the true sense of organic agriculture must pursue a clearly distinct development from conventional agriculture. As a clear evidence of this orientation, the organisation occasionally claimed to be different from the traditional agricultural organisation. Consumer participation, together with farmers and organic enterprises, was seen as essential in this regard. LØJ emphasised its distance from the Agricultural Council, the traditional and powerful place for representing the agriculture's common interest. Joining the Council was thought to soften its critical edge, but also, considering the actual organisational strength, the mere subordination of the organic aspiration under the conventional interests. Furthermore, the advocacy of alternativeness of ecology was clearly seen in LØJ's advocacy of "100 % conversion of the national agriculture to organic" from the early 1990s.

The package of alternativeness has been shared by the diverse but overlapping types of the members. Especially in terms of the dissimilarity with the integrity package, pioneer members, left-wing political ideologists, family farmers (or supporters of the family farm as a social movement), alternative life-style activists, political consumers, etc. were characteristic. Its cognitive composition is also activated by the different devices, though the prevailing one is still identifiable. It utilises the cognitive device of empirical objectivity to promote organic agriculture as the reliable candidate of the next mainstream. This promotion utilises statistic data suggesting growth in consumer demand for organic food, scientific estimation of environmental and health benefits by organic agriculture, positive prospects of farm economy via organic conversion, etc. These "objective" drawings of positive effects of organic agriculture have been geared essentially by the sense of responsibility to protect nature/non-human and humans from the current polluting, unethical and unhealthy agricultural practices. In this way, the construction of the package of alternativeness by LØJ/ØL has rested more deeply in moral responsibility. Explicitly or implicitly stating the immorality of the dominant mode of agriculture, it displayed organic agriculture as the "right" choice for the sustainable food system, which citizens, industry and the state ought to take. At the same time, this package has also been nourished by the romanticism of unspoiled nature and non-humans by human desires for material prosperity. Such romanticism was often evoked by referring to the tradition of food culture and country life as filled with good stories and cosiness. What has been expressed here is quality of life ("the good life"), which is basically the subjective concept. In this light the cognitive device of aesthetic judgment has been employed in the package of alternativeness to some degree. However, compared to the moral and objective presentations, the embedding with such subjective value appeared to be rather minor in this organisation. After all, the connotation with preservation of nature's intrinsic value and tradition is effective when the target is consumers or citizens. As it anticipated being the next mainstream, the real target was most often policy actors and having entered the market place for policy discourse, it became necessary for the organisation to deploy inter-subjective and objective devices, such as economic viability and socio-economic benefits of organic agriculture.

In contrast, the package of integrity has stressed *collaboration* instead of fundamental transformation. As depicted above, the main objective of the organisation has from the beginning been to "advance the diffusion

of organic agricultural methods". To achieve that goal, "collaboration with domestic and foreign organisations with similar goals" was stated in the Terms of Organisation. The first collaboration with Association for Biodynamic Agriculture was underscored to be in line with the above objective. However, early on, there was basic discomfort in the biodynamic community about organic increasingly taking precedence over biodynamic, the relationship between them has generally been expressed as close partners, not as competitors. Collaboration with more conventional actors, namely the traditional agricultural organisations, businesses and the state authorities, was also presented by LØJ's leadership as necessary for creating positive synergy effects. The narrative of "organic converts" has frequently appeared. It basically claims that once a person enters the organic world, (s)he starts thinking differently. To grow organically, farmers must think about how to optimise their own natural resources by (re-)circulation and to achieve animal welfare. To be an organic consumer, one becomes more sensitive about the wholeness of food, quality, well-being of human and nature/non-humans, clean environment, and farmers' daily efforts for those. Based on this concept, diffusion of organics in the overall agricultural sector, policy, and the ordinary market was stressed as the inevitable foundation for the development of organic agriculture. The state and businesses were identified basically not as enemies, but actors whom the organic movement must unavoidably deal and establish alliances with.

All in all, the package of integrity has predominantly been loaded on pragmatism, which prioritises the objective-rational assertion of ecology over romanticising it. The cognitive device dominantly applied has been empirical objectivity, which targeted the ends rather than the means. Unlike the alternativeness package envisaging the fundamental transformation, it has been oriented towards *reformism*, not targeting replacement but improvement of the existing system.

Negotiation of packages and impact of opportunity structures

The symbolic package of agro-ecosystem has constituted the overarching foundation for LØJ/ØL. As mentioned above, it has reached this status since, firstly, it provides the scientific basis for organic agriculture that experts can also associate with. Framing of organic agriculture with the scientific principle of ecology gave legitimacy to this form of agriculture, and this legitimacy was necessary for letting policy actors and general public seriously consider its reliability in the first place. The agro-ecosystem packaging is also effective for framing organic agriculture (ecology) with "indivisibility of nature and society." In this framing, organic agriculture can present itself as a "social/societal" issue, since human health, and thus lives, are claimed to be intrinsically dependent upon the sustainability of self-sustaining nature. As such, it transcends the narrow boundary of the mere farming technique.

While the agro-ecosystem packaging by itself presents the objective, factual and politically colourless perception of organic agriculture, the other two symbolic packages, namely organic agriculture as alternative and as integral to conventional, drove the politicisation. As already obvious, these two packages draw mutually competing directions of the organic movement. Both argue the problem of conventional mode of food system, but the former accommodates the fundamentalist argumentation that requires substantial change in such system. The latter is reformist and views organic agriculture as an integral part of the conventional system. Within this vision the systemic reform is prioritised over fundamental transformation. Due to the mutual contradiction the two packages have constantly struggled in the organisation. The former has constructed the ecological path as technically and idealistically different from the conventional path and generated frames such as "100% conversion," "alternative market" praising direct sales between farmers and consumers and "quality of life." These frames were built upon the exploration of *why* the negative consequences of agriculture exist, and the major problem was found in the existing structure of agriculture that drove unsustainable and environmentally destructive practices. The latter package concentrated more on *how* the negative consequences can be reduced and the frame of "collaboration" with conventional actors made more sense in terms of its potential outcomes than the accusative/critical connotation.

These competing packages are crucial also because they have manifested the organisation's *identity* construction that organised the orientation of organisational strategies. Remarkably, these two packages have led to contradictory identity formulations. The package of alternativeness has geared the identity frames of "grassroots," "direct participation (democracy)," and "alternative/unconventional." Due to this identity, the organisation was at first built upon the decentralised structure of local groups. The organisation's emphasis on member diversity, as represented by consumer participation, also stemmed from the "alternative" identity. This organisational form mimicked the emerging trend of the "new" social movements whose organisational form itself was the expression of their ideal of direct democracy and protest against the hegemonic institutions. The identity framing within alternativeness has incorporated some degree of *anti-institutional orientation* of the organisation, in the way it did not aim to be a part of the traditional agricultural policy-making system; the rejection of membership of the Agricultural Council is clear evidence of this. The identity frames generated from the integrity package were "professional" and "representative of organic interest." Such identities drove the organisation towards the centralised structure, professionalization, as characterised in the employment of paid staff and development of expertise and political lobby. This tendency can present the *pro-institutional orientation*, as the participation in the formal policy-making chain was encouraged. These mutually contradictory orientations have targeted primarily different actors; the non-institutional orientation has concentrated on citizens who are anticipated to be the potential constituencies for the organic movement. In comparison, the pro-institutional orientation aimed at the state viewed as administrator, regulator, investor (economic source), and collaborative partner.

LØJ/ØL has framed such internal contradictions as positive and inevitable process of the movement, and *co-existence of both* was raised as the norm. Yet seeing the organisation's past development, *the relative dominance of the integrity packaging over the alternative has been quite noticeable since the mid-1990s*. To be sure, organic agriculture as alternative to the conventional agricultural development has continued to be articulated, as clearly observed in the recent efforts for own advisory service, clean water campaign, and the anti-GMO campaign. However, looking into the depth, the discursive construction of alternativeness has been transformed through competition with the package of integrity and the actual organisational change. One of the main consequences of this transformation is the *almost complete disappearance of the criticism of conventional agriculture and the grassroots envisagement* in the strategic framing of the organisation.

This development most remarkably took place as a result of the organisational growth and the widening of opportunity structures in the 1990s. During this period *the internal struggle began to emerge from the generational conflicts between the old pioneer members and the new members*. As for farmer members, the organisation just followed the trend in the organic farming community. That is to say, the overtaking of the majority by converted farmers, who, unlike the pioneer members, continued their attachment with the conventional farming community, and were driven more by the pragmatic incentives such as economic profitability and the view of organic agriculture as just another farming technique. The old and new generation divide was also seen among consumer members. In fact, a clear role of consumer members was not quite developed in LØJ, and many of the old members were directly or indirectly involved in farming in the alternative communities (communes) like Svanholm, or wives and families of organic farmers. They were active in the environment of the organic movement, but did not specifically identify as organic consumers. By contrast, the majority of the new consumer members can be categorised as "light green consumers," who typically were casually purchasing organic food but did not necessarily intend to engage in the activism, though some of them identified as active "political consumers," who advocated the role of organic consumers in political actions. The dichotomous formulation of alternativeness against conventional has lost the internal support, since, on the one hand, the current majority of farmer members did not want a hostile, conflictual relationship with the traditional farmers' community. This has resulted in the favouring of the reformist orientation, i.e. the packaging of integrity. On the other hand, LØJ, despite its assertion of consumers as core constituencies, had never succeeded in organising them as a critical actor. In the absence of a clear position, they remained mere supporters of organic agriculture without collective consumer politics of their own. As a result,

those who constituted the majority in numbers tended to passively follow the organisational direction, which was increasingly led by converted farmers. Since the late 1990s, converted farmers have assumed the post as chairperson.

More fundamentally, it has been crucial that the *reformist orientation was not logically contradictory to the organisation's foremost emphasis on organic diffusion*. As mentioned above, LØJ's leaders have from the start been pragmatist in terms of achieving this objective. LØJ had been keen to establish collaboration with conventional actors and the organic labelling system from the early phase. These attempts can imply that the integration of organics in the conventional system was already anticipated in its preliminary scope of diffusion, though in the early 1980s the major opportunity was found only outside the conventional sector. That is why, when policy, conventional farming community and businesses began to engage in the organic issue from the late 1980s, the majority of the leadership viewed it as the rising opportunity, which the organic movement should exploit. Consequently, "integration of organic agriculture in the conventional system," as consented at the Organic Food Council, was perceived and stressed as consistent with the target of the organisation, and indeed, of the organic movement.

7. Case of Japan

This chapter discusses the development of the organic agriculture movement and its surrounding contexts in Japan. The Japanese movement has envisaged a quite different orientation of anti-institutionalisation than its Danish counterpart. Substantial state support for organic agriculture was much more delayed and there has not been a significant growth in organic farms. Despite this limited development in quantitative terms, the Japanese organic movement appeared to be more substantial in qualitative terms, especially in pushing a critical discourse against the dominant tendency of neo-liberalisation.

Like the previous chapter about Denmark, this chapter depicts the development chronologically. It begins with the pre-organic movement phase, which dates back to the pre- and post-WWII period, as it directly affected the foundation of the organic movement. It then moves on to the developmental phases of the organic movement, which are divided into the organisational formation phase and three institutionalisation phases. Finally, the Japanese case is analysed in accordance with this study's framework.

Overview of the Pre-Movement Phase (1940s-early 1970s)

Early attempts and their core conceptions (1940s-mid-1950s)

Attempts at farming without using chemicals and/or other unnatural substances such as synthetic fertilizers were made already around the end of WWII, long before the establishment of JOAA in 1971. Those early attempts in the post-war period constituted a crucial foundation for the organic agriculture movement, though they remained inconspicuous without nation-wide unity. They were far from organised as a collective movement, but many remarkable ideas took shape in this early period, which have been used by organic activists up to today. Those ideas could be characterised as the claim of "indivisibility of soil and health (*shindofuji*)", and of "Japanese way of farming and food culture" which argued the modern western method is not directly applicable to the Japanese context.

The concept of the indivisibility of soil and health was also advocated by one of the organic pioneers Eva Balfour of Great Britain in the 1940s. This indicates how commonly the idea of interdependence between soil and human lives has been shared as the foundation of the organic thought across national borders. However, the idea has most frequently been claimed in Japan as traditional wisdom, and the concept and words of *shindofuji* indeed originated from the old Buddhist writings. This linkage between the conceptualisation of the human-nature relationship, spiritual-religious initiatives and tradition has been, and still is, evident in the discursive repertoires of the organic movement in Japan. [91]

Two major groups of actors in this pre-movement period fit this discursive linkage well. One is the *shokuyou* (health treatment with diet) movement, which put the above-mentioned terminology of *shindofuji* in front, and the natural food movement. The other group, the religious sect *Sekaikyuseikyou*,[92] which ramified from a

[91] My argument here is not that the linkage between tradition and spirituality, as often driven by certain religious belief, is not seen in other countries. Indeed, this is an element widely observable in organic discourses elsewhere. My intention is rather, especially in this study's comparative perspective with Denmark, to stress that this linkage is relatively resilient in the major organic discourse in Japan, while in Denmark (and other western nations in general) argumentations concerning instrumental (particularly scientific) rationality tend to be more prevalent.

[92] *Sekaikyuseikyou* is a Shinto-inspired religious sect, which was founded by Mokichi Okada (1882-1955) in 1935. Following the preachings of Okada, the sect has up to today practiced exorcism and supported art, as well as nature farming, which was strongly pursued by Okada, who was physically weak and experienced health problems around him. His first wife had many miscarriages and died in 1919, and one of his children died when he was five months old. He preached searching for alternatives to western and Chinese medical care, by focusing on a lifestyle based on humans'

Shinto-originated religion, was more organised. This religious sect started non-chemical farming and pursued health objectives based on the preachings of its guru Mokichi Okada, who was to some degree inspired by ideas from the pre-modern period, i.e., the 17th and 18th centuries. The thoughts developed during the centuries of national seclusion (*sakoku*)[93] were positively distinguished by him from the modern perception of nutrition measuring with calculable valuables. The latter was the foundation for his criticism of modern farming, while the former was his inspiration. For instance, he highlighted the work of Ekiken Kaibara in the 17th century, who promoted the function of food and eating habits in disease prevention. Eating fresh and seasonal food, self-controlling of appetite, less intake of meat, and plain seasoning were recommended. Okada was also strongly inspired by Syoueki Ando in the 18th century, who conceptualised nature as a self-sustaining system, based on his interpretation of five elements in the Chinese philosophy of ying-yang. The balance among tree, fire, soil, gold and water constituted the universe. He saw soil as the central element in maintaining the balance of the other four elements, and therefore stressed the importance of agriculture as an essential human activity. Based on this thought, he preached the appropriate agricultural practice was to follow nature's self-sustaining system (Fukuda, 2001:Sudo, 2008). Ando's conceptualisation was modified by Okada in his own religious philosophy. For Okada, the mission of human beings is to enhance the power of nature, which is generated by the three core elements, soil, fire and water. He asserted that one way to achieve this goal is to nurture the soil and purify the body by eating natural food (Okada, 1949:MOA International, 2008). Based on this doctrine, this religious sect started working on nature farming (the term employed by Okada, and thus used in the circle of *Sekaikyuseikyou*) already from 1943 (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981).

In parallel with the actors driven by the advocacy of traditional wisdom and/or religious motivations, several agronomists were focusing on the significance of soil fertility. It is important to point out that "modernisation" of agriculture in Japan towards the end of the War entailed a unique combination of knowledge from the West and traditional farming based on, for instance, mixed farming, compost and crop rotation. For those agronomists this mixture was necessary as the major technocratic attempts to import western agriculture, for instance, the British wool production method, failed miserably. Responding to such failure, agronomists and the agricultural policy community supported a restrorationist orientation that re-emphasised traditional knowledge of farming (Fukuda, 2001, p. 340-344). Leading agronomists from the late 19th century looked for ways to modify the modern western agricultural methods in the Japanese agricultural context. Among them were Masanobu Fukuoka and Toshitada Yokoi, who invented innovative farming methods by studying the experiences of successful farmers. The method of nature farming developed by Fukuoka in the late 1940s was adopted by Sekaikyuseikyou and diffused in this small religious community (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981). Yokoi, who later became the president of Tokyo University of Agriculture, contributed to JOAA's activities from the 1970s along with his works in agronomy in the established academic community.

National strategy for economic growth and environmental contradictions (mid-1950 to early 1970s)

New policy trajectory

Agricultural policy just after WWII concentrated on the radical land reform aiming to transform tenant farmers to independent farmers as well as to recover food production to the level of self-sufficiency. However, it

self-recovering ability, since he considered that (side-effects of) medicines were more likely the source of illness than the cure. For example, he told about how his tooth ache stopped after he removed the disinfected filling.

[93] Japan under Tokugawa Shogunate had officially been in national seclusion from 1633 to 1858; its borders were blocked, but trade with China and Holland continued under strict restrictions. Trade with Portugal and Spain was closed under the policy of national seclusion, but the trade continued underground with local clans, who wished to gain economic benefit.

took a significant turn during the grand alliance between liberal-conservative political forces around the mid-1950. In 1954 the Yoshida government concluded the Mutual Security Act with the US, and the Japanese government agreed to import US surplus agricultural produce and receive economic support in return. As the main food import from the US was flour, the national plan for self-sufficiency in flour was practically terminated, and the diffusion of western food culture became a policy agenda. Notable examples are the Law on Improvement of Nutrition in 1952 and the Law on School Lunch in 1954. Albeit school lunch based on western style meals such as bread and milk had already started in 1947 in big cities, these new laws strengthened the agenda of the nation-wide transformation in food habits and knowledge in nutrition. For instance, the intake of protein from meat and fat from butter were officially recommended as good nutrition by adopting dominant American dietetics (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981:Sudo, 2008). This aspect has often been perceived in the organic movement community and many others to show the typical subordination of the Japanese government to the US. An active organic activist recalled the propaganda at the time: "The Japanese lost the war to the Americans, because they did not eat bread but rice."[94]

This subordination to the US was clearly succeeded by the so-called 55 Structure, namely the long-term domination of the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter LDP) since 1955.95 And the New Long-range Economic Plan in 1957 under the newly established Ikeda Government came to life precisely because the US-Japan Security Treaty enabled a bigger budget on economic plan as a large part of the expenses for defence were covered by the US. This Economic Plan and the Agricultural Basic Law (nougyoukihonhou) established in 1961 were the milestones that set the new trajectory for agriculture. The main ambition of the Economic Plan was to double GNP during the period of 1961-1970 by increasing export, and thereby to increase employment, in particular, full employment. The Plan further emphasised correction of income differences between the agricultural sector and the industrial sector. The main solution proposed by the Plan was the modernisation of agriculture, and this was articulated explicitly in the Agricultural Basic Law. The Law envisaged resolving the lag in the agricultural sector in terms of productivity, income and living standards through rational selection of produce based on actual market needs and competitiveness against import. This market-driven strategy is firmly comprised with the proposition of international division of labour envisioned by both LDP and the growing industrial sector. Regarding the latter, the Japan Committee for Economic Development (*keizaidouyukai*), a powerful interest organisation composed of the heads of major enterprises, made an opinion on the future vision of agriculture in 1965 in the advocacy of importing agricultural produce in return for Japan's enhanced industrial export. Indeed, soon after the establishment of the Law, about 90% of agricultural produce categories were opened to import.[96] On the other hand, the Law anticipated a structural change in the agricultural sector by enlargement of farm size, re-organisation of farmland to more collective units, increase in livestock, mechanisation, rationalisation of ownership of farmland and modernisation of farm management (Furuno, 1991).

While this policy direction was highly criticised, the oppositional voices were frequently overshadowed by the constant rise in the farmers' average income throughout the 1960s. Indeed, income equality with average industrial workers was already achieved by the early 1970s, though the goal was reached with the help of side jobs rather than pure growth in the income from farming (Furuno, 1991). Meanwhile, the state, the government (LDP), and the agricultural community (agricultural cooperatives: *Noukyou*) were establishing their triangular relationship for mutual advantage (Matsumoto, 1986). The farming community would support the

[94] Interview with Katsushige Murayama, 26 October, 2007.

[95] Interview with Rei Ozaki, 24 March, 2008

[96] The Agricultural Basic Law was often called as "the agricultural version of the US-Japan Security Treaty" Nouminren (1997). Fight against US "organic" agricultural goods Noumin. Tokyo, Nouminundouzenkokurengoukai. **4:** 16-53.

LDP government, and in return the government would protect the economic sustenance of the former (see the previous section). The state's interests, such as those expressed in the Economic Plan and the Agricultural Law, would be negotiated in this relationship. Consequently, the national plan for industry-led national economic growth accommodated regular compensation for farmers in the form of the state's procurement of rice, which guaranteed to cover the production cost. For this objective, the Food Control Law (*syokuryoukanrihou*), which *de facto* controlled the production and distribution of rice, was revised to facilitate the state's support of farmers' basic income. The measure for estimating the production price was intentionally unspecified to secure turnover to farmers (Mochizuki, 1998).

The post-war agricultural policy founded upon this triangle relationship and centred on the issue of rice was apparently contradictory to the norm of capitalism, but oriented more to "agricultural welfarism" or, in Mochizuki's term, "socialism" (Mochizuki, 1998, p.106). Its nominal objective with state control and compensation in return was to "protect nation's food security and economic stability" (the Food Control Law, Article 1, 1942) and to "support the farming population to have the equally healthy and cultural life as other population" since "the mission of agriculture and those involve in agriculture continues to be of extremely importance for the construction of democratic nation" (Supplementary Provisions, Agricultural Basic Law, 1961). However, such generous and exclusive subsidisation of rice naturally led to the high concentration of agricultural production of this single crop, while market demands for other produce were largely ignored. Indeed, as the production price was not genuinely derived from production cost but more from the political interest of the agricultural triangle, the consumer price of rice was remarkably high from the 1960s onwards; the consumer rice price which was formerly almost equal to the international price, nearly doubled in the 1970s (Mochizuki, 1998, p.106). With the generous state support, rice reached the stage of over-production in 1967 onwards. The government's response was a controversial scheme for reduction of the rice acreage (hereafter gentan) started from 1970. The scheme included a ban on opening new rice fields, a ceiling on price support on rice, the mitigation in restrictions on direct selling of rise and the subsidisation in conversion from rice to other produces. However, this gentan scheme did not fundamentally change the dominance of rice production in agriculture, as farmers still profited more from rice than from other crops. The high consumer price of rice, which was artificially created by the state's involvement, received public criticism (Mochizuki, 1998).

Neglected environmental consequences

Those policy decisions are widely acknowledged to have triggered today's agri-environmental problems (Ichiraku, 1975:Furuno, 1991:Yasuda, 1994:Nakajima, 2006a). Japanese agriculture, as similar to many other places in the world, became increasingly dependent upon agricultural chemicals, synthetic fertilizers and farm machines, and underwent specialisation and mono-culturalisation under the banner of increasing productivity, rationalisation and modernisation. In this process, traditional farming practices, based on mixed farming and crop rotation, have rapidly disappeared as they were considered to be setbacks. Domestic animals, which were used not only for farm work but also for fertilisation of soil, were replaced with machines and synthetic fertilisation. As a result of the division (specialisation) between livestock production and crop production, manure was hardly brought back to farms and the traditional circulation of natural nutrition was not sustained. Although a few cases of pesticide residue on food were reported, for instance parathion in brown rice in 1957, the media coverage was limited, and the use of agricultural chemicals was not seriously questioned (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981). Even after the outbreak of Minamata Disease (mercury poisoning caused by the intake of fish from a basin contaminated by a pesticide factory), and the official announcement of organic mercury residue in rice by MAFF in the mid-1960s, neither the agricultural nor the political com-

munity admitted that pesticides were a problem, but that specific virulent substances, such as mercury, could be.[97]

As agricultural chemicals in Japanese/Chinese were described as "agricultural medicines", the perception of agricultural chemicals as a positive symbol of modern technology deeply penetrated society in the post-war period. The parliamentary resolution in 1966 did not go further than ordering more research on the effects of pesticides and the prohibition of mercury in pesticide production (Yasuda, 1994).

Missing linkage between leftist and agri-environmental issues

The anti-pollution movement, or more broadly, the environmental movement was the galvanising force for the rise of citizens' movements during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Their common ground was the criticism of polluter enterprises, the LDP government and authority, all of whom historically turned a blind eye to the polluting activities of industry. Thus the environmental movement in this early uprising phase typically took confrontational actions against those actors, as represented by prosecutions, demonstrations, and direct confrontations. For instance, during the Yokkaichi asthma conflict in 1961, around 400 local fishermen tried to clog the drainage of the polluting thermal power plant owned by one of the giant power companies (Jichisougoukenkyuucenter, 1985, p.13). As such, the early environmental movement in Japan has been most often identified as a protest movement which often involved in prosecution of prosecuted actors responsible for pollution (Hasegawa, 2003).

Although several anti-pollution movement groups/organisations made alliances with or organised directly or indirectly under the left-wing political parties and labour unions, their alliances were typically brief. Furthermore, for the interest of this study it is worth mentioning that despite the possibility of linking big pollution cases and other scandals with the issue of food production, no significant linkage was made between non-chemical agriculture and the left-wing parties, i.e. the Social Democratic Party (*shakaitou*: hereafter SDP) and the Communist Party (*kyosantou*). Since the pollution cases were ideal opportunities for the left-wing opposition to attack the LDP government, it was not a surprise that they articulated pollution as an inevitable consequence of collusion between monopoly capital and LDP. The two left-wing parties also shared criticism of the agricultural policy under the Agricultural Basic Law. Both asserted that the policy was problematic in terms of downgrading agriculture as a secondary and subordinate sector to the industrial and service sectors, and that it forced the majority of farmers to have side jobs or migrate permanently or seasonally from their hometowns. From this point of view, farmers were reduced to cheap labour in this process, and their poverty was increasing with the rise in real estate prices in rural areas and investments in farm machines and facilities, though such impoverishment was typically neglected in the policy discussion. They also commonly problematized the government's actual de-prioritisation of food self-sufficiency under the prospect of international division of labour, which resulted in the nation's import dependency and various measures for reducing the domestic agricultural production, particularly rice production (*gentan*) (Hidaka, 1972:Yamaguchi, 1977:Yukino, 1977).

Yet even with the rise of the anti-pollution movement in the late 1960s, and despite the growing awareness of food safety, the problem was not quite connected with agriculture by the government or the oppositions. Although the left-wing parties advocated that both pollution and agricultural problems were caused by the capitalist development, their primary focus was struggles in the industrial sector. And those issues naturally concentrated in big cities. This reflects that the general (and transnational) left-wing thinking back then did not consider industrialisation and modernisation a problem. On the contrary, they were often claimed to be essential for the anticipated socialist/communist development, while the real problem was found in the dominance of capitalists who control the mode of industrialisation and modernisation. As a result, the left-wing

[97] In 1963 mercury-based pesticides were used in almost 90% of the rice paddy fields. Tabeta, M. and T. Masugata (1981). The Organic Agriculture Movement in Japan. Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha.

opposition basically shared the same course as the LDP government in terms of affirming agricultural chemicals as a positive technology for increasing yield and reducing hard farm works (Une, 2006). Both the Left and the Right often perceived non-chemical agriculture as a setback and unscientific and therefore an irrational choice for agriculture, since it did not seem to contribute to either economic or structural development of the sector.

In addition, this missing linkage between the Left and agriculture can also be explained with the earlier failure of the Left to gain support in rural areas and their disconnection since the late 1940. According to Babb (2005), while the Left indeed had a good opportunity to enhance or at least sustain their foundation in rural communities, they failed to do so for several reasons. Although the socialists immediately gained nationwide support from farmers in the fight for land reform and the support surged after the war and the subsequent occupation by General Headquarters (GHQ), they did not manage to build solid ties with the farming community, farmers' unions and agricultural cooperatives (*noukyou*). A main reason could be that the socialists soon fell into internal disagreements, which led to the division into the two socialist farmers' parties in 1948: the Labour-Farmer Party (*roudounomintou*) and the Social Reform Party (*shakaikaikakutou*). This clearly undermined the public recognition of socialists as a unified force. All in all, according to Babb, the fatal lack of alliance within the left-wing community caused the decline of socialists and more profoundly of the Left in rural areas throughout the post-war reform process. Socialists and communists were competing for the same key constituencies, such as tenant farmers, workers and their unions. Partially owing to this competition, neither socialists nor communists could make concrete political party affiliations with farmers' unions and agricultural cooperatives.[98]

This fragility in the left-wing foundation in rural communities was soon exploited by the conservative-liberal opponents. The latter strategically dismantled the relationship between socialists and farmers' organisations through the new institutionally based clientele networks that were linked closely to their political intension. These networks were popular among those who benefitted from the institutional changes[99] when the non-left (the predecessors of LDP) government regained power in the 1948 election. These new supporters were central and local agricultural officials, agricultural cooperatives and the rising mass of newly independent farmers. As often told, the conservative-liberals have more successfully turned land reform and post-war restructuring of the agricultural sector to their own benefits, acting as a saviour by supporting the massive subsidies to agriculture and rural districts (Nishida, 1997). They did not play the opponent of the land reform. And by favouring selectively some actors of rural communities, such as agricultural co-operatives and former tenant farmers, they gained their support and loyalty. This group would otherwise be key constituencies for the left-wing. Ultimately, the farming communities turned conservative.

As a consequence, rural residents have been strong and valuable assets for LDP and its predecessors ever since the late 1940s. Despite the declining population, their influence continues up till today because the Japanese electoral system assigns more weight to unpopulated districts (Hirose, 1986).

Local activities for non-chemical agriculture

Attempts at non-chemical farming continued, typically via small groups' initiatives in their localities. In addition to the above-mentioned individuals and *Sekaikyuseikyou*, a Buddhist doctor Giryo Yanase, who focused on symptoms of health deterioration among farmers, established a small association of farmers and

[98] The Socialist Party did pursue affiliation with members of farmers' unions, but it was opposed by the communists who claimed that choice of party should be an individual decision (Babb, 2005, p.180).

[99] For instance, facilitation of the distribution and wholesale rice merchandising system gave more power to agricultural cooperatives, and the members of cooperatives were frequently associated with the conservative-liberal networks rather than the socialist or communist ones (Babb, 2005, p.192).

consumers for practicing non-chemical farming in 1959. In the same year he published a book about the harm of agricultural chemicals. His book inspired many, including a writer, Sawako Ariyoshi, who in the early 1970s wrote a best-selling book about the unknown consequences of agricultural chemicals. Also other publications warned against the harmful effects of agricultural chemicals on human health. Although their works did not affect the agricultural policy at the time, they contributed to strengthening the linkage between non-chemical farming and health, particularly the health of farmers themselves. It should be mentioned that the perception of farmers as victims and the linkage of this perception with the criticism of agricultural chemicals have constituted a characteristic aspect of the Japanese experience. Victimisation of farmers has generally not been so evident in the western countries, while they were, to some degree, recognised as polluters.

A more substantial foundation for the organic farming movement was formed in the latter half of the 1960s along with the nationwide awareness on pollution (*kougai*). Among the four big pollution cases filed in the 1960s (the above-mentioned Minamata Disease, another mercury poisoning in Niigata, Itai-Itai (ouch-ouch) disease in Toyoma, and Yokkaichi asthma cases), three concerned the serious health damages from heavy metal plants, which contaminated the aquatic environment and consequently food produced in the areas. Furthermore, food safety caught great public attention with the scandals reported one after another, as represented by the floating dead fish in Biwako (the biggest lake in Japan) and Ariake Bay which was contaminated by the herbicide PCP in 1961, mass intoxication caused by commercial rice oil in 1968 and the contamination of mothers' milk by BHC (organic chlorine used as agricultural chemical). Under these circumstances, various social movements, typically called "citizens' movements (*shiminundou*)" in Japanese, emerged around the issue of food, as represented by the anti-pollution movement and the consumer movement for banning food additives. The pollution and food scandals were frequently mentioned as the main reason for the first generation of organic farming activists, who emerged around the 1970s (see the latter section). Tabea and Masugata identify two basic ramifications among the farmers who self-recognised their non-chemical farming as a part of the anti-pollution movement: pursuing safe food and articulating broader criticism of pollution (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981, p.39-40)

Formation of Organic Agriculture Organisations (1970s-mid-1980s): First Phase of the Organic Agriculture Movement

Establishment of JOAA

As mentioned above, non-chemical agriculture was still a minor phenomenon occurring in limited localities, and its practices largely depended on individual leaders and their followers before the 1970s. Nature farming by *sekaikyuseikyo* was one of the few organised actions that existed already in that period, though this religious sect had experienced continuous splits after the death of the charismatic founder Mokichi Okada in 1955. Since then nature farming has been modified into different methods by separate and competing groups of the sect. Despite this internal fragmentation, the sect has nonetheless constituted an important part of the organic movement particularly in terms of the development and diffusion of farming techniques of this kind. Furthermore, the sect has been one of the few, if not the only, collective agencies in the alternative agriculture community with affiliations with LDP. (Much later, it began to affiliate also with the Democratic Party of Japan (hereafter DPJ: *minsyutou*) which has been the real opposition for LDP. This aspect will be deployed later).

It is generally acknowledged that the actual development of non-chemical agriculture towards a common social movement started with the creation of the Japan Organic Agriculture Association (*nihonyuuki-nougyougakkai*; hereafter JOAA)[100] in 1971 (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981:Suzuki, 1995). The term *Yuuki*,[101]

[100] Initially, "Japan" was not part of the name. It was added in 1976 when the organisation found it necessary to collaborate with international actors. Already then, JOAA interacted with organic farming organisations abroad such as the

which is equivalent to organic in the Japanese context, was chosen by the leading founder of JOAA, Teruo Ichiraku, at the establishment of this organisation. Although the term was not diffused in the general public for a while, it soon came to represent the general attempt at alternative agriculture, which used to have other names and was practiced without a common foundation. Furthermore, JOAA's activities, such as monthly publication, seminars, general assemblies and occasional petitions were generally acknowledged as the common foundation of the organic agriculture movement (*yuukinougyouundou*). The reason was that, simply, It had been the only existing, nation-wide and not religiously-oriented forum for this movement until the late 1990s. Considering this general acknowledgement, it is safe to say that JOAA constituted the central and leading part of the movement's foundation.

Preliminary structure of JOAA

The formation of JOAA cannot be told without the role of Teruo Ichiraku, who served as secretary of the organisation until he passed away in 1995. At the time of his commitment with JOAA, he was director of the privately funded research institute for co-operative studies[102] after his retirement as the top executive of *Nourinchukin* bank (the arm of the agricultural co-operative). His distinct personality as a strong leader is quite evident. He was called "Emperor Ichiraku" (Wakatsuki, 1994:Kubota, 2005) and his influence went over agricultural bureaucrats, politicians, academics and naturally his backyard, agricultural co-operatives. One member recalled the time Ichiraku and he unexpectedly came to visit a local agricultural co-operative.

> When we were about to reach the building by cab, I could see several lines of employees standing and waiting for our arrival in the rain! Those employees courteously bowed and welcomed us. I, a farmer, have never been welcomed by any agricultural co-operative in that way! And that was the first and the last time experience for me (Anonymous, 26 October, 2006).

According to a leading member of JOAA, Ichiraku's passion for organic farming seriously began when he heard about the residue of pesticide in mother's milk in 1970.[103] It was reported that the residue had almost reached the tolerable level for babies. Already in December 1970, Ichiraku issued a special edition of the monthly publication of his research institute concerning the effects of agricultural chemicals. The publication included articles and reports from several pioneers for alternative farming, among them Masanobu Fukuoka and Giryo Yanase, as well as from other specialists and agronomists researching this problem (Kubota, 2005). In May 1971 he organised a seminar on Agriculture and Medicine, wherein 17 people participated. The seminar approved the establishment of an organisation for the purpose of "building farming methods that can produce healthy and tasteful food without inducing environmental pollution and destruction and cultivate and

---

Rodale Institute of the US and the International Federation for Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) established in 1972.

[101] It is sometimes written as *yuki*, depending on how Japanese pronunciation is romanised. There are several stories about how Ichiraku chose this word, but one of them is that he picked up the word from Chinese poetry "*tenchiyuuki"* about a system in the universe. The other, which was recalled by Yasuda (1986), is that Ichiraku was inspired by the work of A.G. Howard for "organic gardening and farming" and thought the word "organic" could punctuate conventional farming as "inorganic" and thus undesired.

[102] Co-operative Research Institute was built in 1952 and the headquarters is in Tokyo. It is a legally incorporated foundation for research in co-operatives in Japan and abroad, management of a research archive, facilitation of seminars, publication of, among other things, its own research journal. Membership is open to co-operatives, groups related to a co-operative, researchers and other individuals. Homepage of the Co-operative Research Institute, http://www.kyodo.or.jp [Checked 13.02.2007].

[103] Interview with Sigeru Yasuda (8 November 2006). Yasuda devoted himself to the organic movement through his career as a young researcher and later professor at Kobe University. He was an active member of JOAA from the 1970s and leader of Hyogo Organic Agriculture Association, which he established with inspiration from JOAA.

endure fertility". After two additional seminars, JOAA was founded in October 1971 in Tokyo, with 27 attendants for its first assembly (JOAA, 1972a).

The founding phase of JOAA was clearly elite-driven, and some described the organisation as a "salon for academics" (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981, p.26). As seen in the box below, those who held the first 18 directorial positions were retired executives of national agricultural agencies, incumbent executives of agencies in agricultural and consumer co-operatives, professors in agronomics at national and private universities and doctors. This overrepresentation of elites apparently owed much to Ichiraku, who had the influence to gather people with relevance. Among those who occupied JOAA's secretary positions were pioneer figures in the alternative farming field. For instance, Toshitada Yokoi, professor at Tokyo University of Agriculture, served as the first research manager for the department of soil and plant nutrition at MAFF in post-war Japan and advocated the importance of compost. Yukio Tsuyuki was a former director for the agricultural advisory service in Shizuoka Prefecture, but resigned due to his disappointment with industrial farming and became engaged in pilgrimage for nature farming under *Sekaikyuseikyo* from the mid-1930s. Although his engagement in the sect ended in 1943 with the dissolution of the pilgrimage task force, he pursued to instruct a group of farmers in Miyoshi Village in Chiba Prefecture (a neighbour prefecture of Tokyo), whose consumer counterpart later became one of the most active groups of JOAA. In addition, Shunichi Wakatsuki, who was a doctor, worked on medical care in rural communities, and his hospital in Nagano Prefecture was known for its principles and practices, which prioritized the needs of the locality, for example farmers. One of his symbolic acts was the health check for residents of Yachiho Village in 1959, which led the Prefecture and companies to implement free health check for residents and employees. The hospital practices were introduced in a documentary on one of the major nation-wide TV channels.

Jin Adachi	Director of the Department for Agronomics, Tamagawa University
Teruo Ichiraku**	Chief Director of Japan Institute for Cooperative Research. Former executive director of the Nourinchukin Bank (Agriculture and Forestry Bank)
Kinichi Katsube**	Director of Japanese Consumers Co-operatives Union (JCCU)
Syouichi Kawachi	Doctor
Syou Sakamoto**	Manager of the Department of Culture, Rural Culture Association (Noubunkyo)
Tomonosuke Shiomi*	Director of the Agricultural Workers' Pension Fund. Former subordinate office for MAFF
Ichiji Shimoyama	Vice president of National Mutual Aid Association of Agricultural co-operatives
Yuko Tsuyuki	Former director of Numazu Agricultural Advisory Service
Yoshito Hamada***	Vice chief of Nada-Kobe Co-op
Tatsuya Hishinuma	Professor, Tokyo University of Education
Masaji Fukaya	Professor, Tokyo University of Education
Masaharu Matsumura**	Director of Central Union of Agricultural co-operatives (Zenchu)
Tatsumi Mayama	Counsellor for National Association of Agricultural co-operatives for Health and Welfare

Akira Miyawaki	Associate professor, Yokohama University
Giryo Yanase	Doctor
Syouzou Yamamo-to***	Executive director of the Norinchukin Bank
Toshitada Yokoi	Professor, Tokyo University of Agriculture
Toshikazu Wakatsuki	Director of Saku Hospital, President of Japanese Association of Rural Medicine
	* Representative director ** Permanent director
	*** Audit director

Box 1: Founding leaders of JOAA

Owing much to the people in the prestigious positions, JOAA could automatically enter certain networks with executives of agricultural co-operatives, bureaucrats, academics and politicians, despite the lack of attention to organic agriculture in either agricultural and the political community at the time. In particular, Ichiraku actively used his personal networks with bureaucrats, certain politicians particularly of LDP and the Social Democratic Party, agricultural organisations etc. to let them participate in JOAA's activities, though, crucially, as individuals rather than as delegates of their agencies (JOAA, 1983). His role in the economic subsistence of JOAA was also significant. The organisation had an office in central Tokyo, since Ichiraku had offered a room at his research institute with at an affordable rent until JOAA finally got its own office in 1984. Besides, the largest share of the organisation's economic asset was donations from established agricultural associations, to which the core founding members belonged. *Nourinchukin* Bank, Central Union of Agricultural co-operatives (*zenchu*), National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations (*zennou*) and Rural Culture Association (*noubunkyo*) together donated around four million JPY (11,400 US$ at the 1971 rate. http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca, though 51,900 US$ with the rate of 17.10.2011. http://www.valutakurser.dk/) to establish JOAA (JOAA, 1986, p.11). It must be noted that the money remained untouched until recently because it was thought to be better to save it for when it is truly needed. Likewise, a large part of the JOAA's budget has come from the special membership fee for affiliated organisations, which the above-mentioned agricultural associations paid for.[104]

Soon, the organisation experienced a rapid growth, and consumers (in reality, overrepresented by housewives) and farmers began to outnumber the elites. In 1973, two years after the establishment, the membership grew remarkably from 470 to 1415. In 1975 it organised the first annual convention and the 4th general assembly in Gojo City, Nara Prefecture, and approximately 200 members joined the two-day events. This growth went together with emerging initiatives between consumers and farmers for organic agriculture in their localities. Some leaders of local consumer/farmers groups were inspired by JOAA and established organic agriculture organisations in their localities. These took place for instance in Takahata Town in Yamagata Prefecture in 1972, Hyogo Prefecture in 1973, Kumamoto Prefecture in 1975 and later Nagano Prefecture in 1981. They have participated in JOAA as one of the most active members until today. Whereas the idea of creating a centralised structure of the local organic agriculture organisations under JOAA was dis-

[104] "Affiliated organisations" in JOAA refers to collective actors like co-operatives, public associations and other non-profit-making organisations. The membership fee for those organisations has been set as "any amount over 10,000JPY" until recently, while that for individuals it started from JPY 1500 in 1971 and rose to JPY 6,000 for ordinary members and JPY 10,000 for administrative members with voting rights at the general assembly in 2008. The details are not disclosed, but several interviewees said that the affiliated organisations have traditionally paid much more than the obligatory amount.

cussed in the early days[105], it has not been taken up as the real agenda. Thus the Tokyo-based JOAA and other local member organisations have maintained horizontal relations.

Constructing basic conceptions of organic agriculture

Get the true agriculture back

Looking at JOAA's documents in those early days, we can observe a clear line of argumentation asserting that farmers ought to lead the organic agriculture movement. In *The Prospectus of JOAA* written at its establishment in 1971, farmers were expected to take the central role:

> ...There are certain difficulties for farmers to convert from conventional agriculture. In this respect it is needless to say that such mission can hardly be achieved without understanding of consumers. While the consumption of processed food is increasing as a result of the current rapid change in diet, general consumers were not sufficiently enlightened in terms of their knowledge and ability for maintaining the relationship between food and health as well as for selecting proper food. Therefore we anticipate consumers, through their self-awareness, to improve their attitude towards healthy diet. For this objective, it is utmost necessary that farmers, who produce food, awaken consumers for such aspect, along with their effort for improving own agricultural method.
>
> If farmers themselves work for what agriculture truly ought to be by being awakened for the sense of responsibility to improve the citizens' diet and to protect and recover the environment, agriculture can express its significance beyond economics not only towards farmers but also towards other general public. There can one discover a blight future with hope and prospect, which could not be found by the eyes of economic rationalism (JOAA, 1971).

Here, farmers were explicitly portrayed as the main actors who were expected to "improve own agricultural method" as well as to "awaken consumers". Furthermore, in the Prospectus and elsewhere JOAA depicted farmers also as victims of "modernisation" with nation-wide transformation of agriculture via machines, industrial facilities/devices, chemicals and mono-cultural cropping.[106] Farmers were recognised as victims, since the modernisation process made them suffer not only physically (e.g. due to pesticides poisoning) but also psychologically due to the loss of value in agriculture as "livelihood (*nariwai*)" and "the profession to create life". Consumers were also depicted as victims, since the same process was hindering their well-being by undermining food safety and correct knowledge about "good diet", which is in the general narrative of JOAA based on traditional Japanese eating habits. This view overall stressed agriculture as a special profession, which brings joy in nourishing lives and thus is fundamentally different from industrial labour. The argumentation typically led to the claim of "the authentic agriculture back" (Ichiraku, 1989 (1975)-a, p.6). The organic movement was, particularly in the founding phase, seen as a farmers' movement for the reform of agriculture, and agriculture was assigned a much bigger mission than mere production of food. As stated in the Prospectus:

> Essentially, agriculture must consider the aspects beyond economy. Furthermore the point of human health and survival of the people must be prioritised over economy (JOAA, 1971).

This line of describing the fundamental mission of agriculture to go beyond economic profitability and facilitate the necessary condition for the "survival of the people" occupied ecologism across the world at the time (*Limits to Growth* by Club of Rome was issued in 1972, one year after JOAA's establishment). Yet more

[105] Information got from Noboru Honjoh, 2 December 2006.

[106] This definition of modernisation was proposed by Sasaki (1988, p.5) in his writing about the development of organic agriculture. I introduce his definition, which was referred to as the "four modernisations", here, since it characterises JOAA's and Ichiraku's claim on modernisation.

directly, the basic ideational foundation of JOAA for the most part reflected the personal preference of Ichiraku, who strongly favoured co-operative-based agricultural reform. He was also deeply inspired by E.F. Schumacher, e.g. his book *Small is Beautiful*, saying the book describes "exactly what I think" (Ichiraku, 1989 (1980), p.22). Initially, Ichiraku envisioned the organic movement as a "cognitive revolution" of farmers, whom he criticised as constantly passive and submissive to the modernisation projects from above, towards autonomous and self-conscious individuals. His argumentation was similar to Schumacher's in claiming that such a revolution requires replacing economic/monetary value with value of "hand-made," which values safety higher than convenience and avoidance of loss (steady economy) than profit-making. Along this line, he stressed that desired agricultural reform requires qualitative thinking, not quantitative thinking. Envisaging this qualitative challenge, he called for "retrieving farmers' autonomy from industry" and "retrieving agriculture for farmers by farmers" through "eliminating industrial products from rural communities and bringing farmers back in." In this view, organic agriculture is an ideal way to accommodate such development, as it was thought to be essentially comprised with the value of hand-made; it is labour-intensive but not cost-intensive and based on farmers' autonomous knowledge about the natural environment, rather than on industrial machines and products such as agricultural chemicals (Ichiraku, 1989 (1975)-b). This value was found also in his ideal of co-operatives, whose mission is to achieve the common well-being of the members, as opposed to ordinary firms which inevitably pursue profit. He wanted the organic movement to go hand in hand with the co-operative movement (Ichiraku, 1989 (1975)-b, p.16).

Focusing on this claim for cognitive revolution, it is remarkable that his precise target was farmers, rather than the state actors, politicians and businesses. He strongly criticised the post-war policies that seriously undermined agriculture for the sake of high economic growth by industry. And he explicitly criticised how that political trend had transformed society to prioritise economic gain. However, he found that farmers themselves were to be blamed as they did not recognise the nature of modernisation, and thus, did not confront the trend (Ichiraku, 1989 (1975)-a, p.3-4). His solutions rested clearly outside institutional politics, but, most broadly, within conceptual change of people, most urgently farmers, towards non-economic values.

Non-profit, non-political, and non-confrontational

The major activities of JOAA, such as the monthly publication of the magazine *Soil and Health* (*Food and Health* until 1977), meetings of the directors, and monthly seminars had been put on track in the first couple of years. As the organic movement was based on non-profit making, members' and others' contribution to the organisational tasks should be pro bono and its publications did not allow any advertisement and business-oriented activity. In addition, it was clearly stated in the Terms of Organisation that "unless the purpose and method of the action is agreed by all members, the organisation will not participate in any kind of political and religious activities or citizens' movements" (Amano and Ichiraku, 1989 (1986), p.54-55). These organisational terms were not meant to reject participation by left-wing sympathisers or believers of certain religions. Indeed, many members were affiliated with political organisations (left or otherwise) and some active members were even candidates for local elections. For instance, Setsuko Shirone, who has frequently served as a board member, ran for the local election for the Socialist Party, and she said there were many supporters of the Communist Party in her local consumer group.[107] Furthermore, Aoki et al. (1991) reported that several leaders of the organic farmers' groups in Takahata Town, one of the most well-known practices of the organic agriculture movement, openly declared themselves "progressive" as they had a background in the agricultural co-operative with Socialist Party linkage (p.46). On the other hand, the believers of *Sekaikyuseikyou* and other religions (particularly Buddhists) had constituted a crucial part of the JOAA's technical aspects, as they had advanced knowledge and experience in non-chemical agriculture methods particularly before the subject became interesting to the established research institutions. The organisation maintained collaborative and non-hostile relations with the individuals of *Sekaikyuseikyou*, different Buddhist

[107] Interview with Setsuko Shirone on 24 October, 2006.

groups, some anti-pollution groups, LDP, SDP, MAFF, agricultural organisations, etc. Nonetheless, it is characteristic that these relations were built and sustained without official affiliation or engagement in a clear common objective. This resulted in a loose organisational structure, which was most often based on individual networks of the engaged members. A core member described this organisational style quite negatively as "easy come, easy go."[108]

Yet crucially, JOAA's seeming openness has been arbitrary; the organisation tended to allow a certain political spectrum, namely between left-centre-right, but was more selective concerning the far-left wing with its apparent anti-government and -capitalist stance. Whereas it interacted openly with the politicians of LDP and SDP, interaction with the Communist Party has been almost absent. Nor has it interacted with labour unions and the like. All in all, although the organisation explicitly criticised the conventional agricultural system and thus the post-war/present order that foremost prioritises economy, it most often avoided confrontation with authorities and businesses. Furthermore the organisation has covertly distinguished itself from the left-wing/progressive politics and ideologies since its founding phase. For instance, JOAA's monthly magazine printed a speech by the famous writer Sawako Ariyoshi, who was an active member of the organisation, at the annual convention in 1975:

> My profession is to write novels, and I am an unmistakably conservative writer. Thus I have never been invited to the circles for the left-wing intellectuals, and never been called as progressive. Since I am so a straightforwardly conservative writer that the media makes a big deal out of me resigning once in a while from the Writers' Club…
>
> While I think ideological principles are troublesome, and I do not anticipate with any particular one, what I really go against is imaginary socialism. I dislike utopian socialism, it is messy hotchpotch in description and inconsistent in talk. Thus I take it as a principle as a writer to avoid dealing with it (Ariyoshi, 1975, p.27).

Besides, more explicit connections between oppositional politics and organic agriculture took place outside JOAA. An example is the organic growers' group in Sanrizuka led by several young anti-governmental activists who came to the place in the midst of the struggle against the construction of Narita International Airport. Yet their initial intention with organic agriculture was to reduce the farming cost rather than environmental protection or health considerations, and thus differed from the general aspiration of the organic movement (for more details, seeFukuda, 2001).

Role of consumers

As consumers began to constitute the majority in the organisation – they were already as twice many as farmers in 1979 (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981, p.27-28) – the farmer-centred vision of JOAA was quickly overtaken by the prospect of close collaboration between farmers and consumers. Consumers' participation in the organic agriculture movement first boomed around the mid-1970s, when Japan faced a series of incidents like two oil shocks, the so-called "Pollution Parliament" in 1970 and following lawsuit victories of the four big pollutions' victims. Another event that triggered the boom was the novel by Sawako Ariyoshi, *Multiple Pollution* in 1974. Like Rachel Carlson's *Silent Spring*[109], Ariyoshi's novel had an immense impact on the general public, especially organic activists (JOAA 1975 March No.32, pp.31-32). Similar to Carlson's case in the US, this novel first appeared in a major daily newspaper, *Asahishinbun*, as a serial story, and millions of people became aware of the effect of pesticides tormenting farmers' health and evidence of chemical

[108] Interview with Shigeru Yasuda, 8 November 2006.

[109] *Silent Spring* did not catch much public attention for a long time in Japan, even though its Japanese translation was already released in 1964. It was not until 1970s along with the rise of the anti-pollution movement and the release of Ariyoshi's novel that *Silent Spring* began to be well-known among the Japanese (Chikuchi in Tabeta et. al, 1984, p.24).

residue in food. As the title implies, the novel highlighted scientifically unknown consequences caused by contact with more than two chemical substances, such as DDT and PCB. The fact that Ariyoshi was a famous writer and member of one of the most prestigious writers' clubs only added to the novel's impact.

Furthermore, as mentioned briefly above, the term "consumers" frequently refers to housewives in Japan, and this has precisely been the case for the organic movement. According to a survey in 1974, 70% of the respondents answered that they wanted to buy organic produce; and housewives 90% gave that answer (Arai, 1979). In the late 1960s, along with the rising consumer interests, housewives in Tokyo and other big cities began to organise small local groups for collective purchase directly from farmers (Tabeta and Masugata, 1981:Yasuda, 1986:Aoki, Taniguchi et al., 1991:Hatano, 1998). These housewives were worried about agricultural chemicals, but found out that there was no chemical-free food available in the ordinary market (except a few small health-food shops). Despite the increase in consumer needs, the supermarket chains and consumer cooperatives did not want to sell non-chemical produce, as non-chemical farms were generally thought as inconsistent in supply. At the same time, businesses normally considered non-chemical produce too costly and poor in appearance to be sold in the ordinary market. The general market actors' indifference remained unchanged until the 1980s, when they first began to realise the market potential of non-chemical produce.

Motivated housewives visited farmers and persuaded them to cultivate as close to non-chemical as possible. These arrangements were often established as co-partnerships between consumers and farmers, and the consumer members guaranteed the purchase of the farm produce they ordered. JOAA (and not least Ichiraku) considered the emerging practice of co-partnership ideal, and from the late 1970s it has been the primary action for the organic movement by this organisation.

Principles of Teikei Co-partnership

The practice of co-partnership was gradually formulated by the name *teikei* (meaning co-partnership in Japanese), and the *Ten Principles for Teikei* were agreed at the 7th general assembly in 1978. In general JOAA was against making principles, rules and standards for organic agriculture, since organic agriculture was understood as an open process and basically impossible to define into one method. Hence, the *Ten Principles for Teikei* were the closest to a guideline for this organisation until it was finally deemed necessary to establish own organic standards in the mid-1990s.

Basically, *teikei* refers to mutual agreements on planning and pricing. The practice was to give stable and reasonable income to farmers via the consumers' assurance of purchasing *all* produce cultivated in the yard. In detail, *teikei* included direct delivery of farm produce to a station where consumer members picked up their goods. In this way, the price deviation in the normal food system was circumvented. *The Ten Principles of Teikei*, as seen in the box below, overall called for the creation of a family-like relationship between farmers and consumers, and exchange of money was perceived as "rewarding," as opposed to trading. This concept further encouraged regular support of farm works by consumers (*ennou*) (JOAA, 1979). This aspiration for collaboration between consumers and farmers for farm planning, farmworks, distribution, and even in their lives as friends or families has constituted a core feature of the Japanese organic movement. Overall, JOAA intended with *teikei* to de-couple agriculture from the dominant logic of economics, i.e. "competition" and "profit-making" (Ichiraku, 1989 (1982):1989 (1984), p.45) .

TEN PRINCIPLES OF TEIKEI[110]

1. **Principle of mutual assistance**. The essence of this partnership lies, not in trading itself, but in the friendly relationship between people. Therefore, both producers and consumers should help each other on the basis of mutual understanding: This relation should be established through the reflection of past experiences.
2. **Principle of intended production**. Producers should, through consultation with consumers, intend to produce the maximum amount and maximum variety of produce within the capacity of the farms.
3. **Principle of accepting the produce**. Consumers should accept all the produce that has been grown according to previous consultation between both groups, and their diet should depend as much as possible on this produce.
4. **Principle of mutual concession in the price decision**. In deciding the price of the produce, producers should take full account of savings in labor and cost, due to grading and packaging processes being curtailed, as well as of all their produce being accepted; and consumers should take into full account the benefit of getting fresh, safe, and tasty foods.
5. **Principle of deepening friendly relationships**. The continuous development of this partnership requires the deepening of friendly relationships between producers and consumers. This will be achieved only through maximizing contact between the partners.
6. **Principle of self-distribution**. On this principle, the transportation of produce should be carried out by either the producer's or consumer's groups, up to the latter's depots, without dependence on professional transporters.
7. **Principle of democratic management**. Both groups should avoid over-reliance upon limited number of leaders in their activities, and try to practice democratic management with responsibility shared by all. The particular conditions of the members' families should be taken into consideration on the principle of mutual assistance.
8. **Principle of learning among each group**. Both groups of producers and consumers should attach much importance to studying among themselves, and should try to keep their activities from ending only in the distribution of safe foods.
9. **Principle of maintaining the appropriate group scale**. The full practice of the matters written in the above articles will be difficult if the membership or the territory of these groups becomes too large. That is the reason why both of them should be kept to an appropriate size. The development of this movement in terms of membership should be promoted through increasing the number of groups and the collaboration among them.
10. **Principle of steady development**. In most cases, neither producers nor consumers will be able to enjoy such good conditions as mentioned above from the very beginning. Therefore, it is necessary for both of them to choose promising partners, even if their present situation is unsatisfactory, and to go ahead with the effort to advance in mutual cooperation.

To avoid misunderstandings, it should be remarked that similar attempts as *teikei* have been observed elsewhere in the world. Yet, the Japanese experience was rather special in terms of its strong reciprocal relationship being set at the core of the nationwide movement and continuing until today (though it may no longer be as strict as it used to be). In *teikei*, consumers give up a great deal of convenience of shopping in an ordinary market. Produce from the contract farmers follow the natural seasons, depend on the farm conditions, and are unwashed. Consumers are expected to perceive food as "a material to think" (Shirone, 2003), and adjust their eating habits to what is naturally available. These practices, though there were some differences in how

[110] http://www.csa-netwerk.be/lees-meer-over-csa/teikei-10-principles [Last checked 9 April 2014]

strictly the principles of *teikei* were implemented, have spread over the country, and some *teikei* groups had more than 1000 consumer members at their peak (Hatano, 1998).

Furthermore, whereas direct purchase from producers often by home-delivery (*sanchichokusou*) was already widely organised by agricultural/consumer co-operatives, JOAA stressed that *teikei* should go beyond the existing direct purchase. According to JOAA, conventional direct purchase was still driven by the desire to maximise the economic profit by cutting the margin for middlemen and lacked the crucial aspect of establishing "face-to-face relationships" between farmers and consumers. This face-to-face relationship has been a significant part of *teikei* in terms of building trust and near-family feelings on both sides. As commonly told by consumer members, this relationship reaches the point of "looking at the vegetable and seeing the farmer's face."

Criticism of organic agriculture in the agricultural community

General criticism

While the establishment of JOAA reflected the growing interest in alternative forms of agriculture, the stakeholders in the agricultural community mostly ignored the interest and often criticised organic agriculture. The criticism of organic agriculture can be summarised as follows: 1) Since organic agriculture is a more labour-intensive form of farming than conventional agriculture. It forces farmers to work harder, it is irrational and inhumane and driven merely by restorationism; 2) Pesticides and chemical fertilizers are the product of scientific progress. To reject them is irrational; 3) Organic agriculture causes reduction in yields and that goes against the objective of food security in the nation and the world; 4) Organic agriculture is undemocratic, since it is driven by the desire of the rich for good food quality and safety (Yasuda, 1975, p.27-29); and 5) As organic produce does not fulfil the general standards of the distribution system in terms of size, appearance, stable yields etc., its quality is inferior to the conventional produce in the market (Suzuki, 1995, p.76).

The points concerning "restorationism", "unscientific", damaging "food self-sufficiency", "undemocratic" and "bad quality" can be observed internationally and are not particular to Japan. Yet these criticisms reflect how the agri-food sector has been organised in this country in the post-war period as stated in the previous section. Under the state prioritisation of industrial development, agriculture was reduced to a subsidiary sector. The reduction came about as farmers gained surplus time by applying agricultural chemicals and mechanisation and thus began to work in the industrial sector. Their participation in industry was precisely how the LDP's promise of doubling the farmers' income was realised. This "development" was closely connected to the interest of agricultural co-operatives, too. The use of chemicals and machineries, as encouraged by the agricultural policy, was strongly supported by agricultural co-operatives, as they *de facto* monopolised trade with these goods. Farmers did not go to dealers to purchase tractor and pesticides, but bought them through agricultural co-operatives. Under these circumstances, the authority and agricultural co-operatives not only refrained from changing their routines, but often attacked organic agriculture as a direct threat to their businesses. The department responsible for the issue of pesticide and fertilizer in the National Federation of Agricultural Co-operative Associations (*zennou*) at the time accused researchers on organic agriculture of destroying agricultural co-operatives (Suzuki, 1995, p.77).

However, while the agricultural community and authority intended to maintain the *status quo*, a slight change was made to the pesticides policy in the early 1970s, due to a series of food scandals and an increase in scientific documentation of pesticides poisoning especially among farmers and residents in farming areas. Concerning the latter, inquiries from three regions in 1971 and 1972 reported that 27-50% of the respondents had chronic or acute pesticide poisoning. Furthermore, despite acknowledging the lack of extensive research, some experts openly warned that chronic pesticide poisoning could cause different health problems such as growth inhibition, deformation, reproductive abnormalities, chromosomal abnormalities, carcinogenicity,

abnormalities in organs, dermatitis, allergy, neuropathy, failure or activation of enzyme activities, etc. (Yasuda, 1986). MAFF banned some pesticides with acute poisoning effects in 1967 and the use of organic mercurial pesticides and some chlorine insecticide such as DDT and BHC in paddy fields in 1969. In 1972, the pesticides law was revised under the agenda of "safe usage of pesticides". The revised law stated that products must pass the test for health and environmental effects, and prohibited several widely diffused products such as DDT, BHC, parathion and mercurial pesticides. The law effectively eliminated the chemicals which were proven to be most hazardous. However, it has also been discussed that this legislative change has not been so effective in terms of reducing pesticide use, as the strong pesticides were merely replaced by the more frequent application of milder pesticides (Yasuda, 1986). Consequently, pesticide usage in Japan remained remarkably higher than in other developed countries. According to a study, per ha use of pesticides (active ingredients) in Japan in 1972 was 10790g, compared to only 198g in Oceania, 1870g in Europe, and 1490g in the USA (JOAA, 1972b, p.31-32).

1st Phase of Institutionalisation: Official Acknowledgement of Organic Agriculture (the late 1980s)

Beginning of institutionalisation

Correlation between official support and international pressure

In the latter half of the 1980s organic farming was gradually taken up in the formal policy field. To begin with, MAFF launched a research project on "eco-system agriculture" in 1986, and in 1987 a brief introduction of *teikei* co-partnership in the Chiba Prefecture appeared in the white paper of agriculture as the first appearance of organic agriculture in an official document (Kubota, 1993). In February of the same year, 15 LDP Members of Congress (MCs), with Ichiro Nakanishi, who was also a member of JOAA, as initiator, announced the establishment of a federation of MCs for organic agriculture. At its launch in April, the federation consisted of 79 LDP MCs, and the secretaries of JOAA were invited to the opening ceremony. The following year, SDP also built its own association for organic agriculture. In November 1988, the National Federation of Agricultural Co-operative Associations held its first national assembly for organic agriculture.

Following these events, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Moriyoshi Sato (LDP at the time) officially recognised organic agriculture as a policy agenda, at the Diet in 1988 (Suzuki, 1992). A white paper from 1988 touched upon organic agriculture over two pages. In May 1989 the Taskforce for Organic Agriculture was finally established in MAFF. In February 1987 the Eco-system Council, consisting of food distributors and academics, was established under MAFF for the purpose of consulting the establishment of national organic standards. This initiative was largely taken with the objective of consumer protection as self-claimed organic produce had exploded in the market especially after the Chernobyl incident in 1986. By the late 1980s, 20%-40% of agricultural produce were estimated to be sold as organic produce at the Tokyo Central Wholesale Market, though most often without any credibility to claim so (Taniguchi, 1988). Similarly, the Japan Fair Trade Commission warned the national association for department stores and four related agencies about false descriptions as non-pesticides and organic.

As Nakanishi stated in the prospectus of the Federation, the direct incentive for organic agriculture by the formal institutions and actors was given by the outside influence. Agricultural policy reforms in the US and the EC showed a tendency of a more environmentally conscious direction, e.g. the US *Low Input Sustainable Agriculture* (LISA) programme in the early 1980s and the publication of *Green Paper on New Common Agricultural Policy* by the EC Commission in 1986 (JOAA, 1987).

Even more substantial was the increasing international pressure (*gaiatsu*) for trade liberalisation of agricultural produce with the opening of the GATT's Uruguay Round in 1986. Although the trade liberalisation of agricultural produce for sustaining the export of industrial products such as cars and metals was seen as a

realistic option by non-agrarian LDP politicians and the financial circles, the traditional triangle between agrarian LDP politicians, agricultural co-operatives and MAFF was clearly against changing *status quo* of the protected domestic agricultural system (Sheingate, 2001). Some members of the triangle, such as a typical agrarian politician Nakanishi, became aware of organic agriculture as a potential means for maintaining the protectionist measures. Nakanishi's *Declaration for Environmentally Conscious Agriculture* clearly denoted this intention: Here, organic agriculture was claimed in association with the basic "responsibility of the sovereign states for protecting the eco-system and lives of own people." To fulfil this responsibility, "export prohibition and import restriction for food" was necessary (JOAA, 1989b). Eventually, the trade liberalists of LDP could not do as they wanted, particularly after the historical loss in the House of Councillors' election in 1989. The electoral losses clearly stemmed from the protest voting of the agricultural community, which organised collectively several regional agricultural co-operatives to show their opposition to the beef and citrus agreement (opening of the national market for these produces) in 1988. The party lost almost all seats in some rural districts, and several of those who lost were big-shot agrarian members. Having recognised its ongoing dependency on agrarian votes, LDP had to revise its plan for trade liberalisation significantly. Toward the next election for the House of Representatives, it launched the reversing slogan: "Not a grain of foreign rice into Japan" (Association for Journalists in Agricultural Politics, 1990:Sheingate, 2001).

Strategies of the JOAA

Opposition to institutionalisation

While organic agriculture started being taken up in the formal policy field, the role of JOAA, as the oldest and the only functional nationwide organic agriculture organisation, to coordinate opinions for the organic agriculture community and correspond with formal actors has increased significantly. In general JOAA was critical of introducing organic agriculture into policy. The organisation criticised MAFF, as it articulated organic agriculture as a means to produce "value-added product" and to pursue "effective use of agricultural chemicals" in its official document establishing the task force. JOAA submit an official statement to MAFF requesting cancellation of the task force in 1988 (Amano, 1988:JOAA, 1989a). Approximately six months after the establishment of the Eco-system Council, JOAA made a statement expressing its disagreement with the establishment of official organic standards. It claimed that the standards made under the influence of business actors – the Council was composed of distributors and academics but no one from the organic agriculture community – would compromise the necessary restriction of agricultural chemicals in organic agriculture. JOAA found that the reliability of organic goods could best be protected by *teikei* co-partnership.

As mentioned earlier, the organisation had explicitly rejected the necessity of formulating definitions and standards for organic agriculture. To a large extent, this rejection stemmed from the real-life conditions of agriculture. It has been widely perceived in the agricultural sector that elimination of agricultural chemicals is difficult, and the level of difficulties in achieving this objective differs significantly in accordance with location and type of farm produce. Japan belongs to diverse geo-climate zones; i.e. the southern area is in the subtropical zone, the middle in the temperate zone and the northern in the sub-arctic zone. Naturally, farms in the southern area tend to get more vermin and need more weeding than the cooler areas, while the former can produce different produce year around, and the latter often cannot. Furthermore, farming in mountainous areas, which cover 70% of the land, has been technically challenging and less competitive. In addition, change in farm production has been extremely difficult when the policy strongly promotes specialisation for increasing efficiency and added value in the market. In the course of this policy, individual farm-holds and often whole villages were to concentrate on particular produce which suits local conditions. Under these circumstances, it was often not easy for farmers to change their planting routines technically and socially, as it could impinge on the norms of local farming community. Considering these diverse conditions of different localities, establishment of fixed definitions and standards for organic farming was not initially considered appropriate by JOAA.

At the same time, by putting strong emphasis on the change in the farmer-consumer relationship, the "elimination" of agricultural chemicals was not the first priority for JOAA. Its basic standpoint was that individual farmers should practice environmentally friendly farming which was feasible for them in mutual understanding with consumers. Thus it has generally been tolerant of so-called integrated farming, which still applies some degree of agricultural chemicals. As claimed by the engaged members;

> The organic movement is not a movement which aims merely for technical objective under the slogan of non-pesticide agriculture, but a kind of civic movement based on the acute need of well-beings for farmers and consumers. Furthermore, I think it is indeed the movement for innovating everyday life, wherein the people across different positions unite for that (Yasuda, 1975, p.28).

> The movement we seriously tried to push forward rests in direct relationship between consumers and farmers, in which organic produce and other produce with insect bites or not are all co-exiting. I normally don't tell consumers my produce is non-chemical or natural. A new seed may grow from such point (Kamitani, 1975, p.30) .

However, there were mixed responses among the members about the necessity of the organic standards, when a number of self-claimed "organic" products were flooding the ordinary market, and establishment of standards was targeted by the international organisation for the organic agricultural movement (IFOAM) around the same time. Reacting to this situation, JOAA made a statement on its standpoint on organic standards in 1987. It clearly rejected the need for standards, because although organic standards must state organic produce to be "produced in uncontaminated land without using any chemical matter, such as synthetic fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides and herbicides", the authorities and distributors would most likely objected. Thus, the attempt at standards "will either result in failure or an extreme compromise by accepting some agricultural chemicals". The organisation strongly rejected this compromise, as it would halt the development of organic agricultural practices. JOAA stated that it was more important to diffuse the movement's efforts to establish collaborative relationships between producers and consumers (i.e. teikei). It stressed that such relationships had already built "trust and friendship between them", and generated "a series of unexpected and beautiful human connections". It further argued that sufficient diffusion of such relationships in each country would contribute to the national food sufficiency and eventually prevent war. JOAA's statement was also sent to the Minister of Agriculture and the chiefs of the relevant MAFF offices.

However, the issue of the organic standards continued to be brought up at the 16th General Assembly in 1988. According to the minutes there was a strong support for formulating JOAA's own organic standards, as national and international standards would be unavoidable in the near future. However at the same time, many, particularly organic farmers, decided to stick with *teikei* rather than using energy and resources on organic standards (JOAA, 1988d). In the end, this led the organisation to make a short statement for the "Definition of Organic Agricultural Produce";

> Organic agricultural produce refers to those produced by the method which does not use any kind of man-made chemicals, such as synthetic fertilizers and agricultural pesticides, biopharmaceuticals, and radioactive materials from production to consumption, utilises maximally the local resources, and respects the intrinsic productivity of the nature.[111]

JOAA's efforts towards the definition of standards did not go further than this statement during this early institutionalisation period. According to the several interviewees, Ichiraku's strong opposition to standards was decisive.

[111] JOAA homepage http://www.joaa.net/mokuhyou/kijun.html (Checked 14 August, 2012).

Organisational fragmentation and stagnation

Meanwhile, quite a few members of JOAA and local organic organisations participated in political protest for broader issues than organic agriculture. Among the most significant were the protests against nuclear power, rationalisation of school lunch, construction of and pesticides use at golf courses and spraying of pesticides by plane (*kuusan*). In particular, the last two campaigns awakened the collectivity of the organic agriculture community, as their issues were more directly linked with the problem of agricultural chemicals. This led JOAA to establish a task force and organise petitions on these issues in the late 1980s. However, despite 15,000 signatures for the prohibition of *kuusan* and some success in several localities, MAFF did not give an official response, and JOAA did not take further action (JOAA, 1989c). After all JOAA members were often divided on taking collective action for other issues than organic agriculture, and this has most frequently ended up with no action. The divide was observed particularly on the issue of nuclear power plants (JOAA, 1988d).

While JOAA had grown steadily until the early 1980s, the growth turned into a steady decline. At its peak in 1983 it had 5673 members, compared to 3980 in the beginning of 1990. Many of JOAA's member organisations and local *teikei* groups also experienced a decline around the same time. It is generally perceived that the stagnancy of these first generation organic agriculture organisations largely resulted from the split and dissolution of *teikei* groups caused by increased availability of organic or non-chemical produce in the ordinary market as well as the general decrease in full-time housewives as women's participation in the labour market increased. Furthermore, according to Hatano's studies (Hatano, 1998:2006), while many *teikei* groups had split as a natural course of development in size, many were dissolved due to management problems. They were most often organised spontaneously and highly driven by the moral conscience of members to share the tasks. These organisations did not have stable structures and administrative systems, for instance paid staff. Hatano claimed that *teikei* and the organic movement in many ways exhausted the members with practical work (e.g. distribution and fetching of produce, help for farm works, etc.), and that they were slow in adapting to the change in society, such as a declining number of housewives and growing consumer demands for organics. Furthermore, as long as *teikei* is considered as locally based practice, establishing a prospect for the nationwide diffusion of organic agriculture is difficult. In this light, the organic agriculture organisations failed to provide convincing solutions to the actual problems, for instance, of how farmers in remote areas find consumers, and how small local organic initiatives can impose change in the Japan's agriculture at large.

Despite these difficulties, JOAA more or less preserved its routines. A proposal to spend its savings on developing new tasks was rejected (in 1988 the savings amounted to 18 million JPY, which was more than a half of the annual income for the organisation) as the majority agreed on the traditional stance of the money was to be used for necessary projects in the future or in unexpected situations (JOAA, 1988d). The proposal to accept advertisements in the members' magazine to generate extra income was also rejected.

Emergence of new generation

While the first generation organic farming organisations were facing stagnation, new actors, which can be called "organic entrepreneurs" (Masugata and Kubota, 1989), evolved in the 1980s. Unlike the first generations, the organic entrepreneurs do not totally reject the conventional system for trade and business. For instance, *Daichi* (established in 1975), which currently runs a box scheme (home delivery) of organic produce as its main business, became a corporation in 1977. *Polan* (established in 1983) specialises in mediating trade between organic farmers and greengroceries. Although they are basically business actors who trade organic goods as commodity, their participation in the organic movement has been considerable. Particularly *Daichi* from the start sets its main objective "to purge pollutions by agricultural chemicals", and a part of the profit made through the organic trade is to be used for this aim, as well as for other civic movements, such as

the anti-nuclear movement and the sustainable energy movement.[112] These organic entrepreneurs are typically more flexible and pragmatic than the first generation, as they do not stick to the rigid interpretation of, say, the principles of *teikei* and non-materialistic values. According to the director of *Daichi*, Kazuyoshi Fujita, formerly a left-wing activist, a corporation is actually a very democratic system where the right of stockholders is protected by the commercial law. A corporation is not necessarily a capitalist profit-making machine, but can be used for protecting the national agriculture by having conscious consumers and producers as shareholders (Fujita, 2005, p.111).

Generally, the emergence of such new actors was not welcome by the leaders of JOAA (though Fujita continued to be a member of JOAA), but they do constitute the most growing part of the organic movement community.

2nd Phase of Institutionalisation (1990-1998): Widening but Neglected Opportunity

Policy construction of "Sustainable Agriculture"

New framework: Merger of organic agriculture

The development in the 1990s turned out to be negative as JOAA predicted. In 1991 the so-called New Agricultural Policies were introduced. Thereby the newly established frame of "*sustainable agriculture (kankyouhozengata nougyou)*" was articulated as one of the pillars with organic agriculture as one of the sustainable agricultural methods. This in reality reduced organic agriculture categorically to the same line as integrated farming, in which the use of agricultural chemicals and/or synthetic fertilisers was still allowed though to a lesser degree than conventional farming. In the white papers from 1990 and 1991, MAFF carefully described sustainable agriculture as pursuing both "better environment and productivity of agriculture" (Suzuki, 1992). Under this new policy frame, the process for establishing the guideline for labelling of organic and integrated farming goods officially started in 1992, and the Guideline was issued the following year (see the next section). Meanwhile, MAFF's task force for organic agriculture was replaced with the taskforce for sustainable agriculture (hereafter the Taskforce) in 1992, and the budget for this aim was raised from 43,569,000 to 75,185,000 JPY (Honjoh, 2004).

This new policy measure for sustainable agriculture was viewed negatively by many, as it did not have an actual effect on promoting organic agriculture or even integrated farming. While the overall budget for this objective rose with the establishment of the Taskforce, the budget for organic agriculture was actually reduced by 30% and the reduction continued (Honjoh, 2004, p.146) Furthermore, the money was assigned mainly for research and projects and did not directly benefit the farmers' economy. It was not until 1999 with the enactment of Law for Promoting the Introduction of Sustainable Agricultural Production Practices that the scheme allowed subsidies and technical support for farmers (though it still depended on individual municipalities' plan). In the absence of substantial support on the farm level, sustainable agriculture has not diffused as quickly as anticipated by the policy. According to an inquiry by MAFF, 21.5% of the farm-holds implemented the scheme of sustainable agriculture by February 2000, 62.6% were still using synthetic fertilisers and 67.3% pesticides, though they managed to cut approximately half of the nitrogen compared to the conventional method practiced in the same region.[113] Considering that the scheme required only 20% reduc-

[112] Daichi is built upon two organisational structures; one is *Daichi Corp*., which deals with trade and business activities, and the other concentrating on civic movements. The members of Daichi's box scheme automatically become members of its civic movements arm. A part of the profit from business is placed in the fund for civic movements, and the use of the money is decided at the annual assembly where all members can participate.

[113] http://www.maff.go.jp/soshiki/nousan/nousan/kanpo/s-gikyo.htm (Checked on 8 May 2008).

tion in the use of agricultural chemicals and/or synthetic fertilisers, the conversion percentage of little over 20% is not so impressive. In addition, another survey shows that 60%-70% of the farm-holds, which practiced some type of sustainable agriculture methods, answered that they would not consider extending production with this method (Demura, 1999, p.144-145).

Rising focus on national food self-sufficiency

Meanwhile, along with the EU CAP reform, organic agriculture in Europe began to gain more support from a wide range of actors in both civil society and official institutions as a win-win strategy that achieves a solution for overproduction and environmental protection. The traditional form of farmers' income protection was strategically shifted towards direct payment for environmental and rural development purposes. And as widely acknowledged, this shift reflected the intention to stop the accusation of protectionism by the international community.

However, this logic was still not evident in the Japanese policy community. In the early 1990s, agriculture was in the centre of nationwide political turbulence, in the face of growing international pressure to open the market for agricultural goods and the end of the bubble economy. The iron triangle wobbled as LDP was losing its monopoly on the government. Agricultural co-operatives became insecure about the agrarian politicians' efficacy in protecting farmers' interests, and the agricultural bureaucracy faced increasing pressure for agricultural reform to cope with international competition (see the below sections). Public support for the existing agricultural policy declined drastically when the country encountered a serious rice shortage due to historically bad weather in 1993. With this incident, the agricultural policy's reliability in terms of "protection of national food security" was put into question, and its contradictory production control of rice (*gentan*) was exposed. The subsequent unpopular agreement at the Uruguay Round in December, which finally accepted rice import, put public focus on the country's import dependency and serious decline in the national food self-sufficiency; self-sufficiency of grain was reduced to 23% in 1993, while it was 82% in 1960. At the same time, the agricultural sector as a whole was apparently facing severe structural problems as the farming population was rapidly shrinking; in 1995 the number of farm-holds counted only 56.8% of the 1960, which means that nearly half of the farming population had disappeared over the past three decades. Crucially, the remaining farmers were aging; MAFF reported that in 1995, 46% of the farming population was over 65, and the average age exceeded sixty for the first time (60.2) (MAFF, 1996). This situation was widely called "euthanasia" of agriculture. After all, the agricultural policy was publically exposed with its fatal deficiency in achieving its nominal objective, namely food security and the well-being of the rural population, despite the traditionally high public expenditure on this sector.[114]

Towards the national organic standards

Meanwhile, more concrete measures for organic agriculture, including official organic standards and certification, were already settled by Japan's major trade partner, the US, and more extensively, by the EU, in the early 1990s. Consequently, Japan's lack of compliable organic standards was criticised particularly by the US, who anticipated a huge market potential in the organic business. Indeed the growth in organic sales in Japan was among the fastest in the world. According to the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO), the organic market's retail value in Japan rose from app. 1 billion US$ in 1995 to 1.8 billion US$ in 1996 to

[114] According to Mochizuki, despite a series of budget cuts, Japan's agricultural support was still relatively higher than other OECD countries. In 1995, the percentage of the agricultural budget in relation to the national budget in Japan was 4.1%, USA 4.2%, Germany 2.8%, France 2.7%, Australia 1.4%, Canada 1.2%, the UK 1.1% (including support from the EU, France 5.9%, Germany 5.1%, and the UK 1.6%) (Mochizuki, 1998, p.102).

2.5 billion US$ in 1997. These numbers account for growth rates of 80% in 1996 and 39% in 1997 (Mochizuki, 1998).[115]

Along with this international development, MAFF established the above-mentioned Guideline for labelling of organic agricultural goods and various types of integrated farming goods in 1992. The main objective of this guideline was to ease consumer confusion in the fruit and vegetable market with the growing number of misleading indications as "organic," "non- or reduced pesticides and/or synthetic fertilizers," "fully-ripen," "healthy," etc. (Kubota, 1993). The Guideline was a minimum standard for various farming methods in the newly established frame of sustainable agriculture. Yet, as mentioned above, MAFF's general effort on the new frame was half-hearted. It was basically not interested in regulating them with a stringent standard, but rather in appearing to take action on consumer protection. In consequence, the Guideline still employed highly confusing categories, wherein organic, no-use of synthetic fertilizer and/or pesticides, and reduced-use of synthetic fertilizer and/or pesticides coexisted. Here, "no-use" referred only to the cultivation period, and "reduced-use" to the norm of "50% reduction from the usual application in the same locality." More critically, in a legal sense the Guideline was only advisory, and the claim of specialisations was neither officially controlled nor legally bound (Honjoh, 2004).

Whereas the Guideline received criticism from a wide range of civic organisations, especially JOAA, the Japan Federation for Bar Associations and consumer organisations, MAFF simultaneously initiated a reform of the Japanese Agricultural Standards (hereafter JAS) for the purpose of establishing national organic standards within the existing standardisation framework. The reform, which basically envisaged the extension of the JAS system, was a necessary first step towards the realisation of the JAS organic standards, because this system was originally made to certify that food (most often processed food) complied with the predetermined criteria. In other words, that system was made for controlling the finished product, but not the (whole) process of food production. This is why the JAS system could not, without reform, certify goods produced with a specific production method. The reform was naturally confronted by a range of civil society actors, who commonly found the JAS to be an inappropriate system for organic produce. 152 organisations working in the field of organic agriculture assembled in March 1993 to discuss the matter, and made a shared statement protesting the Guideline and the JAS reform (see the later section). Despite a series of protests, however, the JAS reform was enforced by MAFF in June 1993 (Honjoh, 2001: Kubota, 2003).

The effort of the JAS organic standards was halted for a short while, since, as result of the public protests, the Diet issued a side agreement that required an evaluation of the outcomes of the Guideline as well as consideration on the opinions of organic producers, distributers, consumers, etc. on the JAS organic standards (Honjoh, 2001). However, MAFF soon exploited the growing public attention to food safety, which was triggered particularly by the emergence of BSE, new types of E-Coli (O157) and GM food, to rationalise its own aim for the JAS organic standards. At this point, it was claimed that the deterioration in food safety owed much to the traditional agricultural policy putting too much focus on protection of producers. And thus, the focus must be shifted to consumer protection (Nakajima, 2006a). Furthermore, MAFF's effort on the JAS organic standards accelerated as the international organic standards under the Codex Alimentarius (international standard-setting agency for food under FAO and WHO) was on the way to finalisation in 1999. According to Honjoh (2001), MAFF had several reasons to hasten the passage in Diet. The most crucial one was that JAS was at risk of being shut down, as it was increasingly targeted by politicians and businesses as an inefficient and unnecessary system. The benefit of JAS was apparently decreasing, as JAS-labelled products do not necessarily guarantee higher quality, and consumer trust on the label is therefore considerably low; according to statistics, only 27% of the respondents used the label as a criterion. Facing this situation, the government's three-year plan in 1998 demanded that MAFF "make an effort to minimise the state's role and involvement in JAS." Hence, for MAFF the organic labelling system was a good opportunity to preserve

[115] http://www.ota.com/organic/mt/export_chapter4.html (Checked on 8 May, 2008).

the JAS system, when its functions for consumer protection, food safety and adding the product's market value were justifiable. This was also why the draft included the obligatory labelling requirement for GM food and the origin of the product. Consequently, this JAS reform apparently did not contribute to the "minimisation of the state's involvement" as desired by the government. On the contrary, it was used by the agricultural bureaucracy to maintain its system.

Political Turbulence: Change in the traditional structure

While the international pressure to open the food market was increasing, internal disagreements within the governing party LDP became ever stronger. LDP had already lost the majority in the House of Councillors at the election in 1989, in which the de-regulation for agricultural trade was one of the main issues. Furthermore, even though the party managed to win the 1990 election for the House of Representatives by successfully articulating the election as a choice between "democracy or socialism", the agrarian LDP members were deeply frustrated with the leaders' on-going compromise with the US to liberalise agricultural trade. This eventually caused a series of internal conflicts in LDP and the subsequent formation of new parties by the critical LDP politicians before the House of Representatives election in July 1993. With the victory of eight non-LDP coalition parties at this election, the era of LDP's single party dominance (i.e. the so-called "55 Structure") came to end. Although this government had an extremely short life with only ten months, LDP could no longer sustain its power without coalition with other parties (except in a six-month period in 1998-1999).During the period from June 1994 to January 1996, the historically broad coalition was made among SDP, LDP, and New Party Sakigake, and the following two Hashimoto administrations January 1996-July 1998 were sustained with turbulent cooperation with SDP and the New Party Sakigake, which shifted from in-cabinet coalition to external coalition.

Meanwhile, the reliability of agricultural co-operatives was seriously damaged, when its financial arm Norinchukin Bank declared unrecoverable loans of 5.5 trillion JPY caused by the bankruptcy of Jusen (i.e. firms specialised in real-estate loan) in the mid-1990s. Although the repayment of agricultural co-operatives was drastically reduced to 530 billion JPY by the help of agrarian politicians (Sheingate, 2001), the eventual conversion of compensation to tax-payers generated bitter sentiments among the general public. Besides, agricultural co-operatives were increasingly facing internal struggles regarding common political strategies. Its traditional de-centralised structure was discussed as the subject for change in order to increase organisational efficiency to cope with trade liberalisation and retrenchment in the state budget for agriculture (Association for Journalists in Agricultural Politics, 1991). Consequently, small local agricultural co-operatives organisations were merged into the prefecture-based organisations.

However, this apparent turbulence in the agricultural policy community did not quite bring the end to the iron triangle between agrarian politicians, agricultural bureaucrats and agricultural co-operatives that worked for mutual advantages. Populations in rural communities generally continued to vote for certain LDP or former LDP politicians in accordance with the collective decision in their local agricultural co-operatives. And as the case of the state support on Nourinchukin Bank characteristically shows, agrarian politicians would still protect the interests of the agricultural community (above all agricultural co-operatives). However, the change in the political landscape, the declining economic security and the growing reality of international competition have certainly eroded the strength of the triangle. The process of the Uruguay Round and the eventual split of LDP induced discontinuity in the loyalty of many local agricultural co-operatives organisations towards the party and traditional agrarian politicians, and led many of them to vote for SDP to show their dissatisfaction.

Alongside this change in the political landscape, the agricultural policy has changed significantly since the mid-1990s. Especially, the so-called new Food Law (the Law on Food Supply and Demand and Stabilisation of Food Price), which was passed in December 1994 (enacted in November 1995), pointed towards the future; in other words, the end of the system under the Food Control Law (*syokuryoukanrihou*), which was

established originally in 1942 to combat food shortage during the war. While it is claimed to target improvement of the extremely low national food self-sufficiency, it is widely acknowledged that its primal objective is to strengthen the agricultural sector to cope with the forthcoming international competition introduced soon by the Uruguay Round agreements. The symbolic incident is the launch of so-called "minimum access" in 1995, which allows import of rice at 4%-8% of the national consumption.[116] In other words, this new Food Law signals a remarkable policy shift from protection of agriculture towards the acceptance of deregulation, and thus, towards the "structural adjustment" of the national agricultural sector to the neoliberal order. Firstly, the adjustment entails diminishing control over distribution and pricing of rice. The old system of distribution, which guaranteed the full state purchase of rice, is replaced with the market-driven distribution mechanism, in which farmers decide where to sell.[117] Secondly, the state's control of rice price, which guaranteed the minimum price in relation to the production cost, is abolished and replaced with the open bidding.[118] Overall, this law stresses a shift from state control towards "producers' freedom for producing and selling." Agricultural co-operatives are appointed to take over the state's role in controlling production, and its national association *Zennou* will manage distribution of rice.[119] This trajectory has been strengthened by The New Policy on Rice Production in 1998, The Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas in 1999 and the revision of the Food Law in 2004 (see the section on the 3rd institutionalisation phase below).

Reaction of Organic Agriculture Community

Need for the collective protest

As mentioned, the organic agriculture community has traditionally refrained from acting towards political institutions. Even though organic agriculture was gradually taken up by MAFF from the end of the 1980s, JOAA continued to express its discomfort with the authorities' involvement in organic agriculture. Furthermore, although consumers are a central constituency of the organic movement, the organisation has often distinguished organic consumers from the mainstream consumer movement. It is because its ideal of organic consumers is to transcend a mere claiming of the "rights for safe food" as typically pursued by the latter (Honjoh, 2004, p.42-43). Yet, as an increasing number of public issues were directly concerned with organic agriculture, the existing organic organisations started recognising the need for official actions with other movement actors, in particular the consumer movement.

The first remarkable interaction is seen when the Guideline was launched in 1992. The seminar for discussing on the content of the Proposal of the Guideline in May, which was organised by several civil society organisations, gathered various organisations and groups predominantly in the Metropolitan Tokyo area. Soon after this seminar, 14 consumer organisations made a collective petition against the Proposal. This petition stated that while the MAFF's effort to prevent distribution of deceptive organic produce was considered

[116] According to the agreement on the Uruguay Round of trade talks under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in December 1993, the accord on agricultural trade was to be implemented over six years from 1995. Japan agreed to the tariffication of products like dairy, starch and wheat. A six-year grace period was given for rice for tariffication, while foreign producers got minimum access to the Japanese market (Asahi Shinbun, 1996, p.128).

[117] In practice, the state's rice purchase continued under the excuse of guaranteeing the stock.

[118] Though voluntarily marketed rice through bidding had already started from the harvest in 1990, the price difference was still controlled in order to prevent a rapid drop (The movement for the food safety and health for the nation, p.16, 2001). As discussed above, the rice market has not been fully market-driven up till today.

[119] According to Mochizuki, while rice distribution can be handled by other corporative actors, this area was under the monopoly of Zennou as it handled 95% of the produced rice (1998, p.109).

supportable, the Proposal contained serious problems: The most problematic was continuing acceptance of problematic terms such as "natural," "non-pesticides/synthetic fertilizer" and "reduced-pesticides/synthetic fertilizer." These terms were misleading consumers, as MAFF's survey the year before clearly assessed; the survey showed that an apparently higher number of people answered food labelled with "non-or reduced-pesticides and/or safe" were safer and healthier than those claimed as "organic" (MAFF in Kubota, 1993, p.15). The petition argued that as long as these descriptions were allowed, consumers would not understand the characteristics of organic food as produced without either pesticides or synthetic fertilizer. Besides, they claimed that the definition of "non-pesticides/synthetic fertilizer" did not concern soil quality so that methods like hydroponics were entitled to claim so, despite their highly unnatural character. The definition of "reduced pesticides/synthetic fertilizer" was claimed extremely problematic, since the definition of "reduced" in the Proposal barely stated "reduction with approximately over 50% of the amount used in conventional farms in the same region." Furthermore, the definition "50% reduction" did not include substantial issues such as regional difference of pesticides use and different strengths and health damages individual pesticides can inflict. At this point, the petition brought up the study of the American Scientific Academy reporting that "78% of the risk of carcinogenesis caused by agricultural produce is derived from the ten sorts of pesticides", and eight out of those were still in use in Japan. They overall criticised the Proposal for disregarding the effects of pesticides on health, which, in their view, resulted in the neglect of the special feature of organic food as pesticide-free. Hence they required only the term "organic" or "organic (non-pesticides/synthetic fertilizer)" in brackets to be allowed, and produce under the three-year conversion period to be described so on the side of the "organic" display. Otherwise, all other misleading descriptions should be prohibited. Lastly, the petition demanded creation of a public service to control labelling activities and collect and diffuse information about labels.

As MAFF did not respond to their comments, the consumer organisations (now 15 organisations) sent two additional petitions in July and September 1992, which criticised the Guideline as notoriously ambiguous in relation to the standards in other countries. Furthermore, the September petition stated that the acceptance of "reduced-" claim would "threaten more domestic agriculture as it will open the way for the import of reduced-chemical produce," and that the Guideline would "damage the consumer interests" since "it does not contribute to the reliable labelling system benefitting consumer choice" and "hinder the strong development of organic agriculture, which truly contributes to environmental protection" (Kubota, 1993, p.79-81). Despite these efforts, the Guideline was passed almost as it was in the Proposal with only slight adjustments including the obligatory description for "produce under conversion" (ibid., p.14).

Emerging consolidation outside JOAA

As mentioned, soon after the enforcement of the Guideline, MAFF revised the existing certification system, JAS, in June 1993 with the intention of building organic standards within this system. This shows that the establishment of national standards was recognised as necessary by the statesmen under the circumstances where the US and the EU were already establishing their own. Thus under the norm of "harmonisation," it was a matter of time before Japan would also be forced to comply with the international criteria.

The above consumer organisations were against this agenda. This time, 153 groups and organisations, which were related to organic agriculture and/or organic food consumption, got together on 25th January 1993 to organise the national assembly to "stop the consumer-deceiving JAS reform and food labelling." The assembly was realised on the 31st March, which was the day before the enforcement of the Guideline. The declaration issued emphasised the continuing civic surveillance of the Guideline and strengthening of the protest against the revision of JAS, and demanded a preparatory committee to establish the national council for the organic movement in the near future. Organic agriculture was expressed as urgent for achieving self-sufficient agriculture which "protects life and food safety." The state's intention for the Guideline and the JAS reform was criticised since "organic agriculture and produce are not actively located in the agricultural policy," but "merely taken as an issue of labelling and standards." It also stressed the main factor pushing

this direction was "external pressure (*gaiatsu*) from the US and the EU" as well as the "domestic and international interests in making money with ambiguously defined 'organic' food." Furthermore, the JAS reform was clearly interpreted as a potential way for the state to legalise the misleading descriptions. It was also speculated that legal requirements on production methods might be applied only to organic food, while all other "non-" and "reduced-" produce would be allowed to continue without proper control. Overall, the common declaration asserted that the organic standards would simply put more physical and economic burdens on organic farmers and hinder their autonomous efforts to improve environmentally friendly farming practices.

In the eyes of those critics, the existing JAS system itself was often a part of the problem. As it was the certification system often used for processed food to merely verify whether the food contains the ingredients as set by the pre-defined criteria, its focus is not on food safety and quality. As the actual necessity of such certification was already doubted by consumer organisations (Kubota, 1993), the application of the system to organic food was found inappropriate (Ito, 1996, p.6).

Self-limitation in JOAA's collaboration

The Guidelines and JAS' organic standards clearly generated collaborations between JOAA and other civil society actors. At protesting the former it collaborated with the above-mentioned consumer organisations to make drafts under mutual consultation and submit the petitions together to the authorities (i.e. MAFF and the Fair Trade Committee). This new collaboration was received positively by the members and it was asserted that "from now on we would like to pursue close cooperation with these consumer organisations for a common fight" (JOAA, 1992, p.18). Nonetheless, JOAA still chose to make its own petitions separately from the above-mentioned ones done collectively by several organisations.

JOAA was in fact asked by MAFF to be a part of the expert committee for consulting the context of Guideline soon after its process started in March 1991. This can show how well the organisation was regarded among the agricultural bureaucrats due to the fame of the leaders such as Ichiraku and others, though the bureau's support for organic agriculture was a completely different matter. However, the organisation replied to this request by clearly rejecting the whole idea of a standard-like measure. The then chairperson Amano stated on behalf of JOAA that "there is no need for labelling for agricultural produce in general, let alone organic produce." Firstly, "it is impossible" to label them, since "each agricultural produce, unlike industrial products, has individual characters." Secondly, labelling would not only risk abuse of labels but also maintain the usual consumer behaviours (JOAA, 1991). Food labels were not recognised as a means for consumer protection, but rather as a market tool to control consumer choice.

However, one member of the expert committee was the above-mentioned professor Yasuda, who was an engaged member of JOAA. He did not officially participate as a representative of JOAA or the organic community, but as an agricultural expert. Nevertheless, his participation gave JOAA insider information about the draft-making process, while by rejecting the participation in the committee, it intended to send a signal of protest against the Guideline. In an interview, Yasuda said that the meetings of the expert committee were highly managed by MAFF officials and allowed the committee members very few opportunities for discussions.[120] Furthermore, there have been crucial differences between JOAA and the consumer organisations at formulating their protests. While the Guideline or more generally standards were conceived by this organic organisation as fundamentally "impossible" and inappropriate, the petitions of the consumer organisations were basically not against the idea of standards. Consequently, although JOAA and the consumer organisations worked on petitions collaboratively, the contexts were intentionally made distinctive; i.e. the

[120] Interview with Shigeru Yasuda, 8 November 2006.

former's documents were kept short in stating the clear rejection of the Guideline, whilst the latter explained which parts were problematic and should be revised. The overall point of JOAA in those documents was that distribution of organic goods would best be done through *teikei*. By establishing an autonomous system where producers and consumers are directly connected, "fake" produce will be naturally excluded. The existing practices as well as on-going development of *teikei* should thus be supported, but not be disturbed by the standards which did not (and would not) comply with the movement's aspiration of organic agriculture.

Most of the groups and organisations who participated in the national assembly to protest against the JAS standards were engaged members of JOAA, but also organic enterprises such as *Polan* and *Radish-boya*, which were growing as actors facilitating alternative ways to get organic food other than *teikei*. While many members were actively joining such collective protest with consumer organisations, and it basically did not disagree with other protesting organisations, JOAA continued with the same tactics, namely, collaboration *without* official organisational commitment at protesting against the JAS organic standards.

Weakening of JOAA's leadership

JOAA's tactics depict, as described by a member in the members' magazine, the "defensive" attitude of this organisation (Taniguchi, 1988, p.15-22). Around the 1990s the usual defensive tactics were becoming more difficult to sustain, as more and more members realised the necessity for alternative ways of the movement. Especially facing the situation where the national organic standards appeared to be the reality, an increasing part of the organisation demanded that JOAA take more active role. Indeed, as JOAA was widely recognised as the representative actor for the organic community, this organisation was called by the Diet and MAFF to give expert opinions about the policy proposals for the revision of the Guideline and the national organic standards. In representing the movement's position, JOAA strongly and continuously demanded protection of the autonomous development of organic agriculture, as characterised by *teikei*. For instance, the then chairperson, Haruo Sawanobori replied at the meeting of the House of Representatives in 1994 to the question regarding the already evident limit of *teikei* for distributing organic goods:

> We are also worried about *teikei* today, but the real problem is that the social system is not sufficient. The pressures are coming from there. Actual problem is that the real *teikei* practices between, say, consumers and producers became too big. When they become too big, *teikei* won't work. The problem is thus becoming too big. We have to practice as small as possible, and when it is not enough, we should bring it to a bigger circle…(Sawanobori in JOAA, 1994).

Whereas this was the commonly envisaged ideal of the organic movement, frustrations among JOAA members were growing as the organic movement itself was stagnating. It has widely been recognised in the organic community since the late 1980s that the diffusion of *teikei* halted for many reasons. Despite growing consumer demand for organic food, converting to organic farming was not attractive for farmers, as it was not easy to find either an ordinary market distribution route or well-functioning *teikei* consumer groups in their locality. Even though there were such consumer groups, they would not need new producers since their membership was decreasing. When I was doing interviews and observations in Japan in 2005 and 2008 it was also evident that many *teikei* producer groups could not support new organic farmers, even though they wanted to, as they had barely enough consumers for their own produce. *Teikei* consumers were also wary of the aging of their groups, which lacked young members.

Furthermore, internal disagreements were openly stated in the organisational magazine: For instance, a member complained about the "closed organisational management" of JOAA, which "does not accept the diversity in ideology, religion, and agricultural method among long-standing groups and organisations researching and practicing unique forms of agriculture." Due to its closed-mindedness, the organisation failed not only to establish friendships across the organic community but also to bring common agreements for the objective and definition of organic agriculture. This clearly resulted in the powerlessness of the organic community in the face of the apparently problematic development in policy and market (Yoshida, 1996, p.4-

5). Another wrote that JOAA not only failed to achieve its principal aims over the past decades, but also to catch up with the organic movement. Like the other member, he asserted that the organisation lacked discussions from diverse points of view, while too many discussions were focusing on "inward arguments." He argued that there was no sense of crisis in the organisation, even though other actors such as businesses were more effectively influencing the organic standards (Ishii, 1997, p.16-17)

Such voice can well disclose that the formerly accepted loose and flat structure of the organic movement community, in which *informally* acknowledged JOAA as the leader, was no longer functioning effectively. In reality, JOAA had not developed beyond a forum for actors working for and interested in organic agriculture. It had been one of the few existing nationwide organic organisations, and its annual convention and general assembly had been the biggest event where organic activists from all over the country got together. Yet, except several cases such as the protest against pesticides spraying by airplane and building of new golf courses, JOAA had not succeeded in becoming the place for discussing and organising collective actions. Many proposals for collective protest, for instance against the building of a new nuclear power plant, were rejected, since the purpose of the organisation was understood by the majority to be non-political. The institutionalisation process of organic agriculture/food, most remarkably manifested in the Guideline and the national organic standards, began to reveal the existing organisational norms, which were to be politically and religiously neutral, and the actual organisational capacity could not cope with the growing needs to be politically active and organise effective protest against the state.

Consequently, despite its status as long-standing nationwide and representative organic organisation, JOAA's position in the organic community was wobbling. As discussed above, the issue of the national organic standards was taken up not only by organic organisations but also by a wide range of civic organisations such as consumer organisations and farmers organisations, which were more oriented to collective actions. Furthermore, the above-mentioned network outside JOAA emerged to protest against the Guideline and the national organic standards generated active interaction between formerly unconnected groups/organisations, and certainly strengthened the relationship among local organic groups/organisations, which usually met only at JOAA's meetings before. As a result, JOAA's membership was in constant decrease (except a slight increase in 1997) throughout the 1990s.

This decrease showed not only the eroding common recognition of JOAA as the leader of the organic community, but also the direct decrease in its economic resources as its economy was highly dependent on membership fees. The latter clearly restricted the organisational capacity for domestic and international activities. The board meetings had to be careful with travel expenses for board members living far away from Tokyo, and JOAA's representatives voluntarily participated in the meetings of IFOAM's Asian branch at their own expense.[121] Furthermore, five million JPY was extraordinarily withdrawn in 1997 from the organisation's asset, which had remained untouched since its establishment, to publish *The Handbook for Organic Agriculture*.

Towards own standards

As mentioned, JOAA was still against standardisation of organic or any other agricultural goods. However, as the fake organics were more and more evident in the market, several members of JOAA proposed the establishment of the Taskforce for Teikei and Standards (hereafter the Taskforce) in November 1990. The idea was approved by the directorial board in April 1991. The representative of Taskforce, Kyouichirou Adachi asserted at the launching that he and other members of the Taskforce were still convinced of the movement to be built upon *teikei*. Yet in the current rapid change in the circumstances, which showed increasing involvement by the state, businesses and agricultural co-operatives in organic issues, the movement had to get more information and analyse the development abroad. Adachi's formulation was careful about

[121] Interview with Katsushige Murayama, 26 October 2007.

the Taskforce being received as an attempt at standardisation. He asserted that the objective was "not to determine either the Japanese way of making standards is better than the Western ways *vice versa*", but to investigate such questions as "why market-oriented initiative is dominant in organic agriculture in the West?," "has such initiative always been strong in the West?," "what are pro and con of the market-oriented development?" This task was important, since JOAA would soon have to evaluate whether it should continue its international collaboration within the IFOAM framework, when IFOAM had clearly declared its support for the world-wide diffusion of organic standards. More fundamentally, Adachi stressed that it was necessary for "promoting the new *teikei* movement for the next decade" (Adachi, 1991). In reality, however, the Taskforce paved the way to the later establishment of JOAA's own organic standards.

Since 1996 establishment of own organic standards has been discussed more as a real issue in the organisation, mainly because Ichiraku died in 1994, and because of growing internal criticism. While his life-history remains embraced by the organisation and organic activists in general, his clear objection to the standards had been the obstacle to even talking about this matter. With his death, it was easier for the leaders to start concrete discussions about whether JOAA should make its own standards as an alternative to the forthcoming national and international standardisation of organic goods.

However, there were still mixed feelings about establishing own organic standards. For instance, over half of the Hokkaido regional groups were against the idea (JOAA, 1997b, p.9). However, by the mid-1990s the majority appeared to recognise the necessity of the organic community's standards or, at least, that such standards were unavoidable. An active member, Toshiko Karasawa wrote as follows:

> Since my *teikei* group is functioning well, I was not really cooperative with the committee members who are heating up with the organic standards. But when I heard about CODEX is on the way to make its standards towards the year 2000, I disappointedly recognised that we can no longer turn ourselves away. At the same time I realised the tough way to come for the organic movement. JOAA has until now come only along with *teikei*… (Karasawa in JOAA, 1997b, p.9-10).

Consequently, the directorial board meeting in 1996 agreed upon the establishment of the Committee for Investigating the Organic Standards (hereafter the Standards Committee). Even though this did not yet mean official approval of the standards, it was *de facto* the beginning of the actual process. One of the executive directors, Katsushige Murayama, said:

> Both good and bad, globalisation processes have reached into the field of organic agriculture. WTO regime has been established in the virtue of "liberalisation", while its true intention is the survival of the fittest. In addition, our objective for autonomy of local communities can easily be smashed both by the domestic pressure, as seen in the new Agricultural Law, and the external pressure (*gaiatsu*), as represented by the expansion of trade and distribution and the entrance of new technologies like GMO and cloning that endanger lives…. Thus extensive discussions for standards and certification got started (in the organisation), as we began to acknowledge this crisis situation, and for the intention of protecting life and regional material circulation (Murayama in JOAA, 1997a, p.4).

JOAA's magazine published the minutes of the general assembly in February 1997. It stated a representative of the Standards Committee, Hiroko Kubota, explained ; "although the Committee acknowledge the criticism of standards as unnecessary for *teikei* and their potential to be abused,, it was found essential to bring the common understandings of organic agriculture by exchanging different views. Then it was within this process that the actual necessity of JOAA for own standards would be discussed. According to the minutes, this position of her gained a huge support in the assembly (JOAA, 1997a, p.18). Like the intention of the Taskforce, this shows the careful stance of the leading members to position the organisation's organic standards not as a step towards undermining or neglecting *teikei*, i.e. the traditional objectives and practices of the movement, but, on the contrary, as an effort to consolidate the movement.

All in all, with the death of the founder, the leaders of JOAA began to more openly express the organisation's new role for organic activism in the latter half of the 1990s. This point was seen in the assertion of the above-mentioned Murayama for "quickening of action" at the 1997 general assembly. Similarly, long-time member, Hiroshi Oohashi, stressed: "While IFOAM is the 'federation for the movement,' our JOAA has not functioned predominantly for the movement, as it was unfortunately named 'research society.'[122] But now we are facing a lot of problems, and therefore from this present generation we truly have to push forward the movement" (Oohashi in JOAA, 1997b, p.18).

3rd Phase of Institutionalisation: Organic Agriculture as Top of the Pyramid (1999-2008)

Deepening of neo-liberalism

In 1999 the Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, which came to be known as the New Agricultural Law, was established. It states the government's responsibility for making basic plans for: 1) the basic policy direction regarding food, agriculture and rural areas; 2) the goal of food self-sufficiency; 3) the government's comprehensive and systematic measures for food, agriculture and rural areas; and 4) additional measures necessary for promoting the above measures. Crucially, for the purpose of promoting sustainable development of agriculture, the policy is to support the construction of the "desired agricultural structure," which is based on bigger farm size and efficient farm infrastructures. Here the core farmers, i.e. so-called bearers (*ninaite*), whom the state is to support, are specified as those who can rationalise their farm management. At this point, establishment of business-farm and agricultural corporation, rather than the traditional family farm, is encouraged. The law also stipulates the increase in export, and for that aim, the competitiveness of agriculture must be enhanced and the support (e.g. market research, provision of information, advertisement, etc.) facilitated. In addition, it encourages female participation in agriculture and improved welfare for aged farmers (MAFF, 1999).

The first five-year plan was made in 2000 (MAFF, 2000). It set the national self-sufficiency to 45% on a calorie base. It also set the goals for the main categories of agricultural production, in accordance with the picture of "the desired food consumption," focusing on a diet based on less animal fat (desirably 25% of the daily calorie standard, which was estimated around 2540 kcal) but with increased carbohydrates (e.g. rice), vegetables, beans and potatoes. Concerning desired food consumption, the plan also encouraged eating with less left-over to reduce approximately 10% of the calorie intake. Furthermore, as it stipulates the "support for correcting the disadvantages of meso-mountainous regions," the direct payment for these regions started from 2000. For the purpose of "establishing the desirable agricultural structure," the emphasis on bearers was more clarified. The plan required them to be certified by the local authority for their farm management plan, since state support would concentrate on farms with prospects of operating economically and sustainably. The plan strengthened the Law's recommendation to transform small family farms to community-based farms and/or corporations, as they aspired to bring more efficient accumulation of arable land. In addition, the plan raised the target of "the offensive agricultural policy" as one of the five major points for the agricultural reform. This terminology generally referred to items like development of the export of domestic produce as high-quality food, effective use of locally available biomass, direct sales often organised by women, activities for *chisanchisyou* ("Produce locally, eat locally"), increasing consumer focus on local food and culture as represented by slow food, etc. The same terminology was later used by Minister Nakagawa more narrowly to increase international competitiveness (see below).

[122] Direct translation of the JOAA's Japanese name *Nihon Yuukinougyou Gakkai* is the Japan's Research Society for Organic Agriculture.

When the second plan was established in 2005, however, the situation of agriculture was far from improved. National food self-sufficiency on a calorie base remained flat with 40% from 2000, without approaching the target of 45%. Furthermore, the opening of the domestic rice market under overproduction and the *gentan* scheme hit rice farmers hard. Although it still was partial opening which was restricted to the 4% of the national consumption, the rice import already amounted 700,000 tons in 2003, which were equivalent to the rice production of the seven prefectures of Kyusyu (the third biggest island in Japan). Consequently, the rice price fell by approximately 30% from 1995 to 2000. Making matters worse, the "bearer" farmers who, by following the new policy, invested in large farm machines and infrastructure tended to have serious financial problem as the rice price dropped more rapidly than expected (Ohno, 2003, p.29). Financial problems among farmers also derived from the insufficient, overly complicated, and not transparent subsidy system (Agricultural Managers, 2009, p.18-31). Quite in contrast to the policy ambition, the farming population declined by 11% over the five-year period of the above plan, and the average age of the farming population rose from 61.1 to 63.2 (MAFF, 2011). According to an MAFF report, one million farm-holds had disappeared between 1990 and 2005 (MAFF, 2006).

Meanwhile, the agricultural policy became even more strongly directed towards market-driven development and international competitiveness in the prospect of economic globalisation. For examples, the Food Law was revised in 2004, and the de-regulation of the rice market was significantly widened by the abolishment of the traditional state purchase system. At the same time, the sales and distribution of rice were opened also to non-agricultural actors, and anyone who paid the fee could import rice. Furthermore, the revision intended to shift control of rice production from the authorities to the local agricultural communities themselves. The revision was expected to change the focus from the control of farm acreage towards control of quantity of production. However, this intention did not succeed as the government envisaged, since the mitigation of the authority's control brought abundant harvest in 2007 and thus resulted in the price fall. Eventually, the government reversed the farmer-led control to the authorities, and its intervention still occasionally stops the radical price fall.

By the same token, the second plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas in 2005 continues with this direction. This second plan introduced a new measure for the state subsidy called "the non-product specific support for economic stability" which standardised the "bearers" even further: State support would be concentrated upon bigger-scale certified farms, which were over 4ha (10ha in Hokkaido) or 20ha in case of community-based farms.[123] As widely acknowledged in the agricultural sector, the government's emphasis is apparently community-based farms, and especially those which become corporations. The government anticipated that corporation could not only effectively accumulate arable areas but would also be more efficient at adjusting production to the actual market needs. Corresponding to this intention to make agriculture more competitive, the traditional product-specific subsidy was reduced to only four items, i.e. wheat, soy, sugar beet, and potato for producing starch (Nakajima, 2006b). However, this subsidy was also opened to rice, in case imports excessively influenced the domestic market (Shougenji, 2008). Regarding the national food-self-sufficiency, this new plan set the same goal with 45% on a calorie basis (towards 2010) as the last plan, though it added the goal of production value basis with 76% to reflect the result of vegetable production which generally give lower calorie value. The plan further emphasised environment and food safety, which will be discussed in the next section.

[123] This four ha border was based on the estimation of the minimum rice acreage necessary for a single farm-hold to earn half of the average income of workers in other industries. This means that the "bearers" the government envisaged were mainly farmers who derived minimum 50% of their income from agriculture (Shougenji, 2008).

The policy for economic globalisation was even more strongly stressed by the then Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Shouichi Nakagawa, in his campaign of "Nakagawa Initiative – Do Our Best" in 2006.[124] He asserted the "offensive agricultural policy," which was derived from the strategic evaluation of the areas Japan should "protect, surrender, and attack." In contrast to his predecessors, he explicitly targeted the EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) and the vision of "East Asia as one market." By raising the potential for regional trade (free-market) zone, he emphasised the possible growth in agricultural export as well as the export of the Japanese style diet, rather than the impact of cheap import on domestic agriculture and national food self-sufficiency.

In contrast to the 1990s, when the opening of the domestic agricultural market was discussed heatedly, agrarian politicians were rather silent under Junichiro Koizumi's administration, which lasted from April 2001 to September 2006 (Shougenji, 2008). The historically high public support rate of 80%, which he received at the time of inauguration, did not last, but Prime Minister Koizumi preserved relatively high support of around 40%, which led to the third longest tenure in the post-war Japan (Hirama, 2004). His popularity (and unpopularity) owed much to his clarity on the envisioned structural reform, based on "the small government" as represented by the privatisation of postal services, which was the world's biggest financial institution. His reform further entailed a drastic cut in public support in various fields, as he had pledged to halt the rise in the national debt. Support to agriculture decreased markedly during his tenure (OECD Fact book, 2010).[125]

In the first half of the 2000s the agricultural policy became more oriented to economic globalisation. Under the banner of economic globalisation, "protectionism", which is traditionally evident in agriculture, was declared obsolete. The government's logic thus shifted remarkably from protecting the dying farming communities towards revitalising them by improving their international competitiveness. At this point, the opening of the domestic agricultural market was not asserted as negative but as a new opportunity for Japan's agriculture to extend its businesses, for instance by exploring the export market. This focus on market competitiveness was also seen as a solution to the low national food self-sufficiency, as the increase in market-driven farm management was expected to make agricultural production and distribution more efficient. Furthermore, the rejection of protectionism and market-driven development to some degree shifted the government's focus from farmers to consumers: In other words, it is argued that too much protection of farmers has deteriorated their concern about what consumers really want. What is necessary is the protection of consumers, but not of farmers.

The process of the organic law: Institutionalisation and fragmentation of the movement

Going parallel with this neo-liberalisation, however, the focus on sustainable agriculture and its multifunctionality has also become a more integrated part of the government's policy.

The Law for Promoting the Introduction of Sustainable Agricultural Production Practices was made in 1999, and support for farmers implementing certain sustainable agricultural method started. The Law also facilitated the new certification system for "eco-farmer," given to the farmers whose plans for sustainable agriculture are approved by their local authorities. It required the eco-farmer plan that includes the efforts for improvement of soil fertility and reduction of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides. However, the support for eco-farmers was still limited to interest-free loans and tax deduction. The first-year budget for the promotion of sustainable agriculture remained only at approximately 41 million JPY (about 401,400 US$ and 2,357,000

[124] Homepage of the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai-shimon/minutes/2006/0316/item8.pdf (Checked on 18 September, 2012).

[125] http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/factbook-2011-en (Last checked on 9 April, 2014)

DKK at the rate of December 1999[126]). In addition, organic agriculture remained unspecified in the description of sustainable agriculture.

In addition, the Policy Guideline for Agriculture, Fishery and Environment established in 2003 signified a more integrated direction of agricultural policy with environmental protection. It denoted, among other things, the shift of agricultural support towards an environmental orientation, the mitigation of dependency on agricultural chemicals and the promotion of food education (*syokuiku*) (MAFF, 2003). In addition, the Second Plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas in 2005 emphasised other points than economic globalisation and increasing competitiveness, such as the promotion of "*syokuiku* as a national movement," *chisanchisyou* (the Japanese equivalent to "Produce locally, eat locally") and sustainable agriculture. Although the Plan required only the establishment of minimum criteria, it recommended the extensive economic support (MAFF, 2005).

This emphasis on sustainable agriculture, as well as on the revitalisation of the Japanese dietary pattern and knowledge and practices of local food tradition has been, to some degree, driven by the intention of compensating the predominance of neo-liberalism. These subjects constituted an emerging policy area where the oppositions were proposing alternative directions to LDP's non-protectionist agricultural policy. In other words, the area of sustainable agriculture and food has become one of the crucial policy areas where the oppositions could distinguish themselves from the governing parties (i.e. LDP and the centre-right New Komeito[127]). The role of the House of Councillors' member, Martti Turunen of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was (and still is at the moment of 2014) the biggest opposition party, has been significant in this regard. By his initiative, the trans-party Diet Members' Federation for the Promotion of Organic Agriculture was founded in November 2004. It gathered 154 Diet Members at its establishment (and grew to 166 in November 2010). The Chair was taken by LDP's Yoshio Yatsu, while Turunen took the position as Secretary General. The Prospectus announced at the first assembly in November 2004 referred to grassroots' efforts for consumer and producer co-partnership, and the organic movement's traditional focus on "face-to-face relationship" and *shindofuji*. Organic agriculture was denoted there to achieve "the highest environmental protection." It further claimed:

> Sustaining human life basically necessitates safe food produced on the healthy soil, water and air by following the nature's providence. Considering that, we must urgently promote the food production founded upon natural material circulation, among all, organic agriculture (Prospectus of the Diet Members' Federation for the Promotion of Organic Agriculture, 2004).

Based on these concepts, the Federation intends to study the experiences abroad in collaboration with organic farmers, consumers, the authorities and researchers for "establishing organic agriculture suitable to the geo-climate of Japan."[128] What is more, the Prospectus states that its objective is to facilitate effective support including the law targeting the promotion of organic agriculture. As such, the foundation of the Federation crucially ignited the process towards the organic law, though MAFF was not quite positive about that. In January 2006 Minister of Agriculture Nakagawa expressed at the House of Councillors' meeting that while he acknowledged the contribution of organic agriculture to environmental protection and the public support

[126] http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/cgi/fxdata

[127] The LDP governments around the new millennium occasionally entered coalitions with small parties made of politicians who had defected from LDP, which all of them had dissolved quickly. Most went back to LDP, though Ichiro Ozawa's group constituting the Liberal Party eventually merged into DPJ.

[128] At the first assembly, several members asked questions regarding the reliability of organic agriculture for achieving national food self-sufficiency as well as for revitalising the agricultural sector. Turunen replied by suggesting study-tours to learn about actual practices in organic agriculture. This resulted in 14 study sessions until August 2006, including a study trip to Cuba, which has achieved nationwide conversion to organic (Imai, 2006, 174-175).

for this agriculture, he did not see the need for a law that specifically targets this agricultural method, as the support could be covered by the existing frameworks, such as the Law for Promoting the Introduction of Sustainable Agricultural Production Practices and the planned "measures to conserve and improve land, water and environment" from 2007 (Change Agriculture!, 2006, p.19).

From early on, the Federation pursued an extraordinary method of legislation by Diet members, where the intervention by MAFF could be minimised. Furthermore its draft was quite different from MAFF's. That is, the draft was based on a proposal written by the academic body, Japan's Association for Organic Agriculture Studies (JAOAS). The Association was established in 1999 by the initiative of Professor Shigeru Yasuda as the first nation-wide effort to unite academics doing research on organic agriculture. JAOAS differs from ordinary academic associations, as it is open to anyone "involved in the organic movement" and "aspiring to support the world of organic agriculture" (Adachi, 2001). Up till today, it has been functioning as a forum for exchange of results and perspectives of organic-related research in both natural and social sciences as well as the knowledge of advisors, growers and traders of organic agriculture/food. In addition to academics, the participants count organic agricultural practitioners, such as agricultural advisors, organic farmers and organic traders. The taskforce for drawing the proposal was formed in March 2005 within the Association's small committee for studying the policy of organic agriculture, which had existed since February 2003. Until the final proposal was submitted to the Federation in August, JAOAS called for public opinions about its draft at an open forum in July.

In October 2005, concrete discussions about the organic law started in the Diet's policy-making subcommittee on the basis of JAOAS's proposal. Before the final draft in October 2006, the contents were revised several times through interaction with the Association and in response to comments from organic organisations such as JOAA and IFOAM Japan (see the below section). There were some critical points raised by the organic actors throughout the process. The common criticisms of the Federation's draft can be summarised into two points; firstly, in comparison to JAOAS's proposal, the basic principles of organic agriculture were largely reduced to the aspects of "agricultural production system." JAOAS at this point claimed that the organic law should be more explicit the multi-facet aspects of this agriculture, for instance its contributions to food safety, agricultural workers' health, bio-diversity, natural material circulation and consumer-producer relationship. Secondly, the draft did not include the proposal's requirement for an expert committee for policy-making and implementation, composed of experts with knowledge and experiences of organic agriculture. It asserted that the involvement of the Council for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas as stated in the draft was not sufficient, since knowledge about organic agriculture was apparently limited among the council members with traditional/conventional agricultural background. JOAA saw in this the risk of the usual "forced top-down policy process" (Change Agriculture!, 2006).

Among other organic actors, JOAA strongly criticised that the draft did not include the paragraph of the proposal concerning the history of organic agriculture and the significance of producer-consumer co-partnership, *teikei*. As this paragraph disappeared, *teikei* and the long-standing movement's effort to establish face-to-face-relationships were not mentioned at all in the draft. Later, the following sentence was added: "the promotion of organic agriculture must be accompanied by collaboration (*renkei*) between organic farmers, organic-related actors and consumers." JOAA protested the neglect of *teikei* and the importance of "interaction (*kyouryuu*)" emerging through it:

> This not only ignores the development process of the Japan's organic agriculture. It also overlooks the important sense of *teikei* where urban dwellers, by supporting organic farm-holds, come to understand the value of organic agriculture and rural communities in interaction with nature, while organic farmers respond to that by protecting environment and developing the local self-sufficiency and the local community (Change Agriculture! 2006, p.43).

The law was passed unanimously by the House of Representatives in December 2006. However, since the JOAA's demand for including the significance of *teikei* was not supported by the Federation or the other organic actors, it was not stated in the law. The expert committee requested by the organic community was realised in October 2007 under MAFF. The committee consisted predominantly of organic actors, including representatives from organic organisations such as JOAA and HOAA (JOAA's long-standing member), a private organic agricultural school, a long-standing *teikei* consumer group, *Daichi*, an organic certification body, academics, etc. Then director of JAOAS, Kiichi Nakajima was elected as the first chairperson.

Strategies of JOAA

Emerging political interaction

JOAA's involvement in the policy process has increased remarkably since the late 1990s, as MAFF re-started the actual process to establish the national organic standards within the JAS system. This was punctuated by the formation of the Committee for Discussing the Inspection and Certification System for Organic Food in 1997. Reversing its former disinterest in policy participation, JOAA sent three representatives to this committee. The organisation continued to be invited to other organic standards-related committees, e.g. one concerning inspection and certification. In this process, remarkable contentions emerged.

As the JAS organic standards basically aimed at compliance with the Codex organic standards, it was assumed that they would (and they actually did) enforce compulsory certification by the third party in order to claim organic. The Codex standards and other existing standards, including, to some degree, IFOAM's, were concerned that Japan's organic community would be predominantly western. They were wary that the mere import of western standards would seriously harm the present and future development of the Japanese organic agriculture. These organic standards do not consider Japanese agricultural conditions and thus cannot be directly applicable to Japan.

One of the core issues was that compulsory certification affect the very practices of *teikei*. According to JOAA's leadership, certification should not be necessary for organic goods, since *teikei* consumers could directly and personally know the production process. It was thus found problematic that organic farmers who established trustworthy relationships with consumers would be punished with bureaucratic paper work and additional economic costs for certification. JOAA and other organic organisations demanded exemption of *teikei* and *sanchoku* (direct delivery from producer) from the compulsory certification. In May 1999 the House of Councillors agreed unanimously on a supplementary resolution consisting of nine articles to be considered for the JAS organic standards. Article four states: "regarding organic labelling, consideration should be given to the actual conditions of organic food distribution, where a reliable relationship is established between organic farmers and producers." This article was understood by the organic community and some diet members to demand *teikei* and *sanchoku* to be exempted from the obligatory certification or, at least, the requirements for certification were expected to be reduced (Kubota, 2001). However, MAFF did not intend with the JAS organic standards to restrict *teikei*, as the Codex already stated that organic labelling is not necessary for direct trade between organic producers and consumers. Consequently, the authorities allowed produce to be informed as organic at *teikei* without certification, as long as the produce were not sold with an organic label on the container, packing and invoices. Recently, MAFF also officially states that, as *teikei* between consumers and organic producers was to be based on a reliable relationship, sufficient information was opened to consumers before and after purchasing. Therefore there would not be a problem without organic label (Kubota, Taniguchi et al., 2012).

While distribution via *teikei* was approved to continue without it, how and by whom certification was to be conducted was still the core issue for the organic movement. Opinions of the JOAA's members were diverse on this issue. On the one hand, it was already recognised that the growing majority of organic distribution was and would be taking place outside *teikei*, as *teikei* groups in general were not expanding but barely try-

ing to maintain the *status quo*. On the other hand, the introduction of an organic certification system was largely interpreted as a consequence of international pressure (*gaiatsu*) for economic globalisation rather than the protection of Japanese consumers. Despite these mixed opinions, JOAA ultimately agreed upon the JAS organic standards in the hope that the standards and certification system would reflect the objectives of the organic movement. At this point, it was raised as problematic that the draft of the standards restricted the qualification of organic inspector within the general agricultural knowledge and experiences, and not in organic agriculture. JOAA argued that non-agricultural experts like *teikei* consumers deserved to be organic inspectors, as they have developed knowledge and experiences with actual organic agricultural practices through their help on farms and interaction with organic farmers. Albeit this request was not accommodated in the standards, MAFF approved those consumers as assistant inspectors who can do most of the practical tasks. This paved the way for many organic consumers to be professional organic inspectors.

Furthermore, from the organic activists' view, the western influence was evident in a series of too strict requirements proposed by the draft of the JAS organic standards, as it neglected the actual domestic conditions for organic farming. For instance, as individual farming acreages are most often small and adjacent in Japan, protection of organic acreages from contamination by neighbour conventional farms was not as easy as it might be in big-scale farms in many western countries. And the requirement for a buffer zone in organic acreage for that purpose is apparently a substantial loss for organic farmers, whose farm acreages are typically small. At this point, the above-mentioned pesticide spraying from airplane (*kuusan*) has become problematized again, since with the JAS organic standards the organic farms that risk exposure to *kuusan* were obliged to establish large buffer zones.[129] Especially around the year 2000 the problem of *kuusan* led to collective protests by JOAA, Tokyo Group for Protesting Pesticides, and Syokunou Net (the Network for Food and Agriculture), triggered by the incident of an organic farmer in Nagano Prefecture, who caught pesticides from an airplane as he was putting up red flags to show the pesticide-free area. The organisations claimed, on the one hand, that the organic standards would force organic farmers to take measures to solve a problem which was not caused by them. On the other hand, they accused the long-standing ignorance of the authorities on the negative impacts of *kuusan* and, more fundamentally, pesticides. By combining the *kuusan* issue with the negative consequence of organic standards, they argued the former would seriously harm the economy of organic farmers, because if it contaminates their organic farms, the produce can no longer be sold as organic. In response, MAFF agreed on the regulation for *kuusan* to include responsibility to avoid contamination of organic farms, and specified that this responsibility rests with the organiser of *kuusan*. [130]

Establishing JOAA's own standards

As the JAS organic standards became a real policy agenda in 1997, the JOAA's board members and its division of Teikei and Standards increased their effort to establish its own standards. In February 1998 at the General Assembly the proposal for "the Basic Objectives of Organic Agriculture" consisting of seven articles (later added more) was approved. At the same time, Teikei and Standards distributed the draft of the JOAA's own standards, which were based on the IFOAM Basic Standards, as reference material to be discussed. The revised version of this draft was proposed at the following General Assembly in 1999 and its

[129]While the actual requirement for the size of this buffer zone depends on individual certification bodies, the rule of the International Nature Farming Research Center, for instance, sets minimum 10m in the case of ordinary airplane and 3m with radio-controlled airplane (International Nature Farming Research Center, 2006).

[130] Homepage of the Tokyo Group for Protesting Pesticides.
http://home.e06.itscom.net/chemiweb/ladybugs/indpes3.htm (Checked on 13.09.2012).

own organic standards were finally approved. As such, the organisation managed to formulate its own standards just before the enforcement of the JAS organic standards in April 2000.[131]

Around the late 1990s, JOAA saw standards as urgently necessary to prevent the diffusion of incorrect labelling of organic agriculture, express organic agriculture's rejection of GMOs and signify the risk of pesticides and other agricultural materials, such as plastic as a hormone-disturbing substance. Some of the leaders stated that:

> When we make a "standard," people [farmers] who have not yet reached the level of the standards must make more effort. But we have to remember that standard is not all about that. Instead, the standards are meant to take responsibility for the word "organic." We are making space for recognising what it is, observing objectively the content of own organic agriculture, researching collectively, through talking and discussing "standards" as a common language…There are quite a few who understand "standards" as pressure from above and from the outside. We cannot deny this point under the current process of standardisation. But that is why we have been making an effort to establish our own "basic standard." Regardless of *teikei* or not, the present situation needs standards in order to make the production site transparent to convince consumers and other producers (Kubota and Uozumi, 1999, p.3).

Furthermore, JOAA's definition decided to totally prohibit the use of genetically modified seeds, saplings, produce and harvest. Imported rapeseed meal, soy meal and corn were not allowed for fodder or manure in organic agriculture, as there was no labelling system for those things. Farmers had to find a way to get those domestically or to organise self-sufficiency.

Organisational change

The last couple of years before the new millennium were also the time for the organic organisations for structural change. As the Law on Promoting Specific Non-profit Activities (so-called NPO Law) was established in March 1998 (enforced from December), the existing local organic organisations started considering obtaining the newly formed official status as incorporated non-profit organisation (hereafter NPO). Furthermore, some were considering getting this status also as certification bodies for the purpose of the organic movement. That is to say, in contrast to the third-party certification as stated by the JAS standards, the intention was to provide the second-party certification, which is derived from the organic community itself and facilitate the service with low user cost. Already in 1999 the member organisations in Hokkaido and Hyogo (the above-mentioned HOAA) became NPOs with certification service, and several others have obtained the NPO status without certification service.

JOAA's administration proposed to apply for the NPO status to "promote the social acknowledgement of the organic movement" and "consider potentials for getting contract projects" (JOAA, 1999, p.11). This proposal was agreed at JOAA's General Assembly in 2000 without protest. In order to comply with the NPO Law, JOAA reformed the organisational structure and membership.

In the new structure, the stable 12 departments are settled, in contrast to the former structure based on nine divisions, including one which could be established occasionally when the directorial board approved it as necessary. Soon after that, the old managerial system, which consisted of the directorial board, whose members were directly selected from the individual prefectures and later approved at the General Assembly, was changed. The new system facilitated a national directorial board, which consists of, among others, the representatives of the newly established regional bloc council, the directorial board, the advisory directors and the auditor above the afore-mentioned 12 departments. The intension of the national board and the regional bloc

[131] However, as a result of the request from the organic community, the MAFF allowed a preparation period for obligatory organic certification until April 2001 (JOAA, 2000).

council is to strengthen interaction with members outside Tokyo. Yet although this national board and directorial board (as well as advisory directors and auditor) are situated horizontally, the actual power of the directorial board is the strongest in practice. The members of the directorial board are chosen from the national directorial board and must be approved each year at the General Assembly. This board also appoints chairperson and secretary general.

With the change in the membership structure, the new rule distinguishes between individual/organisational "management members" with voting rights at the General Assembly and "supporters" and "subscribers" of the organisation's magazine without voting rights. One can pay for more than one share of management membership, but the voting right is still one for each person. However, whereas this membership distinction was meant to stress and encourage the members' further engagement, it ultimately resulted in a drastic decline in the number of the engaged members, as the majority of existing members shifted to supporter or subscriber status: Just after the organisation introduced this new membership rule in 2001, only 218 of the 2907 members from the former year registered as management members (data as of January 2002), while the newly established supporter category counted 2377 individuals and 62 groups, and the subscriber category 79 individuals and 40 groups.[132] The tendency was reinforced in the following years as the total number of members declined. This was, to a large degree, caused by the fragmentation of the organic movement (see the next section).

As most of JOAA's income came from membership fees, the membership decrease could be fatal for the organisation. Yet economically, this was compensated by the elevation of the fee; in 2002 the management member's fee was doubled (from 4,500 JPY to 10,000 JPY), and so was the organisational membership to minimum 20,000 JPY. Furthermore, JOAA has occasionally received extra income from its publications and small grants. Since 2004, it has received a relatively stable and large sum of money for its advisory work on the organic area of the Agricultural Park in the Adachi District in Tokyo since 2004. The contract with the local authority yielded 3.4 million JPY in 2004, 6.5 million JPY in 2005 and 2006, and 7.6 million JPY in 2007. So despite the remarkable decrease in membership, JOAA's economy grew.

Overall, the internal structural change signifies professionalization of this organic organisation. While the different divisions for specific fields existed before, their activities had been more or less *ad hoc* and autonomous. Their communication with the managerial board had been voluntary, though functioning since many members of the divisions were board members, too. In the new structure each division was directly linked with the directorial board. This was expected to result in a more formalised and coordinated effort for the specific (divisional) issues, for instance establishment of different networks. The Seed and Sapling Network created in 2002 was formed by extending the existing effort of exchanging organic seeds and saplings for the diffusion of good breed and archiving them in a database. Today, it is a crucial practical attraction for organic farmers to join the organisation. Furthermore, by obtaining the formalised NPO status, JOAA gained general social acceptance as a functioning civil society organisation. Perhaps more importantly, the NPO status has given better access to the public sector and extended the opportunity to engage in organic food research financed (partially) by official grants and contract jobs like the Agricultural Park.

Fragmentation and stagnation

Meanwhile, networks of the organic actors were rapidly and continuously created and evolved. Just to name some, the council for the network of certification bodies was established in 2004, and the IFOAM Liaison, initially recommended by JOAA in 1997 as a network for organic actors, became an NPO, IFOAM Japan, in 2001.

[132] Materials for the JOAA's general assembly 2001 and 2002.

Collaboration in the organic community has taken more substantial shape since 2005, represented by the nationwide assembly for promoting the establishment of the Organic Law in March. This assembly was organised by 23 organic organisations/entrepreneurs including IFOAM Japan, *Daichi*, *Polan*, a *Sekaikyuuseikyou*, academics (including the director of JAOAS, Kiichi Nakajima) and many member organisations of JOAA, but not directly JOAA. The assembly was triggered by the formation of the above-mentioned trans-party Diet Members' Federation for the Promotion of Organic Agriculture in April 2004, which punctuated that organic agriculture finally received substantial support from the state. Consequently, there emerged a realistic prospect for the establishment of the Organic Law toward April 2006. The leading organisers stressed at this assembly that the JAS organic standards have resulted in increased organic import, but clearly not the development of organic agriculture and its spirit of *shindofuji* in the country. 86.5% of organic consumption relied on import, while domestic goods accounted for only 13.5%. Similarly, there were only 4451 JAS certified domestic organic farms, compared to 8729 foreign farms (Honjoh, 2004, p.15). In the assembly, the problem organic agriculture was encountering was connected to the general agricultural problems, such as rapid drops in food prices, discouragement of farmers and aging of the farming population. All these factors had the same cause, namely the policy that supports economic globalisation. This argumentation stressed that organic agriculture requires a national policy for substantial reconstruction of the national agriculture, and that such policy must be based on the transformation of the present import-dependent trajectory of the JAS organic standards toward self-sufficiency and environmental protection. Despite the short notice, the assembly managed to gather approximately 300 people (Change Agriculture!, 2006, p.80, 82-83)

The envisagement of this assembly was succeeded by five more conferences/assemblies over the next ten months. Among them, the roundtable conference for constructing a new movement in June 2005 agreed upon six points of the movement's direction: 1) to increase national food sufficiency, 2) to cherish the Japanese agriculture and ensure a better natural environment for the next generations, 3) to tackle the conversion of the whole agriculture to environmentally conscious agriculture centred upon organic agriculture, 4) to protest against the expansion of food import and to promote food self-sufficiency and protection of agriculture as the world norm, 5) to promote *chisanchisyou*, which succeeds the food culture through collaboration with local agricultural communities, and 6) to promote measures to improve conditions for new farmers. Those points were raised in the declaration made at the national assembly in March 2006, titled "Change Agriculture! (*Nou wo kaetai!*)":

> We envisage creating local visions and exchanging them for bringing solidarity between local communities. By appreciating difference in opinions as a sign of the movement's breadth, we envisage creating rich human relationship, which can oppose to globalisation enforcing centralisation of values. Let's exchange our ideas for the new generation's agriculture and gather inspirational experiences. Let's create the prospect for the nation-wide movement from there (Declaration for the Assembly Change Agriculture!, 2006).

The intensive collaboration to organise seven big meetings during one year generated new ties between organic actors who had not formerly collaborated. The core organisers proposed establishing a national network for a wide range of actors, with the name the National Council for Organic Agriculture Organisations (later the National Council for Promoting Organic Agriculture: hereafter *Zenyukyou*). However, the new network exposed the division in the organic community. In the eyes of JOAA, *Zenyukyou* was established unreasonably without sufficient discussion and information: In the letter stating its rejection for participation, JOAA complained that the two parts misunderstood each other in the whole process of building this network. The first meeting did not discuss the content of the charter and rules of the network, and the agreement for establishment was already made at the next meeting, which was supposed to be a preparatory meeting, and even though JOAA's chairperson had announced that he would be absent beforehand. It claimed that the following meeting proceeded as if the establishment was a *fait accompli*, and JOAA's objection was not taken. Furthermore, it objected the intention of the *Zenyukyou*'s organisers to appoint the JOAA's chairper-

son Kisaku Sato as its first representative, although his organisation did not agree on this network. The letter finally stated that: "to support the Organic Law, it is crucial that each organisation's thoughts and the past development of the movement be respected. It would be better to make space for each, rather than forcibly drawing them together" (JOAA, 2006, no.383, p.20). Consequently, JOAA separately established the Committee for Promotion of Organic Agriculture in March 2007. And hereby the fragmentation of the organic community became clear.

Corresponding to this internal disagreement and the rise of competing actors, JOAA's organisational strength decreased considerably in the 2000s. As seen in figure 15 below, the number of members with voting rights, which had been already declining since it peaked with 5673 in 1983, drastically dropped to 324 in 2007. Furthermore, while its current income sustains the highest level in 1986, the economy came to rely heavily on the public money it received for contract projects and member's fee from those who do not obtain voting right (figure 16).

Figure 15: Development in JOAA's membership



Figure 16: Development in JOAA's budget[133]



Analysis

Surrounding environment for JOAA

Opportunities in the preliminary phase

JOAA was founded in 1971, in the aftermath of the second wave of protest against the extension of the US-Japan Security Treaty from the late 1960s. Concern about pollution (*kougai*) and compensation for victims occupied public attention along with the filing of the four big pollution cases. The anti-pollution movement, which sometimes incorporated direct actions, grew throughout the 1960s towards the early 1970s. More directly connected to organic agriculture, a series of media reports exposed water contamination by agricultural chemicals, chemical residue in mother's milk, mass intoxication by commercial rice oil and many other food safety problems. This unsafe food situation also boosted the anti-pollution movement as well as consumer demands for food without chemicals and additives.

Despite the magnitudes of diverse social movements, the political opportunity structure (POS) remained closed and exclusive to new actors. This was to a large extent a result of the failure of the Left to consolidate as well as LDP (the Right) ability to exploit the opposition's failure. The left-wing forces, as represented by SDP, the Communist Party and affiliated organs, such as labour unions, naturally made a correlation between pollution, the LDP's drastic industrialisation policy and capitalist interests. They argued that pollution was a consequence of capital accumulation, which intrinsically had no interest in protecting citizens' health. They also framed the legal system's failure to compensate pollution victims as an injustice of capitalism. However, the left-wing parties could not gain sufficient power to be a real opposition for LDP. During the 1960s, the biggest opposition party, SDP, not only constantly lost considerable numbers of seats in the Diet, but also had to compete with other opposition parties, above all own breakup, Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), as

[133] Just as a reference, 1 DKK is 19 JPY at a rate of 23 April, 2014 (http://themoneyconverter.com/JPY/DKK.aspx). This is to suggest 2007 income of JOAA was approximately 1.85 million DKK. 2006 ØL had the total income of 21 million DKK.

well as Communist Party and the newly established central party Komeito. This diversification in the opposition did not generate a threat to LDP but rather weakened the opposition. Despite serious political turbulence, LDP managed to control the situation and consolidated the one-party majority in the Diet with strong corporate backing. The left-wing parties struggled with radicalised student groups against the Treaty and ultimately detached themselves from those groups. This not only put them in an ambiguous position, but also exposed to the general public the unresolved divide and internal hostility in the left-wing community, which was naturally exploited by LDP for its own benefit. Those all resulted in their electoral failures, and thus the left-wing did not bring significant change in POS.

Nonetheless, the anti-pollution movement led to the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency, Basic Law on Pollution and the law for compensation of pollution victims. Yet its collaboration with the left-wing parties did not quite develop afterwards, since, on the one hand, the movement itself, especially its non-partisan part, dissolved or split into different movements or local actions for environmental protection, safe food, etc. The organic movement was one of the places where many anti-pollution activists found their next objective. On the other hand, left-wing ideology and anti-pollution activism did not sufficiently penetrate each other for several reasons. Following the core focus of the former, the industry (capital) was responsible for pollution because it controls technology. Hence the left-wing parties dealt with the stricter regulations on industrial practices as a means to regain some control. As in the Danish case, they basically did not deny the necessity of industrialisation, and the solution was sought in the right choice or control of industrial technology. At this point their foremost emphasis was human prosperity in a material sense. In contrast, a crucial part of the anti-pollution activism was explicitly critical of industrialisation and, at a deeper level, of the prevailing idea of modernity that drove industrialisation. Here, the focus was not only human health but also health of the natural environment. The anti-pollution activists tended to require other solutions than the industrial trajectory. Furthermore, they still hesitated to associate with left-wing politics, as the exclusion of the Left had penetrated society deeply especially after the violent radicalisation in the 1960s concerning, e.g., employment, marriage and general human relations. The issue of pollution was therefore to a large degree framed within human health rather than within the crisis of the natural environment.

Environmental problems in Japan were not politically linked with pollution by the Left or the Right. Nor were issues like food contamination, water pollution and deterioration of farmers' health connected with agriculture. This disconnection was maintained by the strong iron triangle relationship among MAFF, LDP and agricultural co-operatives. The rural populations were crucial for LDP's electoral success for their electoral strength in relation to the urban population (and the continuance of the voting system itself was, and still is, the product of LDP's monopoly). The party thus nourished the group of agrarian politicians who tied up with their rural constituencies for mutual interests. In return, the farming community gained, among other things, the high rice price guaranteed by the state. In consequence, there was only *de facto* single farmers' party and single farmers' interest organisation in Japan. This indicates the agricultural policy community could sustain their mutual interests without internal competition. That is to say, LDP gained support from the agricultural community, agricultural cooperatives got monopoly on the trade of agricultural machines and chemicals and MAFF executives were promised well-paid positions in the cooperative's organ after their retirement.

The opportunity for alternative agriculture in the formal policy field was thus quite closed back then, but the opportunity in civil society was quite open as the concern for food safety and environmental problem was rising among the general public, and the concern led to locally organised activities for anti-pollution, protests against food scandals, banning of food additives, etc. For example, the novel of Ariyoshi aroused significant public attention to the dangers of pesticides, and had the same impact as Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*. Many of the first-generation organic activists entered the movement because of her novel. The so-called New Left activists who established themselves in rural areas also practiced non-chemical farming. Yet, their main

objective was not necessarily the development of alternative farming but the economic profit gained by the sales of non-chemical produce.

Unexploited opportunities: Weak civil society

Despite the policy community's neglect, alternative agriculture was rapidly diffusing among consumers, the market, and local authorities. "Safe food" boomed again after the Chernobyl incident in 1986. In response to this situation, the actors of the iron triangle began to acknowledge organic agriculture around what this study identified as the first institutional phase, namely the late 1980s. However this shift owed much to international pressure rather than recognition of the problems in conventional agriculture/food system. To some extent it was a reflection of the trend in the US and EU policies to focus on the environmental benefits of organic agriculture. Yet more substantially, policy-makers were interested in alternative agriculture as it could be used as an efficient basis for maintaining protection of domestic agriculture, when the international negotiation for open market become serious with the GATT Uruguay Round from 1986. Under LDP's economic plan from the 1960s, which prioritised the export-oriented industrial development, agriculture rapidly weakened and was reduced to the secondary (or non-prioritised) sector. While this policy improved farmhold income, this was basically done by transforming full-time farmers to part-time. The rural population was summoned as labour to the industry, and the huge migration to urban areas for permanent or seasonal jobs began. The negative consequences were the drastic nationwide reduction in the farming population, the aging of farming communities due to a lack of successors, and acutely declining national food sufficiency. The protection of the closed market, especially for rice, and price support thus became the central issue for the iron triangle.

As LDP was internally divided between agrarians and trade liberalists, the traditional alliance between LDP and farming community was wobbling. Furthermore, public criticism of the acute situation of national agriculture and food import dependency was rising. POS and DOS were opening in this period. However, the civic demands for food safety and food security were still not sufficiently organised on the national level and were mostly limited to small-scale local actions. A partial reason may be the overrepresentation of grassroots activism in civil society. Typically, actions for food issues were conducted by consumer groups, which gathered for the specific local focus, such as the school food scheme and the support of own local farmers, rather than the nationwide focus. Their practices were more *ad hoc* without a formal organisational structure, and thus a stable network was difficult to establish. Consequently, these local actions failed to be a unifying force, and there was no development from NIMBYism (Not-in-my-backyardism) to NIABYism (Not-in-anybody's-backyardism). Furthermore, the status of the civil society in the 1990s suggests a correlation between the absence of consolidated national food-related activism and the delay in the development of "professional" activist organisations capable of making strategic alliances with different actors. This type of organisation was clearly underdeveloped other than traditional labour organisations though the latter's organisational strength was no longer robust.[134] It should be noted that the lack of a formal system for supporting civic participation was crucial, considering that the actual development of professional civil society organisations was rapid after the establishment of the so-called NPO (non-profit-organisation) Law in 1998.

In the absence of consolidated movements, agricultural policy in the 1990s, which this study categorised as the second institutionalisation phase, ultimately chose the trajectory that made organic agriculture submerge into the broad policy framework called, among other things, "environmentally-friendly agriculture," "sustainable agriculture" and later, "eco-farmer scheme." This basically reduced it to a mere sub-category of special farming methods. Consequently, Japan's institutionalisation of organic agriculture clearly followed

[134] For a study of declining influence of labour unions in Japan, see Kobayashi, Y. and I. Tatewaki (2003). Targets of the labour movement and fragmentation of social movements. Social Movements. T. Kitakawa, T. Shiobara and O. Hasumi. Tokyo, Tokyo University Press.

the state's non-interventionist norm. Policy did not set a clear national target for how reduction of agricultural chemicals and synthetic fertilizers, and neither envisaged providing effective regulative measures nor systemic economic support to advance sustainable agriculture. A clear example was the guideline for labelling special methods in 1992, which merely stated advisory definitions of different sustainable farming methods. Although the guideline was made in reaction to increase in fraudulent labelling in the market, it was hardly effective as local definitions were allowed and no legal binding was enacted. The guideline clearly did not contribute to better consumer information about organic agriculture either, but, on the contrary, to further confusion in the market, as labelling as non-chemical/-synthetic fertilizer continued to be permitted without inspection.[135] The subsequent national JAS organic standards did not change the orientation of the policy community, but was a passive reaction to international pressure and exploited by MAFF for its own benefit.

Policy integration of organic agriculture: mechanisms for institutionalisation

Despite the rise in opportunities in the 1990s, the organic community did not immediately work to affect the policy. Yet around and during the 2000s, coalitions between broad actors within civil society and the formal political field for a more substantial organic policy finally emerged. This resulted in the so-called Organic Law, which declared national support for organic agriculture, in late 2006. This development can be explained from the perspective of different interlocking mechanisms as discussed in Chapter 5. This subsection focuses on the two mechanisms which are viewed as analytically external to the targeted organisation JOAA, while the organisation's internal mechanism is pursued below.

Institutional-relational mechanism

First of all, looking at the formal institutional aspect, the iron triangle still existed but was weakening along with the end of the LDP's one-party dominance from 1996. The division for party support in the farming community became obvious especially at the emergence of the real opposition, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 1998, which absorbed some conservative agrarian LDP politicians and the existed centre-left parties. The LDP government had already lost most of its credibility as the guardian of national agriculture, and its policy direction punctuated in the new Agricultural Law in 1999 and the subsequent measures basically specified the national approval of international competition. The main solution to national food self-sufficiency was found in the restructuring of the sector from the dominant small-scale family farms towards bigger entrepreneur farms. This direction was exacerbated under the Koizumi administration during 2002 and 2007, which pushed forward a clear neo-liberal policy characterised by small government and de-regulation. As evident in the "offensive agricultural policy" proposed back then, the focus was now the (East Asian) regional market based on the EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement),[136] and the domestic agriculture was to focus on competitive products and abandon non-competitive. Export of high quality Japanese produce was to be targeted. In contrast, DPJ raised a more protectionist policy by justifying state support as necessary for stimulating multi-functionality and sustainable development of agriculture. In this emphasis on non-economic values of agriculture, organic agriculture was targeted as a priority. The party raised organic agriculture not only as a solution to agri-environmental problems, but also as the driving force in revitalising the rural community and the agricultural sector. The contrast in agricultural policy between LDP and DPJ partially stemmed from the "urbanisation" of the former advanced particularly during the period of Koizumi, who

[135] In practice, this trajectory of integrated farming and absence of clear official regulation made the entrance of foreign goods with special methods difficult, and thus it worked for the protection of the domestic market for this produce. This included organic goods, whose formal and relatively coherent labelling systems were already established in the West, e.g. in the EU, the US and Australia, up till the mid-1990s. As the market in Japan did not have a legitimate organic certification system, the sales of imported organic goods were generally not only difficult but also unprofitable.

[136] The vision has later developed into Japan's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which in 2006 comprised Singapore, Brunei, Chili, and New Zealand. Inclusion of the US, Australia, Vietnam, Peru, Canada, Malaysia, Colombia, and Japan is currently being discussed.

openly criticised his own party's factionalism and advocated provocatively to "destroy LDP." His popularity, which somehow sustained LDP as the governing party, came largely from the urban population, and thus the agrarian group in the party could not impose the interests of the rural population as before. DPJ's agricultural policy-making was not only strongly affected by the former LDP agrarian politicians, who wanted to protect national agriculture from outside influence, and gave space to individual politicians like Martti Turunen, who was personally enthusiastic about organic agriculture. Turunen also had electoral support from *Sekaikyuseikyou*, which had traditionally supported LDP, as he joined the sect as a believer.[137] On the whole, the advocacy of organic agriculture fit well with DPJ's political line, which inclined towards welfarism, environmentalism, and a centre-left social democratic banner. That made it distinctive from the LDP's neoliberal politics, which implicitly required self-recovery of agriculture.

Consequently, the more aggressive integration of organic agriculture into policy was pushed forward on DPJ's initiative. Among others, the trans-party Diet Members' Federation for Promotion of Organic Agriculture was a crucial organ. An LDP politician was chairperson of the Federation, because it was preferred that a member of the governing party held the top position. As I heard from multiple persons in the field, the substantial power to set the direction for organic policy was concentred with Turunen, the head of the secretariat. Indeed, the process and end-product of the Organic Law reflect more of DPJ's politics than the LDP's, which initially claimed that organic agriculture could be promoted via existing measures. This may indicate the LDP's actual (i.e. relational) power was supressed in the organic discussion in the mid-2000s. Crucially, the establishment of the Law also demonstrates the mitigation of MAFF's influence, as the drafting chiefly took place outside it. In addition, the drafting of this law took a rather extraordinary route of the legislation at the instance of House members, which enabled the policy proposal made outside the Cabinet and MAFF to be passed. This route is normally not taken unless there is enough support in the two houses. The enabling of the law itself thus may reflect the broad political approval for the promotion of organic agriculture.

Meanwhile professionalization of activist groups gained speed with the so-called NPO (Non-Profit-Organisation) Law in 1998, which made it easier for voluntary associations to gain legal status as an NPO Corporation. Albeit the status did not give much tax benefit at the start (though it widened the possibility in 2006 and again in 2012), it was generally welcomed as promoting the democratic process of civic participation. As the registration requires the formal article of incorporation, many groups and organisations have chosen to modernise their structure to the more orthodox professional organisational style with a democratically elected top and committee as well as specific divisions. Furthermore, and crucially for the movement, it made civil society organisations more visible to the general public and authorities. In the field of the organic activism, many existing organic organisations have registered as NPOs with organic accreditation function around the establishment of the national JAS organic standards in 2000. This has clearly extended their organisational routines to more systematic assignments of accreditation, which intrinsically meant interaction with authorities, businesses, and of course, farmers. In addition, as organisations for common benefits, they were more encouraged to facilitate the space, say, seminars, workshops, and conventions, to non-members. The growing role as professional expert body has often transformed voluntary activists to paid staff. That is to say, now their experiences and networks have turned out to be materialised. Considering those points, civil society has finally started to develop what Van der Heijden called the second step of institutionalisation, namely, internal institutionalisation.

Symbolic-cultural mechanism

Focusing on the discursive field, organic agriculture has begun to constitute the counter-discourse against trade liberalisation and the interlocking discourse for localism and nationalism. As discussed further in the below sub-sections, the traditional formulations of the organic movement, such as "indivisibility of body and

[137]Interview with Hideo Miura, 4 March 2008.

soil (*shindofuji*)," "produce locally, eat locally (*chisan chisyou*)," "face-to-face relationship," were growingly linked by broad critical civil society actors with the desperate condition of the farming community and national food self-sufficiency, as well as environmental protection and deterioration of food safety. In this line of narratives the source of the problem was frequently found in the US dominated economic globalisation, which was determined to erode non-economic values of agriculture. Thus it claimed the solution was to detach the national agriculture from this process by, for instance, revitalising local engagement in food production and consumption, encouraging traditional Japanese food habits, and developing an alternative market not driven by price competition. All in all, this indicates that the linkage between organic agriculture and the general problem of agriculture was becoming increasingly normalised in the discursive field. Organic agriculture, in consequence, has become a politically more conflictual subject. Unlike in the former phases, it gradually became approved by a broader range of actors as a real alternative to the economic globalisation trajectory. Consequently, the discourse of organic agriculture has around this time departed from the small organic community which tended towards self-help and "non-political" positioning, and developed toward a public discourse.

Organisational orientation of JOAA

Basic orientation

The leading organisation for the organic movement, JOAA, was established in 1971 "to pursue and establish an agricultural method which does not destroy the environment, but maintain and nourish soil fertility and produce healthy and tasty food" (Terms of Organisation Article 1). Thanks to the founder, Teruo Ichiraku's, social status and network, the JOAA's founding directorial board consisted of high-positioned figures from traditional agricultural organisations, consumer cooperatives and universities, as well as some well-known individuals in the alternative agriculture community. The high social status of the leaders, particularly in the traditional iron triangle circle, constituted the elite-driven foundation of the organisation. Thus it has not easily been discounted as is normally the case for small civic social movements. The name of the organisation in Japanese (*yuukinougyou kenkyuukai*) meaning "research society for organic agriculture" also hints at an academic society.

The membership has been open to anyone who agreed with the organisation's objectives.[138] Yet as it envisaged economic and ideological independency, JOAA has maintained (and still maintains) a quite stringent line for excluding commercial interests. Its economy has managed only by self-earned income, such as membership fee, activities like seminars and workshops, selling of own publications, etc., until recently. The members' magazine has not allowed advertisements, and the organisational works were managed on a volunteer basis. It is also worth mentioning that JOAA had a relatively good economy as a small organisation due to donations from affiliated agricultural organisations, with which the executive board members and Ichiraku were affiliated. The same stringency was seen in its rejection of political and religious purposes. Although this has not banned participation by persons with political and/or religious affiliations, it reflects the organisation's intention to avoid being labelled as religious/political. Considering the circumstances of the 1970s, religious and political incentives could indeed potentially penetrate JOAA. As confirmed by some (cf. Tabeta and Masugata, 1981), the existing farmers' practices for alternative (non-chemical) agriculture were chiefly motivated by religious reasoning and criticism of pollution, in addition to own health problems due to chemicals. Also, those who joined the organic movement with anti-pollution incentives tended to be anti-LDP and more sympathetic to left-wing politics and parties.[139] Both religious and political actors have been the important constituencies of the organisation. However, it was primarily their farming knowledge and a

[138] The terms of membership specifically mentions medical scientists. This indicates that health deterioration of farmers by pesticides has been one of the major incentives for organic activists.

[139] Interview with Setsuko Shirone, 24 October, 2006.

broad critical stance towards the government that allowed them to be integrated in the organisational; as evident in the Terms of Organisation, JOAA would not participate in any kind of political, religious and civic action, "unless it is found necessary by almost all members" (Amano and Ichiraku, 1989 (1986), p.54).

Apparently this strict line of economic and ideational independence has driven the organisation towards a *non-political orientation*. I call it non-political particularly in terms of its avoidance of interaction not only with institutional actors but also with other civil society activism. Formal political actors, as represented by the iron triangle, were most often viewed by the organisation as the perpetrators, and clearly not potential partners. "The control of agriculture's direction by agricultural policy has increased tremendously after WWII," and this has radically degraded the authenticity of agriculture in the name of "modernisation" (Ichiraku, 1989 (1975)-a, p.2). Meanwhile, JOAA's stringent line to exclude commercial interests has made collaboration with the emerging new generation of actors in the organic community difficult, if not impossible. Organic enterprises like *Daichi*, *Polan* and *Radishboya* have generally been eschewed by JOAA's leaders. Especially Ichiraku was clearly critical of the new actors. Several interviewees recalled that, at a General Assembly he shouted at the leader of *Daichi* that stock-corporations must leave the room. Furthermore, collective actions with other social movements and on its own have rarely happened, since it has been extremely difficult to reach internal consensus for collective actions. For the realisation of action, direct relations with organic agriculture must be recognised by the majority. In consequence, while the petitions against the JAS organic standards, *kuusan* and the construction of new golf courses did materialise, protests against nuclear energy did not.

In addition, under JOAA's independence policy, collaboration with other collective actors has been not only non-political but also limited. Especially before the 1990s, that is to say, when the state institutionalisation of organic agriculture did not seriously start, it took place almost only within the limited circle of its member organisations and groups, which were not homogenous and spread all over the country. Yet their diversity was still restricted within the range of the organic community; i.e. which can be characterised as local consumer and/or farmer groups (often doing *teikei*), consumer co-operatives, anti-pollution groups, and, though regarded as heresy, (movement-minded) organic enterprises. Those who were in the iron triangle and affiliated with or targeted institutional politics, such as politicians, agricultural bureaucrats, traditional agricultural organisations and "half-way houses" (Kriesi, 1996), namely, civic organisation with close relationships with formal actors, have participated in JOAA as individuals, but not to establish stable and formal inter-organisational collaboration. Personal networks of the members with actors of the state system have not been actively exploited to affect policy. The focus was, rather, to enlighten them about their organisations' wrongdoing.

All in all, JOAA's orientation is in line with many aspects of the new social movement: Firstly, it has a clear over-representation of elite with non-materialist values (new middle class) in the leadership. Secondly, it has been *self-limited*, in terms of restricting its field of fight *outside* institutional politics, business/market and, more or less, other social movements.

Internal division and persistence of organisational orientation

In the 2000s, especially with the establishment of the organic law in the mid-2000s, JOAA experienced internal division, which can be characterised as the eventual manifestation of the purist-pragmatist struggle. From JOAA's point of view, it still had to work on "self-sufficiency and *teikei*" (JOAA material for the National Conference 2008). The newly formed national network *Zenyukyou* intended to open to other ways than the JOAA's traditional *teikei* and exclusion of business/profit-making actors.

Based on this study's historical overview, the difference in the movement direction has existed for a long time before the start of this visible division. Yet, it had not formerly developed into a serious internal conflict, since, firstly, it has been acknowledged as the leading organisation for organic agriculture and was capable

of summoning local collective actors for this field over the country, but it actually has not established itself as the central organisation for the national movement. There was no hierarchical relationship between JOAA and the member organisations, and decisions made by the former did not formally bind the latter. This flat and non-centralised structure was initially chosen and maintained based on the ideal shared among the pioneer members in the 1970s: The organisation from the start envisioned agriculture to be based on local conditions and needs, and thus, central decision-making was not chosen. This spirit is also evident in its long-standing rejection to establish unified organic standards and definitions. Furthermore, as clearly reflected in the concept of *teikei*, "over-reliance on a limited number of leaders" should be avoided and responsibility must be shared by all. This is claimed to lead to the desirable "democratic management" (Teikei Principle nr.7). Similarly, it advocates that *teikei* groups must keep an "appropriate size," since the envisaged face-to-face and friendly relationship between producer and consumer was expected to be difficult in big organisations (Teikei Principle nr.9). As these points suggest, JOAA intentionally did *not* to step forward to what Van der Heijden calls the second stage of institutionalisation; namely, internal institutionalisation, characterised by centralisation and professionalization. Due to this resistance towards institutionalisation and the above-mentioned non-political and self-limited orientation, the organisation has functioned mostly as a forum for exchanging ideas, opinions, experiences, and knowledge, rather than as a place for organising collective action.

To be sure, the organisation has not been totally stagnant and remained unchanged; in fact the changes in the last couple of decades are important. Particularly (half-hearted) policy institutionalisation of organic agriculture in the 1990s, led it to revise its rejection of standards. Facing those situations, JOAA started collaboration with other civic organisations/groups mostly in the consumer movement. Also, its interaction with policy agents increased remarkably, as it was (still) recognised as the representative of the organic community. As such, the organisation was no longer non-political in the real sense. Furthermore, when it obtained NPO status, it took on a more orthodox formal organisational structure with distinct division of roles. This makes it look much more like a professional and centralised organisation and it appears to approach the stage of Van der Heijden's internal institutionalisation.

Despite those changes, the basic organisational orientation has not been significantly transformed, since the necessity for change was not generally recognised by the leaders, especially Ichiraku and his successors. Ichiraku's influence continues up till today; for example, "the founder Teruo Ichiraku and organic agriculture" was the title of a lecture at JOAA's annual convention in 2008. The organisation has also strengthened its emphasis on the need to "go back to the origin," which re-inforced *teikei* by establishing the nation-wide Teikei Network and publishing Teikei Handbook. According to Noboru Honjoh, professor in agricultural economics, former employee at the Fair Trade Commission,[140] and a central figure in post-Ichiraku JOAA:

> …Teikei consumers who deal with organic produce are taking a different direction than the ordinary consumer movement. They namely eat the whole farm without claiming their right to choose. Those are the consumers supporting the present organic agriculture in Japan, and that is the true stance for supporting organic agriculture (Honjoh, 2005, p.8).[141]

In contrast to this ongoing emphasis by JOAA's leadership, however, the limitation of *teikei* has already been recognised in the organic community, as the diffusion appears to have peaked in the late 1980s and many groups are experiencing stagnancy or worse (Hatano, 1998). *Teikei*, which requires physical (as well as mental) proximity, is in reality difficult in some regions where there are not enough consumers or producers

[140] Fair Trade Commission is an external bureau of the Cabinet Office which is in charge of the operation of antitrust law.

[141] Material for Environmental Symposium "Food, Consumers, Agriculture; Food Safety and Environmental Protection" 5 July, 2005.

in near distance. An interviewee, who is an organic farmer affiliated with the left-wing farmers' association *Nouminren* and frequently joined JOAA's activities in the past, said that he found JOAA's advocacy for keeping the small size of the group unrealistic for the nation-wide development of organic agriculture. This was why he left the organisation.[142]

This leaders' loyalty to the movement's ideals and failure to tackle obstacles and struggles in practice is certainly a ground for the internal division. Yet I argue that the fundamental problem lies also in the organisational orientation that continued to allow a handful of leaders to control the core management. Due to its strong non-profit mentality, organisational tasks have long being conducted without notable economic rewards. As much as this hindered organic activism to be the members' profession (and thus, delayed what Van der Hejden calls "internal professionalization"), the organisational management depended heavily on the leaders who devoted themselves to JOAA. They were formally elected at the General Assembly or appointed directly by the legitimate actor (e.g. the directorial board). However what made them more special than other leaders was that they managed to obtain an actual sense of power to govern the organisational direction, which went beyond the normal prospect of their position. This is described in sociological terminology as actual "relational" power. It existed tacitly in the social relationships among members and exceeded the "normative" power of their intended role (cf. Mouzelis, 2008). Ichiraku had considerable influence on agenda-setting and decisions regardless of which position he held. This tradition has been taken over by some leaders in the post-Ichiraku period with the new organisational structure. Those leaders created a small circle of their own, which consisted of certain groups of people who had the will, time, and economic stability to dedicate themselves to JOAA; they were typically academics at universities and devoted leaders of *teikei* consumer or farmer groups. This small leaders' circle usually managed to circumvent internal criticism. Critical voices were raised at meetings and occasionally in the members' magazine (cf. Taniguchi in JOAA, 1988c, p.15-22: Sakaiya in JOAA, 1988b, p.12-13: Yoshida in JOAA, 1996, p. 4-5:JOAA, 1997b, p.16-17). However, further discussion or action was rare, and *status quo* prevailed. The following citation shows the characteristic argumentation of the leadership.

> I think teikei constitutes a miraculous ideal in the "lost age" drowning in materialism. Since this circle is too idealistic, its realisation is often difficult, and thus, its diffusion is halting right now. I consider this situation is fine. Then the right things to do now are the further exploration of agricultural method and revision of life-style, while maintaining the present status. The expansion of the movement can be done by the new organisations around us. Albeit these organisations seem to be irresponsible and chaotic according to our standards, they are pragmatic and powerful as they surpass ideals. I think they are the vanguard for generalisation of the movement. The job for our JOAA could be to join them at the foot of the table. And when they ask us an opinion, we should talk modestly about our experiences to be used as a reference for them (Sonoyama in JOAA, 1988a, p.15).

Those leaders with actual power have also tended to hinder open discussion of critical issues. The General Assembly I directly observed in 2008 even changed the voting method from the traditional way of lifting a voting card to handclap, which made it impossible to count how many disagreed with the motion. The chair was also decided beforehand by the leaders. According to some old members, the reason was that the elected chairperson of the former year was critical of the leadership and heated debates broke out at the Assembly.

The organic movement has currently reached the stage of re-structuring the traditional grassroots orientation. The orientation had been established and accepted under the proposition of decisions at JOAA would *not* regulate or bind local movement activities. However, along with the institutionalisation of organic agriculture, the common decisions for the national organic movement were found more crucial than ever. Consequently, being a mere forum is no longer considered durable. The establishment of *Zenyukyou* and its parallel

[142] Interview with Toshiyuki Saito, 23 November, 2005.

activity *the National Movement for Change Agriculture* in the mid-2000s by critical people from the organic community represents critical reflection on the absence of a functional space for organising nation-wide collective actions. One of the core persons for *Zenyukyou*, Rei Ozaki, asserts this point.

> We cannot step forward to the next stage without reconstruction of the organic agriculture and movement by verifying all its idea, objective, technique, distribution, food, Teikei, etc. Thirty years has passed after the movement started, and now we are in the time of generation change. We cannot avoid this process (Ozaki in JOAA, 2005, p.27).

Based on this aspiration for renewal, these new initiatives aimed to put "policy proposal" in front of their objectives.[143] And crucially, they included the actors whom the organic community has traditionally differentiated itself from, namely farmers practicing reduced-chemical farming (i.e. so-called "eco-farmers" in MAFF's scheme), non-*teikei* consumer movement and organic food businesses. Although *teikei* was not denied, it was preferred to express that as one of the possible ways for the movement.

> The establishment of organic certification system is favourable from the consumers' viewpoint, since it means the expansion of the market wherein they can buy things which they like as much as and whenever they want. This also means now producers enter the time for choice. That is to say, it depends on individual producers whether they enter the ordinary market by getting certification, try *teikei* or create own networks. Basically, organic produce, which could be obtained only by involving in the organic movement before, starts to function as an object, namely, commodity, by its integration into the ordinary distribution system. At any rate, it is better for the organic movement to recognise the reality of the arrival to such stage, and think about what it responds to that, rather than debating on certification or *teikei* (JOAA, 2008, p.26)..

Symbolic packaging of yuuki

When we look at the discursive aspects of JOAA, it is crucial that "organic" has been formulated as "*yuuki*" in Japanese. Ichiraku's choice of the word has resulted in the distinction of *yuuki* from alternative agricultural methods, but also often, if not always, from imported organic food. In other words, it contains the specific struggle of the organic movement envisaged by JOAA. There are different stories about why he chose this precise word, other than it is the direct Japanese translation of "organic". He was strongly inspired by the British pioneer, Albert Howard's *Agricultural Testament* (first published in England in 1940) and American J.I Rodale's *Pay Dirt: Farming and Gardening with Compost* (published in 1945), and both used the term organic agriculture (Yasuda, 1986: JOAA, 1989). Nonetheless, it was definitely a novel word to describe agricultural method in the 1970s. Furthermore, compared to *Sekaikyuseikyo*'s "*shizen*," which is equivalent to nature/natural, and "*munouyaku*" meaning non-chemical/pesticides, it is not clear what the word signifies. The word was chosen anyway and introduced a brand new discursive formulation of alternative agriculture.

The following sub-sections discuss JOAA's discursive formulation of "what *yuuki* is". As explained in Chapter 5, this study applies the three symbolic packages of organic agriculture. JOAA's packaging is analysed on the basis of *yuuki* 1) as scientific, 2) as alternative to conventional, and 3) as integrative to conventional. In contrast to the Danish case, its formulation has largely concentrated on the second package, though the recent fragmentation generated a new discursive line moving towards the third package. Also unlike the Danish case, JOAA's use of scientific argumentation is rather subtle. For this reason, the next sub-sections give more space to the discursive construction of alternativeness than the other two.

[143] Zenyuukyou's homepage. http://www.zenyukyo.or.jp/ [Last checked 26 September 2013].

Yuuki as alternative to conventional: Retrieving the authentic agriculture

While there certainly are variations between Ichiraku and his colleagues/followers, it is safe to say that the formulation of *yuuki* agriculture at JOAA has constituted their common ground. Especially the statements of leaders, most remarkably Ichiraku, have been frequently referred to as the organisation's standpoints and are collected in its publication *The Proposal for Organic Agriculture* (1989). The common ground is, first of all, characterised by their explicit criticism of "modernised" agriculture. This criticism is based on a clear picture of modern society as divided between industry and agriculture as well as urban and rural, wherein the former dominates the latter. Based on this view, JOAA underlines agriculture as qualitatively different from industry; i.e. agriculture essentially works with the natural environment and *creates life*, while industry is inorganic, abiotic and does not concern life. This point is illustrated in the following words of Ichiraku.

> I have just told you "to nurture crops." This is generally equivalent to "to produce agricultural produce." If we eat industrial products, it may be OK to say "to produce," but we eat animals and plants, which are nurtured by ourselves, because there is not enough naturally-growing food. Everyone, we don't say "to produce a child," right? Children must be nurtured. It is same for food, since it is the source of life and it is made by nurturing lives. It is fundamentally different from industrial products (Ichiraku in JOAA, 1989a, p.66).

While the emphasis on life is consistent with the widely shared notion of "indivisibility between soil and health" in the international organic community, the metaphor of "life" often disappears as organic agriculture becomes more dominantly captured in technical terms, for instance as farming methods and standards. The discursive development in Denmark suggests this tendency. By contrast, JOAA has been persistent with the focus on life, and this has constituted the common formulation of *yuuki* as a movement for "*retrieving the authentic agriculture*" or a "social reform." Conventional agriculture, which "industrialises" agriculture in the name of "modernisation," is depicted as a diversion from its innate disposition. Based on this problematique the organisation asserts that "retrieval of agriculture's autonomy from industry" is essential.

For JOAA, however, this diversion is more firmly rooted in the dominant policy paradigm of "*economic rationalism*", which reduces people to "homo economicus", who ignore the non-economic value of agriculture, most importantly, its contribution to life and health (JOAA, 1971:1989a:Ichiraku, 1989 (1975)-b). In this view, thus, it is the prevailing practice and *idea* that systematically hinder agriculture from pursuing sustenance and enhancement of life. For this reason, the organisation demands a radical transformation of the *whole* system, which encompasses farming methods, economic practices, paradigms, values and lifestyle (Yasuda, 1986:Minamida, 1995). Such a transformation should envisage a food system that prioritises "human health and survival of a nation" over "the economic values and considerations" (JOAA, 1971). Based on this vision, JOAA primarily targets the separation of agriculture from orthodox economics and free-market competition, as well as de-commodification of agricultural produce.

JOAA's movement discourse originally envisioned that the proposed radical transformation would be led by farmers. As stated in the Prospectus, farmers should be the forefront actor in implementing "authentic agriculture" with a "sense of mission to restore the citizens' diet and protect and recover the environment." Farmers are also anticipated to take initiatives to enlighten consumers about "the relationship between food and health," "good choice of food" and "improvement of eating habits by self-awakening." Agronomists and medical scientists would support the farmers' effort. Later, with the rise of consumer activism in big cities for co-partnership with farmers for non-chemical produce, JOAA started to put more emphasis on the reciprocal relationship between farmers and consumers as the core component of the movement. This relationship was termed *teikei* (the most equivalent translation might be cooperation) and its ideal was defined into the Ten Principles of Teikei (hereafter the Principles) in 1978. This discursive construction of *teikei* has constituted the crucial basis of JOAA's vision of what the envisaged radical change is about and how to execute

that in reality. In other words, *teikei* has been the very guideline that links ideology and practice of the *yuuki* movement.

The core elements of the movement's ideal and practice as stated in the Principles are, firstly, the establishment of *friendly relationships* between farmers and consumers. They are to depart from the usual trade relationship: Instead of "purchasing," consumers should think that they are "given" food by farmers. Exchanging of money is "rewards" for receiving food. Ichiraku even argues that this farmer-consumer relationship is close to a familial relationship. Secondly, JOAA envisages this friendly relationship to be based on *mutual commitment*. This leads to the norm of "eating the whole farm," i.e. forming a co-partnership where consumers and farmers together make a plan for planting and all the produce, regardless of the yield, is accepted by the consumers. In this way, farmers are secured the agreed payment. Consumers are here anticipated to adjust their diet to the outcomes of the farm, and help as much with farm works as possible. Furthermore, distribution of farm produce is to be organised mutually by both sides. Through such direct commitment with farmers' daily works/lives, friendly and "face-to-face" relationship will be established. This obviously calls for a much deeper engagement especially for consumers than the existing direct sales (*sanchoku*). Needless to say, the organisation anticipates the development in such close relationship as the means to de-commodify food, which eventually leads to the recovery of agriculture to its authentic shape. It also comprises the desired process towards the "revolution in mentality and life-style" that liberates people from materialism.

Thirdly, it claims *yuuki* that agriculture is built upon a farming method with a rich variety of on-farm species and crops and avoidance of artificial protection to the extent possible. However, according to JOAA, the movement should aim to transcend the narrow focus on elimination of agricultural chemicals. Then what is claimed more important is "establishment of organic relationship between consumers and farmers through agriculture" (Ichiraku in JOAA, 1989a, p.66) According to Yasuda, avoidance of pesticides was deliberately not stated in the main objectives of the organisation for this background (Yasuda, 1986, p.4). From this standpoint, as long as this goal is envisaged, integrated farming should also be encouraged. *Yuuki* movement is, thus, to support individual farmers' experiments with different environmentally friendly methods, rather than impose a specific farming method.

Lastly, JOAA further recommends that the envisaged form of agriculture is founded on *self-sufficiency*. Ichiraku thought that farmers should cultivate to provide food for their own family in the first place. The core driving force for self-sufficiency at this point is the "quality of life" that goes counter to the prevailing focus on economic gain: Food self-sufficiency of households may not yield a better economic profit, but a better life in which people can appreciate "hand-crafting" by relieving agriculture from economic rationalism. This appreciation is stated as something completely different from the satisfaction and convenience gained through commodities and the efficiency brought by agricultural machines and chemicals. Thus it is expected that, as food self-sufficiency of own household becomes the focus, their farm management will spontaneously depart from the present industrialised form of agriculture. It is natural for people to wish well-being for their own family and appreciate hand-made; it costs much less than industrial products but gives more joy. Based on this thinking, consumers are described as the dependents of farmers, who only get the "surplus" of the farm households. The establishment of such dependency and farm-level self-sufficiency constitutes the organisation's proposition for increasing national food self-sufficiency, as farmers and consumers are projected to be less reliant on export. While this farmer-centred argument was more evident in the founding phase, JOAA framed the concept of self-sufficiency as a solution to the nationwide problem more intense as the national food self-sufficiency and farming community increasingly declined. *Teikei* (friendly and non-commercial co-partnership), local food self-sufficiency and recovery of national agriculture were formulated as one.

JOAA's formulation concentrates on ideational, rather than practical and instrumental aspects. The movement discourse is mostly fed by the device of moral obligation that calls on individual farmers and consum-

ers to take action to transform the dominant food system. It is also equipped with the aesthetic device which encourages people to appreciate farming as the profession of life-creation, nurturing, craftsmanship, etc.

Yuuki as science

This overrepresentation of the moral and aesthetic devices is reflected in the ambiguity of "what *yuuki* is" in practical terms. While the *yuuki* movement is claimed to pursue the retrieval of the authentic form of agriculture, how such authentic agriculture looks like has intentionally been left open. It has been told that the visions and the techniques were something we must develop, mostly by trial and error, but they could not be defined at present. In Ichiraku's words: "yuuki is just a terms used for convenience, since there is no other appropriate word" (Ichiraku in JOAA, 1989a, p.10).

As a result, JOAA refused to make definitions and standards for a long time. In the absence of clear definitions, its argumentations for the "authentic form of agriculture" often constituted not only moral argumentation but also of the illustration of good old days, as represented by traditional Japanese farms based on mixed farming with animal husbandry, vegetables, and crops, self-sufficiency and close human relations in the community. The typical narrative is that in the old days food was produced locally and eaten locally. Today, we do not know who produces the food, as it is sold through central wholesale markets and transported a long way. Along with this formulation, it is suggested (also in the JOAA Prospectus) that "if one cannot find other options at the moment, she/he should go back to how traditional farming has operated" (Ichiraku, 1989 (1975)-b). Again, the argumentation is based more on morality and subjective values than on scientific data. The organisation has always had members from agronomic professions, and they share their scientific knowledge via lecturing and advice. Furthermore, the establishment of own standards as well as the national organic standards has pushed it to more frequent use of scientific and technical terminologies. However quite differently from the Danish counterpart, its main foundation does not reside in the scientific validity of organic agriculture. Rather, it tends to appreciate farmers' knowledge (thus lay knowledge) and traditional wisdom than knowledge from research institutions: According to Ichiraku, the *yuuki* movement "encourages abandoning modern agricultural techniques/technologies, since they are basically developed for the interest of enterprises, not for the sake of agriculture" (JOAA, 1989, p.6).

Yuuki as integrative to conventional

JOAA avoids a narrow formulation of *yuuki* as the movement for non-chemical farming. For this reason it claims all kinds of effort for recovering agriculture are to be supported. This includes so-called integrated farming which does not eliminate agricultural chemicals but reduces the use of them. This broad framework stems from the above-mentioned ideal of leaving the definition open, but also from the common perception of non-chemical agriculture as practically difficult. The latter often points to Japan's geo-climatic condition as the factor necessitating intensive combat against vermin. Furthermore, the application of *yuuki* agriculture is still seen as difficult, since it is framed as the opposite of conventional agriculture; as hand-crafting and compassionate and thus less mechanised and more labour intensive.

JOAA's formulation has an ambivalent relationship with integrated farming. Since integrated farming *per se* does not contradict the organisation's vision, it traditionally supports it. However, as the policy started to prioritise it over *yuuki* agriculture in the 1990s, the way it was diffusing has mostly been found as a threat for the movement. In JOAA's interpretation, the authority sees sustainable agriculture in general merely as a new value-added production, and that is contradictory to the movement's objective of de-commodification of agriculture. It also claims that more and more farmers who practice integrated farming are motivated by economic reason. Hence it is more pessimistic about their future conversion to *yuuki* farmers.

All in all, JOAA has not developed the symbolic package of *yuuki* as integrative to conventional agriculture or, more broadly, the conventional food system. Its open and tolerant statement of *yuuki* has not been strate-

gically used to attract ordinary conventional farmers. In fact, the formulation is more selective than it looks like, because it is uncompromising about the critical standpoint on the prevailing mode of agriculture/food production and consumption. Its dichotomisation of *yuuki* and conventional has not changed substantially even after the policy turned in a more favourable direction for *yuuki* and the organisation's internal split and stagnancy became obvious in the 2000s. The main reason for this ongoing prevalence of the alternativeness package is, simply, the lack of converted farmers. It tends to exclude those who enter the world of *yuuki* agriculture in the continuum of profit-making and egoistic desire for safe food rather than looking into why unsafe food continues to be produced.

8. Comparative perspectives

In the previous two chapters, the cases of Denmark and Japan were treated individually, and the overall trajectories of the targeted organisations, i.e. the pro-institutional trajectory of LØJ/ØL in Denmark and the anti-institutional trajectory of JOAA in Japan were drawn and analysed in detail. This chapter studies the two cases in a comparative perspective and answers the research questions by applying the tools operationalized in the Chapter 5.[144]

It begins with an explanation of the organisations' choice of particular trajectories from the three major mechanisms which are found most significant; namely, the institutional-relational mechanism (POS in the state and the civil society), the symbolic-cognitive mechanism (DOS) and the organisations' internal orientational mechanism. It is followed by the answer to the other research question about consequences of the organisational trajectories for the organic movement. This part first draws a map of the organisational trajectories by applying Melucci's perspective. Based on this map and the result of the previous research question, the possible implications of the consequences are discussed along with Dryzek's normative theory of discursive/deliberative democracy.

Why a pro-institutionalisation trajectory was chosen by LØJ/ØL, while an anti-institutionalisation trajectory was chosen by JOAA?

Different institutional-relational mechanisms

Political opportunity in the state

Looking into the *political opportunity structures* (POS) of the two countries during the history of the target organisations up till 2008, both have had a solid agricultural policy community consisting of the government, the agricultural bureaucracy and the representative(s) of the agricultural community. However, this *policy community has been much more fragmented in Denmark than in Japan*, since each part has internal power struggle: The political power has frequently shifted between the (centre-)left of the Social Democrats and the right of Liberals and/or Conservatives. In this landscape, centre-parties, despite their small size, tend to play an important and sometimes decisive role, and in the Liberal-Conservative coalition government in the 2000s, DF's influence was especially significant. The Agricultural Council, the strongest lobby agency, has traditionally been fragmented internally between the different farmers' associations divided basically by farm-size and the ideological preference of individual farmers. This division between the Danish Farmers' Association for entrepreneur-type farmers with medium-and-big-scale farms and the Danish Family Farmers' Association for relatively small-scale family farms has historically following their affiliation with different political parties; i.e. the former with Liberals and the latter with RV. Furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture increasingly faced pressure from the Ministry of the Environment for agriculture's effect on the aquatic environment from the 1980s. The power relations between these two ministries shifted when the ministerial strength of the latter increased when the high profile Social Democratic politician Sven Auken became minister. Already in the 1980s there was a certain degree of political opportunity for organic agriculture by allying with the Family Farmers' Association, the centre and left parties and the Ministry of the Environment.

Considering the basic features of POS, Denmark can be characterised as an inclusive state. In Dryzek et al.'s approach, Denmark resembles their Norwegian case as an "actively inclusive state," that is, the state is not just inclusive for the social movement actors but also oriented to intervention/participation in the move-

[144] This study regards research question 1: "How have the concepts and actions of the organisation evolved?" which has already been answered in Chapter 6 and 7.

ment/civil society (Dryzek, Downes et al., 2003:Daugbjerg and Halpin, 2007). The Danish state fits this category, as manifested in the Organic Law, which was passed in the late 1980s and gave LØJ and biodynamic organisations (as well as the nature conservation organisation DL and the consumer organisation) access to policy. Equally remarkable is the facilitation of the national organic standards, which signifies the state's intervention in and *de facto* seizure of the main space for defining organic agriculture from the movement. Although the Liberal-Conservative government in the 2000s narrowed POS for the organic movement to some degree, the basic state intervention in organic agriculture and ØL was eventually retained. The organic organisation had already become highly dependent on the state finance. The new subsidies allocated under this government, due to the usual support from the centre-left parties plus from DF, constituted a substantial part of the organisational economy.

By contrast, the Japanese state can be categorised as an "actively exclusive state" as entrance to its core is highly restricted to a few actors. Under the stable one-party dominance from 1955, the iron triangle of *the agricultural policy community in Japan has been monopolised by the single representative from each part*; namely, LDP (among all, its agrarian politicians), agricultural cooperative and MAFF. Unlike in Denmark, the Japanese agricultural community has been politically organised under the national association of agricultural cooperatives, which has almost always supported LDP. Japan's electoral system, which values the rural vote more than urban votes, maintains this mutual relationship even in the declining population of the rural/farming communities. In addition, MAFF has not yet been challenged by other ministries in any significant way, especially because the Ministry of the Environment has remained relatively weak. There has not been much space left for new actors to enter the agricultural policy community. Besides, none of the iron triangle actors have been eager to take organic agriculture, or more fundamentally, agri-environmental problems seriously.

However, the actual focus on organic agriculture as the top of sustainable agriculture, thus, *substantial institutionalisation of organic agriculture finally started around the 2000s in Japan*. This study argues that the transformation in the external environment finally occurred due to the combined effects of 1) the emergence of a real oppositional party, DPJ, which also indicates the weakening of LDP as the sole dominant party, 2) international pressure to open the domestic agricultural market, including the definition of internationally coherent national organic standards, 3) a subsequent critical discourse against economic globalisation, and 4) increased recognition that sustainable agriculture serves some state imperatives. (The latter two aspects are discussed in the following sub-sections). Considering this transformation, the question of why JOAA remained in anti-institutional strategy must be answered. This study finds that the answer lies in the organisation's internal orientation that sufficiently rejected adaptation to the change in the policy field (see the section "Different organisational mechanisms" below).

Political opportunity in civil society: Pre-movement development

The organisational choice of trajectory has depended a lot on the development in the pre-movement phase. In a comparative perspective, the fact that JOAA was established already in 1971, i.e. ten years before LØJ, is significant. JOAA was strongly influenced by the turbulence in the 1960s in the country, especially by the social movements for the US-Japan Security Treaty and anti-pollution. Despite the magnitude of criticism of the LDP government, capitalism and industrial development, those protest movements did not bring a regime change, but stabilised the regime by fragmenting the left-wing. This was one of the reasons that the founders of JOAA, who were critical of the LDP's agricultural policy, preferred to distance the organisation from institutional politics in general, but particularly from the revolutionary ideology of the Left. The envisaged "retrieval of authentic agriculture" was better sought outside institutional politics. Coalition with labour, i.e. labour unions and union-related organisations, was not seen as an option either, since the core problem of agriculture was seen as residing in the dominance of industry/the urban over agriculture/the rural.

LØJ was established a decade after JOAA, that is to say, a decade after the social movements in the 1960s, which were as radicalised as the contemporary movements in Japan, and its organisational orientation was more directly affected by the developments in the existing alternative agricultural community during the 1970s. A crucial actor was the Agricultural Study Group, which favoured ecologists over communists. Whereas the latter did not concern the agri-environmental problem but liberation of farmers from heavy debt by collective ownership, the former, via a newly established ecological community, Svanholm, succeeded in gaining official approval of collective ownership of agricultural land. LØJ was founded by ecologists who envisioned an alternative form of community based on democracy and symbiosis with nature. Crucially, while such development of the alternative farming community in the pre-movement phase indicated the shift in the central focus from the communist path, left-wing ideologies continued to be a common reference point in the community, and active members of the left-wing parties were among the founders. It is equally crucial that the supporters of a centre party, RV, constituted the major part in the early phase of the organisation. This means that LØJ inherited the focus in the Agricultural Study Group on the family farmers' movement. Under these circumstances, organic agriculture (ecology) could easily be linked with a relatively wide range of the existing social movements with a broad political spectrum. The potential in a connection with traditional movements like the labour movement and the co-operative and family farmers' movements is of utmost importance. This aspect was much more limited in Japan, as social acceptance of left-wing ideologies had seriously deteriorated in the course of the social movements in the 1960s and did not recover significantly afterwards.

Different symbolic-cognitive mechanisms

In addition to POS, it is increasingly acknowledged that the *discursive opportunity structures* (DOS) of a country affect the trajectory of social movements. However, based on this study, *the effects of discursive circumstances were not always decisive* as generally expected. This sub-section focuses on the commonalities and differences of DOS in the two countries, with special focus on the major trends in policy discourse relevant for the organic movement. This juxtaposition shows that although discursive opportunities for the organic movement existed in both countries, they were not necessarily exploited by the organic organisations. More precisely, *while the Danish LØJ/ØL has been more adaptive to changing DOS, JOAA has kept prioritising its core orientation by rejecting to be adaptive*.

Both Denmark and Japan have adopted the policy discourse of "multi-functionality of agriculture," which began to diffuse worldwide from the 1990s. In this discourse, commercial as well as non-commercial values of agriculture are claimed as integrated one. Those values can be summarised as commodity (economic resource), environmental protection, provision of safe, healthy and sufficient food, animal welfare and rural development. Organic agriculture is often situated as the forefront of this multi-functionality. This discourse has gained popularity in the policy field worldwide, since, from a straight-forward functionalist point of view, its argumentation for non-commercial features gives legitimate ground for maintaining agricultural support/subsidies. This grounding became increasingly important in the policy community along with the strengthening of neo-liberalisation and concurrent economic globalisation as the world norm.

However, *which aspects of multi-functionality have been more focused shows some crucial differences*. These differences have incorporated different discursive selectivity. On the political scene in Denmark (and the EU), over-production has been perceived as the major problem supressing the budget. Hence, the loss of yield, which is common for organic farms, was not regarded as a problem but, on the contrary, a positive effect. As the Social Democratic government's support of organic agriculture became more stabilised in the mid-1990s, the policy discourse started to take up organic agriculture not just as a niche but potentially as the forefront model. Two scientific reports were used to legitimise this as they demonstrated organic agriculture's environmental effects and potential economic viability. Organic standards and the national organic label were also described as a reliable system for securing food safety and animal welfare, and as a tool for growth in organic consumption. The reports stated that organic agriculture fulfils *all* factors of multi-

functionality required in sustainable agriculture. Yet as the organic sector grew and overproduction became reality for this sector, too, the centre of DOS shifted more to the commodity value of organics. The growth in organic trade and consumption, including in the export market, became the central focus, as represented by the policy frame of "market-driven organic development." LØJ/ØL has followed this development in DOS, perceiving it positively. This policy direction did not basically contradict the organisation's pragmatist and diffusionist orientation. These aspects of the organisation's internal mechanism will be discussed further in the following sub-sections. At any rate, it is safe to say that *the overall DOS in Denmark has generally been favourable to the discursive orientation of LØJ/OL especially after the Organic Law in 1987*.

In contrast, the policy discourse on organic agriculture in Japan from the start concentrated exclusively on commodity value. When organic agriculture started to be a policy interest in the late 1980s, it was chiefly captured as a mere trend in consumer demands for safe food. It took a long time for Japan to officially acknowledge agri-environmental problems, as the policy community could persist with the *geo-climatic frame*. In this frame, it has been asserted that the unique national environmental features, as represented by monsoon climate with heavy rain and mountainous geography with thousands of streams, had a strong self-purification system. Thus the agri-environmental problem has been depicted as much less acute than in other countries with weaker natural systems. This argumentation was frequently associated with the environmental friendliness of rice farming whose irrigated paddy field was stressed to enhance the self-purification. The underlying message was "leave nature as it is now" and that significant reform in the conventional practice of agriculture was not necessary. It is be fair to say that this geo-climate argumentation still persists even after the establishment of the Organic Law in 2006.

However, food security, food safety, health and rural development have become increasingly integrated in the policy discourse in Japan since around the 2000s. Crucially, they have been formulated as an inter-linked issue. And even more crucially, this inter-linkage has prominently taken place in the *counter discourse against economic globalisation*, which was emerging in the public discourse marketplace. Such a counter discourse incorporates the movement frames as represented by "indivisibility of soil and health (*shindofuji*)," "produce locally, eat locally (*chisan chisyou*)," "face-to-face relationship" and "food education (*syokuiku*)." All these frames adhere to the *physical and/or mental proximity* between producers/locations of production and eaters/locations of eating. Thus its anti-globalisation argumentation can be said to attach closely to the desire for direct social embedding between people and their livelihood, which is declining in modern society (cf. Giddens, 1990:Kjeldsen, 2004).

Albeit inter-linkage of some of the multi-functionality concepts and proximity is also evident in the policy discourses of Denmark (and also elsewhere), there are some significant differences in these two countries. First of all, the Japanese formulation tended to specify local products as superior in terms of healthiness and socio-cultural value than non-local products. In contrast, the Danish policy discourse was more hesitant to claim the health benefit of local and organic food. As seen in Action Plan II in 1999, although the positive effect on health was understood to constitute a crucial part of the quality of organic food, it was still carefully stated as "consumer expectations" (Structurdirektoratet, 1999, p.38, 42) rather than the established facts. At this point, the policy community maintained its claim of a lack of research on the actual effects of organic food on "health-related values and sensory and ethical qualities" (Ibid., p.45). This position was even strengthened under the Liberal-Conservative government. Similarly, the linkage between local food and health was almost absent in the national policy, though this linkage was more integrated in some municipality level policies (Dahl and Kristensen, 2006). The use of locally produced products was thus chiefly supported for its effect on reducing transport cost and unnecessary packaging and fulfilling consumer demands for fresh food (Structurdirektoratet, 1999, p.50).

Secondly, the Japanese policy discourse connected not only local food and health, but also local and national dietary traditions. This direction is typically seen in the recent campaign for "the Japanese-style diet (*nihongatashokuseikatsu*)", which idealises the dietary pattern of the 1950s, which is based on rice and a varia-

tion of fish-and-vegetable-based dishes with less use of oil. The westernised diet is depicted as unhealthy due to excessive fat (especially animal fat), while the Japanese traditional diet is healthier due to its balanced nutrients and low fat.[145] In comparison, the Danish policy is more likely to claim that the national diet in many aspects is the cause of obesity and other diseases and more often intends to convert the national food habit, rather than embrace it. Here, the particular linkage between traditional/national food and health is not made.

Thirdly, the policy emphasis on the proximity between farmers/place of production and consumers/place of consumption has been much stronger in Japan than in Denmark. We can compare the concept of "produce locally, eat locally (*chisanchisyou*)" with "from soil to table" advocated by the authorities in Denmark (Priemé, 1997, 4). The former clearly limits the distance between the two within the same locality, while the latter does not define the distance. Thus they can be far away from each other, like Australian soil (farm) to the Danish table. Based on this local proximity, the Japanese policy-line has highlighted locally-based trade and consumption. This brought policy attention on direct sales and farmers' markets, which have been more likely to be side-lined from the main target in Denmark. As discussed by Dahl and Kristensen (2006), the local initiatives concerning, for instance, public sector procurement of organic food have strong potential for enhancing local production and consumption. Yet, the national policy focus has not precisely been on local circulation, but rather on means for organic growth.

Lastly, the *policy discourse in Japan has been enabled largely by the moral argumentation* that situates "body-soil indivisibility" and "produce and eat locally" as the necessary foundation for recovering national agriculture and rural communities. Those as the Japanese-style dietary habit and local production were here favoured for, among others, its contribution to national food self-sufficiency; traditional food was expected to increase consumption of locally or domestically produced food and reduce food import. In other words, its advocacy for localness was established upon the framing of the westernised diet but also that of the import-dependent national food system as a negative factor that intensified the ongoing decay of the national agriculture. Together, they constitute a critical discourse that aroused the concept of "local community" stating rural development and revitalisation of agriculture as the common issue for the residents. Situating agriculture in the centre is quite distinct from the former policy tendency of perceiving rural areas as the new industrial zones and the rural population as labour for industry. Now agriculture is the vital source for the community that generates new enterprises based on local production, such as food business (e.g. production of local specialities and restaurants) and tourism. In contrast, the Danish discourse has tended to reason "localness" in accordance with the organic (ecological) principle (Structurdirektoratet, 1999, p.30); namely, something organic agriculture should pursue in order to, in its simplest technical sense, manage effective recirculation in a closed cycle. In this framework the policy discourse has encouraged the local circulation of food and bi-products of agriculture like straw and animal manure due to its biological and environmental benefits, including maintenance of water quality, and/or, as just noted above, reduction in transport costs and waste. The *narrative in Denmark has been driven predominantly by the symbolic device of objective reality* rather than moral argumentation. Overall, the Danish organic policy emphasises the concept of individuals' choice in contrast to individuals' responsibility.

Again, there is a correlation between this policy direction in Denmark and the orientation of LØJ/ØL. As explained further below, the Danish organisation has had the foundation to align its strategies to the changing DOS. In contrast, the case of Japan shows that, while the above-mentioned new policy discourse was much closer to the organic movement discourse, the widening in DOS was not exploited by JOAA.

[145] For more about the MAFF's advocacy of Japanese-style diet, see http://www.maff.go.jp/j/syokuiku/zissen_navi/balance/style.html (in Japanese) [Last checked on 12 March, 2014].

Different organisation's orientational mechanisms

The above sections have already illustrated that the POS and DOS of both countries have, more or less, widened to the organisations in some periods. The crucial point of this study is that the widened opportunities have been eschewed by the Japanese organisation, while the Danish organisation has been more prone to adapt their strategies to the changing opportunities. JOAA simply did not interpret the state involvement in organic issues, as represented by the national labelling guideline and organic standards, and the invitation to expert committee as positive. Furthermore it did not substantially transform its self-limitation in collaborating with other civil society organisations. Consequently, it did not change its anti-institutional orientation. On the contrary, LØJ perceived state intervention as a chance for organic development and indeed activated its transformation from grassroots to a professional organisation. For this reason, this study argues that *the effects of external structures differ considerably in accordance with the organisation's internal orientation.* The following sub-sections focus on the different internal mechanisms that led JOAA to persist in the anti-institutional trajectory but drove LØJ/ØL to the pro-institutional trajectory.

Elite domination or producer domination

The organisational orientation of the targeted organisations has depended a lot on the *leadership*; namely, what type of people has taken leadership and, crucially, the actual power relationship inside the organisation. Regarding the former, JOAA's founders already had established careers. Ichiraku and his followers (among others university professors) had/have considerable power to decide the direction of the organisation. These leaders commonly recognised that the post-war development in agriculture went wrong, and that the present food system needed *fundamental* reform. Yet rather than pursuing reform of the top level, namely the prevailing agricultural policy community, they preferred to change the mentality and practice of individual farmers and consumers. This has led their focus towards the lifeworld à la Habermas, i.e. the space outside the state and political field. In addition, they envisioned organic development to take place outside the ordinary market by promoting the "de-commodification" of food. Overall, their preference for and conviction of being "non-political," "non-commercial" and "self-sufficient" stemmed largely from their personal experiences with the agricultural policy community, institutional politics and the market as executives of agricultural co-operatives and consumer co-operatives, medical doctors, agronomists, etc. In other words, their formulation of the organic movement has contained an *internal (elite) criticism of the prevailing system*, based on the doubt that this system is potentially benign.

The aspect of leadership looks different in LØJ. Its founding members were also mostly well-educated but relatively young people who envisaged an ecologically harmonious lifestyle, direct democracy, gender equality, etc. (Ingemann, 2003:Brandt, 2005). It started out with a stronger grassroots and horizontal organisational form based on local groups and annual rotation of administrative responsibility. Quite differently from JOAA's leaders, they clearly targeted nationwide diffusion of organic agriculture from the start. Even though the early leaders aspired to and indeed practiced an alternative community in their commune, they did not think that the organic development should remain within direct sales between farmers and consumers or small health food shops. Those like commercialisation of organic food and state involvement, which JOAA opposed, were promoted by LØJ without substantial internal conflict. Furthermore, professionalization of the organisation, and thus the departure from grassroots, enforced rapidly after the Organic Law in 1987 also went smoothly. The consolidation of LØJ as the representative of the organic community was commonly found necessary, especially when it gained access to affect policy as a member of the Organic Agriculture Council. Considering these aspects, this Danish organisation has been taking a *reformist* orientation, wherein fundamental change in the food system was not the major target. In contrast, JOAA rejected the invitation to the expert committee as a protest against the state's intervention but also because the leaders did not believe that the committee would take the critical opinions of the organic community in.

Overall, it is crucial that, in contrast to JOAA, *LØJ/ØL and the organic movement in Denmark have not had charismatic leaders who obtained normative and/or relational power*. In the absence of a strong personality, LØJ/ØL has commonly been *farmer/producer-centred*. Although it has proclaimed to be an organisation for organic farmers, organic enterprises and consumers, consumers usually filled the role of supporters whose contribution was to purchase organic food in the market. This has been so, even though consumer members gradually became the majority in numbers, and the internal elective system was built to represent consumer interests. As producers' interests were central, the organisation tended to prioritise technical and instrumental (economic) issues. This focus on the practicality of organic agriculture is clearly different from JOAA, whose elite leaders were inclined towards an ideologically-driven movement. *Teikei* is one of the very few practical solutions JOAA ever made. However, the organisation has mostly looked away from the real problems of farmers and consumers outside it. Unlike JOAA, LØJ has not put much effort into constructing its own organic ideology, but has directly implemented IFOAM's formulation of organic agriculture. Instead, LØJ has prioritized the development of own organic standards, also based on IFOAM's basic organic standards. Furthermore, political lobbying has occupied LØJ's time and resources since the Organic Law. All in all, LØJ was more interested in actual diffusion of organic agriculture than in realising the ideals of an alternative society. This diffusionist direction was chosen collectively in the earliest phase and drove the pragmatist pro-institutional orientation. This orientation was further strengthened when the leaders changed from grassroots-minded organic activists to professional organic farmers who converted from the conventional method. Unlike the JOAA's elite leaders, the farmer leaders in LØJ/ØL implemented an even stronger practical and instrumental orientation.

Compatibility of the movement discourse with the state imperatives and recognition of opportunity

Focusing more on the discursive formulation of organic agriculture, JOAA's dominant package has wrapped it as fundamentally different from conventional agriculture. This claim has traditionally incorporated the demand for radical transformation of the whole system, which will go beyond the mere change in farming method, but overturn the dominance of economics/economy-centred paradigm and practice in society. Consequently, the organisation came to emphasise the alternative form of trade that circumvents the ordinary market by claiming its systemic failure in securing human life. In comparison, LØJ/ØL's formulation did not explicitly problematize the conventional mode of trade and consumption, but the conventional farming method. Consequently, the packaging of organic as fundamentally different from conventional was subordinated by organic as an integrated part of conventional already in the 1990s.

While this can explain JOAA's anti-institutional trajectory for a certain time, it does not explain why it has persisted even after both DOS and POS widened in Japan in the 2000s. This question is valid, considering that *there have been opportunities for JOAA to align with some of the state imperatives without necessarily compromising its ideological conviction*. The above-mentioned integration of multi-functionality concepts and physical/mental proximity between farmers/rural and consumers/urban in the current policy discourse illustrate this point. These have reached the state's core in the first place, since protection of the environment and food safety were realised by the policy community to boost a new market, and thus as a source for *state revenue* and *economic growth*. Although this way of treating organic food as commodities still contradicts JOAA's orientation, organic agriculture also began to be framed as a policy tool for sustainable rural development and recovery of the national agriculture. This development can suggest the linkage of organic agriculture with the "*survival* of the nation," as asserted by JOAA from start (JOAA, 1971). While the issue of food as a national interest had been clearly discounted under LDP's policy, the direction has clearly changed since the late 1980s with increasing international pressure for free market and the concurrent focus on the acute decline in national food self-sufficiency. Since then the wide range of actors within and outside the system began to take the "survivalist" connotation of food as the state's interest. These actors have had competing interests, but shared their criticism of economic globalisation which requires the removal of state protection. Here, putting agriculture into the ever harsher international competition has commonly been claimed

to risk the population's well-being, since it would worsen food security. The actors joining this critical discourse were also those in the iron triangle. As the continuance of *status quo* became increasingly unlikely, these actors in the policy community needed new support to prevent agriculture and rural communities from further decay. Organic agriculture had reached another state imperative, *legitimation*, as support for this agriculture can contribute to the state's status as a guardian of the environment and the population's health and well-being, which had suffered serious damage. While these state imperatives of survival and legitimation can be aligned with JOAA's movement discourse, it has not been done by this organisation but, among others, by the newly established network *Zenyuukyou*.

Again, these aspects punctuate the pivotal points of this study: It is not just the components of movement ideology itself that determine its applicability to the state imperatives. Change in the political and discursive environments may facilitate new opportunities for the movement organisations. However, such *opportunity must be detected as opportunity in the first place*. As discussed above, this detection relies a lot on the individual organisation's orientation. JOAA's movement discourse and orientation have apparently been more challenging than LØJ/ØL's. Yet the more influential factor for its judgement of opportunity or threat than this critical formulation of organic agriculture has been the ideological preference of the elite leaders. They have constantly seen state intervention as a threat and wanted the movement to focus on conceptual and lifestyle change of individuals rather than policy. JOAA's indifference towards change in POS and DOS in the policy field resulted in an absence of "frame alignment" with the emerging policy discourse for anti-globalisation, and, correspondingly, lack of collaboration with diverse civil society actors. LØJ, whose main objective from the start was nationwide transformation of farming methods rather than fundamental change in the food system, did not exhibit explicit antagonism to the state and the market. It perceived the openings of POS and DOS positively and actively utilised these opportunities for its objective of wider diffusion of organics.

Table 12 below demonstrates the development.

Table 12: Overview of development in Denmark and Japan

Denmark					
Phase	**pre-movement**	**preliminary movement**	**1st institutionalisation**	**2nd institutionalisation**	**3rd institutionalisation**
POS in the state	Fragmented agricultural policy community. Actively inclusive state				Temporally narrowed political opportunity
POS in the civil society (Condition for alliance)	Ecology movement. Left-wing. Family farmers and consumer/co-operatives. Biodynamic movement		Added: Farmers' organisations. Environmental conservationist organisations. Mass media	Added: Businesses. Academia (DARCOF). OA broadly integrated	Added: Far-right wing
DOS relevant for OA movement	Criticism of industrialised agriculture. Safe food. Alternative farm ownership, community & food system	Added: Focus on alternative farm ownership weakened	OA as means for small-scale farmers (family farmers). OA for clean water/aquatic environment	Multi-functionality. OA as means for solving over-production and protection of agricultural sector. Market-based development. 100% organic conversion	Added: "Ecology and economy"
Internal orientation of LØJ/ ØL		Reformist, farmer-centred, absence of charismatic leader, collaborative, adoptive to new environment			
		grassroots-based/de-centralised	Added: mixture of centralised and local groups, political	Added: Double strategy. Professionalisation, political strengthened. Grassrootsness weakened	Added: Centralisation & professionalisation strengthened. Grassrootsness denied. Increasing dependency on external funding. Converted organic farmer leaders
Predominant frames		Organic as science & as alternative		Organic as science & integral to conventional	

Japan					
Phase	**pre-movement**	**preliminary movement**	**1st institutionalisation**	**2nd institutionalisation**	**3rd institutionalisation**
POS in the state	Centralised agricultural policy community. Actively exclusive state			Centralised policy community shaken	Centralised policy community less strong. Less exclusive state
POS in the civil society (Condition for alliance)	Anti-pollution movement. Left-wing. Some religious groups. Mass media	Added: Anti-pollution movement & left-wing weakened. Consumers' (housewives) groups	Added: Consumer organisations. Organic enterprises. Local issue protests. Actors for anti-trade liberalisation (e.g. agrarian LDPs)	Added: Actors for anti-economic globalisation & localism	Added: DPJ, New organic network *Zenyuukyou*. Academia (JAOAS)
Nature (as interpreted)		Geo-climate specificity of Japan. Nature's self-purification system.			Added: Vulnerability of nature
DOS relevant for OA movement	Anti-pollution. Safe food, Criticism of LDP. Health problem of farmers	Added: Pesticides /chemical residues in food	OA as value-added food production. National food self-sufficiency. Criticism of food import-dependency	Added: OA as a sub-category of sustainable agriculture. OA as means for protection of agricultural sector. Anti-economic globalisation	Multi-functionality. OA as top of sustainable agriculture. Linkage of OA, localism/nationalism & anti-economic globalisation
Internal orientation of JOAA		Fundamentalist, elite-centred, norm of self-limitation (non-political, non-religious, non-profit-making and non-dependency), rejection of left-wing ideology, charismatic leader, conventional organisational structure, not adoptive to new environments			
			Added: A few protests, signature collecting. Rejection of state involvement in organic issues.	Added: Leadership succeeded by the followers.	Added: Introduction of external funding. Professionalization. Conventional organisational structure strengthened. Rejection of collaboration with *Zenyuukyou*
Predominant frame		Organic as alternative			

What are the consequences of the strategic choices?

Implication of Melucci's collective action perspective

By applying Melucci's conception (see Chapter 3, 5) on the most recurrent discursive and non-discursive practices of the targeted organisations, the status of their strategies as collective actions becomes clearer. Following his conceptualisation, social movement is analytically defined as a form of collective action, whose particularity is found in its invocation of 1) direct participation/commitment, 2) conflict with the targeted system and 3) breaching of the targeted system's limits.

Based on his framework, this study suggests that *LØJ/ØL has been most likely to move away from the status of social movement*, while concentrated on actions which did not challenge the current limit of the state and market system. Consequently, the actual development of organic agriculture in Denmark has been almost consistent to LØJ/ØL's objective. In comparison, JOAA, whose ideas were challenging the state and the market, appeared to stay in the category of social movement. It must be noted that *these two organisations targeted different systems*; LØJ/ØL predominantly aimed at the state (especially along with the deepening of institutionalisation), while JOAA aimed at the lifeworld. Nonetheless, seeing the development over the past decade the boundary of the Japanese state has slowly been breached and approaching JOAA's concepts. Although the force of this breaching was inspired by experiences of the organic movement, it was *not* intention-

ally and directly caused by JOAA. A more significant force emerged in the interplay between the evolving coalition between critical civil society actors and the oppositions in the system. Both have directly opposed the neo-liberal orientation of the prevailing policy.

Going into more detail, figure 18 below indicates the status of the most recurrent strategic actions of LØJ/ØL. This study considers that the frame of "100% conversion" and the action for "GMO Nej Tak!" are basically contentious for the state and the traditional agricultural community. Hence they can be categorised as social movements. However, *the organisation's characteristics as a social movement have been declining*, as the contentious strategies were eventually compromised. As depicted above, the argument of total conversion disappeared from the frontline. And albeit the campaign for the GMO protest continues up till today, the organisation gave a way to the "GMO co-existence" policy, even though it contradicted its rejection of genetic engineering in agriculture.

Alongside this decline in the social movement, the collective actions *within* the boundary of the prevailing system have become constituting the major part of the organisational strategies. First of all, the category of what Melucci calls "cooperation" is clearly evident in the effort for establishing positive relationship within the alternative agriculture community but also with the conventional business and agricultural actors. What is further remarkable in LØJ/ØL's development is that cooperation has driven the *integration of itself into the conventional system*. This required direct involvement among stakeholders (i.e. LØJ/ØL and the traditional actors of the agricultural policy community), and such mutual engagement followed the usual rule of the game. Following this line, the organisation has also invested major energy and resources in political lobbying. The lobbying has, as is common, basically been conducted by few, specific staff members, i.e. not ordinary members, and has thus adhered strictly to the game of institutional politics. LØJ/ØL's construction of "organic consumers" is evidence of "individual mobility," which is defined by Melucci as the unorganised action of individuals for the same or similar purpose within the limits of the system (Melucci, 1996). As a consequence, unified identity, objective and routinized action have not developed for this group and the result is a quite conventional marketing strategy to encourage loose and uncoordinated consumer practices for purchasing organic goods.

Lastly, it appears that the "competition" (following Melucci, a category of collective action based on solidarity/direct participation and conflict with the system but not breaching the system's limit) between the organic and the conventional has recently evolved again with the establishment of ØL's own organic advisory service. This action stemmed from the criticism of the existing service under the conventional agricultural organisation and is closely linked with the organisation's effort to improve the organic practices for further compliance with the ecological principles of managing as much as possible in the closed cycle. A current attempt is the advocacy for 100% organic straw. Nonetheless, the development of own advisory service can be extended to the kind of action that challenges the more fundamental, systemic part of the present organic development.

Figure 17: Map of LØJ/ØL's strategic actions



The landscape of the JOAA's recurrent actions looks quite different. Unlike LØJ/ØL, JOAA's basic orientation has not been transformed with the change in the external environment. As represented by *teikei*, its actions constantly target enhancement of non-economic values of agriculture, proximity of producers/place of production and consumers/place of consumption in both ideational/mental and practical/physical terms, and self-sufficiency. Such actions are based on direct participation and the criticism of the prevailing state policy and the capitalist market though, as mentioned above, its actual target has been farmers and consumers. As they have envisaged breaching the limit of the conventional practices of the lifeworld, this study categorises them as actions for social movement. However, their actual ability and potential for breaching the limits are different matter. The study showed JOAA's strength has remarkably declined since the 1990s with the halt of organisational growth despite the increasing need of unified actions as the organic community. From the view of the movement as a whole, JOAA has not effectively functioned as a place for organising collective actions for emerging problems, such as fraudulent organic labelling, the national organic standardisation with the ambiguous and confusing definition, difficulty of organising and sustaining *teikei* which leads to economic instability for organic farmers, lack of technical advice for farmers, etc. This aspect is shown in the clearly more limited diversity in JOAA's actions compared to LØJ/ØL's. Overall, as result of the self-limited (non-political, non-profit-making, non-religious and independent), moral-driven and elite-dominated orientation, the organisation has circumvented itself from practical issues to develop organic agriculture other than *teikei*. The study argues that this leading organisation's orientation has been the crucial ground for the underdevelopment of what Melucci calls "collaboration" and "competition" in Japan's organic movement community at large. This is consistent with the lack of what is called "creative conflict," which several analysts see as a crucial criterion for the Danish success in organic agriculture (Lynggaard, 2001:Michelsen, 2002:Daugbjerg and Halpin, 2007). Creative conflict naturally will not happen when actors with different interests do not interact upon the problem and compete for solutions. According to Daugbjerg and Halpin (2007), creative conflict also necessitates the capacity of actors to make their own instruments work in the field they intend to influence. At this point, JOAA and the organic movement led by this organisation have remarkably been delayed in developing such capacity. Such delay, particularly in terms of the capacity for cooperation with the state and the traditional agricultural organisations, reflects the still extremely low rate of

organic conversion in Japan, which only accounts for 0.18% of the national arable area in the year 2009,[146] while Denmark reached 6.6% the same year (Plantedirektoratet, 2010).

Figure 18: Map of JOAA's strategic actions



Implication of deliberative democracy

As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, Dryzek's theory of deliberative democracy proposes that social movement's participation in the state can pay off only if the movement's objective can be associated with one or more of the state imperatives, i.e. 1) domestic order, 2) survival, 3) revenue, 4) securing of economic growth and 5) legitimacy. If such association is not possible, the participation is most likely to result in mere co-optation (Dryzek, 2000:Dryzek, Downes et al., 2003). The above section has already mentioned that, despite the negligence and often opposition from the iron triangle, LØJ/ØL's formulation of organic agriculture was from the start not so contradictory to the basic interests of the Danish state (and market). In particular, its formulation of organic agriculture has been quite compatible with the imperatives of economic growth and legitimacy. Economic growth, since it has been imagining the organic development within the conventional market, rather than restricting it within alternative trade framework as JOAA has. Association of organic agriculture to the state legitimacy as guardian of the population's well-being and natural environment has not been so controversial either, as the organisation has not been hostile or critical but collaborative with the state.

However, the Danish case appears to have problems with the requirement of deliberative democracy for a critical public sphere: Basically, when the orientation of organic organisations has become more attached to the formal politics, it has been less likely to be critical of it. A symbolic case is the compromise to GMO co-existence. Albeit the collective protest successfully reversed the initial policy to one with more a comprehensive "polluter-pays" norm, it ultimately gave in to the iron triangle's interest in growth and revenue this technology potentially could bring. Furthermore, this study has already shown that the double strategy that

[146] The data is from the MAFF's homepage. http://www.maff.go.jp/j/jas/jas_kikaku/pdf/yuuki_menseki_0904_3.pdf [last checked November 21, 2013]. However the number only covers the JAS certified organic area. As direct sales of organic produce between farmers and consumers based on mutual understanding of how they are produced are exempted from organic certification, it is generally considered that the organically grown area is larger.

intended to maintain both integrative and alternative elements of organic agriculture has largely resulted in the suppression of the alternativeness by the integration. The critical problems which have not been solved within the present system, such as structural problem of the farming sector, over-production, increasing number of reverters to conventional farming and urban-rural division, were not tackled seriously in the organic movement. Furthermore, from the point of deliberation as citizens' participation, the organisation shows its weakness. Its development from a local group-based grassroots organisation towards a centralised professional organisation significantly reduced member commitment to the organisation. The more complicated the organisational tasks became and the greater the need for expertise, the more the organisation became managed by professional staff/employees. As demonstrated above, members participation has become unnecessary and thus not required. The majority of the members have become supporters or recipients of the service, rather than actors (or activists) in the organic movement. This passive status of the members can also put LØJ/ØL as the representative of the organic movement on a fragile ground. ØL had over 800 farmer members in 2007, though it only constituted one-third of the organic farmers. The actual participation of consumer members has not been successfully developed either, as the organisation indeed has not formulated specific common consumer politics, and thus, did not manage to consolidate them politically. As Lassen asserts in his study of NGOs in Denmark, this raises a question of whether we can talk of such organisation without comprehensive members' participation to sufficiently represent them (Lassen and Jamison, 2003). His study also reveals the general tendency of the environmental movement in this country to concentrate on the argumentation of pros and cons of environmental protection in relation to economy and health. What has been excluded in this focus is "philosophical considerations" of "nature's own intrinsic value or integrity" (ibid., p.2), which means a lack of moral and ethical deliberations. This study comes to the same point as Lassen, i.e., *the Danish organic movement led by LØJ/ØL has not strengthened civic participation.* Its critical potential has not been growing as the orientation of the movement was geared more towards consensus with the prevailing system. It must also be noted that the state's inclusion is most often limited to those who are not only well-organised but also least likely to be radically critical of the conventional system. Circumvention of radicalised movements is a state interest in maintaining order, and movements incorporating physical violence are more often unwanted by the general public. What is at stake here is however not radicalisation with coercive force, but rather critical discourse to expose the limitations of the present system. The case of the Danish organic movement is a good example, as all NGOs which have been included in the Organic Food Council, among them LØJ/ØL, the Association for Biodynamic Agriculture and the traditional agricultural organisations, DN and labour unions, agreed on the norms of institutional politics and market. More anarchistic environmental organisations like NOAH and professional and centralised but direct action oriented Greenpeace, for instance, have not been invited despite their explicit focus on organic agriculture.

In contrast, JOAA's formulation of organic agriculture has been much more conflictual with state imperatives. Seen from Dryzek's perspective, JOAA's clear rejection of "economic rationalism," commodification of organic agriculture, trade in the ordinary market, effectivization of farming, etc. was clearly antagonistic to the imperatives for revenue and securing economic growth. Such organisational orientation has made the association of the organic movement with the state imperatives either unimportant or inappropriate in the movement community. However, as already discussed, the organisation could make association with the state an imperative of survival, particularly when the low national food self-sufficiency and the decay of the farming/rural community have caught broad public attention. After all, the organisation contributed to nurturing the moral and emotional grounding and practice of organic agriculture and close farmer-consumer relationship. These elements have been insufficiently developed in the organic movement in Denmark.

Compared to LØJ/ØL, JOAA has been inclined towards *democratic deficit*, as the leaders with the actual power could often dismiss internal criticism and control the organisational direction. This point suggests some elements of the "iron law of oligarchy" introduced by Robert Michels long ago. Contrary to Michels' deterministic illustration of the inevitability of hierarchical organisation, JOAA did maintain a relatively flat structure. However, even with this structure, the power was concentrated with a limited number of leaders.

As claimed by Michels, an organisation with over 5000 members at its peak requires skills for leadership. The elite leaders, who had management capability, fund-raising capability, personal network with actors in the system and clear convictions about the movement's direction, occupied the managerial position. At the same time, the organisation's *pro bono* spirit and prioritisation of self-sufficiency (non-dependency on external resources) have made it over-dependent on the few members who had time, money and willingness to commit themselves to the activism. Considering these points, the persistence of the anti-institutional trajectory has involved to some degree with this elite or small-group dominance, and thus, democratic deficit of the organisation. This is far from the ideal condition of communication for deliberation, which according to Dryzek is a condition that eliminates all kind of coercion including imposition of mere self-interests and manipulation (Dryzek, 2000).

9. Conclusion

Pros and cons of pro- and anti-institutional strategies

The development of the leading organic organisations in Denmark and Japan has shown several characteristic features of the new social movement (NSM). They were initially driven by the well-educated social group with non- (or post-)materialist values, which can be categorised as the new middle-class. And as Offe presumed, they were tightly linked with "peripheral" social groups like farmers and housewives/consumers who were "de-commodified" and situated outside the material struggle between capital and labour. In addition, their pro-institutionalisation and anti-institutionalisation strategies present a typical tendency of NSMs' development, namely the division between *fundi* (fundamentalist) and *real*o (reformist). Similarly these strategic differences signify the sheer division in the movement's target, i.e. between state (political system) and lifeworld (every-day life). The prominent organisation in Japan, JOAA, has predominantly operated with the anti-institutionalisation strategy taking a fundamentalist ideologically-driven orientation and targeting the non-political arena as its movement field. In contrast, the Danish organic organisation, LØJ, has anticipated the pro-institutional strategy by transforming itself from grassroots to a pragmatic reformist who can negotiate with the state. It has employed a dual strategy, though its "alternativeness" claims have been more likely to be suppressed by the intent to be integrated into the conventional system. This often resulted in non-oppositional action strategies towards "business as usual" in the policy field.

Regardless of the organisations' strategic orientation, the state's intervention in organic agriculture was set in motion, and the reactions of these organisations have had significant impact on the later development of organic agriculture and the movement. The establishment of LØJ's position as the formal and professional representative of the organic movement has been clearly beneficial for the quantitative growth of organic agriculture in Denmark. This study suggested that it owes much to the rising political opportunity, and that the organisation recognised the opportunity. Furthermore, LØJ's envisagement of the organic movement did not initially deny the development in the conventional framework. Thus its alignment with the state's interest was not so contradictory that did not cause serious internal conflict. In contrast, JOAA did not recognise the change in the political climate as an opportunity but as a threat. This recognition finds its roots in its formulation of the movement for fundamental change in the food system. As the organic agriculture community generally followed JOAA's position, the potential opportunity in the 1990s was not exploited by the movement. It resulted in the unsupportive policy and stagnancy in organic agriculture and the movement despite the rise of public attention to food safety and low national food self-sufficiency (food security).

The study revealed that state intervention and widening political opportunity have shaken the movement community and changed it. In the case of Japan, this induced fragmentation of the movement, and the Danish case further centralisation. In Denmark, organic farmers' interest is also represented by the traditional farmers' organisation, and the voice of "the organic movement" has been increasingly channelled through this organic organisation (Moschitz and Stolze, 2011). This has been effective for interest representation, but left little space for other collective actors to emerge in the organic movement field. In the case of Japan, JOAA's role as the leader of the movement has been more tacitly and informally recognised within the network of organic agriculture organisations and groups throughout the country. The informal status has, however, increasingly degraded, as the actors in the movement field were more frustrated by the unchanged non-political orientation led by JOAA. The formation of the new network *Zenyuukyou* can be seen as the division of this movement between *fundi* and *realo*, which finally took place in Japan. So far the rise of this competitor appears to result in the decline of JOAA. Based on the result of the case study, it is safe to say that when the opportunity rose, the movement shifted toward pro-institutionalisation.

The fundamentalist and ideologically driven orientation did not contribute to quantitative development, though has had an impact in development in the discursive field. The collective effort of JOAA for the ideo-

logical development of organic agriculture has generated a critical movement discourse which confronts the industrialisation policy of the liberal government and economic rationalisation and promotes local and national self-sufficiency and close relationship between farmers and consumers. This is currently connected to the theme of anti-economic globalisation envisaged by various agents, which can be exploited for the development of a critical public sphere. Furthermore, several movement ideas putting emphasis on local proximity which are conflictual to economic globalisation have been increasingly integrated in the policy field. This indicates the gradual establishment of organic agriculture as a concrete option for the overall agricultural sector, which is facing ever harsher international competition. Such discursive alliance between the organic movement and the criticism of economic globalisation is difficult and unlikely in Denmark. This is because the organic agriculture sector is already highly dependent on national as well as export markets, and this trajectory is supported by the movement, too. Secondly, another benefit of JOAA's strategy is its effect on commitment. In contrast to LØJ/ØL, which largely reduced members to passive subscribers or supporters, it pushed both ideology and practice of close collaboration between members in front. This has built the tradition of the organic movement based on the participation of members in the movement activities, most remarkably practices of farming, distribution, purchase, adjustment of cooking according to farm conditions, etc., as represented by *Teikei*. And thirdly, it has contributed to the construction of organic agriculture with emotional and moral aspirations. Injection of familial feelings of farmer-consumer relationship and moral argumentation of farming as a "life-creating occupation" have constituted the core part of the organic movement in Japan, and those enhanced and maintained the last point, commitment.

These benefits, however, have double-edged effects. JOAA's commitment placed a heavy burden on the members, and tended to be practiced only by those who have time, money and conviction. Furthermore the concentration on moral argumentation has been at the cost of scientific argumentation. As a result, the movement has neglected developments in organic farming techniques. In the absence of a comprehensive expert advisory system, the development was left to individual farmers. The moral orientation of the movement has not intended to change this situation but more likely to idealise trial-and-error by farmers. Consequently, the movement has not had a strong objective argumentation concerning the authority's geo-climatic statement which opposes organic agriculture and the environmental harm of agricultural chemicals.

Lastly, from the point of deliberative/discursive democracy, both cases appear to show some crucial cons. The highly cohesive direction of LØJ/ØL to the state has not fed much of the critical civil society. Furthermore, the ongoing centralisation of the movement to this organisation has reduced the "ideological plurarity" (à la Offe) within the organic community, especially ideologies which focus upon the structural problem of the agricultural sector as a whole and/or oppose the predominant trajectory of the food system in the international competition. In addition, the movement's loss of local basis has made more frequent interaction between members difficult. Direct participation by members and citizens has not been widely developed in the Danish organic movement and the significance of such participation has declined along with the movement's professionalization. In comparison, JOAA has not been sufficiently democratic, when it was strongly dependent on the strong leader, and his and his followers' informal power have been substantial for deciding the direction of the organisation. As a consequence, the formal rules securing internal democracy have easily and tacitly been violated.

For future development

The emergence of *Zenyuukyou* can be seen as the critical response to the undemocratic management of the leading organisation. Yet there are also risks that this network will be dominated by certain actors and interests. As much as it has potential to be an oppositional "organic enterprise", one of the core members of this network, *Daichi*, is a profit-making actor. And the management of this enterprise strongly reflects the director's personal orientation. Another core actor, a religious sect *Sekaikyuuseikyou* can also be dominant, as it has large economic resources collected by the believers and the businesses run by its sub-organs (one of its sub-organs MOA Trade made sales of approx. 75.8 million US$, which is equivalent to 418.6 million DKK,

in 2012),[147] and nation-wide network of believers who can be mobilised for the sect's common objective. Whether *Zenyuukyou* can facilitate the space for deliberative communication as proposed by Dryzek or develop as a superficial network without substantial collaborative content remains to be seen. The (true) inclusion of business and religious actors is the element which had been circumvented for a long time due to JOAA's strict self-limited policy. The movement actors have not developed their collaborative capability with these actors until recently. Nonetheless, the Japanese organic movement is in urgent need of a consolidated and competent collective actor who can organise the common direction. The movement must overcome its traditional limitation of informal network, when the authority has already started imposing the routine top-down policy implementation. Without such consolidation, the organic movement continues to be just another typical case of the Japanese social movement, which is characterised by grassrootsness but without advocacy power to policy (Pekkanen, 2006).

As consolidation is already relatively achieved, it might be desirable that the Danish organic movement invests more in mental and practical proximity between local organic farmers and other citizens. At present they are most likely connected only indirectly via purchasing of organic goods or information. This indirect connection might be sufficient for enhancing the organic market result, but not for igniting critical thinking and discussion beyond the conventional framework of consumer and farmer behaviours. As stated by Heinberg, discussion on sustainability must involve "radically new form of politics" whose basic consideration rests in "my action has negative consequences on not myself but some others, not here but another place, not now but in another generation" (Heinberg in Læssøe, 2007, p.125). Such politics can be better nurtured by establishing the new form of relationship between these actors based on reciprocity and friendship. This form of relationship can have a better chance of creating critical understanding of sustainability and changing the routines of consumers and farmers than the reinforcement of massive information campaigns. The Japanese experience of *teikei* appears to prove this effect, though it also demonstrates that the overly fundamentalistic (stringent) solicitation of this aspiration would bring stagnation sooner or later.

For future studies

My intention was to critically analyse the developmental paths of organisational strategies and (inter-)actions with the state and, more broadly, the actors in the formal political system. Evaluation of the "success" of the movement indeed differs greatly according to which measurement is applied. This selection of method and "criticality" cannot be detached completely from my own personal viewpoint. Thus I am open to the contradictory points to the results of this study.

Deliberative democracy indeed contains academic challenge in itself. As discussed by Mutz (Mutz, 2008), its normative characteristics, which are defined so diversely by advocates, basically make its application to empirical studies difficult. In consequence, consistent evaluative methods for testing the validity and/or effects of deliberation are highly underdeveloped (Knobloch, Gastil et al., 2013). This study applied theoretical perspective of Dryzek, though more concrete and widely applicable indicators could be desired if deliberative democracy is to develop as a reliable theory but also as a practice.

Furthermore, I suggest that a more sufficiently holistic social research integrating nature. While this study placed nature in the core framework, it only managed to partially touch upon that in the analysis. Further development in the systematic inquiry of, firstly, how (differently) the knowledge of nature is created and diffused, and, secondly, how this knowledge affects the real condition of nature can provide an important source for collective decision-making for a "sustainable" society. Especially the second point promotes collaboration between natural science and social science and humanity.

[147] From MOA Trade homepage. http://www.inter.moanet.co.jp/gaiyou [Last checked on November 19, 2013].

Through this study, I came across many activists and supporters of the organic movement. Their common objective was clear; to develop and enhance this movement. Despite the critical points presented in this report, the study does not intend to discourage their movement. On the contrary, I hope this study will be used for further development of the organic movement, as discussion material.

Appendix

Interviewees in Denmark

Name	Characters	Type of interview
Bo Læssøe	LØJ/Svanholm founder, former chairperson, General Board member of LØJ	Formal
Claus Heinberg	Former LØJ General Board member, University professor	Formal
Erik Fog	Organic inspector, 1st generation organic student at Veterinary University	Formal
Jesper Rasmussen	Pioneer organic researcher, professor in agronomics	Formal
Klaus Loehr-Petersen	Secretary for FBJ (salaried)	Formal
Monica Stoye	Former LØJ General Board member, University professor	Formal
Niels Stockholm	Former board member of FBJ	Formal
Paul Holmbeck	Director of ØL (salaried)	Formal
Troels V. Østergård	Founder of Praktisk Økologi	Formal

Interviewees in Japan

Hideo Miura	Senior researcher at International Natural Farming Research Centre (branch of religious sect, Sekaikyuuseikyou)	Formal
Hiroko Kubota	Board member of JOAA, professor	Informal
Isami Furuta	Leader of an ecological community Konohana Eco Village	Formal
Katasushige Murayama	JOAA's directorial board member, IFOAM international board member	Informal
Katsumi Noda	Daichi executive	Formal
Rei Ozaki	JOAA's national directorial board member, advocator of Zenyuukyou	Formal
Rikio Hashimoto	Organic farmer, organic activist outside JOAA	Formal
Setsuko Akagi	HOAA's chairperson, advocator of Zenyuukyou	Informal
Setsuko Shirone	Board member of JOAA, manager of JOAA's sister organic certification agency	Formal
Shigeru Yasuda	Pioneer member of JOAA, professor	Formal
Shinji Hashimoto	JOAA's regional bloc council member, organic farmer, IFOAM Asia board member	Informal
Toshiyuki Saito	Board member of Nouminren (Japan Family Farmers Movement), organic farmer	Formal
Tsuyoshi Hatano	Board member of JAOAS, professor	Informal

Major observed events

I observed the following meeting without actively participating in discussions. They are listed chronologically.

- IFOAM International Conference and General Assembly in Adelaide, Australia. 20-23 September 2005.
- Annual meeting (Årsmødet) for FBJ at Andelssumfundet Hjortshøj, 12 August 2007.Nouwokaeyou 農を変えよう (Let's change agriculture) Kansai Region Assembly in Osaka, 9 October 2007.

- Annual Assembly for Shokukenren　食健連 (Movement for consumers and family farmers) in Osaka, 7 October 2007.
- Change Agriculture! 農を変えたい！Kanto Region Assembly in Tokyo, 26 October 2007.
- Study meeting for the promotion of Organic Law held by the Japan Association for Consumers 日本消費者連盟 in Tokyo, 27 October 2007.
- Social-get-together meeting for consumers-producers held by JOAA, 28 October 2007.
- Seminar for regional agricultural policies and food education held by Hyogo research center for agriculture and fisheries, Kobe, 17 November 2007.
- JAOAS Conference, Hakata, 2-3 December 2007.
- Regular meeting for a teikei consumer group (安全な食事を広める会) in Kobe, 12 December 2007.
- General Assembly of JOAA in Tokyo, 1-2 March 2008.
- Visit at Konohana Eco Village　木の花ファミリー, 4-5 March 2008
- Hyogo Food Symposium, Kobe, 15 March 2008
- Conference "Future's Organic Research (Fremtidens Økologiforskning)" on 18 August 2009. The conference was organised by the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Aarhus University.

Major written documents

- Økologisk Jordbrug (LØJ/ØL's regular publication) (1988-2008)
- Spir/ Økologi (ØL's consumer magazines) (2002-2008)
- LØJ/ØL annual reports
- LØJ's newsletters: 1981-1987
- Minutes of LØJ/ØL general assembly
- Handouts for LØJ board meetings
- Notes and newsletters of Agricultural Study Group
- Soil and Health 土と健康 (JOAA's monthly publication)
- JOAA annual reports
- JOAA publications: "Advocacy of Organic Agriculture　有機農業の提唱" (1989), "Establishment of "basic standards for organic agriculture" and problems of inspection and certification　有機農業の基準と認定における問題" (1999), and "Encyclopaedia of Organic Agriculture　有機農業事典" (2004), and "Origin of Food and Agriculture: From Organic Agriculture to Future　食と農の原点ー有機農業から未来へ" (2008).

- HOAA monthly newsletters
- Daichi annual reports
- MAFF White Paper of Agriculture

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